What hath the FCC wrought?
Faulhaber, Gerald R.
As Title II "net neutrality" moves toward implementation,
some proponents are having second thoughts. What is to be done?
Last February 26th, the Federal Communications Commission
officially mandated that the Internet would henceforth be regulated
under Title II of the Telecommunications Act. With this action, the FCC
totally reversed over 30 years of aggressive "unregulation" of
the Internet (and all information services), imposing the most
restrictive regulatory framework available under the act, originally
adopted in 1934 to regulate the then-monopoly Bell System. (See
"Groundhog Day at the FCC," p. 56.)
In view of the stunning success of the Internet, what could
possibly justify this radical action? It was done in the name of
"network neutrality," a term originated by Columbia Law School
professor Tim Wu in 2003. Under net neutrality, Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and other Internet carriers cannot discriminate among
traffic from all sources on the Internet, providing lower-quality
service for some traffic. The concern expressed was that ISPs, whose
local markets are typically monopoly or duopoly, would have incentive to
discriminate among traffic to their own advantage and to the
disadvantage of their customers.
This concern was based on a perceived lack of competitive
discipline in the ISP market. In 2005, in response to those concerns,
the FCC adopted a policy statement "incorporating net neutrality]
provisions into its ongoing policymaking."
Despite predictions of rampant ISP violations of net neutrality,
hard evidence of wrongdoing has been in short supply. Among the few
instances that have come to light, a telephone company in North Carolina
was found to be blocking the Internet phone service Vonage in 2005. And
in 2007 Comcast was discovered to be blocking or throttling BitTorrent,
a file-sharing service often used to transfer extremely large video
files.
In both cases the FCC suitably chastised the firms involved,
including levying fines and strong-arming commitments by the firms to
change their practices. However, Comcast sued the FCC on grounds that
the agency had no authority to punish it because the FCC's 2005
principles were not an actual regulation. In 2010, the D.C. Circuit
Court found for Comcast, noting that FCC claims to broad, if vague,
authority over broadband was insufficient (although pointedly not ruling
on whether net neutrality is a good idea).
THE FCC TRIES AGAIN
Meanwhile, net neutrality activists raised the heat on the issue.
The FCC moved quickly to establish a proceeding followed by an order in
late 2010 imposing specific net neutrality obligations on ISPs. I
discussed that order in these pages in late 2011 ("The Economics of
Network Neutrality," Winter 2011-2012). In brief summary,
* The FCC adopted broad regulations on transparency and reasonable
network management, and prohibited blocking or "unreasonable"
discrimination. These regulations include prohibiting ISPs from charging
"edge" providers (entities that provide content, applications,
or services over the Internet, or provide devices for accessing such
content, applications, or services) for access to their customers. They
do not prohibit ISPs from providing higher-speed Quality of Service, but
suggest the FCC is not likely to approve of such services.
* The agency also noted that there have been allegations of
possible bad behavior by ISPs, but the FCC found only four documented
instances (including the aforementioned two). The agency was therefore
adopting "prophylactic" regulations to guard against future
transgressions. The FCC also noted that its regulations corresponded to
ISPs' current standard business practices. In short, there was no
existing problem to which net neutrality regulation was the answer.
* The FCC claimed authority to issue the order under Section 706 of
the Telecommunications Act.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
As I noted in that article, the economics literature does not
support net neutrality (absent empirical evidence demonstrating actual
bad behavior). While all ISPs had no objection to non-discrimination,
non-blocking, and transparency (which they were mostly doing anyway),
the prohibition against charging edge providers access to their
customers amounts to price regulation (i.e., the FCC set the price of
access to customers at zero). Also, the agency's disapproval of
Quality of Service offerings, while not currently being offered by ISPs,
denied the Internet the ability to support services with differing speed
and latency requirements.
These are quite draconian and unrealistic restrictions. It is hard
to find a product or service that does not offer speedier or
higher-quality options to customers, including firms that are tightly
regulated as common carriers. The U.S. Postal Service, for example,
offers regular mail (49<t) and Express mail ($5.25).
"Latency" is the term network engineers use for the time
interval between a stimulus and its response, such as a person speaking
and then hearing the response (round-trip latency). Voice conversations
require very low latency, as do certain video streams. Video or music
downloads (as opposed to streaming) generally are tolerant of high
latency. Thus to provide consumers with quality outcomes across a
variety of Internet experiences, Internet service providers must offer
different latency periods.
