Post-amalgamation politics: how does consolidation impact community decision-making?

Spicer, Zachary

Abstract

Between 1998 and 2001, Ontario experienced four high-profile municipal amalgamations. While the consolidation process itself was highly debated, discussed and documented, very little has been written about post-amalgamation governance. Using Hamilton, Ontario as a case study, this paper explores post-amalgamation governance, asking what effect the amalgamation process has had on the new city's politics? Utilizing factor analysis, this paper analyzes standing recorded votes on Hamilton's city council for the first three councils elected after amalgamation (2001-2003; 2003-2006; 2006-2010). The results suggest that councilors from amalgamated communities primarily vote together, with little cohesion with councilors from the central city.

Keywords: amalgamation, municipal government, factor analysis, urban politics

Resume

Entre 1998 et 2001, l'Ontario a connu quatre haut-profil de fusions municipales. Alors que le processus de consolidation elle-meme etait tres debattu, discute et documente, tres peu a ete ecrit au sujet de la gouvernance post-fusion. L'utilisation de Hamilton, en Ontario comme etude de cas, ce document explore la gouvernance post-fusion, en demandant quel effet le processus de fusion a eu sur la politique de la ville nouvelle? Utilisant ranalyse factorielle, ce document analyse debout votes enregistres sur le conseil municipal de Hamilton pour les trois premiers conseils elus apres la fusion (2001-2003; 2003-2006; 2006-2010). Les resultats suggerent que les conseillers des communautes fusionnees surtout voter ensemble, avec peu de cohesion avec les conseillers de la ville centrale.

Mots cles: fusion, gouvernement municipal, analyse facteur, la politque urbaine

Introduction

Between 1995 and 2001, the Ontario government undertook a wide-scale program of municipal restructuring that saw hundreds of municipalities across the province consolidated and the regional municipalities of Metropolitan Toronto, Hamilton-Wentworth, Sudbury, and Ottawa-Carleton forcibly amalgamated. the consolidation process in Ontario garnered a significant amount of debate and discussion. The majority of the academic literature that has explored amalgamation has largely examined the consolidation process itself (Sancton 2000; Hamel 2005; O'Brien 1993; Poel 2005; Quesnel 2000; Vojnovic 2000). Very little, however, has been written about the post-amalgamation governance of these communities, especially their politics.

The reality is that we know very little about the affect of amalgamation on the communities that have been restructured. What effect has amalgamation had on the politics of these new municipalities? Are these communities coming together? Do old divisions simply change venues? We are now a little more than ten years removed from the amalgamation process in Ontario. The time has come to begin revisiting many of the municipalities that were consolidated. This paper begins this task by exploring one aspect of post-amalgamation governance, focusing on how amalgamation has affected decision-making amongst municipal officials. Using factor analysis, this paper examines the voting patterns of municipal councilors in the amalgamated city of Hamilton, Ontario.

Hamilton was amalgamated in 2001. Formerly members of the Region of Hamilton-Wentworth, the towns of Flamborough, Dundas and Ancaster, the City of Stoney Creek and the township of Glanbrook were amalgamated with Hamilton to create the new City of Hamilton. The process was vigorously resisted locally. The former communities of Flamborough, Dundas, Ancaster, Stoney Creek and Glanbrook wanted to maintain their status as autonomous communities and argued in favour of the continuation of regional government. The provincial government, arguing that amalgamation would result in cost-savings and increased efficiency, forcibly pursued consolidation. Having urban, suburban and rural areas, Hamilton provides an optimal case study to test the effects of amalgamation on the politics of amalgamated communities in Canada.

Amalgamation and Municipal Organization

Municipal organization has always posed a challenge for policy makers. Figuring out the best way to structure a municipal government, where to extend its boundaries and how to best service its citizens is a demanding endeavour. Consolidation is only one tool at the disposal of municipal and provincial officials seeking to expand or rationalize a community or its service area. This type of institutional change does not occur without controversy. Academic debate has taken place for years regarding the best methods to organize municipalities. Two main theories are at either side of this debate: the consolidationist approach and the public choice approach.

Consolidationists believe that it is beneficial for the boundaries of a municipality to reach its metropolitan border. This, many theorists believed, would put an end the type of fragmentation and competition that marked many early American metropolitan areas (Jones 1942; Gulick 1962; Studenski 1930). Larger government, they believe, "leads to stronger and more accountable municipal government, greater efficiency in the delivery of services and more fairness in allocating costs to residents" (Sancton 2002, 55). Larger governments are more capable of handling regional planning and transportation issues as well as coordinating projects with a larger functional scope. Perhaps more importantly, larger governments that encompass both urban and suburban populations are believed to be better able to reduce racial and economic segregation within metropolitan areas (Rusk 1999; 2003).

