The social impact of the global financial crisis in Australia.
Saunders, Peter ; Wong, Melissa
Introduction
The economic impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) that
emerged during 2008 has been lower in Australia than in most other OECD
countries. Between 2008 and 2010, the average unemployment rate in OECD
countries increased from 6.1 per cent to 8.6 per cent, while it
increased only marginally in Australia, from 4.2 per cent to 5.2 per
cent after peaking at just over 6 per cent in early 2009 (OECD 2011:
Annex Table 14; Saunders & Deeming 2011). As a consequence, the
post-crisis unemployment rate in Australia remained below the pre-crisis
level experienced elsewhere.
Many factors contributed to the resilience of the Australian
economy over this period. One was the decisive fiscal stimulus measures
introduced by the federal government in 2008 and 2009 that have
attracted wide praise from international agencies like the OECD and the
IMF, as well as from expert commentators. (1) Another was the rapid
return to growth in the Chinese economy which stimulated the demand for
Australian mineral exports, while the strong financial regulatory
framework introduced in Australia in the early 1990s and reforms to the
labour market that increased flexibility have cushioned it from external
shocks like the GFC. A large budget surplus and relative low public debt
also provided room for the government to expand its fiscal stance
without compromising its longer-term fiscal sustainability.
However, while debate over the relative importance of these and
other factors continues, less attention has been paid to the social
impact of the GFC. Economic statistics like those cited above have
important flow-on effects on social outcomes, where the critical issue
is who bears the burden and for what duration. A sharp rise in
unemployment, even if reversed fairly quickly, can have lasting effects
on those who lose their jobs, particularly if they have to wait some
time before regaining employment or have to settle for lower wages or
poorer quality jobs. Both long-term unemployment (those unemployed for
12 months or more) and youth unemployment (among those aged between 15
and 19) remained high following the GFC, highlighting the uneven
incidence of increased unemployment and the potentially broad social
effects that it caused (ABS 2011a; ABS 2012; CBA/NATSEM 2010).
This paper estimates the social impact of the GFC in several
dimensions using a range of indicators derived from data generated by
two large-scale national surveys conducted in 2006 and 2010. The goal is
to establish whether or not the GFC exerted an adverse social impact in
Australia and, if so, to identify those impacts. A subsidiary question
is whether the GFC contributed to growing inequality between those who
were most disadvantaged before it emerged and the rest of the
population.
It is important to acknowledge at the outset that the GFC has not
been the only factor giving rise to concern about potentially
undesirable social effects of recent economic developments. Much
attention has focused on the cost of living pressures associated with
rising fuel and energy bills, reinforced by the rising food prices that
have been a consequence of natural disasters in food-producing areas of
the country. Although these have occurred against a background of rising
national income, and hence increasing living standards, it has been
argued that the increased cost of living has been a particular burden on
those on lowest incomes. Because these pressures have emerged since the
GFC struck, it is difficult to untangle the effects of each, and this
qualification applies to the results reported below.
Recent studies of the impact of the GFC
The emergence of the financial crisis led to considerable
consternation among government and non-government agencies responsible
for addressing the anticipated increase in social distress. A number of
studies produced by non-government agencies examined its impact so that
remedial measures could be planned and implemented. In 2008, Access
Economics was commissioned by a consortium of leading community sector
NGOs to prepare a report on the impact of the GFC on social services in
Australia. The report, released in November 2008 when concern about the
impact of the crisis was at its peak, began with the bold claim that:
The current global financial crisis and its likely impact on the
Australian economy will have an acute impact on the most disadvantaged
members of society, as well as pushing increased numbers of low and
middle income earners to seek the services of welfare agencies...
Economic growth will inevitably slow, the extent to which is uncertain
[but the] impact will vary across different segments of society, with
the unemployed and other vulnerable groups particularly hard hit (Access
Economics 2008: 2; emphasis added).
The Access Economics report was discussed at an NGO summit that
generated a series of recommendations for government action which began:
We are deeply concerned that the deepening impact of the global
financial crisis will impact most harshly on those Australians that are
least able to weather the gathering storm on their own. Many Australians
who did not enjoy the prosperity of the recent boom will bear the
greatest impact of the bust (Anglicare Australia et al. 2009: 3;
emphasis added).
The recommendations themselves called for prompt action to avert
the impact of the crisis through stimulus measures that should
'target low income citizens, low income households and chronically
disadvantaged locations' (Anglicare Australia et al. 2009: 6).
In the same year, the Department of Families, Housing, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs (FAHCSIA) commissioned a survey to
examine the impact of the crisis 'to help understand the impact of
the worldwide economic downturn on Australian families' (FAHCSIA
2009: 1). The main fieldwork was conducted in May and June 2009 and
involved telephone interviews with 1,650 families with at least one
child under 18. The study found that almost 34 per cent of those
surveyed considered their financial situation to have worsened over the
previous six months (since around the beginning of 2009), while only 11
per cent considered it to be better. (2) In general, there was a clear
tendency for those with lower incomes to be more likely to report a
worsening of their financial situation: for example, 57 per cent of
households with income below $20,000 a year reported a worsening
compared with 14 per cent of households with incomes over $150,000.
