Does school choice reduce Crime? Evidence from North Carolina.
Deming, David J.
Evaluations of school-reform measures typically focus on the
outcomes that are most easily quantified, namely, test scores, as a
proxy for long-term societal benefit. But there are at least two reasons
we might want to look beyond test scores and other school-based outcome
measures. First, there is evidence that schools facing accountability
pressures may be able to raise student test scores through methods that
do not translate into long-term improvements in skills or educational
attainment, by engaging in test-prep activities or by cheating, for
example. Second, even in the absence of such behaviors, the correlation
between test-score gains and improvements in long-term outcomes has not
been conclusively established. Studies of earlychildhood and school-age
interventions often find long-term impacts on such outcomes as
educational attainment, earnings, and criminal activity despite
nonexistence or "fade-out" of test-score gains. In other
words, programs can yield long-term benefits without raising test
scores, and test-score gains are no guarantee that impacts will persist
over time.
In this study, I investigate whether the opportunity to attend a
school other than a student's assigned neighborhood school reduces
criminal activity, especially among disadvantaged youth. Many of the
schools chosen by the students were "better" on traditional
indicators, such as student test scores and teacher characteristics. All
of them, however, were preferred by the applicant over the default
option. The analysis therefore sheds light on whether efforts to expand
school choice can be an effective crime-prevention strategy,
particularly when disadvantaged students can gain access to
"better" schools.
We know that criminal offenders often have low levels of education:
only 35 percent of inmates in U.S. correctional facilities have earned a
high school diploma, compared to 82 percent of the general population.
Criminal activity is concentrated among minority males; it begins in
early adolescence and peaks when most youth should still be enrolled in
secondary school. The schools these young men would attend are typically
in high-poverty urban neighborhoods, have high rates of violence and
school dropout, and struggle to retain effective teachers. Such schools
may be a particularly fertile environment for the onset of criminal
behavior. Yet little research has been conducted to determine the effect
of school quality on crime.
In this study I explore this question using data from the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) school district (CMS) to measure
the impact of school quality on arrest and incarceration rates. I take
advantage of the CMS districtwide open-enrollment school-choice plan,
which until recently let students choose where they wanted to go to
school and employed lotteries to admit students to oversubscribed schools. I compare the criminal activity of students who won the lottery
to attend their first-choice school to that of students who lost the
lottery.
I find consistent evidence that attending a better school reduces
crime among those age 16 and older, across various schools, and for both
middle and high school students. The effect is largest for African
American males and youth who are at highest risk for criminal
involvement. In general, high-risk male youth commit about 50 percent
less crime as a result of winning the school-choice lottery. They are
also more likely to remain enrolled in school, and they show modest
improvements on measures of behavior such as absences and suspensions.
Yet there is no detectable impact on test scores for any youth in the
sample.
School Choice in CMS
With more than 150,000 students enrolled in 2008-09,
Charlotte-Mecklenburg is the 20th largest school district in the nation.
The CMS attendance area encompasses all of Mecklenburg County, including
Charlotte and several surrounding cities. Overall, CMS is racially and
demographically diverse. About 45 percent of the students in CMS middle
and high schools in 2003 were African American, less than 10 percent
were Hispanic (although the Hispanic population was growing rapidly over
this period), and about 50 percent were eligible for free or
reduced-price lunches. Individual CMS schools vary widely in demographic
composition: CMS high schools in 2003 ranged from less than 10 percent
to close to 90 percent nonwhite, and were also dissimilar in average
test scores and rates of high school graduation.
From 1971 until 2001, CMS schools were forcibly desegregated under
a court order. Students were bused all around the district to preserve
racial balance in schools. After several years of legal challenges, the
court order was overturned, and CMS was instructed that it could no
longer determine student assignments based on race. In December 2001,
the CMS school board instituted a policy of districtwide open enrollment
for the 2002-03 school year. School boundaries were redrawn as
contiguous neighborhood zones, and children who lived in each zone were
guaranteed access to their neighborhood school. Under busing, schools
were racially balanced, but the surrounding neighborhoods remained
highly segregated. Thus the redrawing of school boundaries led to
concentrations of minority students in some schools.
The first open-enrollment lottery took place in the spring of 2002.
