Did the 2013 municipal elections destabilize municipal politics in Quebec?
Mevellec, Anne
Abstract
Could the municipal political scandals uncovered by the Charbonneau
Commission exert an influence on a main characteristic of municipal
politics: the stability of its politicians? This paper intends to
explore this issue during the 2013 Quebec elections. To verify adherence
and/or deviation from established trends, we adopt a diachronic view
that considers the two previous elections (2005 and 2009). Three factors
are taken into consideration when interpreting voter trends: (1) voter
participation and the competitiveness of the elections; (2) the role of
municipal political parties; and (3) the incumbency advantage. We
observed (1) more competitive elections; (2) a shrinking number of
political parties but evidences of their general stabilization; (3) a
slight renewal of municipal politicians due more to withdrawal from
office than to electoral defeat. Finally, our analysis of electoral data
also uncovered variable dynamics within Quebec communities of different
sizes.
Keywords: municipal election, Quebec, incumbency, municipal
political parties
Resume
Les elections municipales quebecoises de 2013 se sont tenues dans
un climat defavorable aux elus municipaux. Ce contexte peut-il avoir eu
une influence sur ce qui caracterise le plus la politique municipale,
c'est-a-dire la stabilite de son personnel politique ? Cet enjeu
est interroge a partir de trois tendances documentees dans la
litterature ; (1) la competitivite des scrutins, (2) la presence des
partis politiques municipaux; (3) la prime au sortant. L'analyse
des resultats de 2005, 2009 et 2013, nous permet de conclure que: (1) la
competitivite des scrutins est de plus en plus forte ; (2) si le nombre
des partis politiques a baisse, leur presence est confortee dans les
villes moyennes et grandes ; (3) le renouvellement du corps politique
est davantage lie au depart de la vie politique d'anciens elus
plutot qu'a des votes de sanction. Finalement, l'analyse des
donnees montre des tendances differentes selon la taille des
municipalites.
Mots cles: elections municipales, Quebec, partis politiques
municipaux, prime au sortant
Introduction
The municipal elections that occurred across Quebec in November
2013 came hot on the heels of a multitude of political scandals at the
municipal level on a scale never before seen in Canada. One idea that is
frequently circulated (though is yet to be proven) is the notion that
political scandals not only repel citizens from participating in
municipal democracy, but also destabilize the municipal political
landscape. This article seeks to discover if this was indeed the case in
Quebec in 2013.
In Canada, municipal elections represent a fairly peripheral
subject in both political science and in urban studies (Eidelman and
Taylor 2010). While this relegation is not specific to Canada (see e.g.,
Lehingue 2009), there is currently a widespread surge of interest in
this subject owing to major comparative electoral studies in Europe
(Back, Heinelt, and Stewart 2006; Guerin and Kerrouche 2008) regarding
the professionalization process of local elected officials. The 2013
Quebec municipal elections provide an opportunity to ask similar classic
electoral sociology questions within a Canadian context as well.
A brief review of the literature on municipal elections in Canada
yields a number of observations. The first is that this subject occupies
a residual place in textbooks and works on municipal governance (Tindal
and Nobes Tindal 2008; Sancton 2011; Sancton and Young 2009). However,
when it does take place, the discussion is most often centred on the
voting system (i.e., the ward vs. the at-large systems). Authors also
speak to the presence of municipal political parties in Quebec City,
Montreal, and Vancouver, but generally do so to highlight their
exceptionality. A number of authors have also made efforts to focus on
certain aspects of municipal elections, including the electability of
women (Gavan-Koop and Smith 200S) and ethnocultural minorities (Andrew
et al. 2008; Simard 2004), as well as on the cost of election campaigns
in large metropolises such as Toronto (MacDermid 2009) and Calgary
(Young 2008).
Indeed, a majority of the literature deals, for the most part, with
municipal politics in markedly metropolitan settings. Thus, provincial
capitals are generally well addressed; as an illustration, we can refer
to the work of Stanwick (2000) on Toronto and of Cutler and Matthews
(2005) on Vancouver. There are fewer works on mid-sized cities, although
we can cite the research led by Breux and Bherer (2011) on medium-sized
cities in Quebec, or Spicer's (2012) work on Hamilton. However, the
1997 finding of Kushner, Siegel, and Stanwick regarding the absence of
generic works on municipalities of all sizes still holds true.