There was also a clear gradient linking perceived changes in
financial situation over the last six months and the respondents'
assessment of their current financial situation. Thus, while around 14
per cent of those who rated their situation as 'prosperous'
when surveyed thought that it had worsened over the last six months,
this was the case for over 70 per cent of those who rated their
circumstances as 'poor' and 100 per cent for those who rated
themselves as 'very poor' (FAHCSIA 2009: 8). Even though the
numbers in these latter two groups are small (around 100 households in
total) there was a clear relationship between a perceived negative
impact and current circumstances which suggests that those least able to
cope had been hit hardest.
A similar pattern emerged from a study conducted in May 2010 by The
Salvation Army (2010), which surveyed almost 700 clients who had
requested emergency assistance and compared the results with those
produced by an online survey of 'the general public' that
generated 375 respondents. Over half (55 per cent) of the client survey
believed they were worse off as a result of the financial crisis, with a
similar proportion reporting that they had 'cut down on basic
necessities' or 'felt depressed about their situation'.
The first of these figures was well above the corresponding figure of 37
per cent of respondents to the public survey who reported being worse
off as a result of the financial crisis. The findings lead the
report's authors to conclude that: 'people most disadvantaged
in the economy, the people The Salvation Army has regular contact with,
are facing the worst of the current economic situation and the negative
psychological impact is greater on them' (The Salvation Army 2010:
3).
Another study, conducted by the Wesley Mission (2010), drew on an
online and telephone survey with over 620 adults in New South Wales. It
found that more than one-third of those surveyed reported being
financially stressed, as indicated by having to struggle to pay utility
bills, going without meals or being forced to pawn items. It noted that
'where six in 10 would have been able to cover a $2,000 emergency
expense in 2006, only four in 10 can do so now' (Wesley Mission
2010: 6). These and other findings lead the CEO of Wesley Mission to
claim in his Foreword to the report that:
While Australia has escaped the full impact of the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) at the macro level, many households have nevertheless been
affected and, according to this report, are likely to keep feeling the
pain for some time, particularly those surviving on low incomes (Wesley
Mission 2010: 5; emphasis added).
Although these latter two reports would have captured the effects
of cost of living pressures as well as the impact of the GFC, the
overwhelming impression they present is that the GFC itself resulted in
a considerable adverse impact on those least able to absorb it. However,
all of the surveys reviewed above were small in scale and were targeted
on recipients of cash support or service assistance. This is an
understandable focus for agencies with limited resources and whose
primary goal is to protect and promote the interests of their clients,
but it does not allow conclusions to be drawn about the wider social
impact of the GFC. Only when a broader approach is taken is it possible
to establish whether or not those at the bottom have experienced not
only adverse, but the most adverse effects.
A somewhat different picture emerges when a broader perspective on
the impact of the GFC is adopted. A Melbourne Institute study based on
waves 7 and 8 (covering 2007 and 2008) of the Household, Income and
Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey found that mean job security
satisfaction dropped sharply between 2007 and 2008, but remained above
its level in 2006 and earlier years. Disaggregated results also show
that mean job satisfaction increased between 2007 and 2008 for
fixed-term and casual employees but declined for those in permanent
positions (full-time and part-time) (Melbourne Institute 2010: Figure 12
and Table 12). The latter finding suggests that those in the most
advantaged labour market positions may have fared worse over this
period.
Analysis by the current authors of financial stress data in waves 7
and 9 of the HILDA survey reveals a slight decline in the incidence of 2
of the financial stress or hardship indicators between 2007 and 2009 but
an increase in the incidence of 6 indicators. (3) However, the increases
were all small in magnitude (less than one percentage point in all but
one case), although it is interesting to note that the two indicators
with the largest increase were asking for help from a welfare/ community
organisation (up 0.7 percentage points) and could not raise $2,000 in an
emergency (up 1.2 percentage points).
Overall, the evidence from these national studies suggests that it
is important to look more broadly at how the GFC impacted on the general
population. This enables us to compare how different socioeconomic
groups were affected and to establish whether those experiencing social
disadvantage did worse than others, leading to an increase in
between-group inequality.
Data and methodology
The Community Understanding of Poverty and Social Exclusion (CUPSE)
survey was the second in a sequence of surveys designed to develop
better indicators of social disadvantage in Australia. The survey was
distributed by mail to 6,000 adult Australians randomly selected from
the electoral rolls in April 2006. (4) By the end of July, it had
generated 2,704 responses, equivalent to a response rate of 46.9 per
cent--somewhat higher than that achieved by other similar social surveys
conducted around that time. (5) The detailed comparisons reported by
Saunders, Naidoo and Griffiths (2007: Table A.3) indicate that the CUPSE
sample is broadly representative of the general population, although the
following groups are under-represented: males; those who have never been
married; those who live alone; Indigenous Australians; those with lower
levels of education; those in private rental accommodation; and those
with gross incomes over $1,000 a week. Some of these differences are
inter-related, while others may reflect the difficulty involved in
conducting a mail survey. (6)
The Poverty and Exclusion in Modern Australia (PEMA) survey was
distributed to a new sample of 6,000 adults in May 2010 and generated
2,645 responses over the next three months--equivalent to a response
rate of 46.1 per cent. It was accompanied by a follow-up survey of 1,000
of those who responded to the CUPSE survey, which attracted 533
responses (the PEMA follow-up sample), equivalent to a response rate of
60.1 per cent. Both surveys replicated the CUPSE questions, aside from
the removal of those relating to attitudes to poverty and inequality and
the addition of questions relating to the impact of the GFC and aspects
of community participation and location. A small number of minor
modifications were made to the questions used to identify deprivation.