STRIKE TWO
Verizon sued the FCC to rescind the 2010 order, claiming that the
agency had gone beyond its cited jurisdiction in enacting the
regulations. Again, the D.C. Circuit agreed, and the order was remanded
to the FCC in early 2014. The Court agreed with the FCC that Section 706
gave it the authority to regulate broadband but noted the regulations
treated ISPs as common carriers, which went beyond Section 706.
Again, the D.C. Circuit made clear it was making no judgment on the
substance of the order, and made clear that the FCC is granted authority
to regulate broadband Internet under Section 706. The FCC chose not to
appeal the decision, but instead went back to the drawing board,
attempting to create a net neutrality order than could withstand
judicial scrutiny.
Following the Court's decision, Tom Wheeler, the then-newly
appointed chair of the FCC, sought to base any new order on Section 706,
as the Court had suggested. Reclassifying Internet firms as subject to
Title II was mentioned, but considered to be too draconian. Wheeler
sought to craft a compromise order, but also sought to avoid Title II
regulation.
By the time of the remand, public sentiment about net neutrality
was running very strong, even at a fever pitch. Supporters of the idea
launched campaigns to "Save the Internet," adding 'paid
prioritization" (offering higher quality services for pay) to the
list of net neutrality no-nos. Wheeler attempted to form a compromise
solution and requested comments from the public on the best way to move
forward. He got far more than he bargained for; the FCC website logged
four million comments, mostly favorable to net neutrality--more comments
than the FCC had ever received on any issue by several orders of
magnitude.
Where did that outpouring come from? According to one sympathetic
source, this was the result of "one of the most sustained and
strategic activist campaigns in recent memory," which successfully
"framed net neutrality as a social justice issue, warning about how
an Internet with fast lanes would harm the ability of activists to
spread their message."
One activist in particular weighed in on the issue: President Obama
sent a clear message to Wheeler via YouTube that the "strongest
possible regulation" was needed in the form of Title II. On the
same day, activists picketed Wheeler's home, demanding strong Title
II net neutrality regulation. At this point, all hope of a compromise
went out the window; Title II regulation went from being too draconian
to being the preferred option, and the new order was adopted (by a 3-2
party line vote) classifying ISPs as telecommunications carriers and
thus subject to Title II. The order specified what regulations would
apply, which were basically those of the 2010 order, and which
regulations would not apply (from which the FCC would
"forebear"), which included, among many other Title II
regulations, rate regulations for ISPs.
TITLE II ARRIVES
Paid prioritization was explicitly enjoined. The new order asserts
a litany of nasty things that could happen if paid prioritization were
permitted, and states that its "conclusion is supported by a
well-established body of economic literature." In fact, the
articles cited in the order were mostly written prior to 2001 and refer
to price discrimination, which is not the same as paid prioritization.
Price discrimination involves charging different consumers different
prices for the same good or service; paid prioritization involves
charging different prices for different services, viz., standard speed
and latency vs. high speed and low latency Internet service.
Virtually all the recent economics articles reach the same
conclusion stated in my earlier article: economic theory can only
conclude that paid prioritization can be beneficial to consumers and
competition; there are also circumstances in which it can be harmful.
Empirical analysis is required to determine, in any particular
circumstance, whether paid prioritization is helpful or harmful. No such
evidence has been produced, either in the literature or in the FCC
order. Unfortunately, the order is silent on this more recent and more
relevant literature.
More generally, the order provides no economic justification for
itself. Economic justifications for regulation include monopoly or other
market failure; without such justification, there is no defensible
rationale for regulation. Yet this is entirely missing from the order,
which is not surprising because there was also no economic justification
in the 2010 order.
Although the new order states that the open Internet rules do not
apply to interconnection, the FCC reserves the right to respond to
customer or other network (such as Content Delivery Networks and other
network providers) complaints that contractual terms with an ISP are
"unjust and unreasonable." That amounts to rate prescription
on a case-by-case basis.
Beyond ISPs / The new order (and Wheeler) are quite explicit that
this is not blanket regulation of the Internet, only ISPs. Presumably,
requests for regulatory extensions would be ignored by the FCC. But the
record refutes that claim. When Cogent and Netflix asked the FCC to
extend net neutrality regulations to force Comcast to provide traffic
exchange for free (in violation of 30 years of private Internet
interconnection contracts), then-chair Julius Genochowski refused,
noting that interconnection was not covered by net neutrality. Later,
Wheeler stated at a news conference, "I have said all along ...
that peering [interconnection] is not a net neutrality issue." And
yet here we are: interconnection issues regulated on a case-by-case
basis under Title II.
