Experimental evidence on the benefits of eliminating exchange rate uncertainties and why expected utility theory cases economists to miss them.
Pope, Robin ; Selten, Reinhard ; Kube, Sebastian 等
Abstract
Conclusions favorable to flexible exchange rates typically accord
with expected utility theory in ignoring the costs that exchange rate
uncertainty generates for governments, central banks, firms and unions
in various knowledge stages that occur between identifying a problem and
learning the outcome of the responding decision. Allowing for these
involves SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, Pope (1983, 1995,
2005), Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006). One of these costly stages in
the complex real world is that of evaluating alternatives. The
complexity precludes the maximising choices that, explicitly or
implicitly, underlie arguments for flexible exchange rates. A laboratory
experiment suggests that the complexity costs outweigh the advantages of
having a flexible exchange rate as an additional instrument for managing
a country's international competitiveness goal. Our laboratory
experiment thus supports those who on this count favour fixed exchange
rates, currency unions, even a single money for the entire world.
Keywords: exchange rate regime, exchange rate uncertainties,
currency union, macro- economic instruments, experiment, SKAT, the
Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, international competitiveness,
complexity
JEL Classification: D800, D810, F310, F330
OVERVIEW
This paper provides a novel way of assessing whether providing the
official sector with the additional instrument of a flexible exchange
rate improves or damages maintenance of the country's international
competitiveness goal.
In maintaining international competitiveness, some see our
currently flexible exchange rates as desirable since they afford a
nation's official sector an additional macroeconomic instrument for
dealing with shocks introduced by demand and supply factors and
unreasonable unions. In other words, this set of economists believe that
the exchange rate helps restore equilibrium and a country's
international competitiveness in the face of changing inter-country
conditions. Under this belief in the later 1980s and into the 1990s, the
US sought to solve unemployment problems and help its export sector by
getting Japan to appreciate the yen. Ie the US believed that floating is
good as it could have permitted Japan to appreciate and that this would
fix up the US's competitiveness position. Under this belief in this
millenium the US pressures China to appreciate, ie thinks that flexible
exchange rates used to appreciate the Yuan can restore to equilibrium
its competitiveness, get it out of its private sector "jobless
recovery".
A decade back, this belief that flexible exchange rates are
desirable for restoring international competitiveness led to widespread
concerns about joining the EURO. There were concerns that entering the
EURO bloc would loosen union discipline, increase nominal wages and
worsen employment and inflation. Thereby it would worsen member
countries' international competitive positions-already deemed to be
in international disequilibrium due to excessively high EURO wages.
Today, this belief is mirrored in campaigns to have Italy quit the EURO,
and by others, who accept that the EURO is here to stay, advocating
alternative ways of restoring the international competitiveness of some
EURO members in particular, or of the EURO bloc as a whole. Restoration
of international competitiveness is linked to lowering EURO country
wages--ie to the belief that the EURO countries' high level of
unemployment relative to the US and Australia and Denmark stems partly
from the EURO being over-valued for the whole bloc, and especially for
regions like southern Italy and eastern Germany. See eg Sinn (2003,
2005a, 2005b).
Other economists oppose altering exchange rates to restore
perceived discrepancies in equilibrium due to perceived deviations from
international competitiveness. They deem exchange rate variations a
curse to be curbed by various measures. Measures proposed include a
willingness to let countries like Japan and China peg their currency to
a major trading partner, McKinnon (2005), and a Tobin tax. This belief
in exchange rate variations being a curse results in support for joining
the currency of one's major trading partner (s), eg Courchene
(1999), Courchene and Harris (1999a, 1999b), Cobham (2006), or even
having a single world money, eg Mundell (1961, 2003). Those who find
flexible exchange rates a curse point to the costs of exchange rate
uncertainty or of the additional tiers of transactions involved in
currency conversion, or of both. Historical studies identify elimination
of exchange rate uncertainty costs as a factor behind the spread of the
gold standard, eg Bordo and Rockoff (1996), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003),
Meissner (2005).
There are difficulties in estimating whether the extra official
instrument of exchange rate flexibility for restoring perceived
deviations from equilibrium in international competitiveness is worth
these transactions and uncertainty costs. One difficulty is the tendency
to theorise and estimate within EUT, axiomatised expected utility
theory. This theory excludes earlier stages in the decision process and
thereby key uncertainty costs. One key cost of uncertainty thereby
excluded is the evaluation stage. In ignoring this stage, EUT assumes
that choosers can maximise and that economists can discern optimal
strategies and maximising equilibrium solutions, when under real world
complexities, as leading central bankers and international financial
speculators themselves observe, nobody can choose in such a maximising
manner. Indeed it will be demonstrated in this paper that economists
cannot discern EUT equilibria and give systematically biassed policy
advice when they presume to be able to do so. Our laboratory
investigation avoids imposing impossible-to-attain maximising
assumptions on agents.
There is a second difficulty in estimating whether the official
sector manages its country's international competitiveness better
when it has the extra official instrument of exchange rate flexibility.
This is the common practice of analysing exchange rates within a wholly
or partially rational expectations competitive economy framework. As
George Soros, one of the most influential and successful exchange rate
speculators, observed in his Princeton University presentations
sponsored by Paul Volcker, this framework ignores the power of
individual participants in the market (like himself), Soros (2003). In a
similar vein, at the 2001 American Economic Association meetings in New
Orleans, Robert Merton stated that he deemed the failure to consider
their market power, and to analyse as if they were operating in a
competitive market where their decisions did not alter prices, was what
underlay the downfall of Long Term Capital Management. In our laboratory
investigation we avoid these rational expectations competitive market
pitfalls via a completely new approach to exchange rate determination.
Our new exchange rate determination model allows for the power of all
agents in all roles in exchange rates set.
For our model, we provide moreover a maximising symmetric incomplete game theoretic equilibrium benchmark. Being game theoretic,
it allows for the power of each agent. Such a benchmark was feasible to
construct, since whiles exceedingly complex, our set-up is simple
relative to real world exchange rate determination, and one member of
our team, Reinhard Selten, has extensive experience in computing game
theoretic equilibria. Participants in our experimental set-ups, like
actual central bankers, actual financial speculators, actual producers
and actual wage negotiators, all of whom lack a comparable academic
life-time of performing such calculations, are not falsely assumed to
have the ability to discern such an equilibrium. In this way our set-up,
while false in being so simple compared to the real world, is realistic
enough to reflect this real world feature, namely the inability of any
actor, no matter how large a team of top world economics and financial
experts he hires, to compute for him the maximising strategy of
individual agents and any associated game theoretic equilibrium. In this
way our laboratory experiment sets the scene of doing an appropriate
evaluation of whether officials attain better their objectives in
managing their economy's economic competitiveness when given the
extra instrument of exchange rate flexibility- or whether this adds so
much to the complexity burden that it damages their management of their
country's international competitiveness.
In estimating whether the official sector manages its
country's international competitiveness better when it has the
extra official instrument of exchange rate flexibility, we have so far
identified two difficulties:
1 use of EUT when this theory excludes most uncertainty effects;
and
2 use of so-called rational expectations when this theory ignores
market power.
Other difficulties are: tractability constraints in modeling that
preclude algebraic analyses having adequate complexity as regards
3 price and wage stickiness;
4 shocks;
5 the role of central banks; and
6 hedging/forward exchange markets and estimation hurdles that
preclude algebraic analyses having adequate compexity as regards
7 getting the correct time spans given changes in the exchange rate
regime; and
8 separating transactions from uncertainty cost effects.
In this paper, we first elucidate these eight difficulties, and why
an experiment offers a fresh insight and in important respects, a means
of overcoming them. We then describe our experiment and give our
results.
I. THE GAMUT OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS
I.1 SKAT
To trace the cause-effect chains arising from risk and uncertainty,
we need to look at the decision procedure demarcated by when each stage
of risk and uncertainty is passed. This is the purpose of SKAT, the
Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory, presented in Pope (1983), and in more
detail in Pope (1995) and Pope, Leitner and Leopold (2006). Epistemic means knowledge. The chooser enters a new epistemic stage whenever he
has a change in his knowledge. In the simplest cases, here illustrated,
each change in knowledge is from ignorance about some future happening,
ie at best probabilistic knowledge of what that happening may turn out
to be, to certainty about that happening--to that risk being completely
resolved.
For simplicity, let us illustrate with the minimum number of
epistemic stages that a chooser could encounter after discerning a
problem meriting a decision. This is four stages, and thus involves
three times when the chooser learns something new. Let our illustration
be a fictional account of the Bank of England after it discerned the
1992 speculative attack on the pound.
The Bank's first stage is to discover what alternatives are
available. So at this first stage it is ignorant of its choice set.
Suppose it discovered that it could: 1, tighten money; or 2, depreciate at once; or 3, try to ride out the crisis.
Then the Bank has had a change in its knowledge ahead. The Bank
knows its choice set. It has entered stage 2. Its task now is to
evaluate these three alternatives. It considers the distress to the
country of a tight money policy and the opposition it would have to
shoulder from some sections of the government and civil service. It
considers the distress to the government of an immediate sizable depreciation since under the Maastricht Treaty this would force the
UK's exit from the EMS, the European Monetary System. It considers
the risk of a massive loss of taxpayers' funds if it seeks to ride
out the crisis, but fails to persuade Germany's central bank to
intervene enough on its behalf or lower its interest rate. Suppose it
decided to try to ride the crisis out.
