Want cheaper drugs? More competition, not more government coercion, would greatly benefit consumers.
Hooper, Charles L. ; Henderson, David R.
US. drug pricing is in the crosshairs. Martin Shkreli, formerly of
Turing Pharmaceuticals and KaloBios, made headlines last fall after he
hiked the price for the 1950s-era drug Daraprim (pyrimethamine) nearly
5,500 percent. Throw in ^ some supersized price increases by Valeant
Pharmaceuticals, condemnations by presidential candidates Hillary
Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and Donald Trump, Wall Street Journal articles
about high American drug prices, U.S. Senate and House committee
hearings on drug pricing, and a comprehensive report on government
spending on prescription drugs that is being prepared by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, and we have one pharmaceutical
industry-sized black eye.
Every imaginable product and service has a price, and yet there is
something different about pricing prescription medicines. The unique
characteristics of this industry should be understood, lest
politicians--eager to be seen addressing a "crisis"--severely
damage an industry that has restored health and eased pain for hundreds
of millions of Americans. To "fix" drug pricing, we need more
competition, more cost sharing, and the liberalization of some
regulations.
ODD MARKET
Medicines prevent and cure debilitating and deadly diseases, and
people place a high value on health. That's one reason drugs are
expensive. But there are more reasons. Physicians prescribe drugs, but
they don't personally pay--and often don't know--the prices of
drugs. Pharmacists know the prices, but don't have much control
over the prescribing decision. Patients are the primary beneficiaries of
prescription drugs, but they pay only 22 percent of the cost, typically
through their copays. And notice our use of the word "copays."
Insured patients typically pay a fixed dollar amount--a copay--rather
than a percentage of the drug's price, so for a drug with a copay
of $20, patients do not have an incentive to care whether the drug is
priced at $100 or $500. Third-party payers, both commercial and
governmental, pay most of the cost, but they generally use a broad brush
to put prescription drugs into copayment categories and apply
restrictions. The result of all this is relatively muted demand-side
pressure for lower drug prices.
Patients are heavily insulated from the costs of their care partly
because of long-term efforts by policymakers and advocates on the
political left. The Affordable Care Act was a notable exception to this
trend and, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, following the
legislation's passage, patients' insurance deductibles have
increased six times as fast as average wages. Presidential aspirant
Hillary Clinton would insulate those patients more; her
"solution" to the current drug price problem is to limit
consumers' monthly out-of-pocket costs for medications. This would
counteract one desired effect of the Affordable Care Act--encouraging
drug consumers to economize--and would ultimately lead to higher drug
prices. Patients' insulation from costs makes them less sensitive
to all medical prices, and this lack of sensitivity encourages companies
to charge higher prices. If patients paid a larger share of prices (or
even knew the prices), then health care costs--including drug
prices--would increase more slowly or even fall.
FDA testing / The U.S. Food and Drug Administration contributes to
high drug prices. Its costly approval process makes it hard for new
drugs to reach the market, which keeps price competition between drug
makers to a minimum. Economists Joseph DiMasi, Henry Grabowski, and
Ronald Hansen at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development have
estimated that the costs behind adding one new drug to the market total
nearly $2.6 billion. Why so high? Because so much of R&D is spent on
drugs that fail along the way. This figure accounts for those "dry
holes." DiMasi et al. estimate these costs have increased at 7
percent per year in real terms: $179 million in the 1970s, $413 million
in the 1980s, $1 billion in the 1990s through early 2000s, and now $2.6
billion. If this 7 percent annual growth rate persists, costs can be
expected to double every 10 years.
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This imposing cost means that far fewer drugs are discovered,
developed, and marketed, which means less competition, less overall
pricing pressures, and higher drug prices. This is quite apparent to
drug pricers. The ninth statin drug to enter a market competes against
the previous eight, perhaps with improved efficacy and a similar price,
or perhaps with similar efficacy and a lower price. Competition in that
market keeps prices down because customers have good alternatives. The
first and only drug for a particular type of cancer, conversely,
competes only with whatever archaic and ineffective therapies were used
previously; competition is minimal and prices can be higher.