Furthermore, the existing body of literature is dominated by
inquiries into the office of the mayor (Siegel, Kushner, and Stanwick
2001; Stanwick 2000; Urbaniak 2009). Notwithstanding some exceptions,
very few studies deal with municipal councillors. The exceptions include
studies on councillors in Ontario elections (Kushner, Siegel, and
Stanwick 1997); the accessibility of municipal councillors in Toronto
following amalgamation (Kushner and Siegel 2003); the remuneration of
councillors (Schobel 2014); and the role of councillors (Koop 2014;
Mevellec 2011). Without denying the contribution and the diversity of
these works, it is clear that the study of municipal politics in Canada
is dominated by a twofold characteristic--namely (1) a monographic
viewpoint that limits the scope of inquiry; and (2) a nearly exclusive
focus on large metropolitan cities.
Ultimately, the value of each of these works cannot compensate for
the fragmented portrait they provide of municipal politics. However, the
province of Quebec offers an opportunity to consider an alternate, less
monographic approach. Through the institutional production of election
data, it is possible to undertake a longitudinal examination of
municipal politics in Quebec and, more broadly, to produce more general
knowledge on municipal elections in a transforming world. Indeed, data
collected by Quebec's Ministry of Municipal Affairs (i.e., MAMROT)
now makes it possible to compare various characteristics of the
candidates who ran, both successfully and unsuccessfully, in the 20051,
2009, and 2013 municipal elections in Quebec--that is, for the years in
which simultaneous voting was implemented. The availability of this data
enables us to break with the notion that municipal elections are merely
"second order" elections in order to establish the municipal
election process as a legitimate subject of study in itself.
The 2013 Quebec elections are particularly interesting, as they
came on the heels of a widespread loss of public confidence in municipal
officials. Since 2009, many fraudulent practices tied to the financing
of election campaigns and the awarding of municipal contracts have been
revealed by the work of the so-called Marteau squad and, subsequently,
by the Commission of Inquiry on the Awarding and Management of Public
Contracts in the Construction Industry (i.e., the Charbonneau
Commission). In 2011, the Government of Quebec passed Bill 109, the
Municipal Ethics and Good Conduct Act, which required that municipal
councils adopt a code of ethics and that elected officials take training
in ethics and professional conduct.
Amid the maelstrom of the Charbonneau Commission, several leading
figures in Quebec municipal politics were unseated. Some were removed
over criminal charges (e.g., Gilles Vaillancourt, mayor of Laval from
1989-2012; Richard Marcotte, mayor of Mascouche from 1992-2012; and
Michael Applebaum, mayor of Montreal from 2012-2013), while others
succumbed to political and public pressure and resigned (e.g., Gerald
Tremblay, mayor of Montreal from 2002-2012). In addition to uncovering
the unsavoury behaviour of individuals, the Charbonneau Commission also
provided an opportunity for light to be shed on the previously ambiguous
role played by some municipal political parties, particularly those in
Montreal and Laval, in the awarding of municipal contracts--and also,
unfortunately, in illegal political financing schemes. Public confidence
in elected municipal officials suffered greatly across Quebec, as was
widely reported in the media in a virtual avalanche of negative press.
One Montreal Gazette headline on March 6, 2013 read "Fraud probe
sweeps through Montreal city hall," while another on March 19, 2013
claimed that "False invoices lead to cash for political
coffers".
Could the municipal political scandals uncovered by the Charbonneau
Commission exert an influence on that which primarily characterizes
municipal politics: the stability of its politicians? This stability
(i.e., the trend of municipal politicians to demonstrate longstanding,
consistent involvement in local affairs) has been highlighted in a
variety of contexts. For instance, in their research regarding a
municipal poll conducted in Europe in 2004, Guerin and Kerrouche (2008:
195) indicate that, "While only a third of all mayors have been in
office for over ten years, most have immense experience of public life,
[with] two-thirds having been elected to their first position in local
government leadership more than ten years earlier." In Canada,
Kushner, Siegel, and Stanwick (1997) have addressed this stability in
terms of its benefit to the incumbent within the context of Ontario. In
Quebec specifically, such stability has also been documented against the
background of municipal amalgamations; in particular, both Simard (2004)
and Mevellec (2008) have shown that while the municipal elections of
2001 offered a chance for new (and sometimes diverse) candidates to
emerge, voters still elected incumbents (2).
This paper intends to explore the stability of municipal
politicians during the 2013 Quebec elections. As a baseline, we will use
the analyses and results set out in Mevellec (2011) and Collin (2011),
which relate to the 2009 Quebec municipal elections. In these studies,
three trends in stability were identified: (1) an increase in the amount
of competition/candidacies; (2) a growing role for political parties in
electoral competitions; and (3) the continued benefit to the incumbent.
Given that these trends were identified for the 2009 municipal elections
in Quebec, this paper asks: Do these three trends still hold true for
the 2013 Quebec municipal elections, which occurred in the wake of
numerous political scandals?
