Funding matters: the maze of settlement funding in Canada and the impact on refugee services.

McGrath, Susan ; McGrath, Ian

Abstract

This paper examines the complex federal/provincial funding arrangements for settlement programs and services in four provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec) and the impact that they appear to have on the provision of services for refugees. We draw on Leslie Seidle's four models of federal/provincial/territorial immigration funding arrangements (co-management, tri-level consultation/federal delivery, comprehensive control and devolved) that illustrate the different agreements that have been negotiated for each of the four provinces. We also conducted interviews with senior service providers of Resettlement Assistance Programs in each of the four provinces to get an understanding of the impact of the different funding arrangements on local programs. The analysis features the refugee services provision and looks at the issues of intergovernmental engagement, service impacts and program flexibility. The emerging role of municipalities in settlement service is also considered.

Keywords: immigrant services, intergovernmental funding, policy, refugees

Resume

Le present document examine les arrangements complexes de financement federaux / provinciaux des programmes d'etablissement et des services dans quatre provinces (Colombie-Britannique, Alberta, Ontario et Quebec) et l'impact qu'ils semblent avoir sur la prestation de services pour les refugies. Nous nous appuyons sur les quatre modeles d'ententes federales/provinciales/territoriales quant au financement de l'immigration de Leslie Seidle (la co-gestion, a trois niveaux de consultation / d'execution federal, un controle complet et deconcentre) qui illustrent les differents accords qui ont ete negocie pour chacune des quatre provinces. Nous avons egalement mene des entrevues avec les fournisseurs de services responsables des programmes d'aide au reetablissement de chacune des quatre provinces pour obtenir une comprehension de l'impact des modalites de financement differentes sur les programmes locaux. L'analyse comprend la prestation des services aux refugies et se penche sur les questions de l'engagement intergouvernemental, les impacts de service et la souplesse du programme. Le nouveau role des municipalites dans les services d'etablissement est egalement considere.

Mots cles: services pour immigrant(e)s, financement intergouvernemental, politique, refugie(e)s

Introduction

Canada's provision of settlement support for refugees has long been a part of what is viewed as its humanitarian tradition. It is one of ten countries that accept 99% of the approximately 80,000 refugees annually resettled in new countries with the Canadian government sponsoring approximately 7000 refugees each year (UNHCR, 2011). This figure excludes non-Convention refugees and refugees resettled through Private Sponsorship.

The development of Canadian settlement policy has been complicated by a federalist political structure and complex intergovernmental agreements. Section 91 of the Constitution Act gives legislative authority over "naturalization and aliens" to Canadian Parliament. However, section 95 of the Constitution Act gives shared authority in the area of immigration to federal and provincial governments, with ultimate oversight given to Ottawa (Department of Justice, 1982). With respect to immigrant settlement policy, the Constitution grants the Federal government primary responsibility for immigrant selection and the Provincial governments' jurisdiction over language training, education, economic and social welfare of immigrants.

In an attempt to manage the complexity of these arrangements, the Federal government entered into formal settlement agreements clarifying the respective roles and responsibilities with all provinces and territories, except Nunavut (CIC, 2010a). The government of Quebec took on responsibility for settlement services as early as 1991, receiving funding from CIC under the Canada-Quebec Accord. In 1995, the federal government launched the Settlement Renewal Process as an attempt to devolve the administration of settlement services to the rest of the provinces. In 1998, an agreement was signed with the province of British Columbia and an agreement with Ontario was reached in 2005 (CIC, 2010a). The Agreement for Canada-Alberta Cooperation on Immigration was signed in 2007. Seidle (2010) has conceptualized four main types of settlement agreements: co-management, tri-level consultation/federal delivery comprehensive control and, devolved models of Federal-Provincial Transfers (FPT). Drawing on Seidle's characterization, this article examines the bilateral settlement agreements for the top four immigrant and refugee receiving provinces: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta.