For example, both surveys include in the list of items a telephone and a
mobile phone. However, the increased usage of mobile phones resulted in
the first item being identified in 2010 as 'a telephone
(landline)' to avoid confusion.
Any bias in the composition of each of the two samples can have an
important impact on key aspects of the survey results (for example, when
identifying whether an item attracts majority support for being
essential) and differences in the composition of the two samples can
distort comparisons over time. Because the largest bias was related to
age in both surveys (see Saunders et al. 2007: Figure 2; Saunders &
Wong 2011a: Figure 1), population-based weights have been applied to the
raw data so that the estimates better reflect community-wide effects,
rather properties of the two samples.
The weighted results adjust for any differences in the age
composition of the two samples, but it is possible that other
differences still exist that could have a bearing on the comparisons
between them. A detailed comparison of the socioeconomic structure of
the two samples reported in Saunders and Wong (2012: Table 3.1)
indicates that the main areas of difference between them relate to
educational status (more respondents with undergraduate degrees and
fewer with only high school completions in 2010), family status (fewer
couples with children and sole parent families in 2010) and (gross)
income (far more with incomes over $1,000 a week in 2010). These
differences suggest that the PEMA sample may be somewhat more
economically advantaged overall than the CUPSE sample, and this could
mitigate the estimated negative impacts of the GFC and needs to be borne
in mind.
The over-representation of older people in the CUPSE (and PEMA)
samples was magnified in the PEMA follow-up sample because the sampling
frame itself contained an over-representation of older people. Although
this can also be adjusted for by applying weights to the raw data, this
is a more complex exercise when the data are longitudinal and so only
unweighted estimates are presented for those comparisons that include
the PEMA follow-up sample.
All three surveys included questions relating to a series of
'basic need' items (61 in the case of CUPSE, 73 in the case of
PEMA), some of which had been identified as necessary to achieve a
decent standard of living by participants in a series of focus groups
with low-income clients of selected welfare services (see Saunders and
Sutherland 2006). Other items were drawn from overseas deprivation
studies conducted in New Zealand, Ireland and Britain and included some
of the indicators used to identify hardship or financial stress in HILDA
and other Australian surveys (Bray 2001; McColl et al. 2001; Breunig
& Cobb-Clark 2006; Hahn & Wilkins 2008).
Survey respondents were asked three questions about each item: Is
it essential? Do you have it? And, if not (and where the item is
purchasable by individuals), Is this because you cannot afford it? The
word 'essential' was defined in the surveys as referring to
'things that no-one in Australia should have to go without
today': the aim is thus to identify items that are essential for
people in general, rather than for individual respondents.
Following international practice (see Gordon 2006; Pantazis et al.
2006), only those items that attracted majority support for being
essential were identified as constituting 'the essentials of
life'. A total of 26 items satisfied this condition in 2006,
although one of these (the television) was subsequently dropped after
conducting reliability and validity tests (see Saunders & Naidoo
2009). All but one of the remaining 25 items also received majority
support for being essential in 2010. The exception was a separate
bedroom for older children, but support for this item varied greatly
with age and the overall level of support only just exceeded the
majority support threshold in 2006. This item was therefore also
dropped, bringing the number of essential items down to 24.
Deprivation was defined to exist when people did not have and could
not afford those items that received majority support for being
essential for all Australians. (7) Economic exclusion (the only
dimension of exclusion considered in this analysis) was identified using
the indicators developed by Saunders, Naidoo and Griffiths (2008) and
details are provided later.
Before presenting results, it is important to note that the timing
of the CUPSE and PEMA surveys was not ideal for examining the social
impact of the GFC by comparing "before" and "after"
outcomes. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which highlights the
relatively short impact of the crisis in Australia and the speed with
which it was reversed. Clearly, the observed differences between the two
surveys will reflect the impact of all the changes that took place
between mid-2006 and mid-2010, of which the GFC was only one. Other
factors include the policies introduced to combat the impending crisis
(including the one-off stimulus payments, which were targeted at many
low-income groups), and (potentially) the differences in sample
composition mentioned earlier. It is also important to note that real
incomes (including average weekly earnings, household disposable income
per capita and the real value of most social security payments)
increased considerably between 2006 and 2010 (Saunders & Wong 2011b:
Figure 3) and this could have offset the short-run negative impact of
the GFC.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Despite the existence of these confounding factors, it is rare for
social scientists to have access to data that provides the basis for
making direct 'before' and 'after' comparisons using
data designed specifically for the purpose (including longitudinal
data). Importantly, the CUPSE and PEMA surveys allow the impact of the
GFC to be examined using data that, while not ideal, were specifically
designed for the purpose.