This study has drawn from the official candidate databases compiled
by MAMROT based on the Quebec municipal elections of 2005, 2009, and
2013. These sources have made it possible to document the age and gender
(3), political affiliation, and electoral success of all candidates
across all 1,103 municipalities in Quebec, as well as the incumbencies
for 2009 and 2013.
This work's main contribution lies in its documentation and
analysis of the prevailing characteristics of the 2013 Quebec municipal
elections with regard to the stability of elected municipal officials.
To achieve our aim of identifying adherence and/or deviation from
established trends, we will adopt a diachronic view that considers the
two previous elections. Three respective factors will be taken into
consideration when interpreting the three voter trends: (1) voter
participation and the competitiveness of the elections; (2) the role of
political parties; and (3) the turnover of politicians.
1. Did the political climate tarnish the attractiveness of
municipal political participation in Quebec?
Following an election, the first questions asked tend to concern
voter participation. Indeed, so-called "voter turnout" is
considered to be the truest measure of citizen participation within a
democracy (Nakhaie 2006). In Quebec, voter participation is measured
only in those municipalities in which the mayor has not been elected by
acclamation (Champagne and Patry 2004). This method of calculation
excludes roughly half of all municipalities in Quebec (mainly rural
ones).
According to MAMROT data, the voter participation rate for the 2013
Quebec municipal elections averaged 47%. This figure reflects a slight
increase as compared to the 2009 rate of 45% (4), but indicates an
overall decrease as compared to levels for the period between 1996 and
2002, which Champagne and Patry (2004) place at between 49 and 56%.
While it can be difficult to settle on a consensus, various sources
indicate that voter participation rates remain between 40 and 45% on
average in municipal elections in Canada. Sancton (2011) estimates the
normal participation rate to be between 30 and 40%, while Tindal and
Nobes Tindal (2008) calculate it to be 40% (5). Therefore, the 2013
Quebec election appears to have been a success in an electoral landscape
in which voters are rare.
Tindal and Nobes Tindal (2008) propose two non-exclusive hypotheses
to explain any pronounced increase in voter participation for a given
election. The first involves the importance of the election issue. In
the case of the 2013 Quebec municipal elections, the publicized scandals
related to the management of several municipalities may have helped to
encourage voters to actively participate in choosing their future
council members. The second hypothesis involves increased election
competition. In other words, it postulates that the larger the number of
candidates, the more inclined voters will be to vote. It is this second
idea that is particularly relevant to this paper, as the 2013 municipal
elections saw a notable increase in the number of local candidacies
across medium and larger cities in Quebec.
The competitiveness of municipal elections (that is, the
attractiveness of holding political office) can be measured by the
number of candidacies--something we will discuss further on. The number
of municipal politicians who are actually elected to their seats (as
opposed to being elected by acclamation) can also help gage
competitiveness. Table 1 shows that in 2013, 4,400 elected officials
(519 mayors and 3,881 councillors) were actually elected without
opposition. This represents nearly one in every two elected municipal
officials in Quebec. Yet Table 1 also shows an overall decline in the
number of elected officials who take municipal office without
opposition--a trend that applies across municipalities of all sizes.
This general trend is nonetheless most pronounced in medium and larger
cities (i.e., those with 20,000-500,000 residents), particularly with
regard to municipal councillors. In these cities, the rates of decline
in the number of unopposed elected officials between 2009 and 2013
exceeded -30%.
It is plain to see that electoral competition has been gradually
increasing in municipalities of all sizes in Quebec. As strong as this
overall trend may be, however, there remain many municipalities in
Quebec where "true" elections did not take place in 2013.
Indeed, according to MAMROT, in 2013 there were 247 municipalities in
which the entire council was elected unopposed (i.e., by acclamation),
which is fairly consistent with the data for the 2005 and 2009
elections. On the other hand, the data also reflect the fact that, for
the first time since MAMROT began recording data, the proportion of
mayors elected without opposition fell to below 50% (6).
The result of this decrease in the number of "elected"
officials appointed unopposed is, obviously, an increase in the total
number of candidacies (i.e., people running for office) across Quebec.
Table 2 illustrates this trend for all municipalities in Quebec, as well
as how this trend breaks down by size of municipality. The 2013
elections confirmed the trend observed in 2009 (Mevellec 2011), which
showed a continued increase in the number of candidacies; clearly,
winning municipal office has remained an attractive option to many, even
in the aftermath of the well-publicized political scandals.
The issue of the number of candidacies is important, as it allows
us to observe the attractiveness of local political office over time,
for a near-constant number of seats (7) and for various sizes of
municipality. By observing the rates of change, we can see that the
attractiveness of office is at its highest in cities with 20,000-500,000
residents. In fact, from 2005 to 2013, we can see a 51% increase in
mayoral candidacies and a 34% rise in councillor candidacies. For both
mayor and councillor positions, the percentage of change in the number
of candidacies was higher between 2009 and 2013 than it was for the
period from 2005 to 2009, which illustrates an acceleration in the trend
of wanting to be elected to municipal council.