Then the Bank has had a second change in its knowledge ahead. It
knows its choice. It has entered stage 3. It now waits to learn if it
has luck. By Black Wednesday it learns that it did not have luck.
Then the Bank has had a third change in its knowledge ahead. It
knows the final segment of this outcome flow. It has full knowledge
ahead-certainty of the failure from its decision-and the fallout of a
massive loss of taxpayers' funds and asset redistribution both
within the UK and between the UK and the rest of the world.
Table 1 summarises the four stages through which the Bank passed,
progressively having more knowledge ahead, and by stage 4, certainty--as
regards that crisis.
There are literatures on each stage, eg for stage 1 satisficing and
aspiration-adaptation models, Simon (1955), Sauermann and Selten (1962),
Selten (1998), for stage 2 difficulties in performing such evaluations,
Janis and Manne (1977); and heuristics used, Cyert and March (1963),
Huber (1982), Montgomery and Svenson (1983), Weber and Borcherding
(1993), Brandstaetter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) and Pope, Leitner
and Leopold (2006, chapter 14), for stage 3, the effects of uncertainty
on firms engaged in investment as distinct from production delineated in
Keynes (1936), as noted in Walsh (1994, pp. 56, 62-66), and in effect
extended in Pope (1983, 2004, 2005), and for stage 4, all standard
decision models. For stage 4 there are also non-standard decision models
that consider risk effects from the preceding decision stages like
disappointment that the previously possible better final outcome segment
did not occur, Bell (1981) and financial effects like being fired for it
being discovered in stage 4 that in stage 1 the CEO had chosen the wrong
act (rejecting the Norwegian government's offer of what later
proved to be the most lucrative north sea oil field, Hagen (1985), and
having to repay more interest because of the risk endured in stage 3 by
the lender involved a risk premium interest surcharge, Pope (2005).
I.2 Timing Consistency Issues
Von Neumann and Morgenstern deemed that nice effects in stage 3 of
thrills and nasty effects of fear in not knowing the chosen act's
outcomes have a big influence on choice. They had sought to develop a
decision theory broader than EUT, axiomatised expected utility theory,
so as to include anticipated thrills, fears and so forth. But they
encountered a contradiction and so left the task of finding the higher
level that overcomes this contradiction to future researchers, (1947,
1953, 1972, pp. 628-32).
The contradiction, it turns out, arises because EUT embodies a
false timing simultaneity in what the chooser knows. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern realised that EUT is epistemically static-ie contains only a
single stage of knowledge ahead-and so could not cope with people
learning new information at multiple dates in the future. But they
thought that nevertheless EUT could model the simplest class of risky
choices for stage 4 as follows. Upon having chosen any alternative, the
chooser will at a single date in the future know everything. A single
future date at which the chooser knows everything-has full knowledge
ahead-is feasible if as they assumed, the set of risky alternatives is
restricted to ones where everything is learned at a single identical
date.
But the axioms only derive the EUT property by including sure
alternatives. In the case of choosing a sure alternative, the chooser
knows everything earlier-not in the immediate future, which is after the
point of choice, rather simultaneously with choice. This renders it
infeasible to model risky and sure choices together in a theory that
permits only a single epistemic period. Doing so introduces the
contradiction of probabilities of the mutually exclusive set of outcomes
being simultaneously known and not known. Using SKAT introduces the
higher level and overcomes the contradiction. SKAT has multiple
epistemic periods, ie multiple stages of knowledge ahead, Pope (1985a).
The probabilities that are non-degenerate in stage 3 are degenerate in
stage 4 since this is a later stage in the chooser's degree of
knowledge ahead.
To be within the SKAT umbrella, it is not sufficient for a model to
divide up the chooser's future into numerous chronologically distinct future periods. To be within SKAT, the periods must be
epistemically distinct-demarcated by changes in knowledge. To be within
SKAT, any probability distributions over pertinent outcome spaces must
be epistemically consistent. In other words, the model must not violate
other axioms (assumptions) in the system about what it assumes that the
chooser and other relevant parties know at distinct dates. Hence unless
it builds in an assumption that the chooser or another relevant party is
schizophrenic, it must not simultaneously impute to anyone
simultaneously degenerate and non-degenerate distributions over the
outcomes.
I.3 The EUT Outcome Segment
Positive and negative satisfactions (utilities) are derived from
outcomes. In turn this means that if a segment of the outcome flow is
excluded under a theory, then so also are exluded the satisfactions
deriving from that segment of the outcome flow and (probabilistic)
knowledge of it. EUT's axiomatic base constrains it to include in
its outcomes flows only stage 4, namely the outcome segment that will
occur after all risk and uncertainty will be in the past. This is
because EUT's axiomatic implications include: (i), a restriction of
the outcome flow to those segments that occur after all risk is
resolved, Samuelson (1952), and (ii), a restriction that each of these
post risk segments must be evaluated "as if certain", even
though uncertain at the point of choice, Friedman and Savage (1948),
Samuelson (1952). (1) Restrictions (i) and (ii) hold also for most
extensions of EUT such as cumulative prospect theory. (2)
EUT's omission of the Bank's outcomes segments and thus
utilities in the three earlier stages implies the following. The Bank
has no satisfactions before the final era when all uncertainty is past.
Thus EUT implies that there are no costs, no benefits in stage 1,
ascertaining the choice set, nor in stage 2, evaluating each alternative
in that choice set, nor in stage 3, in enduring or enjoying the period
of risk / uncertainty after choosing and prior to learning whether the
lucky outcome has ensued from the risky act chosen.
It might be thought that models within EUT can at least include all
the Bank's stage 4 effects. This however is not the case. The
earlier stages 1, 2 and 3 have legacies. Table 2 illustrates them with a
fictional account.
I.4 Idiosyncratic Influences on the Exchange Rate
Not everything in our above account of the Bank of England is
fictional. Factual aspects of our account include the non maximising way
that the Bank went about stage 2, its evaluation task, Cobham (1994,
2002 and 2006). The Bank did not for each alternative: (a) specify each
possible outcome flow [o.sub.i], (b) give each [o.sub.i], a utility; (c)
give each [o.sub.i], a probability, (d) compute that alternative's
expectation; and then choose the alternative for which this expectation
was the maximum. Instead the Bank retained multiple dimensions in how it
viewed its goals and its costs of attaining these.
Relatedly, it is factual that the Bank did not fully anticipate the
effects on all its stakeholders of living through stage 3-of not knowing
whether the Bank would succeed in riding out the crisis. The Bank did
not compute a probability distribution over the various risk premia to
which firms would be subjected during the crisis. Nor did the Bank
compute a probability distribution over the legacies of these risk
premia after a failure to ride it out in the form of higher loan
repayments consequent on the risks taken by those contingently able to
repay.
The Bank's disappointment in stage 4 is likewise factual. Nor
was this an isolated incident of the Bank facing the unexpected as
regards sterling's exchange rate change. Cobham (2006) provides
convincing evidence that many of the major exchange rate changes of
sterling over the last 20 years came as surprises, as nasty surprises,
resulting in disappointment.
In summary, the Bank anticipated some effects on its goal
attainment in each stage, and was influenced by these. The Bank missed
some effects that outsiders, not caught up in the emotional heat of the
moment, discerned at the time. The Bank missed yet other effects that,
at least with hindsight bias, bystanders deemed it should have
anticipated.
The Bank had multiple goals and thus multiple dimensions to its
satisfactions in each stage. The set of anticipated satisfactions that
the Bank noticed and missed will be a mix of the Bank's culture,
and of the personalities of those holding top Bank posts. Developing
tractable and econometrically estimable models within SKAT that capture
principal influences in particular decision situations and have some
predictive power is desirable but will be a challenging task.
I.5 Experiment
A means of looking at the net effects of all these intricate and
idiosyncratic evaluation processes is an experiment, where, unlike in
theorizing and econometric estimation from field data, we do not need to
impose assumptions on how all this happens. Let us now proceed to see
how an experiment addresses some of the other difficulties in gauging
whether it is worth having flexible exchange rates in order to redress disequilibria associated with (perceived and actual) changes in
international competitiveness.
II. WAGE STICKINESS
The desire for the extra macroeconomic instrument of varying the
exchange rate to restore international competitiveness is intimately
related to the notion that wages are sticky. When conditions
change-especially for the country needing lower nominal wages -it is
deemed quicker and thus less costly to get to a new equilibrium by
altering the exchange rate than by getting labour to accept a wage drop.
The empirical evidence is abundant on wage stickiness. But we have
limited understanding of the precise forms it takes period-to-period.
Relatedly, whether all the stickiness constitutes irrational or
inefficient disequilibrium behaviour--that ought be countervailed by an
exchange rate change-is far from well understood.
Theoretical models become untractable if they take into account
many of the factors that cause variations in the extent and functional
form of wage stickiness. It would be demanding, to say the least for
theoretical models to remain tractable and understandable if they
included for instance, the diverse forms that wage stickiness assumes in
different organizations depending on their workplace morale and on the
evolving notions of what is fair over the business cycle detected in
Bewley (1999). In a complex and ever-changing world, different factors
grab the attention of wage bargainers at different times, with what
grabs attention depending on the particular personalities involved, and
their particular cause-effect mental models of the world.