Despite guaranteed federal settlement programming for every Government Assisted Refugee (GAR) resettled outside Quebec to ensure that available settlement services correspond with the needs of government-assisted refugees, there are variations in the types of services that are provided across the country (Yu et al., 2007). This research focuses on refugees who are sponsored by the government to come to Canada and sent to specific destinations and not refugees who are privately sponsored (PSR) or those who claim refugee status at the border or inside Canada and are processed through the refugee status determination system. Service provision for GARs is fixed to a specific funding formula and can be tracked. While agencies may serve PSRs and successful claimants, the funding trail cannot be readily traced. We expand the scope of the previous research to include the province of British Columbia in order to have representation of each of the types of federal/provincial agreements.

Refugee Resettlement in Context

In 2011, Canada resettled 7,364 Government-Assisted Refugees (CIC, 2012a) in communities across the country. For their first year, in all provinces except Quebec, immediate and essential support for GARs is paid for by the federal government and delivered by service provider organizations as part of the Resettlement Assistance Program (RAP). This initial financial support covers essential start-up costs for needs like food, furniture, clothing, and basic household items. RAP also helps resettled refugees with temporary housing, identity documents and customized orientation in basic-life skills as well as a monthly allowance for food and shelter (CIC, 2004). In Quebec, settlement services are provided by non-governmental organizations funded by the Government of Quebec through the Canada-Quebec Accord. As resettlement assistance is limited to helping GARs meet their immediate and essential needs during their first year in Canada, this support is often complemented by Provincial and Territorial government settlement programming.

Similar to other categories of immigrants, refugees are selected according to specific criteria. Prior to 2002, an "ability to establish" criteria was applied to the legislation guiding Canadian resettlement as a way to limit the support needs of refugees on Canadian public support systems. The 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) relaxed the financial and health selection criteria and Canada began resettling refugees from 'developing' countries. Refugees arriving with serious medical conditions and limited education and work experience face major challenges for settlement and place high demands on the service providers supporting them. Recent research suggests that federal support to address these mounting challenges has not kept pace. For example, a survey of the research interests of resettlement assistance program providers conducted by Jennifer Hyndman and colleagues (2010) identified the inadequacy of resettlement funding as a major issue.

Settlement Funding

Settlement agreement negotiations are marked by their contentious nature, regularly raising Constitutional questions and engaging the power politics of both federal and provincial governments. For example, the Canada-Quebec Accord was negotiated in a broader political discussion concerning linguistic and cultural issues in the context of Quebec sovereignty. The settlement agreement between Ontario and the federal government was negotiated as a result of increased Provincial interest in the area of settlement. In 2011, settlement programming for all refugees and immigrants in Canada had the largest budget within the immigration portfolio at $923M from a total ministerial budget of $1.6B (CIC, 2011a). Determining how much of this budget was spent in each province is challenging due to the complexity of funding arrangements and varying reporting requirements of federal-provincial transfer settlement agreements. As a result, it is extremely difficult to accurately estimate how much of this federal expenditure has been dedicated towards refugee integration. For example, settlement programming in most provinces is guided by annexes that are negotiated apart from most federal-provincial agreements. Client eligibility, reporting requirements and even defining what counts as a settlement service can differ widely between provinces. Even though it is fairly simple to calculate the level of RAP support in each province, as it is based on a consistent formula in all provinces except Quebec, it is limited to the first year of settlement for resettled refugees. Many refugees rely on mainstream settlement programs after that year and some require special services during that year, such as in the case of persons who have experienced torture. Access to post RAP settlement services is therefore crucial to the settlement experiences of refugees.

For the purposes of this study, some basic statistics are of interest. Table 1 demonstrates the number of GARs and immigrants per province and the amount of provincial funding allocations on a per capita basis.

Based on this data, Quebec receives the highest rate of settlement funding in Canada at a per capita rate of $4368. In 2009, it received 20% of the total number of immigrants to Canada and 27% of GARs. Much of this disproportionate spending can be explained by Seidle's (2010) description of the Canada-Quebec Accord as Canada's only model of "comprehensive control" (pp2-3). Federal funding for immigration is transferred to the province of Quebec along with full discretion on the administration of immigration programs and the allocation of funding without accountability to the federal government. This has made expenditure reporting unclear and it is difficult to discern how much funding is allocated to immigrant and refugee settlement programs. Immigration issues are the mandate of the Quebec Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (QMICC). Through the 1991 Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens Agreement (Government of Quebec 1991), the Quebec government gained full responsibility in determining immigration levels, selection criteria, and expectations of immigrants settling in the province. The Agreement was considered to be key to preserving the province's demographic importance within Canada and the integration of immigrants that respects Quebec's distinct identity.

