Incomplete reform in Baltimore: a shift in authority to school leaders falls short.
Gross, Betheny ; Jochim, Ashley
FIVE YEARS AGO, Baltimore City Public Schools seemed on the brink
of a breakthrough. The district had been freed from mayoral control
after more than a century, and a high-energy superintendent was leading
bold moves to de-emphasize central administration, give schools greater
autonomy, and engage families in a revitalized portfolio of educational
choice.
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A new school funding formula matched resources to student needs,
and chronically low-performing, underenrolled schools were closed.
Citywide, enrollment had begun to stabilize after four decades of steep
decline, as more families opted to enroll their children in district
schools, including newly expanding charters. Suspensions were down, the
graduation rate was up, and more students were proficient at grade-level
work in math and reading. A new teacher evaluation system set common
standards for excellence across the city.
By almost all accounts, Baltimore's district-led portfolio
system--traditional and charter school options, all authorized and
managed by City Schools' central office--was working.
But today, progress seems to have stalled. The school funding
system is under legal threat, with a group of charter schools suing over
alleged underfunding. Fewer than half of the principals at the heart of
the decentralized reform strategy remain on the job. Bureaucratic
barriers to school autonomy and improvement remain, from costly
contract-driven funding obligations to middle-management practices that
limit school budget flexibility. Baltimore's leadership is in flux,
with the departure of its latest superintendent in May after less than
two years.
Baltimore, at least right now, is a story of incomplete reform, a
stark example of the limits of a reform strategy that sought dramatic
change while leaving many old political and administrative arrangements
in place.
"Most of the central office staff who interacted with schools
had no idea how to do their jobs differently in a new era of school
accountability," one former central office staff member said.
"We did not fundamentally change how the central office operated.
We cut [principals], squeezed them, and basically tried to strangle
them. But we did not try to reinvent a new relationship between central
and the schools."
To understand the story of Baltimore's reforms from 2007 to
the present, we conducted more than a dozen interviews, reviewed
district documents and press reports, and collected secondary data. Our
understanding was greatly informed by talking with key observers in 2013
and again in 2015, including principals, current and former district
staffers, advocacy groups, and civic leaders, whose insights are
reflected below.
An Agenda for an Ailing System
For decades, Baltimore followed a familiar path for once-thriving
cities: as its fortunes declined, so did its schools. For nearly a
century, City Schools were under mayoral control, vulnerable to the
corruption and financial mismanagement that challenged City Hall. Over
time, a brisk drug trade and violent crime took hold in formerly stable
neighborhoods.
In 1997, after years of mismanagement and low student achievement,
the state took over the district and appointed an independent Board of
Commissioners, who would hire the CEO. Reform started soon after; in the
early 2000s, City Schools introduced choice to high school students,
closed dropout factories, and founded small, specialized high schools.
Then came a 2003 state law authorizing charter schools in Maryland, and
the arrival in 2007 of Superintendent Andres Alonso. He was the seventh
person to take the job in 10 years.
By then, conditions at City Schools had grown dire. Over the
previous two decades, the middle class had fled Baltimore for the
suburbs, and school enrollment had fallen by one-quarter, to about
80,000 from 109,000 in 1997 (Figure la). About 90 percent of students
were African American, and nearly three-quarters qualified for free or
reduced-price school meals. They were spread thinly across nearly 200
aging buildings that had been designed to hold twice as many students.
Achievement was stubbornly low: in 2007, 47 percent of students in
3rd through 8th grade were proficient in math, and 57 percent in
reading. Four in 10 students did not graduate high school. Meanwhile,
the central office remained a bloated, flawed bureaucracy: a 2006 state
audit had turned up overpayments, including checks to former employees.
Another review found that as student enrollment plummeted, the central
office expanded, adding 2,000 positions from 1995 to 2003.
Alonso, who arrived from the New York City public schools, brought
a clear strategy and agenda based on a portfolio system of schools: to
shift control away from a streamlined central office and into the hands
of school leaders accountable for their success. We focus here on three
key strategies enacted as part of that strategy: closing underused
school buildings and expanding choice, granting principals more
authority, and replacing antiquated budget rules with a funding formula
that followed students wherever they chose to enroll.
