The next generation of reforms in India: why they are urgent and what stands in their way.
Kulkarni, Kishore G. ; Sawhney, Bansi
This is a speech recently delivered by Prof. Raghuram Rajan,
IJEB's Distinguished Advisory Board Member, and the Distinguished
Professor, Booth College of Business, University of Chicago. Editors
thank Prof. Rajan for the permission to re-print this speech here.
Honourable Prime Minister, my fellow panelists, and distinguished
guests:
It is an honor to be here to celebrate the reforms that India
undertook in the 1990s, especially the role of the central figure in
those reforms, then finance minister and now prime minister, Dr.
Manmohan Singh. By reducing controls and increasing competition and
entry, those reforms unleashed the latent and suppressed energy of our
people.
India has achieved much in the two and a quarter decades since
then. There is so much to celebrate, whether it is that we have moved
away from the Hindu rate of growth of 3.5 percent or whether it is that
so many millions of Indians have moved out of debilitating poverty into
a life of some comfort--and yes, despite all the furor over the Planning
Commission's poverty line, we have brought down poverty enormously.
Shops are full of goods that we could only dream of buying in 1990,
many of them made in India. I can withdraw money from my U.S. bank
account today from any ATM nearby (by the way, not incurring the fees I
would incur in the US), while a migrant worker can send money using his
cell phone to his family's bank account in his village. We can buy
air and train tickets on-line, which has eliminated long waits and some
corruption in those areas. Organizations like Shankar Netralaya are
showing the world how to offer medical care cheaply but effectively. The
consumer has never had more choice in India than today.
And even though we lament the deterioration in our old
institutions, superb new ones have come up such as the National Stock
Exchange or the twenty-four seven TV networks. The latter's
competition for news does keep our administrators on their toes even
though some in the audience may feel the networks often produce more
sound than light.
As Mr Chidambaram and Mr Yashwant Sinha built on Dr. Manmohan
Singh's reforms in the years after this book's first edition
was published, we enjoyed the strongest period of growth India has ever
had. Even our gloom today over the fall in growth to between 6 and 7
percent reflects how far we have come--twenty years ago we would have
been elated with such performance.
However, even as the world becomes more competitive, India's
star has dimmed in the last few months, as our governance is besmirched
by corruption scandals and our macroeconomic health has deteriorated.
Alarm bells should sound when domestic industry no longer wants to
invest in India, even while eagerly investing abroad.
Why the gloom? The problem, that I am sure is obvious to this
audience, is that despite the tremendous success of the first generation
of reforms, some of the key next-generation reforms have been stymied.
Typically, these are the reforms that reduce rents and patronage, while
increasing competition--for example, the bill on foreign entry into
higher education, attempts to auction resources transparently, or
attempts to transform public sector enterprises into more autonomous
corporations. On the other hand, rent, patronage, or entitlement
enhancing measures have sailed through. Clearly, there are many
exceptions to this asymmetric reform process--the Right to Information
Act and the setting up of the Unique ID Authority being important game
changers of the right sort--but I am talking about a central tendency.
For a while, growth papered over the paralysis in growth enhancing
reforms, while it made the expansion in subsidies and entitlements seem
affordable. With growth slowing, government tax revenues stagnant as a
fraction of GDP, and spending high, fiscal deficits remain high. At the
same time, private consumption, especially in rural areas, is growing
strongly on the back of rising incomes, strong credit growth, and
continuing government transfers and subsidies.
The result: The gap between our spending and our saving is making
us dependent on short term foreign inflows to a dangerously high extent,
at a time that the international investor is increasingly skeptical
about the India story.
The depreciating rupee is the first warning sign of an unstable
macro-economy, rising long term interest rates could be the second.
Dangerously volatile oil prices could lead to a blowoutin our fiscal and
current account deficits, while at the same time depressing exchange
rates and elevating interest rates. Given geo-political uncertainties,
we cannot be complacent.