In 2009, 55% of all refugees and 48% of all immigrants in Canada settled in Ontario (CIC, 2010b). On a per capita basis, Ontario received $3221 of federal funding, approximately 30% less than Quebec. Seidle describes the 2005 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) as a "tri-level consultation/ federal delivery" model (Seidle, 2010:9-11). This model involves consultation between the federal, provincial and municipal governments in the design, delivery and implementation of settlement and integration programming in Ontario. Unlike other types of agreements, the COIA promised a specific amount of funding; a five-year, $920-million program to help newcomers successfully integrate into Ontario communities. The approach was enhanced through the establishment of Local Integration Partnerships (LIPs) involving all three levels of government in 2008. When the COIA was set to expire in 2010, Ontario and Citizenship and Immigration Canada agreed to a one-year extension worth $320M in federal settlement spending for Ontario (CIC, 201 lb). A new agreement has yet to be negotiated and the federal government continues to have a major role in the planning and provision of settlement services in Ontario making significant cuts to the transfers in 2010-11 and 2011-12, a strategy strongly objected to by the province.

In 2009, British Columbia received 16% of all immigrants to Canada and 7% of all refugees. BC's per capita funding level ranks third of the four provinces surveyed. The Canada-British Columbia Immigration Agreement is considered a model of "devolution" (Seidle, 2010:7-8). The agreement granted the Government of British Columbia the ability to manage its own settlement and integration programs. As part of the funding arrangement, Citizenship and Immigration Canada continues its transfer payments under the condition that the provincial government continues to spend it on the design, delivery, administration and evaluation of settlement and integration programming (CIC, 2010a).

Alberta has the lowest per capita level of service funding of the four provinces. It receives far fewer newcomers compared to Ontario and Quebec. On average, Alberta receives 11% of the immigrants and 10% of all refugees to Canada. Seidle (2010) describes the Agreement for Canada-Alberta Cooperation on Immigration as a "co-management" model (pp14-16). This agreement provides primary responsibility to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for the design and delivery of settlement programs in consultation with the Government of Alberta (CIC, 2010a). Alberta receives more temporary than permanent residents and is a major participant in Canada's Temporary Foreign Worker Program (Austin and Bauder, 2010). Through the Provincial Nominee Program, Alberta recruits highly-skilled labour (Statistics Canada, 2011) making employment opportunities the primary settlement service for Alberta newcomers.

Regional Refugee Settlement Support

In this section, we examine the different arrangements of social service delivery programs in the context of federal-provincial transfer funding for the major regions of settlement in each of the four provinces. The methodology used for this examination includes analysis of federal and provincial settlement data, a literature review and interviews with one key informant service provider in each of the provinces under review. The interviews were done by telephone following a set of open-ended questions. Four key informants are considered adequate given that each is recognized across Canada as a leader in the field and is active in the Canadian Council for Refugees, a pan-Canadian association of agencies serving refugees. We considered the impact of each funding agreement on intergovernmental engagement, program flexibility and services.

Alberta

Alberta's approach to immigrant settlement and integration, under the purview of its Ministry of Employment and Immigration, emphasizes meeting employment needs of business and has made strong investments in job-skill training for refugees. At the local level, there is a long history of relatively weak municipal governments reliant on provincial funding. Connecting newcomers to provincial and federal assistance programs is largely accomplished by civil society organizations such as the Calgary Catholic Immigration Society (CCIS) that is the RAP provider and the agency consulted for this research.

Despite the presence of a "co-management" model, federal-provincial discussions on refugee resettlement in Alberta have focused on refugee numbers and not on the settlement needs of refugees or the service capacity of the settlement sector (Birjandian, 2011). Funding has not kept pace with the higher needs and bigger GAR families (ibid). The numbers of refugees resettled who are destined to Alberta has slowed in recent years due to a shortage of available housing in Calgary. CCIS has helped to address the refugee housing gap in Calgary through the operation of its reception-house (ibid).