In light of the above discussion, and in order to avoid the obvious
interpretational problems involved in relying on a single measure of
impact, the issue has been explored using three approaches. The first
involves examining what respondents themselves said the impact had been
on them and their families. The second draws inferences from comparing
how a range of indicators of subjective wellbeing (SWB) changed between
2006 and 2010. Finally, changes in the reported incidence of financial
stress and in estimated rates of deprivation and economic exclusion are
compared. (To the extent that the timing problem discussed earlier
applies, it will only be relevant to results derived from the second and
third approaches.) If all three approaches reveal a similar story, then
one can be more confident that the findings are robust, whereas if
different results emerge from the different approaches, a more
cautionary conclusion will be appropriate.
Results
The PEMA survey included a question in which a number of possible
effects of the GFC were identified and respondents were asked to
indicate which of them had been relevant in their case (so that multiple
responses were allowed). The effects included and the responses produced
are summarised in Table 1. The aggregate estimates in the first column
of Table 1 indicate that almost one-quarter of the population
experienced some form of employment impact following the GFC and close
to one-half had their incomes affected in some way. The survey question
does not specifically ask respondents whether their changed
circumstances were a direct consequence of the GFC, although the wording
of the question (see Table 1) clearly implies this. Against this, 40 per
cent reported no impact on themselves or their family--a finding that
confirms that the impact was much less than was originally predicted.
The effects are, however, different for different age groups, with
those under 30 bearing the biggest employment impact (substantially
larger in all cases than those experienced by people aged 30-64), with
many young people finding it harder to obtain work or get promoted.
Income effects were generally more pervasive than employment effects,
and although the impacts also vary significantly across age groups,
these differences are not as large as those that relate to employment.
Many older people experienced the impact of lower interest rates,
whereas younger age groups were more likely to reduce their spending or
pay off debts, but both responses suggest a decline in living standards.
It is important to acknowledge that, even when 'normal'
economic conditions prevail, some people will lose their jobs, others
will experience reduced hours of work and those affected will experience
lower incomes that will in turn have further flow-on effects. Some of
these effects will vary with age and hence may in part explain the
patterns observed in Table 1. It is thus not possible to attribute the
survey responses unambiguously to the GFC (even though the survey
question refers specifically to it) because respondents will not know
with certainty if the change they experienced was a direct consequence
of the crisis.
The income impacts also vary with income--not surprisingly, since
both income and employment participation vary systematically with
age--although the differences are not as large as those for age and are
less frequently statistically significant. In terms of absolute size,
one of the employment effects and all three of the income effects are
bigger for those in the middle income category than for those in the
lowest income category. This finding is at odds with the findings
produced by the studies reviewed earlier that the biggest effects were
felt by those on lowest incomes, and suggests that a somewhat different
assessment of the distribution of the impacts is produced when a broader
perspective is taken. Note, however, that no adjustment has been made to
income to reflect differences in household size and composition (for
example, by using an equivalence scale) and this may also partly explain
the difference between the results presented here and those reported in
the studies reviewed earlier.
The second approach used to examine the impact of the GFC compares
the reported levels of subjective wellbeing (SWB) before (in 2006) and
after (in 2010) the financial crisis struck. Six indicators were used
for this purpose: assessed standard of living (ASL); satisfaction with
standard of living (SSL); happiness (HAP); ability to manage on current
income (IM); choice and control over 'one's life and the
things that happen to you (C&C); and satisfaction with one's
financial situation (SFS).
The wording of the relevant survey questions from which the SWB
indicators were derived follows standard practice, with respondents
asked to choose between a small number of options or (in the case of SFS
and C&C) to rate their situation on a 10-point scale from very
dissatisfied/no control to very satisfied/a great deal of control. For
ease of presentation, each response has been assigned a score that
varies between one (for the lowest response category) to the highest
response category provided in each case and the mean value of each
indicator in each year have been derived. Results are presented for the
cross-sectional comparisons for the two surveys, and for the linked
panel of respondents to both surveys.
The results in Table 2 provide little evidence that there was a
decline in SWB as a result of the GFC. Although the absolute values of
both indicators reveal important information about the high level of
wellbeing among the population in both years, interest here focuses on
how things changed over the period. Most of the indicators remained
fairly constant, but those that did move (the last two indicators, both
of which are defined using a ten-point scale) increased significantly in
the cross-section comparisons. (8)
There is, of course, a large literature on the determinants of
subjective wellbeing, much of it showing that SWB indicators tend to be
stable even over long periods. Drawing on his earlier research, Cummins
(2003: 225) reports 'remarkable stability in the means scores of
population estimates of life satisfaction', and goes on to argue
that this is a result of strong internal homeostatic tendencies that
restrict life satisfaction to a narrow range of values, and explain the
weak relationship between life satisfaction and objective measures of
the external conditions of life (Cummins 2003: 253).