The candidate-to-seat ratios for the various sizes of municipality
have also been calculated for the 2005, 2009, and 2013 election years.
Notably, the number of candidates for each seat has risen with the size
of the city. For instance, in 2013, in municipalities with fewer than
10,000 residents, the ratio was an average of 1.6 candidates per mayoral
position and 1.45 candidates per councillor position. In cities with
20,000-500,000 residents, these ratios rise to 3.16 and 2.77,
respectively. Lastly, in the province's only two truly metropolitan
cities with populations larger than 500,000 (i.e., Montreal and Quebec
City), these figures reach an average of 4.5 candidates for the office
of mayor and 4.0 candidates per seat on council. We can thus conclude
not only that the competition in 2013 was fiercest for the office of
mayor across the board, but also that the degree of competition rose
with the size of the city. (8)
By clarifying the electoral dynamic in the 2013 Quebec municipal
elections from the point of view of the number of candidacies, we are
able to draw two important conclusions. The first is that even though
the Charbonneau Commission findings may have discredited municipal
politics to a certain extent, the 2013 Quebec municipal elections saw a
continuation of the ongoing trend of the growing attractiveness of
municipal political mandates. The second conclusion is that,
particularly in 2013, this attractiveness seemed to be strongest in
cities with 20,000-500,000 residents.
2. Did the political climate disrupt the prevalence of municipal
political parties in Quebec?
As mentioned in the introduction, municipal political parties in
Quebec have occupied a central focus in the Charbonneau Commission
inquiries. In the months and years leading up to the 2013 municipal
elections, the rather ambiguous (and oftentimes unsavoury) role played
by these parties--particularly those in Montreal and Laval--was
stigmatized by the media. In this context, did the prevalence of
municipal political parties decline across Quebec preceding the 2013
elections?
On the day of the 2013 elections, the Chief Electoral Officer of
Quebec (i.e., the DGE) announced that there was an overall decline in
the number of municipal political parties fielding candidates in that
year's elections (DGE 2013). According to the DGE's report,
the number of parties across Quebec municipalities dropped from 194 in
2009 to 180 in 2013 (see Table 3). Indeed, for the province as a whole,
the 2013 election saw a notable break in the upward trend in the number
of municipal political parties active across Quebec, which has been
documented as consistently growing since the late 1990s (Mevellec and
Tremblay 2013).
While there is no question that a reduced number of municipal
political parties was the general province-wide trend, this decline did
not hold true for the 52 cities with 20,000-500,000 residents.
What's more, this same group of cities saw a rise in the number of
"labelled" candidacies (i.e., those that were aligned with a
political party). This was due to the fact that, in 2013, a strong
majority of political parties were able to field "complete"
lists of candidates (i.e., parties with as many candidates as seats up
for election).
The 2013 election data suggests that the partisan phenomenon is
becoming a permanent fixture in the municipal political landscapes of
the province's cities. Indeed, after spreading throughout all
municipalities in Quebec from 2001 to 2009, the parties appear to be
concentrating themselves in medium and larger cities. In fact, in 2013,
while political parties were operating in only 46% of municipalities
with over 5,000 residents, they were present in more than 63% of cities
with 20,000-500,000 residents. In addition, as proposed in Mevellec and
Tremblay (2013), it appears that a contagion effect is at play;
examining elections over time shows that rival parties often appear in
municipalities where previously only one party existed. One of the
strategies used to take on a municipal party in power, therefore, seems
to involve the creation of a second party. (9)
With the use of the data collected during the 2005, 2009, and 2013
elections, it is possible to identify those cities that are engaged in
"party politics" and those that have heretofore skirted this
political and electoral practice. For instance, 36 of the 52 cities with
20,000-500,000 residents had at least one municipal political party
present in at least one municipal election since 2005 (10). This
suggests that the presence of political parties is relatively deep
rooted in the majority of medium and larger cities in Quebec--with two
exceptions. First, 2013 marked the first year that the cities of
Gatineau, Candiac, L'Assomption, and Beloeil saw the emergence of
political parties. Second, political parties emerged only for a single
election in three other cities (i.e., in Saint-Hyacinthe in 2005; and in
Shawinigan and Victoriaville in 2009). Beyond these seven instances,
however, municipal political parties have had a relatively stable
presence in the other 29 medium and larger cities in Quebec that engage
in party politics (i.e., have been present in at least two of the three
elections).