Are we supposed to believe that requests by interested parties to
extend regulation, so easy under Title II, will be ignored by the FCC?
It has already failed its first real test. Title II gives the players in
the regulatory game unlimited scope; must actors now get FCC permission
to make their own business decisions? Or must they wait until a
competitor requests the FCC to investigate if a business practice is
"unjust and unreasonable," wait for over a year while the FCC
decides, then suffer the consequences?
Title II regulation is designed to control public utilities such as
the old Bell System. In fact, many advocates of net neutrality
explicitly advocated Title II because they thought the Internet should
be regulated as a public utility. Perhaps advocates under the age of 35
have no memory of the old Bell System and its regulated monopoly. But
they asked to turn the Internet into the Bell System, and in the long
run that is exactly what they will get. The regulators operating under
Title II will see to that.
WHO THINKS TITLE II REGULATION IS A GOOD IDEA?
Once the new order imposed Title II regulation on ISPs, some
supporters of net neutrality began having second thoughts. Among them:
* The Internet Society: "We are concerned with the FCC's
decision to base new rules for the modern Internet on decades-old
telephone regulations designed for a very different technological
era."
* TechAmerica: "However, we have some concerns about the path
the FCC has taken to reach these new rules. Regulatory certainty is key
to investment in the communications and information technology industry,
and these rules do not provide the certainty we had hoped for."
* The Electronic Frontier Foundation: "A 'general conduct
rule,' applied on a case-by-case basis, may lead to years of
expensive litigation to determine the meaning of 'harm' (for
those who can afford to engage in it)."
* Netflix CFO David Wells: "Were we pleased [the FCC] pushed
to Title II? Probably not. We were hoping there might be a non-regulated
solution."
* Google CEO Eric Schmidt reportedly called the White House to
express reservations about Title II regulation and was rebuffed.
One of the claims made in the order is that net neutrality and
Title II will increase innovation. Of course it is hard to imagine that
innovation in the Internet and wireless ecosystems can increase over
what competitive forces without regulation have accomplished in the last
two decades, but perhaps Wheeler has a case. Perhaps we should ask
actual, real-live innovators--people with a track record of innovating,
rather than regulating--what they think.
But we don't have to ask; several of the Internet's great
innovators communicated with Wheeler prior to the order's adoption,
and here's what they said:
* George Gilder (popular author): "We've had 15 years of
marvelous success, just stunning success on the Internet. Our seven top
technology companies are all related to the Internet. The U.S. has four
times the investment in fixed broadband than Europe, with its government
intervention, and twice the investment in wireless. Most of Internet
traffic in the world flows through the U.S. What on earth is wrong that
the FCC thinks it has to reduce it to a public utility?"
* Both Bryan Martin (8x8) and Jeff Pulver (Zula and Vonage):
"Trying to be VoIP innovators in a Title II regime, [our] efforts
drew negative attention from regulators."
* Pulver: "I am very concerned that in the era of the Title II
Internet, we will see many fewer communication innovators come forward
because of regulatory uncertainty. Innovators are less likely to act if
they think they have to get permission from the FCC."
Despite receiving this information prior to the order, the FCC
ignored the comments and went forward claiming Title II will improve
innovation. So the regulators say Title II will improve innovation; the
innovators say it will suppress innovation. The reader is left to decide
who is right.
Investment / Many experts have suggested that Title II regulation
will dampen investment in both networks and edge providers. Wheeler
dismisses this, claiming that investment in wireless networks has held
up despite the announcement of Title II. That is just happy talk that
supports similar language in the new order.
But perhaps we should seek advice from investment professionals,
people who are steeped in the financial markets and understand the
telecommunications and Internet business as well. Anna-Maria Kovacs is a
visiting scholar at Georgetown University, following a career as a
financial analyst and consultant. She is also quite plain-spoken:
From the perspective of investors, Title II reclassification makes
no sense. It does not solve the problem of paid prioritization
that the vast majority of net neutrality advocates are demanding
the FCC solve, but it carries the risk of enormous collateral
damage to both infrastructure and edge providers. It would
bring stultifying regulation that would choke the Internet
ecosystem that has become one of the primary engines of economic
growth for the U.S. and the world. It would encourage
other governments to follow suit, endangering the success of
American digital service and application.