Econometric estimates are limited to assuming constancy in the
stickiness over stretches of time. In addition they need to invoke a
host of assumptions on linearity in the functional relationships and
independence of errors. These assumptions are in reality violated and
can at best be partially filtered out by techniques-with each technique
adjusting for that violation, but introducing a host of other problems.
A laboratory experiment can overcome both the theoretical
tractability hurdle and the above set of econometric hurdles. It can
leave the wage bargainers free to exhibit over time a pattern of being
sticky and immune to what other price incentives indicate as regards
unemployment or overemployment. It can leave the wage bargainers free to
learn over time, and to forget over time. It can leave the wage
bargainer free to respond to events that are salient to them, and to
allow episodes when relativities dominate wage bargaining and other
episodes when absolute welfare considerations dominate.
Since each laboratory session comprises a new set of participants
who have never played before, it allows scope for how different
personalities, with different ways of responding to their monetary
incentives and enhancing their monetary incentives interact. Such
individual idiosyncracies yielding group dynamics have to be assumed
away, replaced by an assumption like homo economicus, in theoretically
tractable models. By independent sessions we create indepence rather
than assuming it. Therefore we can perform non-parametric tests with the
sessions as independent observations and avoid unjustified independence
assumptions.
III. SHOCKS
III.1 The Swan-Mundell Never Repeated Shock
Modelling of shocks and estimating their impact is tricky. The
theoretical work dates back to the seminal paper on assignment of
objectives and associated instruments to the fiscal and monetary
authorities, Swan (1953, 1960). His form of analysis was brought to
international attention in Mundell (1961), and has remained the prime
justification for the exchange rate as an extra instrument. (This is
ironic since Mundell himself, on account of transactions costs, in that
1961 article, ridiculed multiple monies, and in effect launched his
lifelong campaign for a single world money, and ever deemed his article
misunderstood.)
In the Swan-Mundell models, any shock, as the word itself suggests,
is unanticipated. There are no shocks ever after, and indeed no
probabilistically anticipated changes in the exchange rate ever aider.
So moving the exchange rate once to adjust for a shock generates no
future exchange rate uncertainty--no risk of other countries
"retaliating" or "adjusting to avoid damage" as they
do in actuality. This assumption--that a shock change in an exchange
rate fails to alert decision makers to the reality that in the future
there could be other exchange rate changes--characterizes a wide body of
theoretical and empirical analysis of shocks since, not only as regards
exchange rates, but much else also.
III.2 Learning to Anticipate Shocks
It is questionable to construe agents as rational who after the
first shock in their lives, never expect another one, nor realize that
the future exchange rate is uncertain, and thus qualitatively or
probabilistically anticipate exchange rate changes. It is also
questionable descriptively. It is true that many economists in their
modehng took a long time after the demise of Breton Woods to grapple
with the possibility of future exchange rate shocks. But at least some
of those who actively operate in exchange rate markets, and thus help
set exchange rates, after a while start anticipating that there may be
future exchange rate changes. Let us give but two examples.
First, in the interwar period, countries successively devalued to
improve their international competitiveness. The improvement can only
endure of course if the other countries do not retaliate and devalue in
turn. In fact others did retaliate. In due course a majority opinion
developed of anticipating nasty shocks of reciprocal devaluations from
these "beggar-thy-neighbour" attempts of every country to
improve its competitiveness at the expense of all the others. The
earlier failure to look ahead and to fail to anticipate retaliatory exchange rate changes had ended, and countries sought to end the
practice. The compromise, weaker than what Keynes had sought, given US
opposition to a strong new system, was Bretton Woods.
Second, let us take a post Bretton Woods example of learning to
anticipate exchange rate shocks. At the time of the first shock after
entering a new regime of floating after Bretton Woods in 1982 and
finding the Australian USD exchange rate stable for a while, there was
such naivety of anticipating zero shocks in Australia that the private
sector borrowed billions in USD unhedged. The Australian official sector
was even more naive, it expanded the money supply in a prelude to an
election. There ensued a massive abrupt depreciation. The naivety went
and the country's risk premium leapt. That is to say, foreign
exchange dealers and other key parties, understood that there can be
exchange rate shocks, that Australia might in the future yet again
depreciate. (5)
III.3 Maximisers over Ergodic Shocks
The new generation of exchange rate theorizing has agents who
anticipate exchange rate shocks, eg Obstfeld (2001). Here we are
appropriately in the world of recognising that the future exchange rate
is uncertain. The shocks are inserted in perhaps the only tractable way
in a theoretical model. The shocks are inserted as random noise in an
ergodic (stationary, self-repeating system). (6) In these models
moreover each agent maximises his expected utility. (For these agents
therefore there are no shocks in the sense of totally unanticipated
events, but probabilistically anticipated ones.) There are thus two key
features of such modelling: ergodicity; and expected utility
maximisation.
III.4 Our Non-Ergodic World
The ergodicity assumption is contrary to the actual way that shocks
are generated. They are generated by humans decisions, Soros (2003). It
is questionable, to say the least, to assume that these take the form of
history precisely repeating itself. For accounts of how central banker
policy kept changing and not repeating itself, see eg Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (1993) and Cobham (1994, 2002, 2006). For accounts of exchange
dealers having altered over the years their techniques for attempting to
predict the exchange rate, and thus their exchange decisions, see eg
Osler (2000, 2003). For examples of firms and governments making
decisions that alter the course of history, and thus preclude
ergodicity, see Part V below.
III.5 Our Inability to Maximise
Since the ergodicity assumption is false as indicated above, the
assumption that agents choose on the basis of expected utility
maximisation is implausible--the Bank of England with which we
illustrated the decision process in Part 1 is no exception in this
regard. Rather it reflects the universal human condition. No entity has
a capacity to maximise. A non-ergodic world is awesome to
probabilistically predict. Participants in the exchange rate market do
not have a distribution over the utilities of the outcomes that they
seek to maximise. They have a highly time variant perception of whether
there will be exchange rate shocks or not, and in which direction these
might occur.
In our non-ergodic evolving world, we humans do not maximise. We
have to do our evaluations based on other sorts of techniques. We have
systematic learning and forgetting patterns about shocks and other
exchange rate changes. It takes only about a generation of minor shocks
for most participants in a market to forget about the possibility of big
shocks, Allais (1972), Blatt (1983). Besides even if at some higher
level of aggregation, the world were ergodic, it is far too complex for
us to maximize an expectation in the sort of objective impartial overview manner postulated under EUT, axiomatised expected utility
theory. (7)
It is sometimes asserted that unconsciously people maximise. This
assertion has the awkward property that no economist could differ in his
policy recommendations from another except by asserting that the other
economist's unconscious was inferior to his unconscious, and thus
failed to maximise whereas his own unconscious-without his being able to
analyse why or offer conscious supportive reasoning-did the maximisation
correctly. Let us therefore not take this line that in effect no
decision or piece of analysing can be subject to scrutiny as everything
is perfect, no errors are ever made. Instead, let us give two examples
of economists' own fallible non-maximising pattern of arriving at
policy conclusions.
III.5.1 Forgetfulness about Exchange Rate Regimes
First, an example where the focus is more on forgetfulness. In the
complexity and confusion of an evolving world, many economists and
others of the 1960s and 1970s, forgot the shocks that the floating
exchange rate regime had delivered in the interwar period. (8) They
yearned for its return, quite forgetting it could usher in exchange rate
crises comparable to those of the interwar years, or even worse, Kenen
(2002b). Wyplosz (1993, p139) notes the irony involved in the swings pro
and anti floats, an outcome of human fallible forgetfulness-inability to
maximise.
III.5.2 Complexity in Making International Competitiveness Analyses
Second let us take an example of how complexity deprives us
economists of the ability to be expected utility maximisers over any
domain relevant for serious economic policy. We should not feel too
badly about this, since as noted in footnote 7, back in the 1950s Savage
observed that EUT would be impractical even for planning a picnic.
In the nice simple abstract Swan-Mundell framework, it seems easy
to maximize, easy to extend it to obeying EUT. All risk is in the past
after the shock. There is none of the murky complexity of an uncertain
future. It seems transparent that both countries "ought" to
realize that a mutual benefit would arise if one country devalued
-implying that the other had to revalue. In these models it is crystal
clear to all parties what is the shock and what should be done-no scope
for a "beggar-thy-neighbour" set of nasty retaliatory exchange
rate shocks to be set in train.
In real life, the situation is the reverse. It is so complex, as it
was in the interwar period when analysts gradually learned about the
nasty retaliation shocks. Today the world seems even more complex and
confusing in that the authors are unaware of a single country, other
than Singapore, that has ever had a majority of influential economists
and policy makers deeming that its wage rate was low enough for
international competitiveness.
Instead, virtually every country has the majority of its economists
and other policy makers convinced that they are special, that they need
others to appreciate (to avoid them having the shame of depreciating).