For a large vibrant economy like India's, there is always
hope. We still have tools to tackle our problems. But we must exercise
those tools with vigor and a sense of urgency. I know that sense of
urgency is shared within the government, but urgency has to translate to
persuasion and action. We need a common minimum program across all
sensible political parties to ensure that we stabilize the economy and
foreign investor perceptions quickly.
If politics and narrow personal advantage trumps economics and
national interest, as it has done for the last few years, we will
jeopardize the legacy of Dr. Manmohan Singh's reforms that are so
well documented in the book.
How have we come to this pass? As an academic, I will offer a
possible causal narrative, without any claim that this is tested by
evidence. It is, at best, a working hypothesis, but as I will argue,
offers a plausible course of action. My hypothesis is as follows: While
Dr. Singh's reforms opened up the economy and brought in
competition in a number of areas, they were incomplete in four important
respects:
First, they left untouched a number of areas such as higher
education, where the License Permit Raj continued and significant
rent-seeking persisted. Second, they left the public sector occupying
the commanding heights, even possessing a virtual monopoly in some areas
such as in coal. Third, they did not recognize the importance of
national resources such as land, spectrum, and commodities, and left
their allocation ill-defined. And fourth, despite undoubted successes,
they did not change the public mindset as much as they might have.
All this was to a large extent understandable. One could not do
everything at one go, so reforms had to be prioritized. Moreover, the
need to undertake some reforms became apparent only after the success of
the first set of reforms. For instance, the public hunger for education,
and the rents from running capitation fee colleges became obvious only
after the dramatic increases in growth and the demand for skilled
workers post reform.
Similarly, the patronage from controlling the public sector, as
well as the attractiveness of its use for public policy increased
rapidly after reforms. Commodities became valuable only after rapid
Chinese growth in the last ten years.
And finally, because many reforms were gradual in order to not
awake the opposition of vested interests, they were not publicized. But
reform by stealth, by its very nature, does not win hearts and minds.
Moreover, the significant fruits of that first stage of reforms, and
their trickling down to the broader public, occurred with a long
lag--often more than a decade after they were enacted. The public could
not see the link, nor was it trumpeted. Public mindsets therefore moved
only a little, especially in attitudes towards competition and the
private sector. I doubt very much that our carpenter attributes his
cheap cell phone and his speedy state-of-the-art two-wheeler to the
competition brought about by the reforms.
By the early 2000s, India was therefore ripe for a second
generation of reforms to cement Dr. Manmohan Singh's legacy. But
powerful elements of the political class, which had never been fully
convinced about giving up rents from the License Raj in the first place,
had by then formed an unholy coalition with aggressive business people,
whom I will refer to simply as the connected. What has ensued is
coalition "adharma", a coalition of the bad. The new
post-License Raj equilibrium became the Resource Raj.
The Resource Raj resulted in massive fortunes generated by the
connected and by politicians. Again, this is not to take away from
committed politicians and genuinely innovative and strong businesses, of
which there are myriad examples. Many industries became really
competitive and innovative, including ones like telecom that are the
focus of investigations today. Dr. Manmohan Singh's reforms
documented in this book have made India enormously better off.
But if we want to understand why there is a sense of pessimism
today, we have to acknowledge that the full intent of those reforms, to
liberalize so as to enhance entry, competition, and efficiency, to move
from a producer bias to a consumer bias, and to price and allocate
national resources and opportunities fairly, have not been realized in a
number of areas of the economy.
The second generation of reforms is ready and packaged in the form
of bills waiting to be passed. But these bills, some of them conceived
in Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee's government, are stuck, not just
because the government does not have the votes to pass them, but because
there is not enough political will, even in the ruling coalition, to
move on them.
Finally, what has made the unreformed areas bottlenecks today is
that the middle class has grown larger, and it has become more aware,
partly because of legislation like the Right to Information Act brought
in by the UPA government. Newly assertive institutions such as the
press, the CAG, and the judiciary have started uncovering the massive
nexus between the oligarchy and the politicians and bureaucrats that
built up during the go-go years. Unlike in the past, middle class anger
now has tools with which to assert itself even if the middle class is
still numerically an electoral minority.