Public choice scholars on the other hand, believe that the competition and fragmentation in metropolitan areas that consolidationists decried is actually functional (Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 1961; Bish 1971; Bish and Ostrom 1974). These small local governments join a governmental marketplace in which a variety of bodies, such as the volunteer sector and other special-purpose bodies, share a variety of responsibility on both large and small scales (Atkins, Dewitt and Thangavelu, 1999).

The public choice perspective rejected the notion that institutional consolidation is an answer to metropolitan problems. Instead, it argued that institutional fragmentation is beneficial for effective and efficient service delivery. Big city governments, consolidationists contend, are inefficient, unresponsive and cumbersome (Bish and Ostrom 1973, 5). They argued in favour of a governmental system of multiple, overlapping jurisdictions, which they contended take advantage of diverse economies of scale for different public services.

Ontario's era of amalgamation can be best summed up as consolidationist. In 1995, Mike Harris and his Progressive Conservative party came to power in Ontario with an agenda of reducing government waste and cutting taxes--a program that was spelled out in his election document, The Common Sense Revolution. While The Common Sense Revolution made some specific pledges, such as reforming legal aid, cutting government grants and subsidies, and reducing taxes, the document was quite vague when addressing municipal restructuring. The Progressive Conservative platform argued that the province had too much government: "Canadians are probably the most over-governed people in the world ... we do not need every layer--federal, provincial, quasi-governmental bodies, regional, municipal and school board--that we have now" (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17). It continued by stating that, "we must rationalize the regional and municipal levels to avoid the overlap and duplication that now exists" (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17). Despite these two claims, the platform did not describe any specific action it would take to achieve the "rationalization" of regional and municipal government in the province. The Common Sense Revolution only states that, "we will sit down with municipalities to discuss ways of reducing government entanglement and bureaucracy with an eye to eliminating waste and duplication as well as unfair downloading by the province" (Ontario Progressive Conservative Party 1994, 17).

Despite the vague claim, the Harris government certainly did engage in a major restructuring of municipal government in Ontario. One of the Harris government's legislative tools to achieve these ends was Bill 26, the Savings and Restructuring Act. The Bill's main purpose was to find efficiencies and amend multiple existing Acts and provincial departments, but the amendments to the Municipal Act and various other statutes related to municipal operations were some of the most dramatic (Ontario 1995).

Political Scientist David Siegel notes that the Savings and Restructuring Act contained both permissive and mandatory elements. Permissive, Siegel argues, in that it allowed any group of municipalities to devise its own voluntary restructuring proposal, yet mandatory in that it also permitted any municipality to ask the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to appoint a commissioner who could impose a binding agreement (Siegel 2005, 131). Municipalities were strongly encouraged by the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing to amalgamate voluntarily (Siegel 2005, 131).

Overall, the changes to Ontario's municipal system were vast. When Harris and his Progressive Conservatives came to power there were more than 800 municipalities in the province and by 2000 that number had been reduced to just over 400 (Siegel 2005, 129). In many communities, there was significant opposition to any planned amalgamation. In Toronto, a large, organized local movement formed with the intention of stopping the consolidation process (Horak 1998). Similar resistance was seen in Ontario's smaller communities, such as Elgin County and Chatham-Kent (Downey and Williams 1998; Hollick and Siegel 2001), while academic studies of citizen attitudes in some communities found very little support for provincial initiatives (Kushner and Siegel 2003). Despite the presence of these attitudes, the province continued unabated.

Amalgamation in Hamilton

It was amidst this provincial climate of consolidation that Hamilton and its surrounding areas faced a renew prospect of restructuring. The concept of regional reform had been an issue in the Hamilton area since the creation of the regional government of Hamilton-Wentworth in 1974 (Wells 2000). Debate about amalgamation re-started in earnest with the election of Terry Cooke, who ran on an amalgamation platform, as Regional Chairman in 1994. Cooke began to push for amalgamation once in office, but encountered significant resistance from his colleagues on regional council (Wells 2000). Cooke, however, was able to get the regional council to approve the creation of a Constituent Assembly to examine the existing municipal system in Hamilton-Wentworth. The Assembly recommended the consolidation of the region's six municipalities into one, single-tier municipality--an option that was supported by the City of Hamilton and the District Chamber of Commerce, but rejected by the five other municipalities in the region and the regional council itself (The Hamilton Spectator 1996).