As Alonso said in a 2010 Harvard case study,
What we did was to say, we will make the conditions such that every
school will have the opportunity to win. The theory of action is very
simple: the action is in the schools. The resources should be in the
schools, and the community should be involved in decisions at the school
level. With guidance and support from the district, our expectation is
that schools are going to make better decisions about teaching and
learning.
Moving to a System of Schools
Starting in 2008, Alonso set about rightsizing the number of
schools in the district through an annual portfolio review called
Expanding Great Options (EGO). Through EGO, City Schools could opt to
close or reconfigure school programs, based on their performance,
enrollment trends, and facilities needs in neighborhoods and across the
city. Through this process, the district closed 41 of its 195 schools in
seven years.
At the same time, the district added three dozen new schools.
Maryland's local-control charter school law put the City Schools
commissioners in charge of authorizing and overseeing charter schools.
During Alonso's tenure, the number of charter schools doubled,
attracting enough students to end four decades of annual enrollment
declines. By 2013, charters accounted for one in five district schools,
and enrolled 16 percent of students.
City Schools also expanded options for families by approving
"contract" and "transformation" schools, which are
district schools run by outside operators. The district also gave more
families the power to choose, expanding open-enrollment options for
middle school students.
As the authorizer of all schools, City Schools was solely
responsible for the oversight of public education in Baltimore. Still,
for many years it lacked a clear framework for evaluating the relative
performance of the district's different types of schools. In 2012,
the district collaborated with charter school leaders to develop a
common performance framework by which all schools are evaluated, in
order to manage the city's portfolio of charter, contract, and
district schools. The framework included schools' academic
performance, climate, and fidelity to mission, and was considered a
high-quality, fair, and useful assessment by school and district
leaders.
Despite progress on these issues, student achievement on the Trial
Urban District Assessment (TUDA) declined between 2011 and 2015, and
remained stubbornly low relative to that of other large cities (Figure
2). Students in Baltimore's charter schools fared somewhat better,
outperforming those in the city's traditional public schools in 4th
and 8th grade math and reading (Figure 3). A 2014 report to the state
legislature found enrollment in Baltimore charters was broadly similar
to overall enrollment in all city schools, though charter students were
less likely to enroll in free or reduced-price school meal programs: 79
percent compared to 85 percent citywide.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Families offered mixed accounts of their ability to assess school
quality and navigate Baltimore's choice system. A 2014 Center on
Reinventing Public Education (CRPE) survey found that while 55 percent
of public school parents participated in choice, nearly one-third of
families had some difficulty understanding which schools their children
were eligible to attend, a quarter had trouble getting information to
choose a school, and one in five reported difficulty in transporting
their child to the school of their choice. Parents with less education
were much more likely to struggle with these issues.
Overhauling School Funding
Alonso believed that in order to improve, schools needed to be free
to use different methods of instruction; to do this they also had to be
free to hire staff that fit their educational approach and be granted
individual autonomy over how to spend both time and money. In 2008-09,
he implemented a new student-based funding formula, called Fair Student
Funding (FSF). It awarded funding to schools based on their enrollment
and students' respective needs, and expanded principals'
control over their schools' budgets. Every student brought a base
dollar amount, as well as additional funding based on their test scores,
and principals were given expanded authority to allocate those dollars
as they saw fit.
By contrast, the prior formula divided resources by schools, based
on standard entitlements for certain staff positions, creating gross
inequities among large and small schools. A study of elementary and
middle-school funding in the 2007-08 school year found that the 18
smallest elementary and middle schools received 28 percent more dollars
per student than the six largest: $10,900 compared to $7,800.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
As part of the implementation of FSF, City Schools eliminated
nearly 500 central office positions, cutting staff by one-quarter and
putting more than $160 million into the schools. District-wide, the
percentage of funds controlled at the school level increased to 67
percent in 2008-09, up from 60 percent a year earlier. At the school
level, 65 percent of funding was characterized as "unlocked,"
which allowed principals to redirect dollars attached to particular
positions to programs or staff they felt would best serve their school.
