The next banking crisis: will the latest round of reform bring an end to subsidizing risky mortgages?
Calomiris, Charles W. ; Haber, Stephen H.
Is America's housing finance crisis finally behind us? After
two years of collapse and three years of stagnation, home prices finally
rallied in 2013.
In order to prevent banks from issuing a new round of mortgages
that borrowers cannot actually afford, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau recently issued rules governing "Qualifying Mortgages"
(QM). QM loans are protected from legal challenges by borrowers against
the mortgage originator should the borrower be unable to make payments.
Banks therefore have an incentive to generate loans that get the QM seal
of approval.
To prevent banks from using depositors' savings (insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) to make risky investments in
securities and their derivatives, the Volcker Rule, a provision of the
2010 Dodd-Frank Act, was finally implemented last December by the
alphabet soup of regulatory agencies that oversee America's banks.
Many of the other regulatory reforms of Dodd-Frank have been in place
since 2010, including the designation of the country's largest
banks as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). SIFIs
can be subjected to tighter regulation, higher capital requirements, and
more rapid liquidation than smaller banks. Dodd-Frank also created a
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), headed by the secretary of
the treasury, that can designate any financial institution, including
insurance companies and hedge funds, as a SIFI, thereby putting it at
risk of potential liquidation by the FDIC. Finally, last summer, the
House Financial Services Committee approved the Protect American
Taxpayers and Homeowners (PATH) Act. If enacted into law, the
legislation would wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thereby removing
the threat that taxpayers might once again have to bail out the
privileged mortgage giants.
NEW REGIME, SAME WEAKNESSES
It is usually the case that "the devil is in the
details," and the state of America's housing finance system is
not an exception. The sad truth is that reforms that have been
implemented are either irrelevant or have been lobbied to the point that
they have been made irrelevant. The main source of potential
trouble--risky investments in residential mortgages, undertaken by
over-leveraged government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and banks--has
not been addressed.
Consider the rules governing QMs. As initially proposed, home loans
could only obtain QM status if they met quite strict underwriting
standards, such as a 20 percent downpayment and a housing-cost-to-income
ratio limit of 28 percent. By the time the rules were finally put into
place, however, the 20 percent downpayment was gone and the 28 percent
ratio was replaced by a total-debt-to-income ratio limit of 43 percent.
More striking still, mortgages that can be repurchased or securitized by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac while they are under government
conservatorship or until 2021--whichever comes first--are exempt from QM
standards. That is, they automatically count as QM loans provided they
do not contain certain high-risk features such as negative amortization,
balloon payments, or loan amortizations of more than 30 years. Similar
exemptions are made for mortgages guaranteed by the Veterans
Administration, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the
Department of Agriculture, as well as loans made by small community
banks and credit unions. In short, unless Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
removed from government conservatorship, QM standards are a dead letter.
Volcker Rule / The Volcker Rule, which limits bank proprietary
trading, has even less bite. In the first place, proprietary trading by
banks was not a fundamental cause of the recent subprime crisis, and
thus banning it will not prevent future subprime crises. As we show in
our new book, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises
and Scarce Credit, the subprime crisis was caused by a political deal
that gave banks and GSEs incentives to reduce mortgage underwriting standards to the point that virtually anyone and everyone could obtain a
home loan, in exchange for which the banks and GSEs were allowed to back
those risky loan portfolios with paper-thin levels of capital. The
Volcker Rule is meant to partially roll back the unification of
banks' commercial and investment banking operations (permitted
since the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act), but the fact is the
unification of investment and commercial banking had nothing to do with
the origination of mortgages without downpayments, granted to borrowers
who were not required to document their incomes or assets.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Even if one believes--as we do--that proprietary trading in GSE- or
bank-issued mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and their derivatives
allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they had to deploy to back
their mortgage portfolios, the Volcker Rule will do nothing to constrain
that activity. Paul Volcker's initial goal in formulating the rule
was to ban all proprietary trading. The final version of the Volker
Rule, however, specifically exempts real estate-related securities.
Goldman Sachs recently announced its intention to take advantage of this
exemption to invest aggressively in proprietary trading in real estate
through an investment fund it will be sponsoring. Others are sure to
follow. Yes, the long-awaited Volcker Rule, which was supposed to reduce
bank investments in risky trades, has a loophole as big as--well--a
house.
Will reckless risk-taking in real estate by large banks be
constrained by Dodd-Frank's abolition of too-big-to-fail bailouts?
Unfortunately, the legislation did not actually end such bailouts; in
fact, it institutionalized them. Under Title II of Dodd-Frank, when a
bank or other intermediary that has been declared a SIFI becomes
distressed, the treasury secretary, as head of the FSOC, must decide
whether to offer it assistance or liquidate it. If assistance is
offered, and if government losses result from the assistance, then a
special tax will be levied on surviving institutions to pay for those
losses. While the stated intent of Title II is to avoid future bailouts,
this new authority establishes explicit procedures for bailing out
too-big-to-fail institutions and for levying fees to fund the bailouts.