After the 1999 provincial election, the provincial government began discussing the potential amalgamation of the Hamilton region. Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing Steve Gilchrist appointed David O'Brien, the city manager for the City of Mississauga, as a special advisor for restructuring the Hamilton-Wentworth region (Sancton 2000, 144). O'Brien argued that he could find little support for the existing regional government and recommended amalgamation (Sancton 2000, 152). After the passage of the Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, the region's late was sealed and amalgamation became reality. The new City of Hamilton began operating on January 1, 2001.

Resistance to Amalgamation

After the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was amalgamated in 1998 to form the new City of Toronto, residents of Hamilton-Wentworth began to fear that amalgamation would soon be imposed upon them as well. During the 1999 provincial election, Ancaster-Dundas-Flamborough-Aldershot MPP Toni Skarica attempted to alleviate these fears by promising to halt the process at Queen's Park. Arguing during the election that, "if we as the government don't do what we've promised to do, then I'll resign," Skarica staked his political future on the provincial government not pursuing amalgamation in the Hamilton area (Van Harten, 2000). Skarica eventually did resign once it became obvious that the provincial government would not reverse its decision on amalgamation (Mitchell, 2000). Questioned about his decision, Skarica replied, "your word is who you are" (Van Harten, 2000).

In an effort to keep Skarica from resigning, Municipal Affairs minister Tony Clement suggested that Flamborough could find a way to remove itself from the amalgamation plan (Vallance-Jones, 2001). Flamborough mayor Ted McMeekin seized upon the opportunity and proposed that the town be divided in three, each part joining a different municipality: Waterloo, Brant County, and Burlington (Vallance-Jones, 2001). The transition board appointed to oversee the pragmatics of the amalgamation, threatened to seek compensation in the amount of $47 million if Flamborough did not eventually join the new City of Hamilton (Mitchell, 2000). Don Ross, one of the members of the transition board, argued that compensation was needed because of the "lost opportunity cost" of the new city not being able to capitalize on Flamborough's readily available land (Mitchell, 2000). Despite the threat, the residents of Flamborough, through a mail-in survey, responded positively to the idea and the province appointed two fact-finders, Milt Farrow and Bill Day, to examine the option (Vallance-Jones, 2001). The two reported back that Flamborough taxpayers would pay more if they did not join Hamilton and the province concluded that the proposal would not go forward--Flamborough would still be amalgamated with Hamilton as planned (Vallance-Jones, 2001). While it seemed that amalgamation was inevitable, Flamborough's town council, in a last ditch effort to avoid consolidation, granted $9,999 to a citizens group to pursue a legal challenge to amalgamation with Hamilton (Branston, 2000).

A Shift in a City's Politics?

Many of the concerns about amalgamation were played out in the city's politics. Entering the 2000 civic election, incumbent Hamilton mayor Bob Morrow was seen as the undisputed front-runner. Having served as mayor for eighteen years, he was rarely challenged (Vallance-Jones, 2001). When long-time Ancaster mayor Bob Wade entered the race to run the new amalgamated city, few observers gave him much of a chance (Vallance-Jones, 2001). In fact, a poll conducted very early in the campaign showed Morrow with a large lead, intimidating potential challengers, such as the former regional chairman who initially began the amalgamation process Terry Cooke, out of the race (Mitchell, 2000[a]). Morrow maintained his lead in advanced opinion polling throughout the election period (Vallance-Jones, 2000[d]).

Wade's election platform stressed decentralization. He promised, if elected, to establish "community districts" that would "represent neighbourhood viewpoints", but did not specify the amount of power the groups would possess (Elliot, 2000). Wade also promised the establishment of an ombudsman and a 500-member citizen panel to provide public input on city services (Elliot, 2000). Wade emphasized freezing property taxes as part of his platform, which be entitled "The People's Charter" (Prokaska, 2000). Amalgamation-induced property tax increases were a genuine concern for amalgamated communities and Wade seized on that as the centre of his economic development strategy. Political scientist, Henry Jacek, asked for comment by The Hamilton Spectator, argued that Wade had aggressively pursued votes in Ancaster, Dundas, Flamborough, Glanbrook and Stoney Creek, while attempting to grow his support in the former city of Hamilton (Prokaska, 2000). Morrow on the other hand, Jacek argues, relied heavily on his lead in the central-city, a vote share that did not materialize on election day (Prokaska, 2000).

In the end, Wade's decentralist appeal to the amalgamated communities worked, as be ending up winning the election by a margin of 11,672 votes (Vallance-Jones, 2000[d]). Wade only lost one ward outside the old central-city of Hamilton (Ward 10, Stoney Creek), winning 70 per cent of the vote in Waterdown and East Flamborough, 76 per cent in rural west Flamborough, 80 per cent in Ancaster and winning a clear majority in Dundas (Vallance-Jones, 2000[d]). Morrow did not receive more than 20 per cent of the vote in any of the western amalgamated communities (Flamborough, Dundas, Ancaster) (Vallance-Jones, 2000 [d]).