But wouldn't clinical trials still be needed absent FDA
regulation, in order for the drug to earn consumer acceptance? They
usually would. But even if doctors and patients would always be as
cautious about new drugs as the FDA is, there would likely be more
efficient ways of getting the same information about a drug's
safety and efficacy. For example, the FDA required Roxro Pharma to run
clinical trials for its Sprix (intranasal ketorolac tromethamine) nasal
spray, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. That might have been
reasonable had the active ingredient in Sprix not had two decades of
real-world experience. It was clear that ketorolac worked; the only
remaining questions were specific to the intranasal delivery system.
What the FDA required for approval made no sense but cost millions of
dollars and took two years. Moreover, doctors and patients show by their
behavior with off-label uses that they are willing to consume drugs that
have not been tested specifically, or approved by the FDA, for those
uses.
FOREIGN MARKETS
It's often noted that drugs are much cheaper in other
countries that have more socialized health care systems. While that is
true, the disparity isn't quite as large as is claimed; for
instance, U.S. consumers make much greater use of generic drugs, and
generics are cheaper here than in Canada or Europe. Still, there is a
significant price difference.
There are three principle reasons for this difference. First, most
people around the world are poorer than Americans. Pricing based on
value--economists call this "market segmentation" or
"price discrimination"--means setting lower prices where
incomes are lower. A Wharton Business School analysis showed that price
differences across countries were somewhat consistent with per capita
income differences. In some cases, people are so poor that drug
companies simply provide the medicines for free.
Second, most governments negotiate drug prices. While some may
cheer this, it involves the exercise of monopsony power--market power on
the buyer's side. These governments are saying, in effect, that
under normal circumstances, if they can't buy a drug cheaply, their
citizens won't get it. As a result, their populations do without
some breakthrough medicines.
Drug companies would likely extend price discrimination to poorer
Americans if not for a perverse incentive in the nation's Medicaid
program. Medicaid requires drug companies to charge it the lowest
domestic price offered on every drug. That unintentionally dissuades
drug companies from offering lower prices to low-income Americans who
aren't enrolled in Medicaid. Those same low prices would then have
to be offered to the huge Medicaid program and the smaller 340B program,
lowering overall company profits. It is wrong to prevent drug companies
from making mutually agreeable deals with these patients.
The third reason branded drugs are cheaper in other countries is
that some governments threaten to invalidate a drug's patents if
the (typically foreign) drug maker charges a price that government
officials deem "too high." Thus, so-called compulsory
licensing is really just a violation of intellectual property rights.
When faced with a choice between making no money or some money, most
drug companies choose the latter. That outcome does not legitimize the
process.
The result is that Americans subsidize global drug research and
development costs because Europeans and Canadians pay so little for
drugs. In essence, new drugs are developed for the U.S. market, with its
large, wealthy population and generally less-regulated drug pricing.
Many breakthrough drugs would never have been developed given, say,
English pricing levels. Once drugs are developed for the American
market, other countries effectively hitch a free--or at least
cheap--ride, relying on Americans to subsidize the R&D costs. The
problem is, if we Americans also try to free ride, there may not be many
new rides.
PUSHING PRICES DOWN
Once a drug is approved, the $2.6 billion development and approval
cost is "sunk." A clear-thinking company will ignore it when
setting a price based on what the market will bear; the company need
only recover manufacturing, marketing, and distribution costs in order
to make production of the already-invented drug financially worthwhile.
But at some point, all companies need to consider a price high enough to
make the whole venture profitable from the outset; the sunk costs were
not always sunk and must be paid somehow. Otherwise, why would drug
companies embark on a money-losing venture?
How much lower would drug prices be if not for the FDA's
mandated approval costs and the subsequent damping of competition? We
don't know, but some analysts have suggested a full order of
magnitude less, based on observations of markets with lots of
competition and those with little. Occasionally we do get to see
particular drugs that enter a market where similar drugs were marketed
without FDA approval. The new drugs, which received FDA approval and
marketing exclusivity, are always priced much higher. One such drug,
Makena, which helps prevent premature births, was priced at 100 times
the price of existing non-approved drugs for the same purpose.