This observation is particularly notable in terms of qualifying the
two main arguments commonly put forward in an effort to minimize the
municipal party politics phenomenon. The first of these arguments is
that parties are merely campaign organizations (Breux and Bherer 2012).
Indeed, the lifespan of political parties has been estimated at less
than two mandates by both the DGE and our own analyses; in this way,
municipal political parties do resemble election teams. However, it is
also the case that 12 of the province's cities with 20,000-500,000
residents had a political party that was active or successful during all
three consecutive elections. This suggests that, particularly when they
are successful, an institutionalization process may be occurring for
municipal political parties. This analysis cannot be confined to the
election alone, but must bring into consideration the modes of operation
and the effect of parties when they endure. This research has yet to be
carried out.
The second argument put forward to minimize the role of municipal
political parties in Quebec is that these parties serve the main purpose
of financially benefitting candidates' campaigns. Until the 2013
reform, Quebec's Act Respecting Elections and Referendums in
Municipalities (AERM) authorized parties to accept up to $1,000 from
each voter (L.R.Q., chapter E-2.2, art. 431). Furthermore, some of the
election spending incurred by parties could be reimbursed depending on
the election outcome. For instance, if a party-affiliated candidate was
elected or obtained at least 15% of votes, they would be reimbursed for
50% of their election expenses from the municipality's general
funds (L.R.Q., chapter E-2.2, art. 475). Following revelations regarding
rampant secret financing in municipal politics, the AERM was amended in
June 2013. Since then, individual contributions have been set at $300
for party-affiliated candidates and independents alike, and
municipalities are to reimburse 70% of eligible campaign expenses for
all candidates (both independent and party-affiliated) who have been
elected or who obtained at least 15% of votes (L.R.Q., chapter E-2.2,
art. 475 and 476). Therefore, the financial justification argument can
be considered insufficient to explain the role of municipal political
parties in Quebec--particularly since Gatineau, Candiac,
L'Assomption, and Beloeil all presented political parties for the
first time in 2013, when any supposed financial advantage had been
extinguished. This argument will be fully tested during the next
municipal elections, when the law will have been in place for more than
one mandate.
We have seen that municipal political parties are pervasive in
municipal politics in Quebec, although the extent of their influence
remains unproven. One effect of these parties, however, seems to be
their ability to get candidates elected. Table 4 illustrates the
relative success of parties in having their candidates elected.
Specifically, the success rate of candidates who are members of
political parties is higher than that of independent candidates (i.e.,
39% for the former as compared to 33% for the latter).
Building on the work of Mevellec and Tremblay (2013), we can
postulate that this elevated success rate is at least partly due to the
sizable financial and organizational resources obtained by the parties
for their candidates. However, the relative success of parties in having
their candidates elected should be a call to researchers to further
understand what link--if any--exists between a candidate's
membership in a municipal political party and his or her electoral
success.
By showing the development and extent of the party politics dynamic
that is so specific to Quebec, this section enables us to draw two main
conclusions. First, that while party politics continued to represent a
pervasive force in the 2013 Quebec municipal elections, the trend
towards an increased presence of political parties (observed across the
province since the late 1990s) generally began to lose steam in
2013--although the increasing presence of these parties seems to be an
ongoing phenomenon in medium and larger cities. Second, these parties
appear to be relatively effective in their ability to have their
candidates elected. Importantly, our lack of conclusive research on the
topic leaves us far from able to cast doubt on the role of these
political parties, even though several of them have been called into
question by the Charbonneau Commission.
3. Did the political climate disrupt the benefit to incumbents?
Our final avenue of inquiry into the effect of political scandal on
the stability of municipal politics in Quebec focuses on the benefit to
incumbents. The literature on the benefit to incumbents (which has been
produced in both Europe and North America) speaks in particular to the
distinction between candidates' original resources (i.e., those
they had prior to their first successful election) and the resources
they acquired during their term(s) in office. It has not been clearly
demonstrated that the resources acquired in office are what actually
allow incumbent candidacies to succeed in reelection (Trounstine
2011). Regardless of the origin of these resources, for our purposes,
the benefit to the incumbent describes the relative ease with which
incumbent candidates are reelected to office. In connection to incumbent
benefit, many researchers have examined the possibility of limiting the
number of municipal mandates that an individual can serve (Luttberg
2004), as well as the possible justifications for such limits in terms
of modernizing public administration (Marrel and Payre 2005). However,
no such term limits were at play in the 2013 Quebec municipal elections.
Given the electoral climate in Quebec in 2013, it was possible to
believe that a renewal of the political landscape was
underway--particularly given the departure of more incumbents from
office than had been seen in previous elections. One could wonder
whether the publicized municipal scandals and the subsequent
discrediting of those in office might have altered the mechanisms
favouring incumbents, even for a limited time.