We hinted at this in the opening paragraph of this paper-in the example
of the US which has a low unemployment rate compared to China,
pressuring China to appreciate. Now not every single country in the
world can be at a competitive disadvantage because of its high wages
relative to the others. This is a situation in which we have to own that
economists fail to be able to utility maximize- fail even in drawing
conclusions about exchange rate levels.
In these complex situations neither we economists-nor other leading
analysts and policy makers-grapple too well with the complexities. We
fail to form an objective overview of the situation. In these complex
situations, both countries' economists get angry via their opposite
partisan Swan-Mundell vision of which way to move the exchange rate in
order for the economy to move toward equilibrium. Both are distressed
that the opposing country, the offending country, does not recognize
their partisan equilibrium notion of how exchange rates should shift.
We economists do not even notice that we fail to aggregate
consistently when giving our policy advice on matters that alter
exchange rates. This is completely excusable. The world is very complex.
Our mistakes in policy advice as an economics profession that is unable
to consistently apply the concept of international competitiveness, add
to the exchange rate shocks. For further details see Pope forthcoming.
III.6 Laboratory
A laboratory set up permits all the exchange rate shocks to be, as
in reality, from humans who lack overall maximizing capacities. It
permits for the ever fluctuating and evolving perceptions of humans.
These could not be incorporated readily into any tractable theory, not
even one that modified its random shocks to allow them to become
non-ergodic shocks and introduced some learning processes. Shifts in
these directions would be interesting in theorizing. An alternative is
the laboratory. There all the decisions and thus all the shocks, as in
reality, come from individuals, from their differing responses and
interactions. The laboratory set-up allows for the complexity of
decision making to cloud choices and perceptions and generate the shocks
even as we see this happening in historical episodes. It allows us to
see whether, when humans make all the decisions in complex situations,
the extra instrument of moving the exchange rate really helps to restore
international competitiveness after shocks. It allows us to check out
the reverse hypothesis, that it renders the situation worse. This
reverse hypothesis is hinted at in the inability of economists as a
profession, to analyse consistently international competitiveness issues
once we step outside the simple Swan-Mundell framework and have to apply
the concept in a world muddied by many complexities.
IV. THE ROLE OF CENTRAL BANKS
It is simply a matter of the power of each country's central
bank to produce its own currency that ensures that if any two countries
agree to co-operate fully and to totally defend any given exchange rate
between them, no other central bank, and no private agent, can dislodge that exchange rate. Exchange rate changes undesired by one of the
central banks come via lack of full co-operation from the other central
bank, Eichengreen and Wylosz (1993). In turn this renders all exchange
rate changes undesired by one central bank, a matter of less than full
co-operation from the central bank of the partner currency. The conflict
or cooperation among central banks is routinely ignored. The reasons are
fivefold: so-called rational expectations modelling (see page 3 above);
statements of central bankers; the clean float focus; the small country
focus; the particular reaction functions used in big country models.
IV.1 Central Banker Statements
Some central bankers avow their powerlessness to determine the
exchange rate. Acting alone this is true. A central bank hardly wishes
to advertise that it is failing to obtain co-operation from a brother
central bank. Only as a last resort when the conflict has flared to
inter-government public rows, is this generally broadcast. Further,
whiles fully co-operating central banks are unassailable, this does not
mean that each knows by how much to intervene by the hour, or whether to
supplement interventions with public announcements of support, or
altering instead its domestic monetary base. These fine details are
still in the exploring stage-even 35 years after the end of Bretton
Woods. Thus the matter that two central banks that fully committed to
each other are unassailable is the situation when viewed with respect to
a reasonable stretch of time. There can be a window of a few hours, even
days, when the exchange rate between two fully cooperating central banks
diverges unintentionally through ignorance on how much and how fast to
intervene / do swaps and so forth.
IV.2 Clean Floats
The third reason why the unassailable power of cooperating central
banks gets ignored stems from a semi-closed economy perspective. This
yields a policy of advocating clean floats, meaning ones in which the
central bank pays zero attention to the exchange rate in using monetary
policy to attain domestic goals, eg Carew (1985). A dirty float policy
by contrast includes an exchange rate aim in the central bank's
basket of goals. Once the international connections are accurately
modelled, it becomes obscure what a clean float could mean, since the
exchange rate affects in varying degrees all domestic goals. As
awareness of this expands, usage of the term clean float has become less
frequent.
The most persistent and influential group emanating from the clean
float tradition are those who advocate reserving central bank policy for
controlling the domestic inflation rate, eg Friedman (1953). This group
has evolved away from monetary targeting as practised eg by Paul Volcker
in his era as Chair of the US Federal Reserve System, to a focus on
interest rates as the engine of monetary policy. The "twin
pillars" of the European Central Bank, suffer regular criticism for
not being sufficiently transparently in the clean float tradition of
caring only about the EURO inflation rate, eg EurActiv (2006). (Instead
this bank has as its second pillar, economic and financial indicators-
considerations so broad it can even include exchange rate targetting.)
Any sort of clean float focus-including the modern more
sophisticated variant- deflectsthe adherent from noticing that
accidentally, in pursuing exclusively their domestic central bank goals,
clean floating central banks are major operators in foreign exchange
rate determination. Let us illustrate with an application of
Australia's clean float programme of the early 1980s alluded to in
section III.2. In reading the account, be wary of hindsight bias. The
misconceptions and changing understandings of the Australian official
sector are mirrored in academic writings of this era, and have marked
traces still in our understanding as economists-in how we fail as
economists to put due weight on central bank co-operation and conflict
as critical to the history and theory of exchange rate movements. (9)
The Australian central bank had begun the era of a floating
Australian dollar in 1982 embracing the clean float approach, though a
clean float approach of a sort Friedman decried-one in which the goal
was to boost employment prior to an election via an expansion in credit
prior to an election. Its central bank markedly lowered the rediscount rate prior to an election. It accompanied the lowering, with statements
to those incredulous inquirers that a government with a floating rate
really meant to keep the rate low, that of course as an independent
country pursuing a clean float, this was the course. There swiftly
followed the depreciation unanticipated by the government.
Thus being a clean floater, and declaring this public in response
to inquiries, could not and did not eliminate the Australian central
bank's crucial role in affecting the Australian dollar. But the
clean float focus had temporarily eclipsed from official thinking this
reality. In the complex real world officials were immersed in
"reforms" like floating, for which they were hailed as
bringing independence to their country's central bank. In this
complex situation the Australian officials had misinterpreted an
independent free monetary policy as meaning that the central bank's
action was irrelevant to Australia's exchange rate.
The Australian central bank then switched six months later in 1983
to being a dirty floater-to having exchange rate aims. It used its now
understood power to unilaterally depreciate dramatically for a second
time. It took monetary action to abruptly and massively depreciate to
aid farmers in the grain export market who were suffering from a drop in
world grain prices. A higher grain price in Australian dollars achieved
by the depreciation would help the current Australian government get
re-elected by these farmers.
Now how did the Australian central bank manage to act unilaterally?
The loss in competitiveness that the Australian depreciation imposed on
competing US and Canadian grain exporters was not so marked that they
effected retaliatory depreciations- or retaliatory subsidies. What thus
operated were effects of complexity. Much else was concerning the US and
Canadian governments and Australia were in the grain export market a
sufficiently small-player that retaliatory depreciations did not ensure.
IV.3 Small Country Focus
That Australian deployment of its power to depreciate without
retaliation is the mirror image of what entices us economists to
overlook the unbeatable, invincible power of co- operating central banks
to prevent a country unwillingly depreciating. Our economic modeling has
focussed so much on the small country assumption, eg in the speculative
literature, that we tend to overlook the scope for central bank
co-operation in withstanding speculative attacks. It is true that
utterly unlimited support of the partner central bank is rare, arguably non-existent. But last century and up to the 1st World War, sufficient
support was the norm. The reality is that the gold standard worked via
co-operation not via any automatic movement in prices caused by gold
flows. It worked in the early 19th century via co-operation of the Bank
of France and the Bank of England. It worked later via the big four
co-operatively varying rediscount rates. It stopped when France was
uncooperative in the 1920s, and the US a new weak link. See eg Hook
(2005), Butkiewicz (2005a, 2005b). In the monetary arrangements of the
countries planning to form the inaugural EURO bloc, central bank
co-operation episodically failed, and episodically succeeded, so that in
the end some countries exited. But co-operation sufficed to get several
countries over crises and into this inaugural EURO bloc, Eichengreen and
Wyplosz (1993) and Cobham (1994, 2002, 2006).
IV.4 Big Country Reaction Functions
Sometimes we economists do make a big country assumption, and two
or more central banks are modeled permitting co-operation and conflict
effects to be studied. But here the reaction functions are based on the
assumption that the central banks are expected utility maximisers
employing (extended) Taylor rules. Such responses bear little
resemblance to the motivations and decisions reached according to the
minutes of central bank meetings and the other information documented in
the references given in Parts I and III above. For every country,
including the frequently touted independent central bank of Germany,
central bankers interact intimately with the government. Which
side's view prevails is frequently a matter of personalities and of
other political events.