She goes on to say:
The Internet has grown phenomenally and has become a critical
underpinning for the U.S. economy. The U.S. government
is vigorously opposing governmental control of the Internet
abroad, and Title II reclassification within the U.S. would make
that opposition a travesty. But the most important point is
that section 706 allows the FCC to write on a clean slate, while
Title II would bring with it a multitude of rules from which it
may well not be able to forbear and which could reach not only
[Broadband Internet Access providers] but edge providers. The
FCC would have far more control over its own actions and risk
far less collateral damage using section 706.
Why have investors continued to support investment over the past
year while facing the possibility of Title II regulation? Is this
because, as Wheeler would have it, Title II would not suppress
investment? Kovacs addresses this question by noting comments from half
a dozen financial analysts, all of whom doubted that the FCC would
actually implement Title II because to do so would make no sense.
Surprise.
So the regulators say Title II will improve investment, but the
investment guys say it will suppress investment. Again, the reader is
left to decide who is right.
The unseen / The saddest and most frustrating aspect of our current
Title II muddle is that we will never know what we missed-- what new
innovations could have occurred, what investment in broadband
competition could have happened absent regulation. We will think
everything is OK, just a little less exciting as time goes by. Former
Wall Street Journal publisher Gordon Crovitz offered this instructive
thought experiment in his March 1 column:
What if at the beginning of the Web, Washington had opted
for [Title II regulation] instead of the open Internet? Yellow
Pages publishers could have invoked "harm" and "unjust and
unreasonable" competition from online telephone directories.
This could have strangled Alta Vista and Excite, the early leaders
in search, and relegated Google to a Stanford student project.
Newspapers could have lobbied against Craigslist for depriving
them of classified advertising. Encyclopedia Britannica could have
lobbied against Wikipedia.
Competitors could have objected to the "fast lane" that
Amazon got from Sprint at the launch of the Kindle to ensure
speedy e-book downloads. The FCC could have blocked Apple
from integrating Internet access into the iPhone. Activists
could have objected to AOL bundling access to the Wall Street
Journal in its early dial-up service.
Among the first targets of the FCC's "unjust and unreasonable"
test are mobile-phone contracts that offer unlimited video or
music. Netflix, the biggest lobbyist for utility regulation, could
be regulated for how it uses encryption to deliver its content.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Assuming no dramatic change of course at the FCC, Title II issues
will be litigated against the agency for the next several years (at
least), casting a fog of uncertainty over the Internet. This uncertainty
alone is sufficient to suppress investment and cut off innovation, even
without the directly negative effects of Title II regulation.
Both during and after this period of litigation, the FCC's
Title II regulation will briskly move the Internet to a regulated public
utility--no new competitive entry, minimal investment, reduced
innovation, gradual expansion of regulation from ISPs to backbone
networks to edge providers. The history of regulation provides us a sure
guide, as expressed by University of Chicago professors Dennis Carlton
and Randal Picker in a 2006 working paper:
Competition is diverted from the marketplace to the regulator's
office, and the tools for success--ranging from subtle influence
to out-and-out bribery--may be very different. Instead, we
should regulate only when we must--natural monopoly being
the core case--and leave general antitrust doctrine and the
court system to handle the rest.
If we wish to avoid the Internet being sucked into the vortex of
Title II public utility regulation, we must depend upon Congress to act.
In these times of partisan stasis in Congress, this appears to be a
slender reed, but it is all the Internet has. What can Congress do?
The simplest and most direct congressional action is to pass new
legislation vacating the recent order and restoring the actions of the
2010 order. The 2010 order has very serious problems, but it is far less
onerous than Title II public utility regulation. This option, while the
easiest to implement, would not "fix" the underlying issues,
but would avoid the worst excesses of Title II.
Many would argue, however, that a return to the 2010 order,
combined with the competitive discipline of the market, would be an
inadequate solution because the extent of Internet provider competition
would be insufficient. Are there other policies Congress could adopt?
In response to a perceived lack of competitive discipline to
correct potential bad behavior, the recent order proposes heavy
regulation. This is not a fix; the fix is to move toward more
competition and away from regulation. Two policies would help to
accomplish this:
Free up spectrum for wireless broadband competition. / If the basic
issue is limited competition in the broadband market, there is a clear
and obvious solution (which apparently the FCC has missed): wireless
broadband. Mobile broadband volume doubled between 2012 and 2013, and is
projected to increase 650 percent by 2018. Yet the United States has
relatively little spectrum for each LTE (the most efficient wireless
broadband protocol) device. Wireless broadband is clearly a substitute
for wired broadband for many applications and many users.