This line of reasoning suggests that the finding that there was
little change between 2006 and 2010 in the SWB indicators examined here
provides rather weak evidence that the GFC had no impact, since
stability in the indicators examined is to be expected. However, the
logic of this view depends on how quickly the homeostatic mechanisms
operate to maintain life satisfaction in the face of major external
shocks (like the GFC). The idea of homeostasis is consistent with
short-run volatility in life satisfaction in the period before the
homeostatic mechanisms exert their influence. If this takes more than
four years, then one should observe some degree of short-run volatility
in life satisfaction (and other SWB indicators) and the tests reported
above should be able to detect it--as some of them do.
The third approach begins by examining changes in the reported
incidence of a range of direct and indirect indicators of financial
stress or hardship between 2006 and 2010. These comparisons are again
based on the two cross-section samples (weighted by age, as before) and
on the (unweighted) linked panel sample. The indicators of financial
stress are defined in Table 3, which also presents the incidence rates
of each indicator in each year. (9)
The results in Table 3 provide no strong evidence that financial
stress was any worse in 2010 than in 2006. The individual estimates move
in both directions and although many of them declined over the period
across both sets of comparisons, the only differences that are
statistically significant are the cross-sectional decline in the
proportion unable to raise $2,000 in an emergency, and in the proportion
of the panel sample that went without food when they were hungry. Doubts
have been raised, for example, by Bray (2001), about the ability of the
kinds of indicators shown in Table 3 to capture who is most
disadvantaged, and a degree of caution thus applies to the
interpretation of these results. In contrast, the indicators now
considered have been developed specifically to capture the extremes of
disadvantage and should thus provide a more accurate picture of the
changes that have taken place.
As explained earlier, the analysis of changes in deprivation are
based on the 24 items that received at least 50 per cent (age-weighted)
support for being essential in both years. In addition to comparing the
overall incidence of deprivation across these items in each sample,
changes in deprivation for those identified as facing severe deprivation
in each year are also examined. For this purpose, severe deprivation was
defined to exist when the household was deprived of 4 or more of the
essential items. Two summary measures of overall deprivation are used,
the mean deprivation incidence rate across all 24 items, and the mean
deprivation score, equal to the average number of deprivations
experienced across the whole sample. The (unweighted) mean deprivation
score is commonly used in deprivation studies and there is statistical
support for its use as a summary measure of multiple hardship or
deprivation (see Butterworth & Crosier 2005; Cappellari &
Jenkins 2007). The results are shown in Table 4.
The first point to note about these estimates is that both the mean
incidence of deprivation and the mean deprivation score declined for the
full sample between the two years. So too did the size of the severely
deprived sub-sample relative to the total sample--from 13.6 per cent in
2006 to 11.7 per cent in 2010. However, within the severely deprived
group there was no change in the mean incidence of deprivation, while
the mean deprivation score increased slightly, but not significantly.
Thus, while overall deprivation fell somewhat, its severity did not
change or rose slightly, suggesting that those who were most deprived in
2006 suffered most over the period.
The overall deprivation incidence rate declined for 19 of the 24
items and increased in only five instances--generally by a very small
margin. Some of the declines are substantial, with five items
experiencing declines of more than 1.5 percentage points: dental
treatment if needed; an annual dental check-up for children; up to $500
in emergency saving; computer skills; and a week's holiday away
each year. (10) However, few of the individual item (and none of the
aggregate) year-on-year changes shown in Table 4 are statistically
significant. The weight of the evidence thus suggests that the
hypothesis that deprivation became worse over the period can be
rejected.
Table 4 also indicates that deprivation declined less among the
most severely deprived sub-group than among the community as a whole.
For this group, deprivation fell for only 13 of the 24 items and
increased for the other 11--in several cases by more than three
percentage points. Both indicators show that dental deprivation also
declined among this group, but remained high enough to suggest that
there is still a need for further policy improvement in this area. With
those already facing the most severe deprivation faring relatively worse
than the community as a whole, the results in Table 4 suggest--albeit
tentatively--that there was an increase in inequality in deprivation
(and hence in living standards) over the period. This aspect of the
findings is also consistent with the picture of the greatest burden
falling on those least able to afford it that was given prominence in
some of the community sector reports described earlier.
The final piece of evidence concerns changes in economic
exclusion--one of the three broad domains of exclusion identified in
earlier research on social disadvantage (Saunders et al. 2008; Saunders
2011). Eight indicators have been used to capture economic exclusion and
they are identified in Table 5, which shows changes in the mean
incidence of each indicator and in the overall incidence of economic
exclusion among the full sample and among those identified as in deep
exclusion (defined as experiencing at least 8 of 27 indicators across
all three dimensions of social exclusion). The mean exclusion score is
defined in the same way as the mean deprivation score. This summary
measure has been used in work on social exclusion conducted by the
Melbourne Institute (see Scutella et al. 2009). The definition of deep
exclusion has been based on all three domains of exclusion (rather than
the multiple incidence of just economic exclusion) for consistency with
earlier work (see Saunders et al. 2008) and with the analysis of severe
deprivation presented earlier.