Under its current governance structure, Calgary's municipal government has not been engaged on the issue of refugee settlement nor has it been a priority for the provincial government. Given the lack of provincial and municipal government engagement in the design and delivery of refugee settlement programs, service provider organizations rely on federal funding for innovative practices outside the RAP program. Another challenge for refugee program design and delivery has been the fluctuation in GAR arrival patterns and the difficulty in planning for adequate staffing and supplies. Agencies rely on private donations to cover some costs such as the stockpiling of goods (ibid).

Quebec

The Canada-Quebec Accord grants exclusive powers related to integration to the provincial government. The Accord has resulted in increased rates of funding for the province dedicated to overall integration and language programs, while requiring the Government of Quebec to settle a proportion of humanitarian cases. As early as 1991, Quebec took the initiative to resettle refugees outside Montreal, and currently lists over 12 destinations where service provider organizations deliver resettlement assistance (Reichhold, 2011). Of the 1,700 GARs resettled on average each year to Quebec, only 250 (typically people with complex health care needs) are resettled in the Montreal metropolitan region (ibid). All settlement services are delivered through local not-for-profit organizations. When GARs settle in Quebec, they are immediately eligible for social assistance and provincial health care.

In 1979, agencies serving refugees and immigrants in the Montreal area formed an umbrella organization called the Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes refugiees et immigrantes (TCRI). With 144 member organizations, TCRI is dedicated to advocacy for and protection of refugees and immigrants in Quebec and assists with the establishment and integration of all categories of new entrants in the city (TCRI, 2010; Reichhold, 2012). The TCRI serres as an intermediary between agencies and the provincial and federal governments.

Generally speaking, there are two main differences between Quebec and other provinces in terms of refugee resettlement assistance. Unlike other provinces, Quebec does not use reception houses. Refugees arriving in Quebec stay in a hotel for 3 to 5 days while accommodations are located (ibid). The high costs of hotels compared to reception houses takes up precious settlement funding which may be better spent elsewhere and the rapid rehousing of GARs has raised other issues (Rose and Charette, 2011).

The second way that Quebec differs from other provinces is that the Ministere de l'Immigration et des Communautes culturelles (MIGC) micro-manages the settlement of GARs. Provincial public servants actively engage with immigrants and work with non-governmental organizations to provide services for refugees; there tends to be very little municipal involvement. The MICC provides limited funding to locally-engaged service provider organizations for the promotion of intercultural exchanges between ethnocultural groups, which are not coordinated and lack an overarching policy and vision. Evidence of these initiatives is poorly documented and largely anecdotal (Reichhold, 2011). The limited flexibility and promotion of innovation that does exist within this model is round as a result of close relations between the Table de concertation as an umbrella organization and the MIGC. Attempts to allow regional program variations within Quebec have suffered from a lack of coordination. For example, each region of Quebec has developed its own approach to suit the needs of its specific refugee population. The result has been a noticeable disparity and reduction in the quality of some services.

The 2008 report of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences identified concerns about the coordination and funding of settlement services by the Quebec government (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). A recommendation of the Commission was to increase government funding for community groups and frontline organizations in order to overcome what the commission regarded as a "serious deficiency" and to "consolidate and develop the existing network of organizations while avoiding a piecemeal approach" to integration (ibid, 268). In particular, the report recommended increased funding for organizations that work with immigrant women. The Bouchard-Taylor Commission has not had a long-term impact in strengthening refugee social sustainability. According to practitioners, the release of the Commission's report resulted in the "Bouchard-Taylor Effect" which led to a 25% increase in MICC budgets (Reichhold, 2011). However, this increase was short-lived as budgets returned to previous year levels in 2010-2011. In terms of engaging public institutions to better support the settlement of refugees, the MICC has begun engaging education, health and employment sectors to improve refugee access to public services, particularly for refugee youth. It is currently estimated that around 30% of refugees in Quebec are below 18 years of age (ibid).

British Columbia

The federal-provincial agreement of 1998 (Government of British Columbia, 2008; CIC, 2010a) was renewed in 2004 for five years and has been extended (Government of British Columbia, 2009). All GARs in British Golumbia are originally resettled to Vancouver and spend their first two weeks in BC's only reception centre at the Immigrant Services Society of British Columbia (ISSof-BC). Approximately half of all GARes then more to the suburbs in Surrey due to high housing costs in Vancouver (Friesen, 2011). BC municipalities are active in the resettlement of refugees. The City of Vancouver (2007) has taken a leadership role in supporting settlement through the Mayoral Task Force on Immigration, whose focus has been on refugee claimants and refugee housing issues. In Surrey, the municipality has taken an increased leadership role in supporting funding and research on government-assisted refugees related to housing (Friesen, 2011).