The likely path of least resistance, if a large bank becomes insolvent,
will be for the FSOC to declare it a SIFI, and for the Treasury, Federal
Reserve, and FDIC to take steps to bail it out. Troubled financial
institutions will argue that anything less will bring the world to an
end, and it is difficult to imagine that any treasury secretary--who,
after all, is a political appointee--will want to bear the personal
risks of standing in the way and endangering the political future of the
president that put him in his job.
No PATH / One might take some comfort in the House of
Representatives' proposed PATH Act, which phases out taxpayer
subsidization of mortgage risk by winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Alas, the bill has about as much chance of being enacted as we have
of winning the doubles championship at Wimbledon. Even if it passes the
House, it will be dead on arrival in the Senate. The alternative Senate
version of the bill also phases out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, but then
replaces them with government credit guarantees that would offer
permanent, explicit subsidization for excessive mortgage risk-taking.
The good news is that the Senate version has little chance of clearing
the House.
The bad news is that the absence of agreement will mean the
continuance of the government conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), whose recently appointed
director, former congressman Mel Watt, is a longtime political supporter
of taxpayer-supported subsidies of mortgage risk. (President Obama had
to use the new filibuster-proof confirmation process to get Watt
appointed.)
One of Watt's first acts as FHFA incoming director was to
announce that he will delay the implementation of increases in Fannie
and Freddie guarantee fees (what they charge lenders for bundling,
servicing, and selling MBSs, the main component of which guarantees the
MBSs against a "credit-related loss"). This all sounds well
and good until you remember that there are no free lunches. Providing
favored treatment to one class of households or business enterprises
inevitably taxes other households or business enterprises. Watt's
decision to delay guarantee fee increases is a prime example of this
principle at work. If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge lower guarantee
fees than they would otherwise, it implies a subsidy from the taxpayers
who invested $187 billion in the two GSEs when they failed in 2008 and
who now receive a return on that investment via dividends paid by Fannie
and Freddie to the Treasury.
Some of the senators who pushed though the Watt appointment are
already urging him to return Fannie and Freddie to the good old days
when they were used as vehicles for income redistribution via affordable
housing initiatives. Last January, 33 U.S. senators signed a letter to
Watt encouraging him to direct Fannie and Freddie to resume payments to
a trust fund designed to create subsidized rental housing. Ironically,
that fund was created in 2008, right before Fannie and Freddie had to be
rescued at taxpayer expense.
Many analysts also expect that Watt will favor debt forgiveness in
the form of reductions in mortgage principal balances for underwater
borrowers whose loans are now owned by Fannie or Freddie--a step that
his predecessor at FHFA, career civil servant Edward DeMarco, staunchly
resisted. One might be tempted to think of DeMarco as Ebeneezer Scrooge
and Watt as the ghost of Christmas Past--until you again remember that
there are no free lunches. Write-downs of principal balances by Fannie
and Freddie have to be paid for by their stockholders, which is to say
by taxpayers.
Furthermore, during the mortgage crisis, the FHA, which guarantees
low- and moderate-income mortgages, substantially increased its share of
the market to a historically unprecedented degree. Like other mortgage
lenders, it substantially relaxed its underwriting standards in the
years prior to the subprime crisis. The FHA has been experiencing
historically unprecedented default rates on its mortgage guarantees and
there is no plan on the table for reining in its activities.
We could go on and on, but we hope that by now readers get the
point: the United States is very far from anything that resembles a real
reform agenda that would constrain the taxpayer subsidization of
risk-taking in the mortgage market and prevent a repeat performance of
the subprime crisis.
FRAGILE BY DESIGN
It would be easy to blame this state of affairs on lobbying by Wall
Street "fat cats," but that would be only partially true.
Bankers acting alone are not powerful enough to engineer the fleecing of
taxpayers on this massive scale. American banking regulation since the
1810s has produced two centuries of politicized and unstable banking
practices, which was the result of bankers' successful alliances
with populist groups to form highly successful political partnerships.
Those partnerships use regulation as the means to benefit bankers and
populist groups at the expense of everyone else. The subsidization of
real estate debt--in residential and agricultural mortgage markets--has
been a predictable consequence of those partnerships.
As our book documents at length, from the 1810s until the 1970s,
local bankers, who were opposed to the creation of large, branching
banks that would put them out of business, allied with farmers, who
disliked and distrusted big corporations of any type and who wanted to
constrain banks to serving their local, agrarian borrowing needs. Their
legislative agenda gave rise to an extremely peculiar banking system
unlike that of any other country. Circa 1970, it was illegal for banks
to branch across state lines, and the vast majority of states (38 out of
50, to be exact) limited the ability of banks to open branches even
within the state. Some states, such as Texas, outlawed branches
entirely: all banks were single-office "unit banks." The
absence of branching meant that the U.S. banking system was fragile by
design: banks could not regionally diversify their risks and poorly
operated banks faced little competitive pressure.