CMS conducted an extensive outreach campaign to ensure that choice was
broad-based, and 95 percent of parents submitted at least one preferred
school; parents could submit up to three (not including their
neighborhood school). Admission for all students from outside the
neighborhood zone was subject to grade-specific limits. The lottery
process for oversubscribed grades gave preference first to students who
previously attended the school and their siblings, then to low-income
students applying to schools that previously did not have a majority of
low-income students> and finally to students applying to a school
within their "choice zone" (which would guarantee them access
to district-provided transportation). I study the effects of winning a
seat at a preferred school in the 2002 lotteries on student outcomes
through 2009, seven years after the lotteries were conducted.
Because nearly all rising 12th graders received their first choice,
I restrict my study to students in grades 6 through 11. I also exclude
the 5 percent of students who were not enrolled in any CMS school in the
previous year. About 60 percent of the remaining students chose (and
were automatically admitted to) their neighborhood school. About 75
percent of applicants to nonguaranteed schools were in lottery priority
groups in which the probability of admission was either zero or one.
Even though these students chose a nonguaranteed school, there is no
randomness in whether they were admitted, so I do not use them in the
study. The resulting sample consists of 1,891 high-school students
(grades 9-11) and 2,320 middle-school students (grades 6-8). Compared to
all students in CMS, these students were more likely to be African
American and eligible for free lunch; they also had lower test scores
and higher rates of absence and out-of-school suspensions (see Figure
1).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Data
Since the mid-1990s, the North Carolina Department of Public
Instruction (NCDPI) has required all districts to submit data that
include demographic information, attendance rates, and behavioral
outcomes, yearly test scores in math and reading for grades 3 through 8,
and subject-specific tests for higher grades. I used these data, along
with internal CMS files that contain student-identifying information
such as name, date of birth, and exact address in every year. This
information enabled me to match CMS students to arrest records from the
Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office, which include all arrests of adults
(age 16 and over in North Carolina) that occurred in the county. I
measure crime severity in two ways, both of which are intended to
capture the idea that not all crimes are equal First, I use estimates
that economists have developed of the social cost of crimes, which
include tangible costs, such as lost productivity and medical care, as
well as intangible costs, such as impact on quality of life; these
estimates are extremely high for fatal crimes. (The estimated social
cost of murder is S4.3 million in 2009 dollars. The next costliest crime
is rape, which is estimated at $125,000.) To avoid the results being
driven entirely by a few murders, in my main analysis I limit the cost
of murder to twice the cost of rape. The second measure of severity
weighs crimes by the expected punishment resulting from a successful
conviction. Neither measure accounts for justice system costs such as
police or prisons.
Methodology
If the school lottery is truly random, the winners and losers will
on average have identical observed and unobserved characteristics. With
a large enough sample, a simple comparison of outcomes between winners
and losers would identify the causal effect of winning the lottery. In
reality, CMS conducted many lotteries (for each school and grade). The
number of students in each lottery is relatively small, so my analysis
combines data from all of the middle-school and all of the high-school
lotteries. My results reflect the average difference in outcomes between
winners and losers across all of the lotteries conducted at each level.
The result is the "intent-to-treat" effect of winning a
lottery; it is an intent because students offered a place in their
first-choice school did not always take it (for example, they may have
moved out of the district). Students who won the lottery are more than
55 percentage points more likely than losers to attend their
first-choice school in the first year, and on average spend an
additional 1 to 1.5 years enrolled in that school overall. One can
therefore obtain a rough estimate of the effect of actually attending
the first-choice school (as a result of winning the lottery) by doubling
the results presented below.
I examine the impact of winning the lottery on crime separately for
groups of students with different propensities to commit crimes, with a
focus on the highest-risk group. Because students with adult arrest
records can be tracked all the way back to kindergarten in some cases, I
use all of the potential predictors of criminal behavior--test scores,
demographics, behavior, and neighborhood characteristics--to calculate
an index of crime risk. The students in the top 20 percent of this
crime-risk index are disproportionately African American males and
eligible for free lunch (see Figure la). Their test scores are on
average one standard deviation below the North Carolina state average,
and they are absent and suspended many more days than the average
student (see Figure lb). Because high-risk students are overwhelmingly
male, I exclude females from all of the analyses. The results comprise a
final sample of 1,014 high-school students and 1,081 middle-school
students.