The evidence for the full sample suggests that economic exclusion
declined overall and in most dimensions, with the overall decline and
several of the individual falls (particularly those relating to labour
market exclusion) being statistically significant. A similar pattern is
evident for changes in deep exclusion, although fewer of the individual
changes are statistically significant (although those that are all
indicate a decline). Although both the average incidence of economic
exclusion and the mean exclusion score declined overall and for those in
deep exclusion, the decline was proportionately less (and not
statistically significant) for the latter group, which suggests a rise
in exclusion inequality over the period.
The exclusion indicators based on unemployment and joblessness
declined over the period even though overall unemployment increased
slightly (Figure 1) and these declines contributed substantially to the
overall decline in economic exclusion. Perhaps of greater significance
is the sharp drop in the proportions who did not have $500 in emergency
savings, could not raise $2,000 in a week if they needed to and had not
spent money on a special treat, which is consistent with the fact, noted
earlier, that the average real incomes of most groups increased over the
period. In contrast, the (small) rise in the percentage experiencing
difficulty getting by on their income may reflect the rising costs of
living that were taking place over the period.
Summary and conclusions
This paper began by noting that the Australian economy has
weathered the storm caused by the global financial crisis better than
most other OECD countries. Despite this, concerns have been raised about
the extent and distribution of the social burden that accompanied the
economic downturn. A series of reports released by those working at the
coalface of poverty relief have suggested that declines in actual
incomes and perceived wellbeing were experienced by many of those who
were least able to afford it. The results presented here have examined
the validity of these propositions using data from two national surveys
that were conducted around 18 months before the crisis emerged in
Australia and about 18 months after its effects had begun to dissipate.
The approach explored whether the overall picture is one of decline
or improvement across a range of indicators that capture the effects of
the GFC, including people's own perceptions of its impact, changes
in a series of indicators of subjective wellbeing and reported financial
stress, and changes in two objective indicators of social disadvantage,
relating to deprivation and economic exclusion. A substantial proportion
of those surveyed in 2010 reported that their employment circumstances
and incomes had been adversely affected by the GFC, with younger people
reporting the worst employment outcomes and middle-aged and older people
the worse income effects. In contrast, although the evidence suggests
that some dimensions of subjective wellbeing improved slightly between
2006 and 2010, many of these indicators remained static over the period.
The picture revealed by movements in the more objective indicators
is one of greater stability, with very few of the indicators of
financial stress and none of the 24 indicators of deprivation showing a
decline (or an increase) that is statistically significant. The evidence
that economic exclusion declined over the period is stronger,
particularly in relation to labour market exclusion and some of the
indicators that track changes in material living standards.
There is also evidence that those who were initially most
disadvantaged in terms of their exposure to deprivation and economic
exclusion tended to fare somewhat worse than others in the community. In
this sense, the results are consistent with the reports of increased
demand for welfare assistance produced by community sector studies
conducted immediately after the onset of the GFC, and suggest that
inequalities in living standards (like income inequality--see ABS 2011b:
Table 1) increased between 2006 and 2010.
However, despite many qualifications, the over-riding impression
conveyed by the results is one of a general (if modest) improvement in
living standards, broadly conceived--a finding that is consistent with
the increased real incomes that many Australians experienced over the
period. This suggests that the resilience demonstrated by the Australian
economy in response to the GFC, reinforced by the direct
(income-enhancing) and indirect (macroeconomic) impacts of the fiscal
policies introduced to counter its effects, have meant that the adverse
social impacts that many had feared when the crisis first broke in late
2008 have been avoided. The fact that most people were better off in
2010 than in 2006 suggests that any negative social effects of the GFC
were modest and temporary.
Acknowledgements
Preliminary versions of this paper were presented to a seminar at
the Social Policy Research Centre in May 2011 and to the 2011 Australian
Social Policy Conference in July. The authors would like to thank the
participants in both events who provided helpful suggestions for
improvement and acknowledge the incisive comments provided by three
anonymous referees. Financial support was provided by Australian
Research Council grants DP0452562 and LP100100562.
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Endnotes
(1) Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz was reported as noting during a
visit to Australia in 2010 that by introducing the stimulus measures the
ALP Government 'did a fantastic job of saving Australia from the
global economic crisis' (Saunders & Deeming 2011).
(2) Results from the 2007 Australian Electoral Study (AES) reported
by McAllister and Clark (2007: Section 4) indicate that 27 per cent of
those surveyed indicated that the financial situation of their household
had improved over the past year. This is well above the corresponding
figure of 11 per cent among FAHCSIA respondents.
(3) Declines were experienced for the percentage not able to pay
electricity, gas or telephone bills on time, and not able to pay the
mortgage or rent on time. Increases took place for the percentages who:
pawned or sold something; went without meals; was unable to heat home;
asked for financial help from friend or family; asked for help from a
welfare/community organisation; and could not raise $2,000 in an
emergency (HILDA unit record file data).
(4) Because voting is compulsory in Australia, the electoral rolls
provide a good sampling frame of the adult (aged 18 and over)
population. Household members aged under 18 are defined as children.