Many have argued that wireless broadband is not a good substitute
for wired broadband (e.g., cable or fiber) for truly high speed
applications; it is too slow and expensive. But encouraging entry by
bringing lots more spectrum to market will clearly drop the price. Even
today, wireless broadband growth rates suggest many customers find it a
good substitute; it is also the principal means of Internet access for
many low-income customers.
How can we bring much more (and much cheaper) spectrum to the
wireless broadband market quickly? The FCC (which controls privately
held spectrum) and the federal government (which controls federally held
spectrum) have been agonizingly slow in bringing spectrum to market. For
example, the FCC has been working on an incentive auction that would pay
current spectrum license holders to transfer their rights to broadband
providers. This is a great idea, but the FCC has been incredibly slow
(over five years) at making that happen.
An innovation that would expedite both the transfer of private and
federal spectrum to mobile broadband is to create a commission to review
all spectrum, identify the spectrum bands that can be moved to civilian
use for wireless broadband and the bands that can be shared for civilian
broadband use quickly (say, less than a year). The commission would then
present a list of those bands to Congress for an up-or-down vote. If
approved, the list would move to the FCC for immediate auction (within,
say, three months) and then to the relevant federal agency to remove and
relocate current spectrum use. Costs of relocation, including
compensation of existing rights holders, can be met by funds raised at
auction.
The model for this proposed commission is the Base Realignment and
Closure Commission established by Congress in 1990, which periodically
identifies and lists military bases that it judges are no longer
militarily necessary and can be dosed. Congress then must either accept
or reject the commission's lists, without amendment, thus avoiding
local political lobbying in exchange for an overall benefit to the
country. This process has met with great success in saving billions of
dollars while avoiding individual nitpicking in Congress. This concept
should work well if applied to spectrum.
Indeed, this is not a new suggestion. In 2010, Sen. Mark Kirk
(R-Ill.) and Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R.-Ill.) formally proposed this idea
to a fiscal "supercommittee" of Senate and House lawmakers.
Unfortunately, the idea went nowhere. Now is the time to revive the
legislation and enact it--quickly.
Shift jurisdiction over the Internet from the FCC to the FTC. / The
second important component is to remove the FCC's jurisdiction over
the Internet and vest authority in the Federal Trade Commission. The FTC
has two overarching and relevant roles in this market:
* Police the industry for anticompetitive behavior and take
antitrust actions when and where appropriate.
* Police the industry to protect consumers from fraud and corporate
misbehavior.
The FTC's track record in both areas is credible. Most
recently, the agency filed a complaint that AT&T Mobility had misled
customers who had purchased unlimited data plans for their smart phones
but were throttled by the company (a task one would have looked to the
FCC to undertake).
This shift would remove jurisdiction of the Internet from a
commission that appears to have lost its understanding of regulation,
markets, antitrust, and consumer protection and place it with a
commission that has a demonstrated understanding of those issues. FTC
Commissioner Joshua Wright recently presented an excellent paper on net
neutrality, regulation, and competition that spells this out in
compelling detail.
These two proposals would be a tough agenda to adopt, particularly
for a Congress that seems to have trouble getting the simplest things
done. However, increasing competition and avoiding Title II regulation
would seem to have real bipartisan potential.
CONCLUSION
Activists supporting net neutrality carried signs reading
"Save the Internet" when it didn't need any saving. They
got Title II regulation for their troubles. Now, the Internet really
does need saving; we can only hope that Congress is up to this task.
We are now about to exchange our beloved Internet for a public
utility. I am reminded of the Joni Mitchell lyrics: Don't it always
seem to go / That you don't know what you got 'til it's
gone. / They paved Paradise and put up a parking lot.
READINGS
* "Antitrust and Regulation," by Dennis Carlton and
Randal Picker. University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working
Paper #312, Oct. 2006.
* "Net Neutrality Meets Regulatory Economics 101," by
Joshua Wright. Federalist Society Media and Telecommunications Event,
Feb. 25, 2015
* "Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination," by Tim
Wu, Journal of Telecom and High Tech Law, Vol. 2 (2003).
* "The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet," by
Jason Oxman. Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and
Policy Working Paper #31, July 1999.
GERALD R. FAULHABER is professor emeritus of business economics and
public policy in the Wharton School and Law School at the University of
Pennsylvania.