The 2000 municipal election was not the only shift in the new city's politics. The resignation of Toni Skarica forced a by-election in the riding of Ancaster-Dundas-Flamborough-Aldershot, a riding that contained the three communities most opposed to amalgamation with Hamilton. The governing Progressive Conservatives chose Priscilla de Villiers, a victim's rights advocate, as their candidate, while the Liberals nominated Ted McMeekin, the former mayor of Flamborough and a vocal critic of amalgamation, to represent their party (McGuinness, 2000). During the campaign, amalgamation figured prominently, with de Villiers being booed at local all-candidates debates and enduring heavy criticism in the press and in candidate literature over the issue

(D'Allesio, 2000). In response to the criticism she received, de Villiers, accompanied by Municipal Affairs Minister Tony Clement, held a press conference at her campaign office where she announced that she would demand that Dundas, Flamborough and Ancaster's seats on city council be referred to as their former communities names and not by numerical identifiers, that she would fight any municipal property tax increases and that she would introduce a private members bill at Queen's Park that would audit the new city's finances (Nolan 2000[a]). De Villiers argued that her plan was a way to maintain local identity after amalgamation but political scientists Henry Jacek, who was asked for comment on the story by The Hamilton Spectator disagreed, stating that, "they're trying to get a handle on (amalgamation) and how they can turn public opinion around on it" (Nolan, 2000[a]).

In the end, McMeekin ended up winning 183 of the ridings 199 polling divisions and taking upwards of 60 per cent of the vote, even winning in the rural areas of Flamborough, including Waterdown, Freelton, Carlisle, Millgrove and Greensville, all of which were traditional venues of Progressive Conservative party support (Vallance-Jones, 2000[b]). Only a year earlier, in the 1999 general provincial election, Toni Skarica had won the riding with 58 per cent of the vote for the Progressive Conservatives (Galloway, 2000). This reversal was afforded to the amalgamation process that the Progressive Conservatives had forced upon the riding (McGuiness, 2000). Emphasizing the role that amalgamation played during the contest, McMeekin summed up his thoughts on election night: "This was never a campaign ... it was, rather a crusade" (Galloway, 2000). Liberal leader Dalton McGuinty also stressed the importance of amalgamation in the by-election victory, arguing that, "we have seen a government which has ignored the expressed wishes of the people of this riding and run roughshod over their concerns," (Galloway, 2000). Progressive Conservative candidate de Villiers even conceded after the results were tallied on election night that forced amalgamation had caused her defeat (Nolan, 2000[b]).

Hamilton City Council, 2001-2003

The post-amalgamation composition of Hamilton city council would look very different from its pre-amalgamation form. Before amalgamation, Hamilton had embraced a ward-based system with two councilors elected from each ward. In total, there were eight wards and sixteen councilors. The mayor was elected at large. After amalgamation, the city moved to a ward-based system with fifteen wards, each with a single elected councilor. The mayor remained elected at large. In total, seven of the fifteen wards were composed of the former rural and suburban communities that surrounded the former central city of Hamilton (Wards 9-15).

The former communities of Glanbrook, Ancaster and Dundas were afforded one councilor, while Flamborough, due to its large geographic size, and Stoney Creek, because of its large suburban and urban population, were afforded two. Despite having nearly twice the population, the former central-city of Hamilton has only one more ward than the amalgamated communities, as evidenced through Table 1.

This disparity provided the amalgamated communities, each of which were formerly represented by an autonomous town council, with a minority of the seats on the new City Council.

Data and Methods

What effect has amalgamation had upon the politics of consolidated communities? To examine the voting patterns of Hamilton city councilors, voting records from Hamilton's first three post-amalgamation councils (2001-2003, 2003-2006, 2006-2010) were retrieved. Results gathered from Hamilton's second and third council were assembled in order to provide a broader context for the results from the first post-amalgamation council, ensuring that findings initially seen were not the result of personal or political differences.

The council minutes from 2001 through 2003, 2003 through 2006, and 2006 through 2010 were assembled from the City of Hamilton's online achieves. The results of all votes at council meetings between 2001 and 2010 were recorded. The mayor, as a voting member of council, was included in the analysis along with the councilors. Committee votes were not included. In total, council met 273 times, recording 485 standing votes, between 2001 and 2010. All 485 of these votes were included in the model.

Once the data were collected, factor analysis was performed. Factor analysis measures the amount of correlation between diverse sets of variables with the goal of grouping variables that are relatively homogenous. Simply put, factor analysis can help find linkages between large numbers of observations and build concise classifications for the purpose of examining clusters of similar terms. For this project, factor analysis can assist in grouping variables together so we can view similarity between the voting habits of city councilors. By using this method, we are able to build clusters of voting behaviour on city council and see which councilors are voting together.