The 1998 agreement devolved most settlement and integration services to the provincial government. The experience of British Columbids government in managing settlement and integration programs demonstrates that devolution opened the door to innovation in program design and greater responsiveness to stakeholders. For example, WelcomeBC, a branch of the Ministry of Jobs, Tourism and Innovation, currently has administrative responsibility for most programs for newcomers, the most important being the BC Settlement and Adaptation Program (BCSAP), and the Welcoming Communities and Inclusive Workplace programs (Government of British Columbia, 2007). With the increased flexibility, the Government of British Columbia has developed a number of innovations including expanded language training (some of which has a labour market component), the placement of settlement workers in schools, and programs targeted at particular groups, including seniors (Hiebert, 2009). Unlike other types of agreements, the devolved model permits the provincial government to determine its own priority populations for funding. The Province has also used this latitude to fund refugee-specific programs including home based case management, youth and young adult classroom based programming, and support for refugee families with children under the age of 6 years.

The process in British Columbia for funding programs submitted by service provider organizations has moved to a competitive process of bid tendering which is open to service providers in the not for profit and private sectors. This change was meant to bring greater fairness and broaden the circle of organizations being funded (Leo and Enns, 2009). Most contracts are multi-year and are re-tendered every 3 to 5 years. The focus of the tendering process is based on the outputs and outcomes of settlement programs not financial management and reporting. All proposals are graded by a third party with a set of established marking criteria (Friesen, 2011).

This process is a high risk/reward scenario for service providers. If successful, service providers in British Columbia can experience 5 years of stability. If not, then they must wait 5 years for the next opportunity. Given that funding parameters are usually set within a 5-year timeframe, organizations often experience funding surpluses in the early years that compensate for inflation adjustments in later years. The provincial government is taking steps to develop minimum standards and competencies for settlement service providers. To this end, the Government of British Columbia has designated funding specifically for training staff of successful proponents.

Bid tendering has resulted in limited micro-managing of funds when service provider organizations can demonstrate that they have met minimum 80% service utilization during quarterly reporting periods. While this process has eased the administrative burden on service provider organizations, it has resulted in some of the smaller providers either disappearing or forming legal consortia to sub-contract settlement work from larger settlement agencies (Welsh, 2006). This process has increased the 'legalization' of settlement work as all legal risks and liabilities are placed on the lead proponent of the proposal. This approach has increased the risk aversion of some larger organizations in addition to changing their role to include 'project funder' (Friesen, 2011).

In terms of reporting to the federal government, it is unclear how many refugees access settlement services outside of their initial six weeks of RAP support. Provincial settlement programming reports are not required to disaggregate expenditures by immigration category, making it very difficult to know how much settlement funding is spent on vulnerable populations, such as GARs. It is clear that the autonomy granted through the Agreement has encouraged BC to deliver wide-ranging and innovative programming to meet the needs of resettled refugees in their province.

Ontario

In 2009, Ontario received 106,867 immigrants, of which 11.8%, or 12,651, were landed refugees (CIC 2010b). The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) is based on the tri-level consultation/federal delivery model, which engages municipal government more than any other provincial agreement (CIC, 2012b). Local Immigration Partnerships (LIP) have been established in thirty urban centres across Ontario with plans to extend them to the Prairies and Atlantic Canada (Qayyum & Burstein, 2012; Welcoming Communities, 2012). Inherent in the LIP program is recognition of the importance of local municipalities and neighbourhoods in providing responsive services. Local partnerships have also raised some concerns that the responsibility for these services will be transferred to the provinces and municipalities without adequate funding from the federal government. It remains to be seen how effective they will be and what impact they will have on the funding of local service provider organizations particularly for refugees. This pressure to collaborate and consolidate services often leaves community-based agencies struggling with the tensions of being compelled to form partnerships with agencies with whom they have been, and may continue to be, in competition for resources (McGrath et al., 2012). One of the early challenges identified has been how to engage all sectors that play a role in the settlement of newcomers. Many provincially governed sectors, such as education and health, lack the experience and expertise to meaningfully support integration and settlement. It is anticipated that engaging various actors at a grassroots level will evolve into best practices and strengthen existing capacity to support settlement and integration (Calla, 2011).