Rather than hire required administrative staff or aides, for example, a
principal might opt to add a science teacher or a social worker,
depending on student needs and his or her vision for the school.
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Still, central office authority was difficult to escape: countless
decisions, big and small, were still controlled by district rules. While
the district had more than $15,000 per pupil to spend in 2009-10,
principals at district schools had control over just $6,500, or about 45
percent (not including additional unlocked dollars to cover special
education costs).
Where did the rest of the money go? Costly obligations to fund debt
service and health insurance for retirees took significant chunks of
City Schools' overall budget. In addition, some money remained in
the hands of the central office, used to support a range of district
functions and services whether or not principals wanted or used them.
Overall, after adjusting for inflation, per-pupil expenditures have
declined slightly since FSF was implemented, by about 6 percent (Figure
4).
Expanding Authority for Principals
Greater control over spending also meant greater accountability for
results. School leaders were suddenly on notice that they now had the
tools to improve student performance and would be held responsible for
doing so.
While autonomy with accountability may have been popular in theory,
its aggressive implementation with minimal support left the principal
corps feeling more demoralized than empowered. Central office budget
guidance for principals wasn't always targeted, timely, or useful.
Principals publicly described the threat of district closure as
stressful, and those leading lower-performing schools were closely
scrutinized by the central office. Observers we interviewed noted that
overall, instead of embracing and using the new flexibility they had,
many principals were tentative in their actions, fearing any misstep.
City Schools aggressively pursued greater accountability for
student outcomes by replacing principals who did not meet expectations.
In a 2011 interview with the Baltimore Sun, Alonso argued that turnover
"[was]... needed, especially given our outcomes this year and given
how much work needs to be done."
This combination of weak support and tough accountability
eviscerated the leadership corps in the city. By the end of 2009, the
district had replaced 40 percent of its principals, and by 2011, just 25
percent of those who were in City Schools at the beginning of
Alonso's tenure remained. The district also struggled to keep new
principals on the job; a study of first-year principals in six cities
hired in 2007-08 found that less than half of those in Baltimore--41
percent--were on the job three years later, compared to 65 percent, on
average (Figure 5). As one school leader told us,
Three hundred principals in the last four years. There's no
stability in the schools. There's not strong organization in the
schools, there's not experience in the schools in terms of
leadership, so therefore, I don't think we have been able to
sustain any kind of growth and progress.
Differences at Charter Schools
Complicating matters, the funding formula and new accountability
rules laid bare major differences between the city's traditional
and charter schools. As Alonso described at the time:
One-sixth of our schools have tremendous flexibility and buy-in from
the community and politicians. Then we [have] 150 other schools that
were perceived to be the dregs of the universe and had no buy-in, a
fortress mentality, and no flexibility whatsoever... You put me in a
room with charter school principals, and you put me in a room with
traditional school principals, and it's night and day. One of these
groups has a vision and feels like they're in charge of their schools,
and one of those groups are all about compliance and are just waiting
for the Central Office to tell them what to do.
Under FSF, charter school principals continued to have
significantly more control over school spending. In 2009-10, they had,
on average, an additional $2,800 per student to spend as they saw fit,
compared to district schools: $9,300 in flexible dollars, or 65 percent
of the total funds per student. In addition, charter schools could also
create rainy-day funds by rolling over money from one year to the next,
giving them substantially more financial flexibility to deal with
staffing shortages or budget shortfalls.
While charter schools in Baltimore have substantially less autonomy
compared to charters in other states--they are held to local
collective-bargaining agreements and subject to the approval processes
set by the local board of education, for example--the stubborn
differences between district and charter schools in Baltimore seeded a
sense of unfairness accepted that charter schools can do things that
traditional schools can't do and it's unfair."
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Meanwhile, the district's mixed signals regarding autonomy
undermined all school leaders' trust in central office
administrators, and in particular, compromised opportunities for the
sectors to work together. Charter school leaders expressed worry about
conceding any ground to the district. As one school leader said, "I
want to run as much as I can on my own, because if I [concede ground],
it becomes a slippery slope."
In addition, a landmark 2010 contract with the Baltimore Teachers
Union, signed with reform-oriented intentions, actually undermined
principals' autonomy over staffing. The agreement sought to reward
top-performing teachers with more pay, replacing the traditional
"step and lane" system of pay increases based on seniority and
levels of education. While principal input is one factor in a
performance evaluation system, the contract also included provisions
that enabled teachers to rapidly earn advancement and increased pay
through professional activities, including completing college courses
and professional development programs. As one district observer told us:
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
I think the teacher contract between the district and the union has
just gutted any autonomy or authority principals have. I mean you have
teachers getting promotions with very little input from principals. You
can easily have a mediocre teacher go through the model teacher process
and get a $30,000 raise... We need to re-establish the principal's
position as a position of real authority.
An Incomplete Reform Story
The City Schools story is an important illustration of the
potential advantages and liabilities of a district-led portfolio
strategy. The successes in Baltimore--including rapid progress on
closing underenrolled and low-performing schools, a common performance
framework to evaluate district and charter schools alike, a leaner
central office, and some improvement in academic outcomes--point to the
progress that one forward-looking superintendent can make with
consolidated authority. But those successes were incomplete in large
part because principals, in both district-run and charter schools,
encountered ways in which remnants of the old bureaucratic system
undercut or failed to support their efforts.
Today, Baltimore is struggling with many of the same issues that it
faced prior to Alonso's leadership. In 2015, a $115 million budget
deficit prompted then-superintendent Gregory Thornton, Alonso's
successor, to propose new setasides in charter school funding to cover
the costs of central office systems like payroll and the student
management system. In response, a coalition of charter schools filed
suit against the district. Thornton also moved toward a differentiated
autonomy model, where resources for some of the city's most
struggling schools are controlled almost entirely by the district.
Despite those challenges, district officials report making progress
on some of the issues we observed over the course of our work in
Baltimore, particularly in supporting school leadership. Education
Resource Strategies, a non-profit consulting firm, is now offering
targeted budget-development support to school leaders, and the district
is focused on developing, rather than exiting, principals. Thornton,
whose tenure was described as "divisive" by the Sun, left the
district earlier this year under pressure, and was replaced by
Baltimore's former academics chief under Alonso, Sonja Santelises.
There is clearly much more to be done, and no question that the
urgency and optimism accompanying the reforms from the Alonso era have
faded. We believe, however, that Baltimore can regain some of its
momentum by refashioning how the central office supports schools.
The central office still controls substantial portions of City
Schools' funding. Requiring central office units to cost out their
services (as was previously attempted) and develop business plans while
giving schools more choice over what they purchase could create greater
efficiency on both sides. This shift would also capitalize on ongoing
efforts to develop principals' budget-management skills.
Beyond a focus on efficiency, those working in the central office
to support schools must have a clear, shared understanding that
principals and teachers are often better positioned to know and act on
the needs of their students and communities. And these central office
staff must understand that this expectation necessarily changes the
day-to-day work they do to support principals.
While Baltimore provides a cautionary tale for urban district
leaders implementing the portfolio strategy, it should not be seen as
the death knell for reform within a traditional school system. The
unified system of governance in Baltimore enabled Alonso to take
aggressive action on low-performing schools and create coherent
standards and common practices. Those sorts of changes would have been
far more difficult in a decentralized system, as in Detroit.
However, it is clear that moving from a centralized school system
focused on stability to an innovation-minded system of autonomous
schools requires more than pulling a few policy levers. To get the full
benefits of a decentralized system of schools, reform leaders must make
clear commitments to educators, enforce these by eliminating
administrative control functions that create ambiguity, and curtail
central office control of funds. Such wholesale change requires
refashioning staff expectations, rule making, and professional cultures.
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Whether this is achieved by granting charter autonomy more broadly,
or by transforming district administrations, these changes are critical.
Urban public school systems, no matter their structure, will educate the
vast majority of students living in cities for generations to come.
by BETHENY GROSS and ASHLEY JOCHIM
Betheny Gross is a senior research analyst and research director at
the Center on Reinventing Public Education (CRPE), and Affiliate
Faculty, School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, at the
University of Washington Bothell. Ashley Jochim is a research analyst at
the Center on Reinventing Public Education.