Factor analysis is primarily used for theory or questionnaire development, but has been used to examine voting patterns as well, primarily in international relations literature relating to the United Nations (Kim and Russett, 1996; Newcombe, Ross and Newcombe, 1970; Voeten, 2000) and American Political Science literature relating to legislative behaviour in Congress (Parker and Parker, 1979; Hoadley, 1980). It has, however, also been used in local government studies (Simpson and Carsey, 1999; De Socio, 2007). As such, utilizing factor analysis can help us gain a better understanding of the voting patterns of Hamilton city councilors after amalgamation and help provide an answer to whether amalgamation has caused certain groups of councilors to vote together as a bloc.

Primary Component Analysis with oblique rotations--meaning that the best definition of the uncorrelated and correlated cluster patterns of interrelated variables is sought--was selected as a method of measuring the relationship between councilors. The use of orthogonal rotations is generally seen as the norm in academic studies utilizing factor analysis. An oblique rotation, however, was chosen for this project for a number of reasons. First, unlike other statistical measures of analysis, factor analysis relies heavily on interpretation by the researcher and oblique rotation enhances the interpretability of factors. An oblique rotation maximizes the loadings--the correlation coefficients between the variables and factors--between the variables in each cluster and creates factors that more strongly represent clusters of highly correlated variables than orthogonal rotation. Second, orthogonal rotation is primarily used to create a reduced set of factor variants for use in further analysis. An oblique rotation is best suited to uncover the underlying structure of a set of variables, which in this case, is the results of every recorded vote on Hamilton city council between 2001 and 2010, which may be influenced by a large amount of inputs, such as geography, ideology, personality, or existing interpersonal conflicts. As such, oblique rotation provides a more complex, but more useful method of examining the post-amalgamation voting patterns in Hamilton.

Results

Once the voting record of each councilor was assembled and a useable data set presented itself, principal component analysis with promax (oblique) rotations was completed. Five components--or more simply put, groupings--were extracted from the data set, which capture about 87 per cent of the variance. Each component represents one grouping that a particular councilors voting behaviour best aligns with. To assist in interpretation and data presentation, factor loadings less than 0.1 were suppressed, meaning that the results for some councilors are not shown in each component. The highest values of each councilor are bolded to draw attention to the component in which they most highly load. The results are listed below, in Table 2.

From Table 2, a number of interesting trends emerge. The first two components load most heavily, explaining most of the variance. With that said, three factors, in particular, show the most significant amount of amalgamation related voting behaviour.

In the first component Morelli (Ward 3), Merulla (Ward 4), Collins (Ward 5) and Frank D'Amico (Ward 8) load most heavily. Each councilor represents a highly urbanized portion of the central city with Merulla, Morelli and Collins representing the downtown core and D'Amico representing the northern, urban portion of Hamilton Mountain. This would suggest that there is an urban voting bloc of sorts. What is particularly interesting about the first component is that McCarthy (Ward 15) and Braden (Ward 14) are loading very negatively. Both McCarthy and Braden represented Flamborough on Hamilton council and their high negative loadings would suggest that they rarely vote with the urban voting bloc in component 1.

The third component presents an amalgamation-centred grouping. Ferguson (Ward 12, Ancaster), Powers (Ward 13, Dundas) and Mitchell (Ward 11, Glanbrook) all represent primarily suburban amalgamated areas. The same trends are seen in the fifth component, where McCarthy (Ward 15) and Braden (Ward 14) load heavily. Horwath (Ward 2) also loads heavily on Component 5, but the strong negative loadings for McCarthy and Braden in component 1 suggest that there is a stronger voting relationship between McCarthy and Braden as rural Flamborough representatives.