This disjunction between theoretical models with simple fixed
utility maximizing reaction functions of central banks on the one hand
and the real world's murky complex decision processing is in part
natural. What a difficult job, how seemingly impossible to capture this
complex set of considerations under any sort of theoretically tractable
reaction function. For the early 1990s, how for instance might one
theoretically model the role of Germany's central bank culture and
the special personality of its governor, Otmar Emminger. Germany's
government under Helmut Kohl was dedicated to the EURO, and to its being
adopted by all in the EU. Yet in the run up to the EURO, under the
Maastricht Treaty, Emminger managed to get Kohl's government to
give it permission to renege on its obligations under that agreement,
and so not necessarily support other countries committed to adopting the
EURO if they faced a crisis, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993, p109).
Further there is evidence supporting the hypothesis that the German
central bank used this permission to push out of the EURO process those
countries that it preferred excluded, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993, p.
111-2). This hypothesis implies that the German central bank's
partisan approach to co-operation with EMS members in crisis had a key
effect on their exchange rates during these years, and on which
countries entered the EURO. Under a variant of this hypothesis asserted
eg in Fischer (1993, p137), the German central bank sought to defy the
German government and sabotage the move to the EURO altogether.
Hindsight bias might make it seem easy to model this sequence of
events and to contend that all knew the power of Germany's central
bank, and which countries it favoured. To appreciate that any notion of
that this era in exchange rate history was easy to model / predict is
only hindsight bias, think of other closely related predictions. Who
believed 10 years earlier that the EURO could come about? We could print
the names of all the international economists who went in print on its
infeasibility, a far longer list than the few who in print declared it
might happen. Who in the early 90s could have forecast which countries
would survive the crises in exchange rates and political
interactions-including Blair letting himself get talked into a EURO
referendum -and be the actual set of formative countries constituting
the EURO? Like complexities involving a mass of interactions, defy us to
build theoretical models of central bank co- operation and conflict.
Efforts in this direction would be fascinating. We encourage them. In
the meantime, a laboratory experiment offers a fresh handle on the
matter.
It allows for the distinctive personalities of those taking on the
official and private sector roles to form group dynamics that differ
over different sessions because of the different people playing these
roles. It permits participants as central bankers to behave as in the
theoretical models, namely maximising their set of objectives. It allows
for participants to be like the real world central bankers, routinely
making bad judgments (at least according to the studies such as
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993, Cobham (1994, 2002 and 2006). It can
allow for a richer set of central bank objectives than is practical
under normal tractability requirements. It can allow for the confusion
and complexity that besets all decision makers who influence exchange
rate determination, both the official and the private agents.
V. HEDGING
Another difficulty in theoretical and econometric work on exchange
rate determination is what to do about hedging by private firms.
Explicitly or implicitly most theoretical and econometric work assumes
that this is available. Further, many of these models assume that the
forward and spot markets are connected to each other in ways
contradicted by the empirical evidence and that hedging is available at
a zero transactions charge. (In qualitative field work, the assumption
is typically of a positive but minimal charge.)
Over the typical one year plus lag for trade and associated capital
movements, the reality is quite different. Until very recently there
have not been any publicly listed year plus forward rates. Over such
extended horizons, what rates are available are at best available to
giant multi-nationals, typically in the form of exotic derivatives. The
complexities of these derivatives are hard for anyone to understand,
even for a specialist on their production like Enron. This brought Enron
into difficulties that could not be covered up by fraud indefinitely and
finally pushed this firm out of business.
One complexity is that one cannot fully hedge in both directions in
any satisfactory sense. Yet exchange rates are so uncertain, that
uncertainty comes in both directions. In popular (non-rational
parlance), where one may/will import, hedging is when, with a risk of
the home currency depreciating, one pays a fixed sum to avoid this risk.
In popular (non-rational parlance), speculation is when there is a risk
of one's own currency appreciating, one borrows foreign currency to
convert into home currency. But for a "rational" economist
looking at opportunities foregone, there is no necessary difference in
the riskiness or speculativeness of these two behaviours. If one fails
to so-called hedge and there is a depreciation, one may be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other importers and fail to survive,
but so also if there is an appreciation and one failed to so-called
speculate.
Another complexity is that the hedging has to be for a specific
amount. We are indebted to Peter Kenen (private communication) for this
commonsense observation. At the time the firm should start hedging, it
does not yet know how big its export sales will be in foreign currency,
or if an importer how well its business will be going, and thus how much
it will be importing.
To illustrate the complexities and costs of speculation/hedging,
consider how often one reads of firms bankrupted / put into
reconsruction through their errors. Long Term Capital Management
misestimated the Ruble. Alan Greenspan speedily indicated to the
company's underwriters that if they were not helpful in minimising
the fallout, the US Federal Reserve System might make life difficult for
them. Greenspan thereby can be seen as forestalling the risk of a 1929
style depression ensuing, Davidson (2005).
At about the same time, the giant Pasminco was convinced of a rise
in the Australian dollar vis-a-vis the US dollar and took measures to
protect the export value of its Australian zinc mines. In organising the
agreement, it did not consider sufficiently the reverse risk, of instead
the Australian dollar at that time depreciating, as happened. Pasminco
went into reconstruction at a point when the receiver was unable to even
estimate the billions of liabilities so generated-since some holding the
other side of the derivative could wait indefinitely in the hope of yet
further falls in the Australian dollar before seeking to cash in. Also
about this time, the Australian Treasury had engaged in interest swaps
due to its expectation of an Australian dollar appreciation against the
US dollar. When instead the massive depreciation ensued, it endured
Parliamentary inquiries and the following testimony in the
country's parliament from the country's central bank. If the
Treasury were to seek to unwind its hedge act that had misfired, it
might cause an altogether catastrophic drop in the Australian dollar.
In summary, in competitive market expected utility theory modeling
it is assumed that firms have access to a rational forward exchange rate
market, and can hedge with zero transactions costs in doing so. The
stylised facts are the reverse. Most firms lack any access to a forward
exchange market over the pertinent time span for trade and associated
capital flows. The big multinationals can get forward cover for such
extended horizons. But the process is so complex as to preclude analysts
discerning whether getting forward cover is sensible, let alone a
maximizing strategy. A laboratory experiment can avoid the assumption
(present essentially always implicitly) that firms have access to a
rational forward exchange rate market, and can purchase this Cover at a
zero transactions cost.
VI. THE TIME SPANS
Trade effects of relative price Changes such as those emanating
from exchange rate changes lag price changes by over a year, Pope (1981,
1985), and those of direct capital investment would have even longer
lags. But over the decades needed to get a satisfactory time series,
much else will have changed muddying the econometric estimates,
including fluctuations in exchange rate regime for many countries from
clean to dirty floating and partially back again. The result has been a
concentration on whether day-to-day or week-to-week volatility affects
trade. Not surprisingly, the conclusion has been, only modestly.
A laboratory experiment frees us from this problem. We can make the
periodisation compatible with the year plus lags that are pertinent. We
do not need to model using a periodisation that is, depending on the
particular study, between four and 365 times too short for being
relevant for trade and associated capital flows. We can also fix the
exchange rate regime, and avoid effects of exchange rate regime changes
introducing heterogeneity into the degree of uncertainty that agents
face. Thereby we can complement other ways being employed to get over
the timing and regime change problems such as the gravity models with
dummies brought into prominence by Krugman and applied to exchange rate
effects in eg Rose (2000, 2004), Kenen (2002a), and Adam and Cobham
(2007).
VII. TRANSACTIONS COSTS
Mundell (1961) focused on transactions costs as the plank of his
arguments against multiple currencies. This has continued to be his
focus, eg Mundell (2003). Others have recognized that both uncertainty
and transactions costs impede trade and thus are grounds for more stable
currencies, even currency unions, eg Adam and Cobham (2007). But in
field data we lack more than qualitative means of separating out the two
effects. In the laboratory by contrast, we can effectively exclude
transactions costs in the sense that we can and do set the exchange
conversion costs at zero.
VIII. OUR LABORATORY DESIGN
There have already been interesting experiments on exchange rates,
eg Noussair and Plott (1995, 1997), Fisher (2001, 2005), Fisher and
Kelley (2000), Cheung and Friedman (2005). Our design differs for
numerous reasons. One of these is our desire to examine sticky price
behaviour (or its absence) in the context of wage bargaining, as this
had been a prime concern of economists in Europe opposed to the
EURO's introduction and sticky wages out of the wage bargaining
process a lynchpin of the Mundell 1961 model that inspires much of the
advocacy of floating exchange rates. A second is our desire to model
shocks (supply, demand, expenditure changing, expenditure switching,
domestic in origin, foreign in origin) exclusively as in real life,
namely from human decisions. A third is our desire to enable central
banks to conflict or co-operate, and to model the prime role of central
banks in exchange rate determination-including under floats. A fourth is
our desire to combine trade and capital flows. A fifth is our desire to
mirror as far as possible real world complexity, including the official
sector's multiplicity of goals.
