Much ado about nothing? Despite the claims of opponents and supporters, changes in procedure seem to have little effect on the regulatory process.
Coglianese, Cary
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Early last year, President Bush signed Executive Order 13422,
implementing modifications to the review requirements for new federal
regulations. EO 13422 follows previous orders signed by presidents
Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton that established White House policy for
scrutinizing federal rulemaking and incorporated aspects of cost-benefit
analysis into regulatory review. The Bush order gives presidential
appointees in regulatory agencies increased "gatekeeper"
functions, requires agencies to specify in writing the market failures
they hope new rules will solve, and calls for agencies to provide the
Office of Management and Budget with information on certain guidance
documents.
EO 13422 met with strong opposition from Congress and received
considerable attention from the media. A subcommittee of the House
Committee on Science and Technology held hearings on the order and the
full House voted to block its implementation. Critics of the measure
charge that it gives the White House too much control over the
regulatory process and that it will create "paralysis by
analysis"--that is, it will hamper agencies' ability to issue
regulations in a timely manner, jeopardizing public welfare.
Such lamentations have been heard before. For at least 70 years,
significant changes in rulemaking procedures have elicited criticisms
that federal regulation will be obstructed. Yet the federal government
continues to issue many new, high-impact regulations. Is the
rhetoric--from both supporters and detractors--over changes in
regulatory procedure like EO 13422 really much ado about nothing?
RHETORIC ...
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, Georgetown law professor David Vladeck claimed that EO 13422
"deals a body blow to the ability of our agencies to do their
jobs" and could "lead to the further ossification of an
already overburdened administrative process." At a later hearing of
the same subcommittee, Columbia law professor Peter Strauss suggested
that the order might "throw a good dose of sand into the gears or
rulemaking." The sub-committee chair, Rep. Brad Miller (D-N.C.),
agreed with those assessments, claiming the order is "another
avenue for special interests to slow down and prevent agencies from
protecting the public." Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) also agreed,
saying EO 13422 will "make it harder for agencies to take virtually
any action."
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The rhetoric over EO 13422 could easily have been borrowed from the
early part of the last century. At that time, observers worried that New
Deal changes to administrative procedures would create "a partial
paralysis ... by reason of excessive formality and litigation," as
the author of a 1938 Harvard Law Review article put it. The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, although praised today as
the source of simple and efficient rulemaking techniques, was actually
chastised around the time of its adoption. In 1946, the prestigious
Public Administration Review featured an article asserting that the APA
amounted to a "sabotage of the administrative process." The
author of an article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review's
1948 volume claimed that the APA would "severely cramp the style of
government regulation." The American Political Science Review in
1947 published an article arguing that the right to file a rulemaking
petition under the APA's section 553(e) was of "doubtful
value" and would lead to regulatory agencies being "swamped by
frivolous requests having delay as their sole objective."
Over the years, other changes to administrative procedures--from
freedom of information laws to environmental impact statement
requirements--have prompted similar predictions. Following President
Reagan's issuance of EO 12291, a 1986 Harvard Law Review paper by
Alan B. Morrison claimed that the OMB's power to review regulations
under the order "imposes costly delays that are paid for through
the decreased health and safety of the American public." The Reagan
order was relaxed somewhat by President Clinton's EO 12866, which
limited the set of rules subject to OMB review and placed a time limit
on the review process. But the new order still met with similar
criticisms. As Richard B. Stewart explained in a 2003 article in the New
York University Law Review, many observers believe that "OMB
regulatory analysis and other forms of regulatory impact review have
contributed to 'paralysis by analysis.'"
... AND REALITY
Despite the rhetoric, it does not appear that administrative
procedures have hindered the federal government's ability to
regulate. The sheer volume of rules, as measured by pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations, has increased about five times since the APA was
enacted in 1946, and it has continued to grow since the advent of OMB
review. Over the past two decades, the federal government has issued an
average of several thousand new rules each year in the Federal Register.
The Code's 2006 volume contains over 30 percent more pages of
binding regulatory text than does the 1980 volume. According to
estimates collected by the OMB, government regulations issued since 1981
have imposed $127 billion in annual costs on the economy.
But these are only prima facie measures; they do not consider what
the pace of regulation would have been without the various changes to
rulemaking procedures. Several empirical studies have attempted more
rigorous examinations of the effects of regulatory review, but
researchers have yet to find systematic evidence that OMB review imposes
"paralysis," let alone causes any significant delay in the
regulatory process.
For instance, political scientists Cornelius Kerwin and Scott
Furlong analyzed determinants of the duration of 150 non-routine U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency rules issued in the period from October
1, 1986 to September 30, 1989. The authors reported results from three
separate regression models, two of which failed to find that OMB review
made any difference at all in the time it took the agency to develop its
rules. The third model, examining the duration between proposed and
final rules, found the OMB variable was statistically significant, but
it only had an effect of increasing the process's duration two days
for every one day of OMB review.