These trends are consistent with the opposition to amalgamation seen in these communities. A poll of the city commissioned by The Hamilton Spectator in early 2000, showed amalgamation being the top concern of the residents in Dundas, Ancaster, Flamborough, and Glanbrook, with concern being highest in both Flamborough and Dundas (Vallance-Jones, 2000[a]). In fact, amalgamation was the top concern of 37 per cent of Dundas residents, 34 per cent of those in Flamborough, and 31 per cent in Ancaster (Hughes, 2000). The issue of amalgamation was a concern to just only 9.2 per cent of those in the former central-city of Hamilton (Hughes, 2000). A similar poll was seen in Glanbrook, where 72 per cent of area residents opted for the continuation of a two-tier model, with only five per cent opting for amalgamation (The Hamilton Spectator, 2000). In Dundas, the rallying cry of "Dundas Forever" was prevalent during the lead up to amalgamation and long after. The "Dundas Forever" slogan was appeared on lawn signs and bumper stickers during the amalgamation process (Howard, 1999). The "Dundas Forever" slogan even appeared on signs in the windows of voters during the 2000 by-election in Ancaster-Dundas-Flamborough-Aldershot in an attempt to connect the amalgamation issue to the unpopular Progressive Conservative candidate (Vallance-Jones, 2000[c]). During the 2000 municipal election, both candidates for Dundas' seat on the new City of Hamilton council utilized "Dundas Forever" as their campaign slogan, with the eventual winner Russ Powers editorializing in The Hamilton Spectator that, "I believe in Dundas Forever and hope you'll support me" (Powers, 2000). In Flamborough, a similar rallying call was used: "Free Flamborough". The same signs and bumper stickers were created and displayed throughout the community and the Committee to Free Flamborough was formed shortly after amalgamation (Committee to Free Flamborough). The group still maintains a website and meets regularly to this day. The grouping of these councilors is not a surprise considering the amount of negativity seen towards the amalgamation process in their communities.

Components 2 and 4 show strong voting patterns but few geographical or ideological linkages. Component 2 shows Larry Di Ianni (Ward 9), Bill Kelly (Ward 7) and Mayor Bob Wade grouping heavily. Another non-geographically linked grouping is seen in component 4, where Bain (Ward 10) and Caplan (Ward 1) load strongly together, despite being from opposite ends of the city. Additionally, Caplan represents a central-city ward, where Bain represented an urban amalgamated ward in Stoney Creek. Jackson (Ward 6) loads heavily on components 1, 2, and 3, not easily fitting into any of the distinct voting groups.

From the principal component analysis conducted on voting from 2001 to 2003, some interesting trends have emerged. An urban voting grouping has emerged (component 1), along with suburban councilors from amalgamated areas (component 3) and councilors from rural amalgamated areas (component 5). While these results are significant, do they continue after the next election, in 2003, or are they unique the initial election after amalgamation? Are the results shown above merely the result of the personalities or ideological alignment of the councilors, or the results of ward-level preferences and aversion to the amalgamation process?

Another municipal election was held in 2003. Many of those elected in 2000 were re-elected. Larry Di Ianni, the former Ward 9 councilor, was elected mayor upon Bob Wade's retirement. Brian McHattie replaced Marvin Caplan in Ward 1 in the city's west end and Terry Whitehead replaced Frank D'Amico in Ward 8. In Stoney Creek, Phil Bruckler replaced Di Ianni in Ward 9 and Maria Pearson replaced Ann Bain in Ward 10. Aside from these additions, two by-elections were held after the 2003 general election. Andrea Horwath resigned to seek a seat in the Ontario Legislature, with Bob Bratina eventually winning the by-election in Ward 2. Russ Powers, the councilor for Ward 13 in Dundas, also resigned very early in the terra in order to seek a seat in the House of Commons. He was replaced by former Dundas town councilor Art Samson.

The 2003-2006 council presented some challenges with data. With both Horwath and Powers resigning so early in the term, they did not register enough votes to warrant inclusion in the study. As such, they were excluded and Bratina's and Samson's votes were recorded in their place. Because of the early by-election, Bratina and Samson only missed thirteen votes. As such, their inclusion did not negatively affect the data set. A more problematic data challenge occurred with councilor Murray Ferguson, who missed twenty-eight consecutive votes due to illness. When originally included in the data set, the sheer amount of missing data corrupted the data set and, as such, he had to be excluded.

With a data set assembled, primary component analysis with oblique rotations was again performed. Once again, five components were extracted from the data set, which captured about 88 per cent of the variance. The results are contained in Table 3.

By examining Table 3, we see fewer concrete trends than we did with the previous council. Like the previous council, we see the urban councilors aligning with each other; in this case Mayor Di Ianni, Collins (Ward 5) and Jackson (Ward 6) align in component 1. Also in component 1 is Phil Bruckler (Ward 9) a councilor from an amalgamated area. As in the first data set, the Stoney Creek councilors, in this case Bruckler, load heavily in two components but primarily aligns with central-city councilors. The remaining central city councilors-McHattie (Ward 1), Morelli (Ward 3), and Whitehead (Ward 8)--load heavily onto component 2. In component 3, Dundas councilor Art Samson (Ward 13) aligns almost perfectly Sam Merula (Ward 4), a central city councilor. Kelly (Ward 7) loads heavily onto component 3 as well. Maria Pearson (Ward 10) loads heavily onto factor 5 and Mitchell (Ward 10) and Bratina (Ward 2) load evenly on several different components.