(5) Response rates have been calculated after removing returned
surveys indicating that the address was incorrect. The CUPSE response
rate was above that of 44 per cent achieved in the Australian Survey of
Social Attitudes 2003 (AuSSA)--see Wilson, Meagher, Gibson, Denemark and
Western (2005: 7).
(6) One area where the difference between the sample and the adult
population was most pronounced is in relation to age structure. Older
people (aged 50 and over) are over-represented relative to younger
people (particularly those aged under 30) among the respondents. The
AuSSA sample also contains an under-representation of those aged under
35 and an over-representation of those aged over 65 (Wilson et al. 2005:
Table 1.1).
(7) It is worth observing at this stage that the identification of
essential items is driven by community views as reflected in the survey
responses rather than imposed by the researchers, and also that the
method avoids the need to set a poverty line or make any assumptions
about relative needs (as captured in an equivalence scale).
(8) Because of the differences identified in Table 1 across age and
income groups, the analysis reported in Table 2 was repeated on a
disaggregated basis for the same sub-groups. There are some interesting
between-group differences in the estimated impacts in both years,
particularly those based on income. However, while all of the
year-on-year differences broken down by income are statistically
significant in the cross-sectional comparisons, few of those
disaggregated by age are, and almost none of the disaggregated linked
panel comparisons are statistically significant. These disaggregated
results are available on request from the authors.
(9) Trends in the incidence of financial stress using the HILDA
data for the period 2001-08 are presented in Wilkins and colleagues
(2011: Table 9.1). Although the general patterns are similar, the 2006
estimates reported in Table 3 are somewhat higher than those derived
from HILDA for either 2005 or 2007. This may reflect differences in the
definition of the indicators and in the detailed wording of the
questions from which they are derived.
(10) The first two of these can in part be attributed to the
improvements in the Commonwealth Dental Health Program that were
introduced in March 2008.
Table 1: Reported impacts of the financial crisis (weighted
percentages)
Question: The global financial crisis (GFC) began to affect Australia
towards the end of 2008. Since that time, have you been affected by any
of the following?
Age:
All < 30 30-64 65+
I lost my job 6.2 8.1- 7.0 0.5
My partner or another 10.3 15.8** 9.7 5.0
close family member lost
their job
I found it harder to 12.3 26.2** 10.2 0.3
obtain work or get a
promotion
At least one of the above 23.9 41.0** 22.3 5.5
three 'employment
effects'
I was forced to reduce my 7.1 12.5** 7.0 0.3
hours of work or take a
pay cut
My income fell because of 13.9 6.2** 10.4 37.3
lower interest rates
I reduced my 31.3 32.4** 34.4 18.8
spending/paid off some
debts in case I was
affected
At least one of the above 46.6 44.3* 46.4 50.5
three 'income effects'
The GFC did not affect me 40.7 33.7** 41.4 48.3
or my family
Gross weekly family income:
<$500 $500- $1,500+
$1,499
I lost my job 8.2** 7.2 3.7
My partner or another 8.5 12.7 8.8
close family member lost
their job
I found it harder to 17.1 ** 13.3 8.8
obtain work or get a
promotion
At least one of the above 27.2** 26.6 18.8
three 'employment
effects'
I was forced to reduce my 6.8 7.9 6.0
hours of work or take a
pay cut
My income fell because of 14.9** 17.6 7.7
lower interest rates
I reduced my 25.6 35.1 29.4
spending/paid off some
debts in case I was
affected
At least one of the above 42.2* 53.1 39.3
three 'income effects'
The GFC did not affect me 41.2** 34.3 49.6
or my family
Note: The asterisks (**/*) indicate that the three disaggregated (by
age and income) estimates are significantly different from each other
(p=0.01/0.05). Source: PEMA survey.
Table 2: Changes in subjective wellbeing between 2006 and 2010
(percentages or mean scores)
Indicator definition Cross-sectional Linked panel
comparisons comparisons
(weighted by age) (unweighted)
2006 2010 2006 2010
Assessment of standard of
living (ASL)--% very high 31.3 32.8 34.2 32.7
or high
Satisfaction with
standard of living 66.4 68.2 70.8 73.6
(SILS)--% very or fairly
satisfied
Happiness (HAP)--% very 89.4 88.6 92.4 90.2
happy or happy
Income managing (IM)--%
have enough or more than 57.9 58.8 64.1 61.3
needed
Degree of choice and
control (C&C)--mean score 6.88 7.05** 6.97 7.14
on a 10-point scale
Satisfaction with
financial situation 5.82 5.97* 6.24 6.33
(SFS)--mean score on a
10-point scale
Note: The asterisks (**/*) indicate that the year on year differences
are statistically significant (p= 0.01/0.05).
Sources: CUPSE, PEMA and PEMA follow-up surveys.
Table 3: Changes in financial stress between 2006 and 2010
(percentages)
Question: Have there been times over the last 12 months when you
have experienced any of the following because of a SHORTAGE OF MONEY?