The design of the COIA permitted the development of increasingly progressive supports to encourage access to public institutions by refugees, such as child minding and transportation (CIC, 2012b). Certain municipalities in Ontario, such as York Region located north of Toronto, have been very active in the development and delivery of settlement programs. For example, York Region successfully lobbied the Government of Ontario to secure federal funding for the development of "Welcome Centres" for immigrants and refugees and there are now five centres across the Region. Welcome Centre Immigrant Services provide a one-stop service designed to guide and support immigrants through the maze of information and resources in York Region (www.welcomecentre.ca/york). Given its rapid demographic growth based on immigration, settlement providers in the region have often had difficulties in responding to the demand and maintaining the quality of settlement services.

While increasingly common across Ontario, Welcome Centres feature a variety of settlement supports and programs, such as language and employment supports, under a single roof. The Welcome Centres also host "fairs" in which service providers, such as Legal Aid or Service Canada, bring their services to the refugee community. The success of this model in Ontario has been evident as Durham Region is planning to design two Welcome Centres for the unique needs of its population (Calla, 2011). An additional benefit has been the ability of Welcome Centres to facilitate integration across ethnic groups. Classes within the Welcome Centre are comprised of members from a variety of ethnic groups and feature curricula focused on multiculturalism and rights. Immigrants surveyed have been very receptive to this format and feel increasingly integrated as a result (ibid).

Comparative Analysis

Based on this research, we draw a few conclusions related to the impact of program flexibility and intergovernmental engagement on settlement programming for resettled refugees.

Intergovernmental Engagement

The 2011 GAR/RAP Evaluation found that the challenges facing refugees arriving in Canada after the introduction of IRPA have become more pronounced, indicating that the need for RAP has increased in the past 10 years (CIC, 2011c). The Evaluation also reported that settlement service providers across Canada believed they were meeting the immediate and urgent needs of GARs but that resources and staff were working at maximum capacity (ibid). With service providers working flat-out to meet just urgent needs, the level of sustained support and range of actors required for resettled refugees to achieve economic self-sufficiency is considerable. How the federal and provincial governments work to address this challenge is determined by the agreed upon responsibilities from their immigration Agreements.

The structure of federal-provincial immigration agreements appears to be the determining factor in how both levels of government respond to refugee needs. For example, agreements that require engagement at the community level, such as Ontario's, might respond by addressing the social and community connections of refugees. Agreements in which the province has greater control, such as Quebec and British Columbia, might respond by enhancing provincial social services to meet refugees' needs. Finally, in provinces where both the federal and provincial governments co-manage the design and delivery of settlement programming, the response would be to fund service providers to deliver more unique refugee-specific programming.

Each approach has its merits, but their comparative advantages are less clear. It does appear that the greater engagement of local municipalities and the NGO sector increases the flexibility and innovation of services such as is seen in BC. Despite high levels of collaboration promised by the COIA, in the absence of a current agreement and with the introduction of the federally funded and managed Local Immigration Partnerships, refugee settlement programming in Ontario appears to be moving to a more federal/municipal program with limited input from the province. It is not yet clear whether this shift will increase the flexibility and responsiveness of services to the unique needs of resettled refugees. The provincially centralized model of service delivery of the Canada-Quebec Accord has experienced its own challenges in addressing the unique needs of GARs in Quebec.

The delivery of settlement services by the Government of Quebec is overly expensive at a time when the Bouchard-Taylor Commission has recommended a funding increase for front-line service providers. The lack of coordination across the province has resulted in disparities in service delivery and the impact of these regional differences on the integration of GARs is not clear because of the lack of reporting and evaluation (Reichhold, 2011). These disparities in service delivery might be remedied by better engaging service providers in service development, with the Province assuming a greater coordinating and management role. The Canada-Quebec Accord has provided significant powers to the province that it is unlikely to relinquish.