The only councilors from amalgamated areas that load together are McCarthy (Ward 15) and Braden (Ward 14)--both councilors from Flamborough, an area of continued dissatisfaction with the amalgamation process. From the 2003-2006 council, it appears there is more fluidity. Councilors who loaded heavily onto one component in the previous data set are more dispersed in the second data set.

This dispersion trend is most evident with some of the councilors from amalgamated communities. Samson (Dundas) aligns with several central city councilors and Mitchell (Glanbrook) loads evenly on several components. Unfortunately, Ferguson could not be included in the analysis to see if this trend continued into Ancaster. The only two councilors from amalgamated areas that load together are McCarthy (Ward 15) and Braden (Ward 14), both of which represent Flamborough. In the previous data set, McCarthy and Braden loaded strongly together on only one factor and loaded very negatively on the component with the majority of urban councilors. In the 2003-2006 data Braden also loads--albeit much more weakly--on component 1 and 5, while McCarthy also loads on components 1, 2, and 3. This would indicate that the two are not voting together as much on most issues. They are voting with other councilors as well.

The 2006 municipal election resulted in some turn-over amongst councilors. Former MPP Brad Clark defeated Phil Bruckler in Ward 9 (Stoney Creek), while Murray Ferguson retired from his Ward 12 (Ancater) seat and was replaced by his son Lloyd. Additionally, Bill Kelly opted not to run for re-election in Ward 7 and was replaced by Scott Duval, while Russ Powers regained his Ward 13 (Dundas) council seat, replacing Art Samson. In Flamborough, Dave Braden decided to not seek re-election and was replaced by Robert Pasuta in Ward 14. Finally, Larry Di Ianni was defeated. Fred Eisenberger, a former councilor and head of the Port Authority, was elected as mayor. With a data set assembled, primary component analysis with oblique rotations was again performed. This time, however, only four components loaded, accounting for 63% of the variance. The results are listed below, in Table 4.

When examining Table 4, we can see more groupings of certain councilors. In component 1, urban councilors Morelli, Merulla, and Collins load very heavily, as they did from 2003 through 2006. Also in component 1, Duvall, who represents the urbanized part of Hamilton mountain and Clark, who represents the urbanized part of Stoney Creek load very heavily. Component 1 contains the more urban councilors, much like the other component analysis for previous councils.

The second component is quite interesting. Pearson, Mitchell, Ferguson, Powers, Pasuta and McCarthy all load quite heavily on component 2. These representatives are from Flamborough, Dundas, Glanbrook, Ancaster, and rural Stoney Creek, the areas where resistance to amalgamation was highest. The first two components account for most of the variance explained in the model, with Mayor Eisenberger, along with west end councilors McHattie and Bratina loading heavily onto component three and mountain councilor Jackson loading heavily onto component 4. Table 5 presents two distinct voting blocks: the urban areas of the former central city and the more rural and suburban areas of the communities amalgamated with it.

Discussion and Conclusion

Principal component analysis with oblique rotations was conducted upon three sets of voting records: the new city of Hamilton's first council (2001-2003), the city's second (2003-2006), and, finally, the city's third council (2006-2010). In each component that is analyzed we see some connection between councilors from similar areas. In all three, more urban councilors, such as those from the downtown core and the northern mountain areas load more heavily together, while councilors from areas amalgamated into the central city load heavily together as well. As such, we can see two distinct voting blocs emerge, These voting blocs appear to be losing strength over time however, as councilor voting patterns become more disparate in later councils.

The results show that councilors from certain communities are more likely to vote together. Simply put, those who represent the former rural and suburban communities that once surrounded the City of Hamilton are more prone to vote together, while those councilors representing the former central city are more likely to vote together. These connections were strongest just after amalgamation, where representatives from Ancaster, Dundas, and Flamborough frequently voted together. Over time, these connections lose strength. As the results from the votes logged between 2006 and 2010 demonstrate, these councilors still constituted a voting bloc, but they voted together less frequently after the 2003 and 2006 elections than they did immediately after amalgamation.

Despite this dissipation, amalgamation continues to have an effect on Hamilton. The divisions between the former central city and its neighbouring communities have manifested itself in different ways. Hamilton's long debate regarding the use of community councils continues to be unresolved, which has led to a patchwork of implementation across the city (MacIntyre 2006; Nolan 2006). Major public infrastructure projects, such as the Red Hill Expressway, the reconstruction of Ivor Wynne Stadium or the proposal to implement Light Rail Transit, seem to find support or opposition based upon rural and urban lines (MacLeod, 2011). These marquee projects are placed in the former City of Hamilton and have little connection to the region's former suburban and rural communities, which means that gaining their financial support for such projects is challenging.