VIII.1 A Concrete Complex Setting
We make the context concrete to all participants, given the
evidence that context affects decisions. The world is complex so that
conclusions drawn from simplified set-ups may miss effects, and this
matter is especially important when the study concerns uncertainty,
since uncertainty itself generates complexities. Our design is a
compromise between the complexity of reality, and other constraints,
including the number of seats in our laboratory, and the maximum time
for which we keep participants in a session (one day). To our knowledge
it is the most complex experiment performed in an economics laboratory
other than those on the Sinto market, Becker and Selten (1970), Becker,
Feit, Hofer, Leopold-Wildburger, Pope and Selten (2006). More complex
experiments have however been conducted in psychology laboratories on
economic decision- making, eg Dorner, Kreuzig, Reither and Staudel
(1983) and MacKinnon and Wearing (1983). To grapple with real world
uncertainty costs, we sought as complex a design as was teachable to
advanced economics students for them to play it within a day, and also
theoretically analyzable with a game theoretic benchmark.
Despite simplifications, the set-up is sufficiently complex that we
are unable to spell out a standard game theoretic solution. We
restricted the complexity to what was teachable to advanced economics
students for them to play it within a day, and analysable with a game
theoretic benchmark of an incomplete equilibrium, designed by Reinhard
Selten. It involves the non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium for final
output, and a Nash bargaining solution in the nominal wage rate
bargaining. The incomplete equilibrium does not specify choices at all
information sets and allows a player to neglect those branches of the
game which, on being reached by his actions could not improve his
payoff, no matter what is assumed about unspecified choices.
VIII.2 The General Set-up
Our set-up has two countries, symmetric in every respect, and thus
suggestive of the UK and Germany, countries that are of approximately
equal economic size. This is a matter of interest in that some
economists, eg Cobham (2006), keep open the possibility that the UK
might find benefits in joining the EURO. Vice-versa, for German
industry, having the UK in the EURO is touted as the way to solve many
co-ordination and other costs of complexity and uncertainty involved in
trade at present.
We perform experiments with and without a currency union. In the
two currency case, there is in each country: 1 government, I central
bank, 1 union representative, 1 employer representative, 5 firms who buy
local and imported materials produced under competitive conditions that
are used in fixed proportions to produce a homogenous final good sold in
a domestic Cournot market, with nominal demand set by the government.
Firms face fixed costs, must produce at least a minimum amount, and face
a capacity constraint on the maximum that they can produce. In the case
of a currency union, the set-up is the same except that there is only
one central bank.
VIII.3 Credit, Interest Rate Charges and Opportunities
There is no cash, reflecting the fact that in advanced countries,
only a minimal portion of firm working capital is in this form. Firms
operate exclusively on credit up to their credit limit with their home
and foreign bank. Firms thus face interest charges on their three inputs
for producing physical output, labour, local materials and imported
materials. Firms also face interest charges on their borrowings for
hedging and speculative capital flows, and reap interest in the other
country in which they lodge such borrowed funds. Interest is earned in
the same period, and interest due must be paid in the same round. Sums
on the foreign account however-debits for imported materials, and
credits on capital invested abroad-only get repatriated in the next
round.
Interest rates thus affect firm decisions in the standard ways.
Higher interest on borrowed funds deters production and borrowing for
hedging and speculation. But inter- country interest differentials
entice capital flows. In their hedging or speculating in the current
round, firms face uncertainty concerning both the current exchange rate,
and because of the lag in the repatriation of profits on a firm's
foreign account, the future exchange rate.
VIII.4 Exchange Rate Determination
We impose a dirty float regime. If the two central banks have the
identical aim for the exchange rate, they determine it, as in reality.
In the case of central bank conflict, each central bank intervenes to
support its exchange rate aim. Each bank automatically intervenes up to
a set multiple, [[zeta].sub.1], of its export price in the form of
selling its own currency, if seeking to depreciate its currency against
the wishes of the other central bank. Each bank automatically intervenes
up to a set multiple, [[zeta].sub.2], of its import price in the form of
buying the foreign currency, if seeking to appreciate its currency
against the wishes of the other central bank. Since countries have more
limited scope to intervene in an effort to appreciate against the wishes
of other central banks (this requiring foreign reserves), than in an
effort to depreciate (this requiring them only to produce more of their
own currency), [[zeta].sub.1] > [[zeta].sub.2] The actual exchange
rate ensuing in these conflict situations is the ratio of currency
offers made by the firms and central banks of each currency. However if
this ratio is outside the range set by the two central bank exchange
rate aims, the central banks cooperate in keeping it at the nearest of
their two exchange rate aims. It is in the common interest of both
central banks to join forces to this extent against the firms.
VIII.5 Official Sector Tasks and Instruments
In addition to the government setting nominal expenditure for this
round, the official sector, in the form of its central bank, sets its
interest rate for this round and announces its price goal for next round
and in the case without a currency union, its exchange rate goal for
this round. Thus between its government and central bank, a
country's official sector has four instruments of macromanagement.
In having only four instruments, it is, as in real life,
under-instrumented for meeting goals. In having the official sector
short on instruments, we offer reasonable scope for the popular view to
be demonstrated that adding an exchange rate change instrument helps
macro management.
Thus the goals were seven in the two currency case: 1 keeping
prices steady; 2, meeting its price target; 3, keeping its ideal
interest rate; 4, maintaining its ideal level of competitiveness in its
cost structure relative to the other country; 5, meeting its exchange
rate target (a goal absent in the one currency case); 6 avoiding unduly
low employment; 7, avoiding unduly high employment). This latter goal is
less important than underemployment, and accordingly is given less
weight in the overall objective function. Although the decisions on
instruments were allotted (as in most countries) either to the
government or the central bank, the payoff was joint: both work for the
national good. The specific penalties for the official sector deviating
from each of its goals in our set-up were as in Table 3.
VIII.6 Exchange Rate Targetting and Shocks
From Table 3, in the two currency case central banks operate dirty
floats. As in the 1961 Mundell model, they can target (manipulate)
exchange rates so as to re-equilibrate the economy after shocks. But we
shed fresh light on the issue by dropping the assumption of there either
only being one shock ever, or else a set of shocks produced by a random
generator and in each case external to the system, as it were from outer
space. In such Mundellian models the central bank knows perfectly the
source of the shocks, exactly where the new equilbrium is. We replace
these false assumptions about shocks and knowledge of the new
equilibrium in our laboratory experiment, having instead all shocks
generated unwittingly by the domestic official sector, and sometimes
wittingly, sometimes unwittingly by the private sector. Thus in our
laboratory set-up central banks and governments can be as fallible and
error-prone as has been the Bank of England in its exchange rate policy
according to Cobham (1994, 2002, 2006). In our laboratory set-up, firms
as in real life can attempt to make a profit out of exchange rate
dealings if they think that one country's central bank has adopted
an untenable position as regards its joint choice of exchange rate aim
and interest rate relative to the other central bank. Being also
fallible, in our laboratory set-up, if firms misjudge the situation,
they may lose funds on a grand scale (like Long Term Capital
Management), or on a small scale (like some British universities with
overseas campuses). Out of this mix of varied fallible moves by members
of the private and public sectors in the two countries, our experiment
offers a fresh perspective on whether central banks really are able to
use the extra instrument of the exchange rate to improve macroeconomic
management, to restore equilibrium. Ie we get a fresh perspective on
whether dirty floating central banks can target their exchange rates in
the way hypothesised in the model of Mundell 1961-and in modern expected
utility extensions thereof populated by EUT maximisers.
VIII.7 The Private Sector
After the official sector has set its four targets and made these
public knowledge, in each country the union and employer representative
bargain over nominal wages. In this bargaining the union
representative's payoff is real wages measured as nominal wages
divided by the announced official sector target price, while that of the
employer representative, is the profit of the firms deflated by nominal
expenditure. If after the set time allowed of 10 minutes, an agreement
had not been reached, there was strike, with both negotiators receiving
zero pay. In strike periods there is an institutionally set wage, and
firms are subject to a lower maximum production level and a cut in
nominal demand relative to that announced by the government.
Once the wage rate (from bargaining or a strike) was announced for
both countries, firms decided on output and on the amounts of a currency
(home or foreign) to borrow in order to offer on the foreign exchange
market in order to either hedge, speculate. In making their decisions
the firms face two credit limits, one from their domestic bank and one
from the foreign country's bank. Their credit limits are multiples
of respectively the domestic and the foreign wage rate. Following their
decisions, the currency market operated, and set the period's
exchange rate, followed by the consumer market, determining the consumer
price, followed by firms paying for last period's imported
materials, and profits flowing to the firm's owners.
VIII.8 Exchange Rate Impacts
When the exchange rate changes, this alters directly: (a) the cost
of imported materials; and (b) any profits or losses from having
invested local currency abroad-from having hedged against a depreciation
of the home currency); or (c) any profits or losses from having invested
foreign currency at home-from speculating on an appreciation of the home
currency. Hence the exchange rate impacts directly on the economy via
its impact on trade and capital flows, and indirectly on the economy via
wage bargaining responses altering the costs of a firm's non-traded
inputs (direct labour inputs, and indirect labour inputs via domestic
materials that embody labour). Since private sector decisions have to be
made before learning this period's exchange rate, and since profits
are only repatriated from abroad at next period's exchange rate,
private sector decisions are influenced by two anticipated changes in
the exchange rate, those from: (i) last period to this period; and (ii)
this period to next period.