British Columbia administers its own settlement programs. Through open tendering, the Agreement opens up the provision of services to the marketplace. Municipal governments are engaged in the development of refugee policy but the Provincial government sets the priorities. Given the limited duration of RAP, the Provincial health, education and housing systems provide most of the essential services for refugees. The Province has struggled to get more refugees to settle outside the Vancouver area. With only one RAP service provider in all of British Columbia and a high cost of living, refugees often travel quite a distance to get the services they need. The Federal and Provincial roles set out in the BC-Canada Agreement require that the Federal government provide RAP support and the Province provide settlement programs. This arrangement appears to work well because of the expertise of the Federal government in refugee programming and the broad support of the Provincial government as a service provider and its willingness to prioritize refugee needs.

Alberta co-manages the settlement program with CIC. There is little engagement of the municipal government in the settlement policy development process. The impact has been the provision of standardized refugee programming with a high level of engagement between the federal government and provincial healthcare, education and settlement service providers. The result has been an increased awareness of refugee health and settlement needs amongst all major service providers. Given the overwhelming need for immigrant labour in Alberta, settlement services in the province have focused primarily on labour-market integration and skills training. The expensive and sustained level of support required of refugees before they achieve economic self-sufficiency does not make them an effective 'quick-fix' for Alberta's labour shortage and are not likely to become a funding priority.

Service Impacts

Despite the breadth of provincial programming available to resettled refugees after their first year in Canada, the separation of powers within the Canadian constitution has led provincial governments to view refugee settlement programming as a federal responsibility. As such, the Government of Canada has assumed the largest role in refugee resettlement program design and delivery. As social policy is directly within the constitutional purview of provinces, provincial governments have tended to focus their efforts on the economic integration of migrants. Thus, provincial governments invest relatively small amounts of money in refugee settlement and engage in minimal promotion of their work in this area.

Devolution of responsibility in British Columbia has sparked fears of a privatized settlement industry. However, it has also empowered the Government of British Columbia to determine its own priorities for federal spending on settlement programs. As the provider of social services, the increased control could enable the Government of British Columbia to target vulnerable segments of its immigrant population, foster service innovation through fair and competitive contracting processes, engage municipal governments in refugee settlement and ensure the sustainability of its refugee settlement programming. While increased federal transfers have provided for an expansion of services, particularly around English language education, arguably it is the Government of British Columbia's settlement and integration programming which has kept the immigrant serving sector in British Columbia highly dynamic and adaptable (Seidle, 2010).

With respect to the agreements in Ontario and Alberta, it appears that the biggest challenge to the federal-provincial settlement relationship is the lack of vision and meaningful communication between levels of government. This condition has resulted in lost opportunities for strengthened program design and delivery. For example, all provincial governments in this study fund a variety of settlement programs that are beyond the scope of federally funded programming and include job referrals and training, youth programming, translation and interpretation, and enhanced language training. These programs are essential for ensuring the effective settlement of refugees but are regularly beyond the scope of federal funding. The engagement of community actors in the provision of services could strengthen social connections and support for refugees in the community leading to greater social sustainability for refugees in the urban centres where they are settling.

Program Flexibility

The complexity of federal-provincial transfer funding for settlement programs has resulted in inconsistent approaches between the federal and provincial/territorial levels of government. Changes in resettlement selection criteria have meant that refugee populations tend to have higher settlement needs. The challenges of limited funding are compounded by variations in service-delivery models and federal-provincial transfer relationships, which result in inconsistent experiences across the country.

In April 2012, Federal Immigration Minister Jason Kenney announced that the federal government would be centralizing settlement and immigration services, effectively pulling out of its agreement with the Government of British Columbia (CIC, 2012c; Cohen A4). While the centralization of settlement services may ensure consistency of service across Canada, there is a fear that the Government of British Columbia will lose important controls over the direction of service provider organizations, unique expertise and the face-to-face service of workers in settlement services. As has been experienced in Alberta, a co-managed system can make it difficult to ensure a diversity of culturally appropriate services.