Many of these divisions came to a head during the 2010 mayoral election. During the campaign downtown councilor Bob Bratina ran for mayor, opposing then mayor Fred Eisenberger and former mayor Larry Di Ianni. Bratina ran on a platform of exploring de-amalgamation, arguing that amalgamation was "not working" for the city and that de-amalgamation was something that he was prepared to advocate for (Reilly 2010). Bratina continued by arguing that consolidation had divided the city and that amalgamation was the cause of many of the city's more recent divisions, including the debate about the placement of the redesigned Ivor Wynne stadium (Reilly 2010).

Hamilton, then, is still feeling the effects of amalgamation and the divide on council could have further repercussions for the city in the future. Currently, the councilors from the amalgamated areas are in a minority voting position, only comprising seven of the 15 seats on council. Even if they voted together, which they do not always do, they could still be out-voted by the more urban councilors. If the mayor, however, came from an amalgamated area, as Bob Wade did, both areas could have eight representatives. Additionally, the majority of the city's population growth and new housing construction is in the suburban, amalgamated areas, meaning that an additional council seat or multiple seats could be added if there was a redistribution based on population in the future. In either scenario, these voting trends could be detrimental to future urban initiatives, such as transportation planning in the city or urban renewal projects. Councilors from the amalgamated areas may face political pressure to oppose such ideas or not see any value in such initiatives and vote against them. As such, the political dynamic of the city could shift--perhaps at the expense of truly urban policy initiatives.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr. Andrew Sancton and Dr. Robert Young for their input on earlier versions of this paper.

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Zachary Spicer

Department of Political Science

The University of Western Ontario

Table 1: Population By Ward

Ward Voters Residents

1 21,215 31,704
2 19,786 38,349
3 23,913 40,869
4 23,322 36,733
5 24,937 39,283
6 27,699 40,529
7 38,478 56,334
8 32,996 46,509
Central City Total 212,346 310,400
9 18,202 24,349
10 19,112 24,569
11 19,488 20,544
12 22,130 25,297
13 17,994 24,394
14 11,682 15,322
15 17,445 24,662
Amalgamated Total 126,053 159,137

Total 338,399 469,537

Table 2: Principle Component Analysis, 2001-2003

Councillor Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5

Morelli .899# .225 .239 -.359
Merulla .857# .111
McCarthy -.830 .606#
Braden -.830 .606#
Collins .798# .117 .128 .179
DAmico .743# .315 .459 -.206
Di lanni .133 .987# .472 .111
Kelly .133 .987# .472 .111
Wade .133 .987# .472 .111
Ferguson .142 .684 .879# .117
Powers .438 .842#
Mitchell .370 .181 .812# .313 -.298
Bain .223 .355 .511 .779# -.215
Caplan .106 .158 .261 .611#
Jackson .527 .533 .447 -.559
Horwath -.163 -.144 -.182 -.141 .888#
Eigenvalue 5.70 3.84 1.60 1.30 1.17
Variance 36.63 23.968 9.98 8.09 7.32
Explained

Note: The highest values of each councilor are indicated with # to
draw attention to the component in which they most highly load.

Table 3: Principle Component Analysis, 2003-2006

Councillor Comp. l Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5

Di lanni .970 .127 .225 .418 .186
Collins .829 .572 .325 .129
Bruckler .824 .170 .436 .719
Jackson .691 .222 -.169 -.161
McHattie .184 .896 .136 -.186
Morelli .488 .828 .454 .131
Whitehead .769 -.642 -.335
Samson .315 .586 .883
Merulla .315 .586 .883
Kelly -.164 -.194 .782
McCarthy .190 .219 .127 .759
Braden .163 -.434 -.314 .752 .405
Pearson -.232 .123 .885
Mitchell .478 -.347 .517 .554 .637
Bratina .574 .607 .634

Eigenvalue 4.57 3.29 2.44 1.54 1.29
Variance 30.49 21.94 16.29 10.28 8.54
Explained

Table 4: Principle Component Analysis, 2006-2010

Councilor Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4

Eisenberger -.288 .342 .571
McHattie .233 -.174 .809 -.111
Bratina .358 .768 -.124
Morelli .671 -.109 .274 .178
Merulla .630 -.118 .249
Collins .723 .436
Jackson .220 -.110 -.192 .942
Duvall .840 .192
Whitehead .554
Clark .537 .366 .118
Pearson .836
Mitchell .218 .865 -.363
Ferguson -.341 .346 .369
Powers -.146 .644 .319
Pasuta .202 .881 -.318
McCarthy .404 .160 .463

Eigenvalue 4.31 3.26 1.32 1.13
Variance 26.92 20.372 8.30 7.10
Explained