A close look at the MAMROT data reveals that, while the total
number of all candidacies available in the province increased by 3.85%
between 2005 and 2009, the number of incumbent candidacies remained
stable between 2009 and 2013, with a difference of only 0.13%. It is
possible that these incumbents were nonetheless influenced in some way
by the events leading up to the elections; perhaps a desire to distance
themselves from the scandals or to leave a different legacy motivated
them to run for reelection. Regardless, across Quebec as a whole,
incumbents won a moderately smaller proportion of available seats in
2013 than they did in 2005 and 2009--although, as illustrated in Table
5, no dramatic drops in incumbency occurred.
Once again, however, Quebec's medium and larger cities proved
to be exceptions. As Table 5 shows, a notable decline in the number of
incumbent candidates running for reelection in 2013 can be found in
those cities with 20,000-500,000 residents, where only 359 incumbents
ran (as compared to the 437 incumbents who ran in 2009). We can
therefore conclude that 2013 saw an evaporation of incumbent politicians
running for reelection in medium and larger cities, and thereby many of
these districts were left "orphaned." This leads us to believe
that the lack of reelected incumbents in 2013 in medium and larger
cities was not necessarily due to voters penalizing those politicians
who had theretofore been in power. Rather, it seems clear that one major
variable at play was the fact that a large number of outgoing
politicians simply chose not to run again in 2013.
We can also ask questions regarding the success rate of incumbent
candidates in the aftermath of Quebec's political scandals. In
2009, in cities with 20,000-500,000 residents, the success rate for
incumbent candidates was 84%, both for the position of mayor and
councillor. This figure is consistent with that of the International
City Management Association, which is also the one used by Krebs (1998).
However, the 2013 data for these same cities show a slight decline in
the success rate of incumbents, which did not surpass 81.8% for mayors
or 79.7% for councillors (12). Therefore, while medium and larger cities
saw fewer incumbent candidates choosing to run in 2013, there does
appear to have been at least a small degree of voter backlash at the
polls, as those incumbents who did run were slightly less successful
with voters than they had been in the past. Therefore, the 2013 results
allow for a more nuanced picture of the work of Kushner, Siegel, and
Stanwick (1997), which found that the larger the city, the firmer the
grip of incumbent candidates on the election.
Our analysis of incumbent candidates revealed some other
interesting trends. For instance, in Quebec in 2013, women were more
likely than men to become candidates, with a variation of over 20%.
However, according to Gidengil and Vengroff (1997), the benefit to the
incumbent particularly favours men. By not running for office,
therefore, male outgoing elected officials potentially leave the way
open for women politicians. Further analysis would determine if an
increase in the number of women elected to municipal politics in Quebec
actually took place in these orphan districts.
By taking a closer look at trends in incumbency during the 2013
Quebec municipal elections, this section has enabled us to draw two
conclusions. First, that there was an exodus of incumbent candidates in
medium and larger cities, although this was largely due to the decision
of many outgoing candidates to retire from municipal politics. Second,
Quebeckers did not manifestly use the voting booth to penalize their
incumbent candidates for the events leading up to the elections. It
remains to be shown if the lack of incumbent candidates made way for a
sort of "renewal" in the municipal offices of these cities.
Conclusion
The objective of this text was to examine the 2013 Quebec municipal
elections while taking into account the troubled political climate in
which they took place. The guiding belief behind this work was that the
public image of local representative democracy has been tarnished by the
political scandals that have shaken a number of Quebec municipalities
since 2009. While opinion polls could contribute to this discussion, we
chose to address the actual behaviour of voters and candidates in the
2013 elections. Our analyses examined the influence of this shaken
public confidence on political stability, which is a well-recognized
characteristic of municipal politics in Quebec and elsewhere.
Specifically, three facets were chosen for examination based on their
ability to provide a snapshot of the dynamics and inertia of political
stability in Quebec municipalities in 2013. These facets were: (1) the
attractiveness of democratic municipal participation in Quebec; (2) the
prevalence of municipal political parties in Quebec; and (3) the
dis/advantage to incumbents.
In a media environment that was highly critical of elected
municipal officials, we saw that voters in 2013 still chose to go out
and vote at a rate similar to the 2005 and 2009 elections. Indeed, we
observed neither a citizen tidal wave looking to oust incumbents nor
excessive voter apathy in the face of this confidence crisis. Moreover,
we believe that the increased number of candidacies for seats in
municipal politics reflects the growing attractiveness of these
positions--a continued upward trend that is consistent with previous
elections. This leads us to conclude that the well-publicized scandals
that led up to the 2013 elections had no particularly negative effect on
the attractiveness of municipal political office at large. While
Quebec's distinctive municipal political parties were somewhat
negatively impacted by these municipal scandals, they seemed to survive
overall in the 2013 elections. To agree with Lehingue (2009), however,
this remains a largely understudied and poorly understood area. A final
avenue of analysis considered a possible renewal of municipal
politicians thanks to the slightly raised departure (and sometimes
failure) rates of incumbent candidates, with the interpretation that the
lack of reelected incumbents was generally due more to withdrawal from
office than to electoral defeat.