Little wonder that, from the 1840s to the 1980s, the United States
had no less than 11 systemic banking crises. In contrast, the Canadian
banking system, which was built on the basis of large banks that
branched across provincial lines, had none. America's peculiar
banking system also came at a large cost to social and economic
mobility. Because banks were risky and did not compete very hard against
one another in loan markets, the cost of credit to small and medium-size
business enterprises and households was artificially inflated. As
bankers in the 1970s joked, banking was a "3-3-3" business:
borrow at 3 percent, lend at 3 percent more, and be on the golf course
by 3 P.M.
Megabanks and urban activists/The alliance of local bankers and
agrarian populists finally died with the wave of bank and savings and
loan failures in the 1980s--a collapse that, like many prior banking
crises, reflected the subsidization of undiversified risks in
residential and agricultural real estate lending. In the late 1980s,
many reformers called for ending regulatory policies that subsidized
real estate risks, including the winding down of the housing GSEs
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and the farm credit GSEs that comprise the
Farm Credit System. But in its wake of those calls, the GSEs remained
and grew.
Indeed, the banking collapse of the 1980s was prologue to a new
unlikely partnership formed to increase the subsidization of residential
mortgage risk. This was an alliance between bankers building new
nationwide megabanks through aggressive mergers and acquisitions, and
urban populists who sought to garner a share of the economic benefits
generated by the mergers. Urban populist groups did so through
regulations designed to boost affordable housing. Some of those
regulations required banks engaging in mergers to demonstrate their good
citizenship (as defined under the Community Reinvestment Act) at Federal
Reserve Board hearings. To do so, bankers enlisted the assistance of
urban activist groups like the Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now (ACORN) and the Neighborhood Assistance Corporation of
America (NACA) to testify on their behalf. ACORN, NACA, and similar
organizations had every incentive to do so because they received over
$850 billion dollars in contractual commitments by merging banks to
channel lending or grants to those organizations.
Other regulations forced the GSEs to invest in the loans generated
by the megabank-urban activist partnerships. In 1992, Congress passed
the GSE Act, which required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to repurchase the
affordable housing loans that megabanks had made to their populist
partners. In other words, high-risk loans that banks had made in order
to get the support of activist groups at Fed merger hearings were
quietly transformed into a public subsidy by virtue of Fannie and
Freddie's mandates combined with their special status as GSEs
(which meant that taxpayers would back their debts, an eventuality made
more likely by the thin capital requirements that the GSEs faced).
The heavily taxpayer-subsidized GSEs found it in their interest to
go along with the fiction that the subsidized home loans that were being
generated by megabanks and populists were no more risky than other home
loans. The result was the new normal of zero or near-zero downpayments
and undocumented mortgages, which were applied to everyone, not just the
urban poor.
WILL THIS TIME BE DIFFERENT?
The megabank-urban activist-GSE coalition was certainly dealt a
blow by the subprime crisis and dramatic slowdown in bank mergers since
the crisis. Nevertheless, the coalition has not yet gone the way of the
local banker-agrarian populist coalition. Will regulatory reform this
time ultimately bring an end to the subsidization of risky mortgages or
just pretend to address the problem? As we described at length above, so
far there is little indication that Congress or the Obama administration
is serious about rolling back mortgage risk subsidies.
It is certainly possible to imagine effective reforms. For example,
the elimination of mortgage risk subsidization by Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, and the FHA would not require abandoning an effective affordable
housing policy. It is possible to craft government policies to promote
affordable housing on a sustainable basis without placing the financial
system at risk. A means-tested downpayment matching funds program would
be one obvious approach; it would make it easier for low-income
households to qualify for mortgages while encouraging saving by would-be
homeowners. It would also stabilize housing finance by lowering the
loan-to-value ratios of mortgages.
Such a program would, however, require the government to budget for
the cost of downpayment assistance. There's the rub: Congress much
prefers off-budget, invisible credit subsidies to politically powerful
coalitions. The public costs of those arrangements are only borne after
a financial collapse, and even then are not visible to taxpayers because
they are channeled through highly opaque mechanisms such as GSE lending,
lending to troubled banks, or lending to troubled homeowners. Until
average Americans decide to punish political leaders for acquiescing to
the subsidization of mortgage risk, effective reform will remain
elusive, although reform likely will be promised again--right after the
next banking crisis.
CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial
Institutions at Columbia Business School and a visiting fellow in the
research department of the International Monetary Fund. STEPHEN HABER is
the A. A. and Jeanne Welch Milligan Professor in the School of
Humanities and Sciences at Stanford University and the Peter and Helen
Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.
This article is adapted from the authors' new book, Fragile by
Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit
(Princeton University Press, 2014).