Understanding Institutional Diversity.

Meurs, Mieke

Understanding Institutional Diversity Elinor Ostrom Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2005, 365pp, index, Price: 17.95 [pounds sterling] (paperback).

In this book, Elinor Ostrom lays out in detail the results of her more than 20 years of work with Vincent Ostrom and other colleagues on institutions dealing with common pool resources. The hook's purpose is a careful presentation of the analytical framework ('a detailed multilevel taxonomy') they have developed to examine these issues, which they call the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Most of the chapters, some of which are co-authored with Sue Crawford, are devoted to developing a finely detailed grammar for describing and analysing institutional situations and characteristics. In addition to a literature review, one chapter describes the range of rule types that have been found to work in practice and contrasts these with those commonly found in the policy literature.

The IAD framework has a lot in common with a general game theoretic approach to the public goods problem. The difference between the two approaches is that while the general game theory (GT) framework presents a universal model of rational behaviour, the IAD approach sets out a universal framework or set of components, relevant for the analysis of all common property situations. With this framework in band, the author hopes that researchers will be able more consistently to dissect complex processes into specific, identified parts for comparison and analysis, and move beyond the existing confusion about the role of norms, rules, strategies and so on. The IAD framework adds to the usual GT setup more complex action-outcome links (including specifications of risk, uncertainty, and degree of control), noting that individuals may assign different values to the same variables, depending on their differing action-outcome links, norms, and so on. The IAD framework also assigns to participants positions, which are more complex than the GT specifications of the order of action, and specify 'the set of authorized actions and limits on actions' the particular position holder can take in that situation. Ostrom expects that this variety of assumptions and ad hoc elements will be an asset.

Using the ADICO syntax she and Sue Crawford have developed to describe rules for common property management, Ostrom explains how to use the syntax to classify different kinds of rules, very exactly defined. Patience will be required on the part of analysts to learn the characteristics of ATTRIBUTES, DEONTICS, DEONTIC operators, AIMs, CONDITIONS, and so on, and many readers may be overwhelmed by the swirling acronyms and new names for concepts already in use. Ostrom assures that the grammar is not impenetrable, using plenty of diagrams, typologies and examples to help illustrate its purpose and how it works. The framework can be developed mathematically or in nonmathematical terms, so it is accessible to dedicated researchers from a variety of disciplines.

Having already faced criticism about this highly detailed, unique grammar, Ostrom defends its usefulness in clarifying communication, highlighting possible specific points for reform in CPR management, and identifying common elements of existing rules. No doubt she is correct that the grammar achieves these goals. What is not clear is whether the resulting clarifications are worth the time by analysts in learning new language and the consequent loss of general accessibility for the discussion.

In Chapter 8, Ostrom promises to apply these tools to CPR problems and illustrate their usefulness. Unfortunately, in this chapter, the reader does not see the application of the highly detailed grammar. Ostrom outlines the kinds of rules that are found in practice. She analyses how these choice rules affect allowable actions and thus the management of common pool resources, based on the extensive field work she and her colleagues have done, but for this reader the value-added from the AIDCO syntax is not demonstrated. In fact, many of the main findings here echo those presented in Governing the Commons (1990), prior to the development of the AIDCO syntax. Yes, the value of Ostrom's basic IAD framework and her earlier ideas are reinforced by the subsequent 15 years of research. But readers looking for groundbreaking new ideas, or evidence of AIDCO's revelatory powers, will be disappointed.

An early chapter covers CPR problems at a high level of theoretical sophistication, but in accessible language. This will make it an ideal starting point for someone new to CPR debates and for more general readers. The next provides an excellent overview of the experimental evidence on human behaviour that motivates Ostrom's insistence on more complex (not universal) modelling. And a later chapter is an up-to-date overview of the state of understanding of CPR management. So the book has many uses besides the grammar.

Throughout the book, Ostrom emphasises a number of points which still need to be heard more often by social scientists. She contrasts what IAD researchers have learned about successful CPR management and the management rules currently dominant in policy analysis. Finding workable rules is not simple, but messy and complex. No rule is universally optimal, as there are too many possible permutations and conditions of application. Instead, appropriators use experiments based on partial analysis and local information, and researchers cannot hope to do better by creating elegant, parsimonious models.

Whether the AIDCO syntax will significantly improve the discussion of collective action and common pool resource management is something that will take more time to answer. The IAD framework is flexible, and the level of analysis necessarily depends on the specific policy goal. Some researchers may find significant analytical rewards in the highly precise form of the grammar, bringing at least parts of it into broader practice. If not, the more basic IAD framework still has much to add to analysis of CPRs and other questions of institutional evolution.

Mieke Meurs

American University, Washington, DC, USA