Finally, our analysis of electoral data also uncovered variable
dynamics within Quebec communities of different sizes. Indeed, the three
trends noted above are not observed to the same degree in all
municipalities in Quebec. Specifically, for each analysis employed, the
group of cities with 20,000--500,000 residents proved to have the
largest increase in candidacies, the most notable retention or
affirmation of municipal political parties, and one of the largest drops
in the number of incumbent candidacies. Together, these findings suggest
that medium and larger cities have been the theatre of more aggressive
electoral competition than other cities. Indeed, in this specific range
of cities, voter and candidate behaviours did in fact lead to the
demonstrable destabilization of municipal politics in 2013. Therefore,
we are led to reaffirm the academic and social value in looking beyond
huge metropolitan centres to consider smaller cities as legitimate
subjects of study in their own right.
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Notes
(1) In 2005, three municipalities postponed calling their elections
by one year. The implementation of simultaneous voting was therefore not
complete until 2009.
(2) Simard (2004) in particular has demonstrated that although
there were more candidacies from ethnocultural minorities in 2001, these
were seldom successful. In her study, Mevellec (2008) has shown that
voters chose to reelect incumbent mayors in order to ensure a political
transition in the context of the new city of Saguenay, created in 2001.
(3) The data concerning gender are used in another article in this
special issue. Upon analysis, the data on the age of candidates and
elected municipal officials do not reveal any notable trends, according
to Mevellec's (2011) findings. There is no data available on the
ethnocultural origins of elected municipal officials.
(4) Figures available on the MAMROT website. See
http://www.electionsmunicipales.
gouv.qc.ca/je-minforme/resultats-anterieurs-de-2009-et-2005/ (Accessed
April 15,2014).
(5) The Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) reports
that the voter participation rate in the 2008 municipal elections in
British Columbia was 27.78% (UBCM 2010). According to Bourgeois and
Strain (2009), New Brunswick had a voter participation rate of 45%
during the 2008 municipal elections.
(6) Further to this, Champagne and Patry (2004) have noted that,
from 1996 to 2002, 59% of mayors in Quebec were elected by acclamation.
This situation is not unique within Canada, however. In fact, after
collecting comparable data for Alberta, LeSage and McMillan (2009: 448)
note that, "By our calculations, using 2004 election data available
from Alberta Municipal Affairs, 47 per cent of rural municipal council
members and 38 per cent of village council members are acclaimed ...
Seventeen of the 109 town councils are wholly composed of acclaimed
members, and 38 per cent of town mayors are acclaimed ... Acclamations
are not restricted to the province's smaller municipalities; four
of Calgary's fifteen council members were acclaimed in 2004."
(7) According to MAMROT, the number of seats up for election was
8,111 in 2005; 8,078 in 2009; and 8,050 in 2013. This data is available
on the following website:
http://www.electionsmunicipales.gouv.qc.ca/pub/elections/statistiques_
elections_2013_candidat_elus.pdf et
http://www.electionsmunicipales.gouv.
qc.ca/je-minforme/resultats-anterieurs-de-2009-et-2005/ (accessed April
14, 2014).
(8) On these points, our data confirms the findings of Kushner,
Siegel, and Stanwick (1997) in regards to Ontario, although the Quebec
data can be differentiated due to the fact that the 1997 Ontario figures
referred to ratios of no larger than 3.0 candidates per seat even in
large municipalities.
(9) This no doubt explains why, in six cities with 20,000-500,000
residents, there were more than three political parties running in the
2013 election. Notably, Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu saw a race between six
political parties, of which five fielded complete lists of candidates.
(10) The presence of municipal political parties has been
strengthened over time in large cities (i.e., in cities with more than
100,000 residents). Gatineau was the final large city to see the
emergence of a political party, "Action Gatineau" (see
Chiasson, Gauthier, and Andrew in this issue). However, the parties do
not function on the same scale or have the same influence in all the
large cities in the province. For example, in the large city of
Trois-Rivieres, the "3R" party only fielded a single candidate
for mayor in 2009.
(12) This latter figure appears to approach the figures for New
Brunswick proposed by Bourgois and Strain (2009), which puts the
election success rate of incumbent candidates at 75% since 1966.