High-school lottery winners attend schools that are demographically
very similar to the schools attended by lottery losers, while
middle-school winners attend schools that are less African American and
higher income on average. All lottery winners travel farther to attend
their first-choice school, but the distance is greater for high school
students than for middle school students.
High-school lottery winners in the high-risk group and all
middle-school lottery winners experience modest increases in standard
measures of school quality. Their peers' average test scores are
about 0.15 standard deviations higher, and the new schools have
higher-quality teachers, measured in terms of the fraction of teachers
with less than three years' experience, the fraction that are new
to the school that year, the percentage of teachers with an advanced
degree, and the share of teachers who attended a "highly
competitive" college as defined by the Barron's rankings. For
youth in the high-risk group, the gain as measured by these quality
indicators is roughly equivalent to moving from one of the lowest-ranked
schools to one around the district average.
Results
I find that winning a lottery for admission to a preferred school
at the high school level reduces the total number of felony arrests and
the social cost of crime. Among middle school students, winning a
school-choice lottery reduces the social cost of crime and the number of
days incarcerated. Importantly, I find that these overall reductions in
criminal activity are concentrated among students in the highest-risk
group. Indeed, I find little impact either positive or negative of
winning a school-choice lottery on criminal activity for the 80 percent
of students outside of this group.
Consider first the results for high school students in the
high-risk group. Among these students, winning admission to a preferred
school reduces the average number of felony arrests over the study
period from 0.77 to 0.43, a pattern driven largely by a reduction of
0.23 in the average number of arrests for drug felonies (see Figure 2).
The average social cost of the crimes committed by high-risk lottery
winners (after adjusting the cost of murders downward) is $3,916 lower
than for lottery losers, a decrease of more than 35 percent. (Without
adjusting for the cost of murder, I estimate the reduction in the social
cost of crimes committed by lottery winners at $14,106.) High-risk
lottery winners on average commit crimes with a total expected sentence
of 35 months, compared to 59 months among lottery losers.
When high-risk students attend a school of choice, violent felonies
decline ...
Number of arrests
High Middle
school school
Property Violent Drug Property Violent Drug
felony felony felony felony felony felony
Lottery 0.25 0.11 0.33 0.24 0.25 0.24
loser
Lottery 0.19 0.10 0.10 * 0.48 * 0.08 * 0.31
winner
Note: Table made from bar graph.
money is saved...
Tatal social cost (in dollars)
High school Middle school
Lottery loser $12,500 $11,000
Lottery winner $7,084 * $4,084 *
Note: Table made from bar graph.
... and less time is spent in jail.
Total expected sentence (in months)
High school Middle school
Lottery loser 58.6 48.3
Lettery winner 35.5 * 17.3
Note: Table made from bar graph.
Note: the charts display the average value of each outcome for high-risk
lottery losers and estimate of the aveerage value for hight-risk lottery
winners based on the estimated effect of winning the admission lottery
for high-risk students.
* indicates that the difference in outcomes between lottery losers and
winners is statistically significant at the 10% level or greater.
SOURCE: Author's caloulations
Among high-risk middle-school students, I find no effect of winning
a school-choice lottery on the average number of felony arrests.
Although the number arrests for violent felonies fails, this is offset
by an increase in the number of property arrests. Because violent crimes
carry greater social costs, however, winning a school-choice lottery
reduces the average social cost of the crimes committed by middle school
students by $7,843, or 63 percent. It also reduces the total expected
sentence of crimes committed by each student by 31 months (64 percent).
An important limitation of this analysis is that I do not have
access to data on juvenile crime. Especially for students in the middle
school sample, this could mask big differences in juvenile offending in
the early years after the lotteries were conducted. As an alternative, I
examine the effect of winning the lottery on school disciplinary
outcomes such as absences and suspensions, as well as on test scores.
Among the high-risk group, lottery winners are absent slightly less than
the lottery losers are. The effect on high school suspensions in 2003 is
relatively large, but the other school discipline effects are small and
statistically insignificant.
In contrast to the results for crime and disciplinary outcomes, I
find no evidence that winning admission to a preferred school leads to
test-score gains. But I do find some impacts on enrollment, grade
progression, and grade attainment for high-risk youth. For example,
high-risk middle-school lottery winners are 18 percentage points more
likely than lottery losers to be enrolled in CMS in their lOth-grade
year. The effect on 1 lth-grade enrollment is about half the size (9
percentage points), and there is no impact on persistence into 12th
grade.