More recently, in a paper presented at the 2006 Midwest Political
Science Association meeting, a research team led by Steven Balla studied
the determinants of the duration of OMB review and found that, contrary
to claims that special interests try to capture and prolong the review
process in order to delay the adoption of rules they do not like, OMB
reviews were actually shorter when only narrow sets of businesses were
in contact with OMB. The authors found that staff contacts with outside
parties occurred for only about 7 percent of the reviewed rules and,
though those rules tended to have longer reviewing times, other
variables appear to explain the longer review process. The authors
concluded, "[C]ontrary to widely held expectations ... outside
communications do not operate in a way that particularly advantages
business firms and trade associations seeking to derail prospective
agency regulations."
WHY THE DIVERGENCE?
The ongoing production of significant new regulations combined with
the lack of systematic evidence of substantial delays from OMB review
raises the question whether the effects of EO 13422 will be as
significant, or as dire, as critics claim. If previous major changes in
administrative procedure failed to reduce the issuance of high-impact
federal regulations, will Bush's order likewise prove
insignificant?
That question cannot be definitively answered without empirical
data that will not be available for some time. In the meantime, there is
another question worth considering: Why have policy observers invoked
such heated rhetoric about the Bush procedural changes? Perhaps the
observers believe that previous procedures have indeed been pernicious,
but that policy research has simply failed to discern the harmful
effects. Or perhaps EO 13422 is different from previous changes, and
this time there really will be "paralysis by analysis." Or
perhaps the rhetoric surrounding current procedural changes is just
that--rhetoric.
Why has procedural reform rhetoric diverged so much from the
reality of regulatory policymaking? Three possible explanations spring
to mind. The first is that administrative procedures like EO 13422 are
epiphenomenal, or at least highly malleable. That is, rulemaking
procedures may appear to impose burdens on agencies, but the real
burdens depend entirely on whether or how the procedures are
implemented. As a result, regardless of what procedures are on the
books, a presidential administration that wants to issue a lot of
regulations will succeed at doing so, and an administration that wants
to ease the nation's regulatory burden will also succeed.
Another possibility is that there may be real effects from
procedural changes, but the effects are trivial. For instance, agencies
may be able to satisfy a new administrative procedure simply by
publishing boilerplate language in their Federal Register notices. If
agencies come to satisfy EO 13422's new requirements using
boilerplate language, check-boxes, or other "shortcuts," the
order's effect will be inconsequential in terms of the pace and
cost of rulemaking.
A third possibility is that EO 13422 and other regulatory procedure
changes do have real and consequential effects, but those effects are
eclipsed by behavioral factors that push in the same direction. For
instance, if Reagan's EO 12291 did place a significant burden on
regulatory agencies, that burden may not have had much effect on
appointed agency administrators who were already disinclined to
regulate. Likewise in the case of EO 13422, if other legal rules,
professional norms, or political exigencies are pushing agencies to take
benefit-cost analysis seriously, then any additional, incremental
stringency of a regulatory review order may have only indiscernible
effects.
In each of those possibilities, it is not the procedure that drives
the pace and nature of regulation, but other factors such as the
political and policy objectives of the presidential administration that
is tasked with adhering to the procedures. Administrative procedures, in
other words, do not take the politics out of the rulemaking process.
CONCLUSION
Given the history of changes in regulatory procedure, policy
scholars and decisionmakers should be careful before concluding that EO
13422 will result in "paralysis by analysis." That lament has
been heard for at least seven decades, yet steady increases in the cost
and volume of federal regulations during this same period clearly
indicate that paralysis has yet to set in.
Both scholars and decisionmakers should bear in mind that
administrative procedures are embedded within a complex web of politics,
institutions, and organizational behavior. Within that web, procedures
are but one factor influencing government agencies. Other factors
include a variety of institutional, professional, social, budgetary, and
political forces that interact with each other and that can adapt and
change over time.
Social scientists who have devoted their careers to the empirical
study of bureaucracy have yet to create a robust theory that makes sense
of all the influences on bureaucratic behavior. That failure, combined
with the lack of strong evidence showing that past procedures have lived
up to expectations, should make both institutional designers and their
critics more circumspect about their predictions--and their
rhetoric--concerning the impact of any procedural reform related to
government regulation.
BY CARY COGLIANESE
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Readings
* "Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century," by
Richard B. Stewart. New York University Law Review, Vol. 78 (2003).
* "OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to
Write a Regulation," by Alan B. Morrison. Harvard Law Review, Vol.
99 (1986).
* "Outside Communication and OMB Review of Agency
Regulations," by Steven J. Balla et al. Annual Midwest Political
Science Association Meeting, Chicago, Ill., 2006.
* "Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory
Process under the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations," by Stuart
Shapiro. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, October,
2006.
* "Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory," by
Cornelius M. Kerwin and Scott Furlong. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory, Vol. 2 (1992).
Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law and
professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School and director of the Penn Program on Regulation. This article is
based on an article that appeared recently in the Yale Journal on
Regulation,