Table 1: Changes in the number of unopposed (i.e., acclaimed)
elected officials in Quebec municipalities of various sizes
(2005, 2009, and 2013)
2005 2009
All municipalities Mayors 605 548
Councillors 4,302 3,984
More than 500,000 residents Mayors 1 0
(i.e., Montreal and Quebec Councillors 5 2
City)
20,000-500,000 residents Mayors 10 10
Councillors 117 108
10,000-20,000 residents Mayors 12 13
Councillors 94 80
Fewer than 10,000 residents Mayors 582 525
Councillors 4,086 3,794
2013 Rate of
change
2009 to
2013(%)
All municipalities 519 -5.29%
3,881 -2.58%
More than 500,000 residents 0 0%
(i.e., Montreal and Quebec 1 -50%
City)
20,000-500,000 residents 7 -30%
73 -32.40%
10,000-20,000 residents 5 -61.53%
53 -33.75%
Fewer than 10,000 residents 507 -3.42%
3,754 -1.05%
Table 2: Change in the number of candidacies for the office of mayor
And councillor in Quebec municipalities of various sizes (2005,2009,
and 2013)
2005 2009 2013 Rate of
change
2009 to
2013 (%)
All municipalities Mayors 1,778 1,935 2,031 4.96%
Councillors 10,269 10,803 11,198 3.65%
More than 500,000 Mayors 73 84 99 17.85%
residents Councillors 442 440 470 6.81%
(i.e., Montreal
and Quebec City)
20,000-500,000 Mayors 104 126 158 25.39%
residents Councillors 1,071 1,199 1,445 20.51%
10,000-20,000 Mayors 79 81 104 28.39%
residents Councillors 442 500 532 6.40%
Fewer than 10,000 Mayors 1,522 1,644 1,670 1.58%
residents Councillors 8,314 8,664 8,751 1.00%
Table 3: Municipal political parties and the number of "labelled"
candidates fielded (2005, 2009, and 2013)
2005 2009 2013
Number of municipal political parties 162 * 194 ** 180 **
authorized by the Chief Electoral
Officer throughout Quebec
Number of municipal political parties 52 55 61
that fielded candidates in cities of
20,000-500,000 residents
Number of "labelled" candidates fielded 580 627 663
by municipal political parties in cities
of 20,000-500,000 residents
Source: * DGE Annual report 2005/2006--Appendix III http://www/
electionsquebec/qc/ca/documents/pdf/
rapport-annuel-dge-2005-2006.pdf (accessed April 24, 2014); ** DGE
report http://www/election- squebec.qc.ca/francais/
actualite-detail.php?id=5523 (accessed April 24,2014)
Table 4: Number of candidates and elected officials (both
independent and members of municipal political parties) in the 2013
Quebec municipal elections in cities with 20,000-500,000 residents
Number of Number of
candidates candidates
elected
Independents 940 311
Members of municipal
political parties 663 259
Total 1,603 570
Table 5: Outgoing candidacies and outgoing elected officials in the
2009 and 2013 elections (11)
2009
Outgoing Outgoing Outgoing
Candidacies Elected candidacies'
Officials rate of
success
All Mayors 848 680 80%
municipalities Councillors 4,370 3,603 82%
More than Mayors 14 12 85%
500,000 Councillors 57 42 73%
residents (i.e.,
Montreal and
Quebec City)
20,000-500,000 Mayors 38 32 84%
residents Councillors 399 337 84%
10,000-20,000 Mayors 37 28 75%
residents Councillors 174 132 75%
Fewer than Mayors 759 608 80%
10,000 residents Councillors 3,740 3,092 82%
2013
Outgoing Outgoing Outgoing
Candidacies Elected candidacies'
Officials rate of
success
All Mayors 835 658 78%
municipalities Councillors 4,390 3,664 83%
More than Mayors 3 3 100%
500,000 Councillors 22 17 77%
residents (i.e.,
Montreal and
Quebec City)
20,000-500,000 Mayors 33 27 81%
residents Councillors 326 260 79%
10,000-20,000 Mayors 28 23 82%
residents Councillors 157 122 77%
Fewer than Mayors 771 605 78%
10,000 residents Councillors 3,885 3,265 84%
Outgoing candidacies :
rate of change
2009-2013 (%)
All Mayors -1.53
municipalities Councillors +0.46
More than Mayors -78.57
500,000 Councillors -61.4
residents (i.e.,
Montreal and
Quebec City)
20,000-500,000 Mayors -13.16
residents Councillors -18.3
10,000-20,000 Mayors -24.32
residents Councillors -9.77
Fewer than Mayors +1.58
10,000 residents Councillors +3.88
The data provided by MAMROT does not identify outgoing candidacies
in 2005.