VIII.9 Periods, Sessions, Independence
A period is the above sequence of decisions and their outcomes
played by both the official and private sectors. A period was played by
the same participants 20 times, with a lunch break, typically after the
8th period. The first period was preceded by over an hour's
instruction. The participants were economics students at Bonn University
who had passed two or more years of economics, ranging in skill from
those in their third year of undergraduate economics up to doctoral
candidates. There were twelve such sessions run on 12 different days in
2003. Each of the 12 sessions contained different participants. Six of
the sessions had two currencies. Six had only one currency, and only one
central bank. This allowed us a comparison of the situation with and
without a currency union. There is interdependence between periods in a
single session: participants are influenced by what happened last
period. This means that we do not have 12 times 20 = 240 independent
observations. The interdependence of successive periods means that we
have only 12 independent observations, so that only strong effects are
detectable. The sessions were typically on Saturdays, since few
participants were available for an entire Monday to Friday weekday.
Participants were paid in accord with their task achievement.
IX. RESULTS
In each session, we started play in the initial period in
equilibrium, though not announcing this to participants. That is, if
people recognized the exchange rate fundamentals and behaved as
prescribed by the incomplete equilibrium solution, under the dirty float
regime imposed, the exchange rate would float for all 20 periods at its
initial rate.
IX.1 Disequilibrating Exchange Rate Changes
The rationale for flexible exchange rates is that these allow a
rapid return to equilibrium if wages are sticky and there was a shock,
and that in the absence of shocks, exchange rates are stable. But
despite starting off in equilibrium, in a system with no external shocks
and in this sense no grounds for exchange rate changes, in every session
at least one central bank sometimes altered its exchange rate aim. Thus
in every session, contrary to much standard theory, exchange rate
changes can be described as not equilibrating, rather destabilizing.
This accords with other experimental findings that EUT and game theory
(which uses that axiomatic base also), is descriptively invalid, Selten
(1997), and that assuming EUT yields biased estimates, Pope (2004).
IX.2 Better Performance of the Central Bank under a Currency Union
The exchange rate instability damaged governments and central banks
in their goal achievement. This can be seen from the payoffs of
participants acting as central bankers and governments. Without a
currency union, on average these each earned 74[euro] for the day. But
with a currency union, government players earned 80[euro] and central
bank players 85[euro]. Performance as regards its various individual
goals and their statistical significance is itemised in Table 4.
XI.2.1 Statistical Tests
The payoffs of participants acting as central bankers and
governments denote the official sector performance in each session. The
null hypothesis is that these payoffs are identical with and without a
currency union. In choosing statistical tests of whether the null is
confirmed by chance, we restricted ourselves to non-parametric tests.
These avoid assumptions on the functional forms of distributions.
The Perm Test
We performed a permutation test. Under this test we check whether
the higher average ,payoff of the official sector with a currency union
could be due to chance as follows. We have 12 averages of official
sector payoffs, six from the sessions with a currency union, and six
without. We make each possible combination of those 12 sessional average
sorted into two sets of six. We weight each combination by the number of
permutations that would give that combination. For this total set of
permutations, we compute the probability of getting the average at least
as high as was the case with the currency union if the two populations
were homogeneous. This probability is shown as the upper perm tail
number in Table 4 for each individual official sector goal, and for the
overall official sector performance. Conversely the probability shown in
the lower tall is 1 minus this magnitude, ie the probability of getting
a lower average than was the case with the currency union if the two
populations were homogeneous.
Outliers
The perm test is sensitive to outliers. To see this, let us take an
extreme case in which there is a single ultra ultra large payoff for the
official sector in one single currency session. This can yield the
finding that the currency union is better for macroeconomic management
even if the five other currency union sessions had lower average payoffs
for the official sector than did the six sessions without a currency
union. It is therefore desirable to do also a second (in some sense
weaker) non-parametric test that is independent of the absolute payoffs
for those cases found to be significant, to do a test that simply looks
at the payoff ranking.
The Mann-Whitney U-test
The Mann-Whitney test looks at the actual ranking of the payoffs
from all 12 sessions and compares these with the other possible
rankings. It ranks the 12 payoffs. It then computes the number of times
in this ranking each of the six instances of the official sector's
average payoff with a currency union is preceded by an average official
sector payoff without a currency union. It then sums these and obtains a
number. Let us term this [n.sub.wu]. It also does the analogous sum for
the non-currency union case, and obtains a lower number. Let us term
this [n.sub.nu]. It then constructs the set of all possible rankings and
uses this to calculate the probability of getting the number [n.sub.wu]
as high as observed if indeed the two samples are randomly drawn from a
homogenous population.
Two Tail Significance Levels
The null hypothesis is that the exchange rate regime is irrelevant
to public sector performance. In testing whether a currency union
improves or detracts from official sector performance, we used 2-tailed
significance levels. We do this because a 1-tailed test would fail to
take into account that the two opposing hypotheses held by economists,
one being that a currency union would worsen this performance due to
inability to use the exchange rate to rectify some sorts of
competitiveness shocks, and the other that a currency union would
improve it by eliminating exchange rate uncertainty.
IX.2.2 The Results
As regards the six individual official sector goals remaining also
with a currency union, the major gain from a currency union proved to be
in the attainment of [b.sub.4], its competitiveness level. The
improvement in competitiveness was significant at less than 1/2% level
on the non-parametric permutation test. As this is sensitive to
outliers, we also conducted a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test under
which it also proved significant at less than 1/2% level. Restoring
international competitiveness is the grounds for having a flexible
exchange rate, an extra instrument for managing the economy. Our results
disconfirm this.
The currency union improved performance on attainment of all
official goals except [B.sub.3], attaining its interest rate goal, and
[B.sub.6], avoiding too little employment. However, on the official
sector's pair of employment goals, [b.sub.6] + [b.sub.7], the
currency union's performance was superior. That is, with a currency
union, prices were steadier and better predicted, the country came
closer to its sum of employment goals, and there was an overall
improvement over the whole basket of goals. However none of these other
improvements in individual goal attainment or that in overall goal was
statistically significant.
The results suggest that even when the official sector is short of
instruments, having three less than its number of goals, it is better
for it to lose its exchange rate instrument -even when as in most
sessions, the exchange rate instability is minor. In a complex
environment, adding even minor additional uncertainty of exchange rate
changes reduces attainment of the government's set of price and
employment goals.
The costs of this additional uncertainty lie outside EUT,
axiomatised expected utility theory. These costs stem from uncertainties
in choosing among acts (strategies), and uncertainties in the interim
between action and learning the outcome. The results indicate that we
need a non-optimising approach to decision making compatible with SKAT,
the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory that adequately describes how
humans cope with the complexity of the real world. This allows us to
incorporate the benefits and costs prior to the period modeled in EUT.
These prior periods are when complexity takes its toll. Our findings
accord with the complexity tolls of information overload in making
predictions, Marey (2006), and in executives taking action, Omodei et
al. (2004). The complexity toll gets overlooked when our chronological welfare analysis begins, as under expected utility theory, upon learning
the outcome of risk taking, ie begins after the risks and uncertainties
are in the past.
Our findings accord with the descriptive material furnished by
ourselves and the other studies cited in this paper revealing that
evaluating alternatives in a complex world is a big and costly stage in
the whole decision process. It has been shown that evaluating
alternatives is far too difficult a procedure for central bankers,
governments, firms and their economic advisers to execute in the
costless, instantaneous and maximising manner assumed under EUT. Our
findings accord with the hypothesis that the complexity of evaluating
alternatives in the real world (as distinct from in simple abstract
models) has deceived us as an economics profession. It has yielded
inconsistent economic policy advice to diverse different countries on
improving their competitiveness positions via maintenance of a floating
rate to deal with shocks. Our findings tell against the continued use of
maximising models under the EUT umbrella that skip over all the tolls of
complexity and uncertainty in evaluating alternatives and how this
affects the decisions made.
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Notes
Address correspondence to Robin Pope, email Robin.Pope@uni-bonn.de,
the author of this paper for our team. We thank for comments on drains
Peter Kenen, Princeton University, David Cobham, Heriot-Watt University,
and Andrew Scott, London Business School, Sussex. We thank for comments
at presentations, David Cook, Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology, Dan Friedman, University of California, Santa Cruz, Kjell
Hausken, University of Stavanger, Mike Gilroy, University of Paderborn,
Angelo Sanchez, European Central Bank and others at conference and
workshop presentations. We thank Kerstin Wandschneider for background
information; thank for research assistance Angela Meyer, Shiraz Ahmed
and Andreas Orland, Bonn University and Daniel Lederer, St Andrews University; and thank for funding the German National Science
Foundation.
(1.) See Pope (2004) on the alternative Ramsey version of EUT which
has the like property of precluding attaching a different utility to an
outcome depending on its degree of risk, uncertainty.
(2.) Many scientists inadvertently violate the extreme epistemic
constraints of EUT, and thus construct epistemically inconsistent models
termed EUT. But in fact such models lie outside both SKAT and EUT.
(3.) For literature on Table 4 pertaining to other decision
situations, see Pope (1995, 1996/7) and Pope, Leitner and Leopold
(2006).
(4.) This critique, Cobham notes, builds on Melitz (1994).
(5.) Naturally, as in all markets, not everyone had been naive with
their fingers burned. Some had been wiser, had anticipated the
likelihood of exchange rate shocks, and refrained from such unhedged
borrowings. The next depreciation is described in Part 5. It too was a
shock in the sense that its timing and size could not have been
predicted-it arose out of overseas good weather conditions expanding the
world grain crops and reducing the price of Australian grain exports.