The reason that drug companies even consider large price increases
for their products is a perception that their drugs are currently
underpriced relative to their value. In 2003, Abbott Laboratories raised
the price of Norvir, an HIV drug introduced in 1996, from $54 to $265 a
month. Abbott received widespread criticism for the decision, partly as
a result of internal memos that exposed the decision as a tactic to help
another
Abbott HIV drug, Kaletra, which is a combination of Norvir and
another drug. As offensive as the price increase was to some, Abbott
believed that the price of Norvir was far below its value. The protease
inhibitor had serious side effects that prevented its stand-alone use.
However, Abbott had discovered chat in small doses, Norvir boosted the
effectiveness of other protease inhibitors; it soon enjoyed widespread
use as a component in the drug cocktails taken by AIDS patients. On its
own, Norvir has a low value; in combinations with other drugs, it has a
high value.
With little holding them back, why don't manufacturers of
drugs facing minimal competition set outlandish prices like $1 million
per dose? The simple answer is they can't; even monopolies are
bounded by what consumers are willing and able to spend. Preventing
pre-term births, curing hepatitis C, treating HIV, limiting the effects
of Parkinson's disease, and giving cancer patients another year to
live are truly valuable outcomes, but the economic value is still capped
and must meet the implicit approval of health plans, physicians, and
patients. After all, if any of the three balk, the sale is lost. So at
least two market mechanisms limit drug prices.
Two other remedies that the federal government could use to keep
pharmaceutical costs down are the approval of more over-the-counter
(OTC) drugs and allowing drug reimportation.
OTC status can lead to strong price competition. For instance, OTC
proton pump inhibitors and H2 antagonists are priced at about 10 percent
of the prices of their prescription versions. Why would OTC drugs be so
much cheaper? Patients who pay 100 percent of the cost--as they do with
OTC drugs--are far more price sensitive, and companies price
accordingly.
Drug reimportation--allowing patients to import drugs that have
been sold in other countries--would circumvent both the FDA's
high-cost approval process and Medicaid's "best price"
requirement. The only requirement is that these sales should be
voluntary for all parties; U.S. drug makers should not be coerced to
sell to foreign countries that then sell the drugs back into U.S.
markets. Some have argued that these "re-imports" should not
be allowed because the drugs are sold to wholesalers on the condition
that they not be sold back to buyers in the United States. If this is
the contractual arrangement with foreign wholesalers, then they
certainly are breaching their contract, and that shouldn't be
allowed. But enforcing contracts is not the job of U.S. Customs, the
FDA, or the Department of Health and Human Services.
CONCLUSION
It should be noted that misbehaving drug companies like Turing and
Valeant have been punished heavily for their dramatic price increases.
Valeant lost 70 percent of its market share by November 2015 and Turing
posted a $15 million third-quarter loss. (And Shkreli, it should be
added, was arrested for securities fraud.) A generic competitor
announced that it would begin selling a version of Daraprim for 0.1
percent of Turing's price. Already facing lawsuits and government
investigations, these companies have been ostracized by the rest of the
pharmaceutical industry; the industry organization, BIO, even took the
unusual step of expelling Turing.
Those developments underscore that the best long-term solution for
keeping a lid on drug prices is good old-fashioned competition from more
new drug approvals and more prescription-to-OTC approvals, combined with
cost sharing and the elimination of the Medicaid "best price"
regulation. Cost sharing gives patients an incentive to use medicines
only when the benefits are greater than their share of the drug's
price, which will put further downward pressure on prices. Not only will
further competition hold down prices, but also the concomitant increased
supply of good medicines will help Americans live better and longer
lives.
Outrage over drug prices may someday be a historical curiosity.
Until then, the industry will face periodic black eyes and politicians
who, through the unintended consequences of their actions, may make
matters worse. The best solution isn't one of clamping down on
industry, but of relaxing some rules and unleashing a flood of new
therapies.
CHARLES L. HOOPER is president of Objective Insights, a consultancy
for pharmaceutical and biotech companies. DAVID R. HENDERSON is
professor of economics at the Naval Postgraduate School and a research
fellow with the Hoover Institution. He was senior economist for health
policy with President Ronald Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers.