Ballots not barristers: Arizona case show limits of litigation.
Dunn, Joshua ; Derthick, Martha
While the competition is formidable, one case today best
illustrates why the judiciary is ill suited to crafting education
policy. Flores v. Huppenthal (formerly Horne v. Flores and Flores v.
Arizona) has been in federal court since 1992 and could very well
stagger on for several more years. Litigation, Flores shows, is
time-consuming,
costly, subject to political manipulation, and prone to prompting
unpredictable policy reforms that even the plaintiffs may not wish for.
When the Supreme Court heard the case in 2009, it cautioned against
judicial adventures in reforming educational institutions. Recent
developments give this warning some measure of vindication.
Four years ago, the Court held that Arizona should be allowed to
argue that expenditures should not be considered the sole criterion for
its English Language Learner (ELL) program. The plaintiffs had argued
that Arizona was underfunding ELL instruction in violation of the
federal Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA). In response to the
lawsuit, Arizona modestly increased its funding for ELL students and
adopted a new policy requiring them to spend four hours a day in special
language classes. Students would transition to regular instruction after
testing proficient in English.
The plaintiffs replied that the funding increases were insufficient
and opposed the instructional reforms. Four hours of language
instruction amounted to segregation, they contended, and made ELL
students fall behind in other subjects. The trial court and the Ninth
Circuit agreed that both the funding and the reforms were inadequate,
and even refused to let Arizona argue that the instructional changes
were working and would bring it into compliance with the law.
The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case back to the Ninth
Circuit and ruled that Arizona at the least should be able to argue that
its instructional reforms were working before deciding whether more
money was necessary. As well, the court worried that the case had become
collusive because the governor, who was then a Democrat, Janet
Napolitano, had refused to defend the state and thus was using the
lawsuit as a political lever against a Republican legislature.
Despite winning before the Supreme Court, Arizona still was not out
of the judicial woods. The same trial-court judge, Raner Collins, would
hear the case on remand. Prior to the Court's ruling, his attitude
toward Arizona could best be described as hostile. He twice found the
state in civil contempt and imposed $21 million in fines. Few would have
been surprised if he had found that Arizona's four-hour model was
unlawful, leading to a fresh round of judicial interventions.
After concluding a four-month hearing in January 2011, he
inexplicably waited to issue a judgment until March 2013. Even more
surprising than his delay was his decision: he sided with the state. He
quickly dismissed the argument that the program was discriminatory. He
conceded that the state had adopted the four-hour model for the purpose
of helping ELL students. Grouping students by English proficiency, like
other groupings by ability, was not "segregation" and was in
fact allowed under the EEOA. He then noted that ELL students had made
progress since 2006, and that it was not his job to decide whether the
four-hour program was "ideal" or whether the plaintiffs had an
even better plan. He said the state has great latitude to set education
policy, and with at least some hint at exhaustion, announced that
"this lawsuit is no longer the vehicle to pursue the myriad of
educational issues in this state."
The plaintiffs naturally did not accept this bitter pill from their
former ally and immediately appealed to the Ninth Circuit. It is not
unreasonable for them to hope that Collins's decision will be
overturned there. But even under the best of circumstances, it would
take several more years before any judicial action would change
Arizona's policy. Thus, after 21 years, most of which were spent
before a compliant district and appellate court, the primary consequence
of the litigation has been the adoption of an educational model that the
plaintiffs oppose and under which at least an entire generation of
students will be taught. Such results should give even the most hardened
public-interest attorney pause before racing to the courthouse rather
than the ballot box.
Joshua Dunn is associate professor of political science at the
University of Colorado-Colorado Springs. Martha Derthick is professor
emerita of government at the University of Virginia.
Litigation is prone to prompting unpredictable polocy reforms that
evev the plaintiffs may not wish for.
by JOSHUA DUNN and MARTHA DERTHICK