(6.) See footnote 2 above.
(7.) This impossibility of maximising was recognised by Savage,
granting that EUT was impractical for planning even a picnic. He
proposed a short-cut heuristic, a small worlds assumption, but found it
too difficult to operationalise, and left this task to future
researchers. As an alternative he proposed what he called an "extra
logical loose" sure thing principle, Savage (1954, 1972). But the
principle turns out to be irrational, to give the mirage of clarifying
by generating an illusion of certainty, Pope (1991).
(8.) This process was helped by those who had ever favoured floats,
those of the Chicago School who out their interpretation of the role of
New York grain speculators entering the Chicago grain market in the
1870s, saw all speculation as stabilizing, as creating desirable new
equilibria, eg Friedman (1953).
(9.) Indeed throughout this paper, readers will notice that we
largely refrain from giving examples from ourselves (the academic
community), in the belief that it is nicer for us to read about mistakes
made by officials, not by ourselves. But the officials hire us,
selecting primarily those perceived to be the best to help in a
country's macroeconomic management-their errors are a mirror of the
typical thinking of the economic profession in each era.
ROBIN POPE * AND REINHARD SELTEN
Experimental Economics Laboratory, Bonn University, Germany
SEBASTIAN KUBE
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn,
Germany
JURGEN VON HAGEN
Institute for International Economics, Bonn University, Germany
* Correspondence author: E-mail: Robin.Pope@uni.bonn.de
Table 1
The Four Main Stages of Knowledge Ahead After Encountering a Crisis
Stage Activity Unknown
1 Discovering Alternatives Choice set
2 Evaluating Alternatives Chosen alternative
3 Experiences while waiting to Last Outcome Segment
learn if had luck
4 Living with the Now Known Nothing-full knowledge
Outcome of the Chosen Alternative ahead, certainty (with
respect to that crisis)
Note: Stage 3 is irrelevant, since of zero duration if a sure
alternative is chosen
Table 2
Legacies for the Bank of England in Stage 4 from Earlier Stages 1, 2
and 3 (3)
stage 1 Discovering Alternatives
As regards reputation, the Bank has the minus of criticism that it
should have discovered a wider range of alternatives including a
Tobin tax and seeking to get the Maastricht Treaty overturned so as
to permit capital controls, dual exchange rate schemes, crawling
pegs, big depreciations for EMS members, Eichengreen, Wyplosz,
Branson and Dornbusch (1993), Vernengo and Rochon (2000).
As regards the welfare of its stakeholders, the Bank has the minus
of lower welfare by not considering these alternatives in that its
failure to identify better alternatives meant that the United
Kingdom exited from the EMS and is out of the EURO today. Yet there
is reasonable evidence that the capital controls at least would
have worked for quite a period, and saved the British taxpayers not
only their large loss in September 1992, but also the increase in
the country's risk premium for an extended period from being
perceived as depreciation prone.
Stage 2 Evaluation of the Alternatives identified
As regards reputation, the Bank has the minus of not having
evaluated its identified alternative of immediate depreciation, as
superior to its chosen alternative, namely to try to ride out the
crisis. This criticism has extra bite in that some, eg Cobham
(2002, p90), contended that it should not have been in the
situation of facing a crisis--that the Bank provoked the crisis by
its soft interest rate policy when it was unrealistic that it could
pressure Germany's central bank to follow suite and lower its rate.
(4) As regards the welfare of its stakeholders, it has the minus of
lower welfare from the additional funds plunged in the unsuccessful
effort to avoid depreciation.
Stage 3 Awaiting Resolution of the Risk / Uncertainty
As regards its emotional state, the Bank has the minus of
disappointment that Germany's central bank might have been more
cooperative and that one of the UK politicians might have been more
diplomatic in the period when such cooperation could not have been
ruled out. As regards the welfare of its stakeholders, the Bank has
the minus of the higher risk premia now due for payment arising
out of the turmoil before Black Wednesday.
Table 3
Official Sector Objectives
Variables
q actual price of the home country consumption good
[p.sub.+] next period's goal for the price of consumption good
p current period's goal for the price of consumption good
e exchange rate, the number of unit of home currency needed
to buy one unit of foreign currency and thus as e rises,
the home currency depreciates
m actual price of home materials in home currency
[m.sup.*] actual price of foreign materials in foreign currency
r interest factor (1+ the marginal interest rate)
f exchange rate aim
B official sector (government and central bank) objective
function
L actual employment
Parameters
[r.sub.0] ideal interest rate, set at 0.05
[L.sub.a] minimal acceptable employment, set at 600
[L.sub.b] maximum acceptable employment, set at 720
[b.sub.I] weight parameters, i = 0 5. The [b.sub.i] are positive
constants, set respectively 5, 6, 6, 3, 3, 1, and 0.01
Official Sector Objective function
B = [b.sub.0] - [b.sub.1] [([p.sub.+] / p - 1).sup.2] - [b.sub.2]
[(q/p - 1).sup.2] - [b.sub.3] [(r - [r.sub.0]).sup.2] - [b.sub.4]
[(m/[em.sup.*] - 1).sup.2] - [b.sub.5] [(e/f - 1).sup.2]
[-b.sub.6] max {[L.sub.a] - L, 0)} - [b.sub.7] max (L - [L.sub.b], 0)
Table 4
Performance of the Official Sector
Penalties [B.sub.1] for Falling Short of the Official Sector's Goals
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 Overall
Prices
Stable as Interest
Goals aim aimed Rate
[B.sub.1] +
Currency [B.sub.1] [B.sub.2] [B.sub.2] [B.sub.3]
Union
1 -0.06 -0.39 -0.45 -0.00
2 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 -0.00
3 -0.02 -0.20 -0.22 -0.13
4 -0.05 -0.20 -0.25 -0.00
5 -0.07 -0.13 -0.20 -0.00
6 -0.01 -0.26 -0.27 -0.13
average -0.04 -0.22 -0.25 -0.04
of 1-6
Two
Currencies
7 -0.09 -0.46 -0.55 -0.04
8 -0.01 -0.15 -0.17 -0.00
9 -0.02 -0.12 -0.14 -0.01
10 -0.11 -0.36 -0.47 -0.00
11 -0.03 -0.21 -0.24 -0.02
12 -0.06 -0.11 -0.17 -0.01
average -0.05 -0.24 -0.29 -0.01
of 7-12
permtest
upper tail 0.23 0.40 0.37 0.78
lower tail 0.77 0.60 0.63 0.22
Employment
International too too
Goals Competitiveness low high
Currency [B.sub.4] [B.sub.6] [B.sub.7]
Union
1 -0.00 -0.83 -0.18
2 -0.00 0 -0.16
3 -0.01 -0.01 -0.33
4 0 0 -0.34
5 -0.01 0 -0.07
6 -0.00 -0.79 -0.03
average -0.00 -0.27 -0.19
of 1-6
Two
Currencies
7 -0.22 -0.13 -1.09
8 -0.09 -0.03 -0.21
9 -0.28 0 -0.24
10 -0.87 -0.64 -0.01
11 -0.45 -0.07 -0.13
12 -0.27 -0.01 -0.62
average -0.36 -0.14 -0.38
of 7-12
permtest
upper tail 0.001 0.72 0.16
lower tail 0.999 0.28 0.84
Overall
Success
S-B = 5 +
[B.sub.1] +
[B.sub.2] +
[B.sub.3] +
[B.sub.4] +
[B.sub.6] +
Goals [B.sub.7]
[B.sub.6] + + [B.sub.6]
Currency [B.sub.7] + [B.sub.7]
Union
1 -1.01 3.09
2 -0.16 4.56
3 -0.34 4.07
4 -0.34 4.16
5 -0.07 4.53
6 -0.82 3.51
average -0.46 3.99
of 1-6
Two
Currencies
7 -1.22 2.43
8 -0.23 4.35
9 -0.24 4.19
10 -0.64 2.55
11 -0.20 3.85
12 -0.63 3.76
average -0.53 3.52
of 7-12
permtest
upper tail 0.38 0.11
lower tail 0.62 0.89
The maximum payoff attainable by the official sector was 5. For
[B.sub.i], i =1, ... 7, the symbol B, denotes the term of the public
sector goal function B, of Table 3 with the coefficient b, ie the
penalties for shortcomings in meeting the individual goals, [B.sub.1]
of stability of price aim, B2 of the conformity of actual price with
the price aim, [B.sub.3] of the interest rate being at its desired
level, [B.sub.4] of competitiveness being maintained, [B.sub.6]
of employment being too low, and [B.sub.7] of employment being too
high. Ie each [B.sub.i] denotes a subtraction from goal attainment.
In calculating the overall success of the official sector, presented
in the last column, there were no subtractions of penalties for
failing to attain the exchange rate target. This was because this
target, [B.sub.5], is absent in the case of a currency union. So there
is some merit in making the assessment of the improvement in official
sector objectives net of this additional burden borne in the
non-currency union situation.
Sessions labeled 1 to 6 were with a currency union; sessions labeled 7
to 12 were without a currency union.