Cross-sectional Linked panel
Financial stress indicator comparisons comparisons
(weighted by age) (unweighted)
2006 2010 2006 2010
Had to go without food 4.5 4.7 2.5 0.6 *
when I was hungry
Got behind with the rent 9.0 7.6 4.0 5.4
or mortgage
Moved house because the 2.8 2.8 1.5 1.2
rent/mortgage was too
high
Couldn't keep up with 13.4 13.3 10.7 10.2
payments for water,
electricity, gas or
telephone
Had to pawn or sell 7.2 7.4 4.2 4.8
something or borrow money
from a money lender
Had to ask a welfare 3.1 2.7 1.7 0.8
agency for food, clothes
accommodation or money
Wore bad-fitting or 11.6 10.9 8.0 8.3
worn-out clothes
Couldn't go out with 24.1 21.9 15.8 17.3
friends because I was
unable to pay my way
Unable to attend a 3.1 4.0 2.5 4.4
wedding or funeral
Couldn't get to an 5.7 5.2 4.6 3.3
important event because
of lack of transport
None of the above 64.5 65.3 75.1 72.3
I/we have not got enough 6.1 6.2 5.2 3.8
to get by on
Unable to raise $2,000 in 14.6 11.2 ** 9.4 9.7
a week in an emergency
Note: The asterisks (**/*) indicate that the year on year
differences are statistically significant (p= 0.01/0.05).
Sources: CUPSE and PEMA surveys.
Table 4: Changes in deprivation and severe deprivation, 2006 to 2010
(weighted percentages)
Incidence of deprivation Incidence of severe
- full sample deprivation - sub
sample (D [greater
than or equal to] 4
2006 2010 2006 2010
Item (n=2,589) (n=2,574) (n=353) (n=300)
Warm clothes and 0.3 0.4 1.8 2.7
bedding, if it's cold
Medical treatment if 2.1 1.7 12.9 11.8
needed
Able to buy medicines 4.5 3.5 26.9 23.4
prescribed by a doctor
A substantial meal at 1.2 0.9 7.6 5.6
least once a day
Dental treatment if 14.5 13.1 69.3 64.3
needed
A decent and secure 7.1 6.7 33.3 34.6
home
Children can 3.7 3.0 21.0 20.5
participate in school
activities & outings
A yearly dental 9.8 8.0 * 50.2 44.0
check-up for children
A hobby or leisure 5.7 5.2 30.9 34.5
activity for children
Up to date schoolbooks 4.0 3.4 21.6 21.5
and new school clothes
A roof and gutters 4.8 5.1 21.7 27.3
that do not leak
Secure locks on doors 5.0 4.4 25.1 25.4
and windows
Regular social contact 4.7 4.9 26.2 30.6
with other people
Furniture in 2.8 2.2 14.5 14.4
reasonable condition
Heating in at least 2.1 2.5 12.2 14.5
one room of the house
Up to $500 in savings 19.6 17.8 72.2 71.0
for an emergency
A separate bed for 1.7 2.1 7.8 12.2
each child
A washing machine 1.1 1.0 4.7 5.7
Home contents 11.1 9.5 53.9 50.2
insurance
Presents for family or 6.8 5.5 38.2 33.4
friends at least once
a year
Computer skills 4.7 2.9 ** 23.3 15.9 *
Comprehensive motor 9.8 9.1 40.7 44.5
vehicle insurance
A telephone 1.9 3.8 ** 10.8 19.9 **
A week's holiday away 23.6 19.8 ** 84.1 83.3
from home each year
Mean incidence of 6.4 5.7 29.6 29.6
deprivation
Mean deprivation score 1.43 1.30 6.80 6.89
Note: The asterisks (**/*) indicate that the year on year differences
are statistically significant (p= 0.01/0.05).
Sources: CUPSE and PEMA surveys.
Table 5: Changes in economic exclusion among full and
deep-excluded samples, 2006 to 2010 (weighted percentages)
Incidence of Incidence of deep
exclusion - full exclusion - sub
sample sample
2006 2010 2006 2010
(n=2,626) (n=2,605) (n=349) (n=292)
Does not have $500 in 26.1 23.2 * 80.0 78.4
emergency savings
Had to pawn or sell 7.2 7.4 32.9 36.7
something or borrow
money
Could not raise $2,000 14.6 11.2 ** 62.5 54.9 *
in a week
Does not have $50,000 27.7 25.5 69.6 67.6
worth of assets
Has not spent $100 on 8.6 6.2 ** 27.7 24.4
a special treat
Does not have enough 6.1 6.2 30.2 32.9
to get by on
Currently unemployed 4.2 2.7 ** 14.4 11.2
or looking for work
Lives in a jobless 19.9 14.4 ** 38.5 27.1 **
household
Mean Incidence of 14.3 12.1 * 44.5 41.6
Exclusion
Mean exclusion score 1.08 0.92 ** 3.49 3.26
Notes: Deep exclusion is defined as those experiencing at least 8
of 27 indicators of social exclusion across the three broad domains
identified by Saunders, Naidoo and Griffiths (2008): disengagement;
service exclusion; and economic exclusion. The asterisks (**/*)
indicate that the year on year differences are statistically
significant (p= 0.01/0.05).
Sources: CUPSE and PEMA surveys.