The Government of Ontario is opposed to the centralization of services. In early 2012, the Ontario Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Charles Souza established an Expert Roundtable on Immigration to advise the Province on the formation of its own immigration strategy designed to give Ontario more control over the immigration file including the selection of refugees and immigrants for settlement. Released in December 2012, their report calls for a renewed partnership between the provincial and federal governments and makes 32 recommendations including calling on both levels of government to provide longer term services for refugees who need support (Government of Ontario, 2012). Because of its unique agreement, Quebec is excluded from the centralization process.

Having the flexibility to respond to the specific concerns arising in local contexts and from distinct populations is crucial. It is the lack of a joint vision for refugee settlement, or clarity in defining the goals of successful integration, which has resulted in a weak political appetite to absorb the costs and expectations associated with refugee resettlement at the provincial level. The prominence of the federal government in Alberta and Ontario reduces the incentives for their provincial governments to increase their involvement in refugee settlement. Despite the good work of all provinces to support GARs, they are reluctant to publicize it. The reluctance of Alberta and Ontario to request full authority for refugee programming and the inflexibility of federal funding have left the resulting needs gaps to be borne by municipalities and service provider organizations.

Within all four models examined, municipalities and service provider organizations have been required to take on an increased coordinating role between public and social sectors. Despite the provincial government being better positioned for this function, municipalities and service provider organizations have largely assumed this role through increased lobbying and engagement within ethnic communities as seen in examples discussed above, such as the York Region Welcome Centres and Mayor's Task Force on Immigration in Vancouver.

Conclusion

Canada's ability to resettle refugees with high settlement needs requires that settlement policy engage and leverage the support of actors at all levels of government. Furthermore, ensuring that settlement funding allows the programmatic flexibility to accommodate the unique integration challenges of GARs in Canada is crucial to the social sustainability of Canada's resettlement program. Key to addressing these concerns are federal/provincial settlement agreements that clearly articulate the roles and shared responsibilities of all actors engaged in the settlement process.

Given innovative projects in Vancouver and York Region, and the reality that people settle and live in established communities, it seems there is a role for local levels of government in policy and funding discussions and decisions. Engaging municipal governments on issues of settlement and integration would help to build individual/family/household settlement decisions into the broader national discussion concerning the role of immigration and humanitarian programs. Furthermore, the structure of existing federal-provincial transfer and settlement agreements has left those actors undertaking the bulk of settlement work, such as municipalities, with the least funding support. Any joint-vision for the future of the federal-provincial relationship must include this level of government in order to foster the kinds of social connections required for resettled refugees to integrate into Canadian society. It remains to be seen if the Local Immigration Partnership program will increase local support for refugee services given the centralization of the provision of settlement services by the federal government and the apparent marginalization of the provinces from the process. The engagement of municipal governments and the coordination of local services will only benefit refugees if the system is adequately funded by upper levels of government.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of out key informants: Fariborz Birjandian of Calgary Catholic Immigration Society, Mario Calla of COSTI, Chris Friesen of Immigrant Settlement Services of British Columbia and Stephan Reichhold of Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes refugiees et immigrantes. We also appreciated the feedback by a CIC staff person on an earlier draft and the detailed and thoughtful comments by the two anonymous reviewers, particularly Reviewer B.

We also want to recognize the support of the Social Sciences & Humanities Research Council of Canada for the research that this paper draws from.

References

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Interviews

Birjandian, Fariborz (Director-Calgary Catholic Immigration Society). April 11, 2011.

Calla, Mario (Director-COSTI). April 13, 2011.

Friesen, Chris (Director-Immigrant Settlement Services of British Columbia). April 15, 2011.

Reichhold, Stephan (Director-Table de concertation des organismes au service des personnes refugiees et immigrantes). April 11, 2011, June 5, 2012.

Susan McGrath and Ian McGrath

Centre for Refugee Studies

York University

Table 1: Actual Spending of Federal Transfer Payments by Province
and number of Government-Assisted Refugees Admitted, 2009
(CIC, 2010b)

Name of Actual Number of Total Funding
Province Spending Government- number of transfer
 (2008-09) Assisted immigrants on a per
 Refugees admitted capita
 Admitted in 2009 basis
 in 2009

Quebec $216.2M 1,881 49,493 $4,368

British $111.8M 798 41,438 $2,698
Columbia

Ontario $344.2M 2,492 106,857 $3,221

Alberta $49.6M 944 27,017 $1,836