Under this scrutiny, the non-transparent systems to acquire and
allocate land, iron ore, and other commodities have ground to a halt, so
business and investment in these areas is threatened. I pointed out that
we have not established public support for the basic principles of
competition and free enterprise. Indeed, distrust of even the legitimate
activities of the private sector has grown. Not surprisingly, the utopia
promised by the extreme left is once again enjoying a resurgence of
popularity. Unfortunately, even necessary new reforms such as the
proposed Land Acquisition Bill do not draw fully on the intent of Dr.
Manmohan Singh's initial reforms, underemphasizing the need to
provide good incentives, and making success overly dependent on
government capacity.
This then is the dangerous place we are at. Growth is slowing, in
part because of bottlenecks. At the same time, given public
dissatisfaction, politicians are even more focused on subsidies and
transfers to keep people happy, especially as general elections near. No
one wants to be blamed for taking away the goodies, even as our ability
to pay for them has plummeted. Politicians are loathe to act quickly to
give up their rents, so reforms that might improve sentiment are stuck.
And opposition to liberalization is gathering strength amongst the angry
middle class--they have become more willing to listen to old discredited
remedies once again because their trust in the private sector has been
shattered.
But we should not succumb to pessimism. There is no reason that
India's growth cannot regain double digits. Simply moving our
millions from low productivity agriculture to rural industry or services
will give us growth for years to come, provided we are willing to do the
minimum necessary to collect the low hanging fruit. That requires
completing the second generation of reforms. We need to liberalize
sectors like education, retail, and the press, freeing entry and
improving customer choice. We need to transform more government owned
firms into well-managed publicly owned firms which are free from
political influence or government support. And we need to evolve
transparent means of pricing and allocating the bountiful natural
resources in our country. Clearly, we need to ensure that growth reaches
more people. But there is no better way of inclusion than a decent job,
no doubt augmented by better public services as well as targeted
conditional cash transfers to the poor.
I am hopeful that our increasingly difficult situation will focus
political minds.
Given that the public is no longer willing to tolerate the
"a-dharmik" coalition and the lack of transparency, perhaps
politicians will see they have no alternative but to change. Moreover,
and perhaps as important, the connected businesspeople are themselves
now frustrated with the free-for-all resource grab, and government
paralysis. I sense they too want change. When everyone wants change, it
just might occur.
In addition to the medium term changes I have just outlined, here
are at least three steps that we must take in the short term. They are
nothing that the government does not know, but are worth emphasizing.
1) Raise fuel prices to international levels in a set of quick
steps, then completely deregulate them. Announce this as soon as
politically possible, and do not roll back.
2) Resolve the commodity bottleneck in a way that does not give a
windfall or bailout to any party, least of all the private promoters,
but that ensures these projects/plants can resume production. If
necessary, write down the equity of these promoters before restructuring
bank liabilities.
3) Be kinder to foreign investors--they are not the enemy but a
necessity--we need their money to fund our spending to the tune of 4% of
GDP. No doubt, however badly we treat them today, they may eventually
want to be in India, but many crisis are always about timing. We need
them now, when India looks increasingly tattered compared to alternative
investment opportunities, not five years from now when growth recovers.
We should open up more to FDI where feasible, because FDI is a
safer form of financing. We should bring certainty about taxation to
foreign investors, and resist the temptation to levy new retrospective
claims. If we think Mauritius and Singapore offer undue arbitrage
opportunities, and I think they do, we should renegotiate those treaties
with prospective effect. Yes, there will be one time adverse effects,
but so be it. And finally, we should avoid the tremendous uncertainty
created by catch-all measures like GAR, which give tax authorities
unbridled power. We should focus instead on clearly delineating specific
actions we want to prevent.
I have been very frank--as an academic, that is the only value I
bring. The history of development is replete with countries that grew
strongly for a while, only to stutter and stop as their leaders and
their people started taking growth as their birth-right. Somewhat
paradoxically, it is only when we are paranoid about sustaining growth
that we will continue achieving it. We need to become paranoid again, as
we were in the early 1990s, and perhaps then we will achieve the full
promise of Dr. Manmohan Singh's reforms. Thank you.