Despite the impacts on enrollment and progression there is no
detectable increase in high school graduation rates. Because I am
limited to CMS administrative data, it is difficult to distinguish
dropouts from subsequent GED recipients or transfers who may have
graduated elsewhere. Administrative records are particularly problematic
for high-risk youth, who sometimes disappear from CMS well before they
are old enough to do so legally. The graduation rate is only about 25
percent among high-risk high-school students, and currently only about
10 percent among high-risk middle-school students, although some who are
still enrolled may yet graduate. Additionally, a bit less than 10
percent of the high-risk middle-school sample never appears in any high
school grade but subsequently appears in the arrest data. Because any
intervention aimed at high school students would miss this group
altogether, this suggests that high school might be too late for the
youth at highest risk of criminal activity.
Explanations and Policy Implications
Overall, I find that winning the lottery to attend a first-choice
school has a large impact on crime for high-risk youth. High-risk
lottery winners experienced roughly a 50 percent reduction in the
measures of criminal activity that weight crimes by their severity.
I consider four possible explanations for the reduction in crime
among high-risk lottery winners. The first is incapacitation^ which
advances that winning the lottery entails longer bus rides to and from
school, thus occupying youth during high-crime hours. The second is
contagion, in which winning the lottery prevents crime by removing
high-risk youth from crime-prone peers or neighborhoods, thereby
reducing contemporaneous exposure of high-risk youth to criminogenic influences. These first two explanations would predict a strong initial
effect that fades over time. If, for example, drug-market activity is
concentrated within a few schools, we might expect large differences in
criminality in the high school years that diminish as enrollment in the
chosen school ends and lottery winners and losers return to the same
neighborhoods. When I examine the effect of winning a school lottery
separately at different points in time after the lotteries were
conducted, however, I find larger effects in later years. I therefore
conclude that there is little support for the incapacitation and
contagion explanations since they do not fit the pattern of results over
time.
A third possibility is that the reduction in crime comes from the
skills students gain by attending a higher-quality school. If the
schools attended by lottery winners do a better of job of teaching
skills that increase students' ability to find employment, they
will stay enrolled in school longer, delaying the onset of criminality
through the peak period of offending behaviors. Moreover, youth with
more and better schooling will gain access to more and better
opportunities for paid work, making crime less attractive. Based on a
back-of-the-envelope calculation of the relationship between enrollment
and criminal activity in my sample, I estimate that the effects of
winning a school lottery on enrollment could potentially explain about
45 percent of the impact on criminal activity in the high school sample,
but only about 10 percent in the middle school sample.
Alternatively, peer networks formed in middle or high school could
have a persistent influence on adult criminality without affecting
skills directly. In my own data, I find relatively little evidence that
the propensity of a student's peers to engage in criminal activity
influences the degree to which he commits violent crimes. This may be
due in part to the high rate of early dropout among violent felons.
However, having crime-prone peers in middle school substantially
increases the likelihood of committing a violent crime, especially for
youth in the high-risk group. Based on this relationship, I estimate
that changes in peers can explain roughly 9 percent of the impact on
violent arrests in the middle school sample.
Regardless of the mechanisms by which admittance to a preferred
school influences criminal activity, the fact that these impacts are
concentrated among high-risk students has important implications for the
design of school-choice programs. It may make sense for oversubscribed
schools of choice to give preferential admission to students at greatest
risk of criminal activity. To illustrate this point, I use my results to
evaluate the consequences of two different types of lotteries: 1) those
giving priority to the highest-risk students and 2) a simple lottery
similar to those virtually all charter schools nationwide are required
to use to admit students when the schools are oversubscribed. The actual
CMS lottery system gave preferences to low-income students who applied
to schools with a low fraction of lowincome students. As a consequence,
many poor (and high-crime risk) students were automatically admitted to
schools while other students had to win the lottery.
If slots in oversubscribed schools were systematically allocated to
the highest-risk students, the social cost of crime would fall by an
additional 27 percent relative to the actual CMS assignment mechanism. A
more realistic form of targeting is the method actually pursued by CMS,
giving preference to low-income students within the lottery system. I
estimate that this policy choice lowered the social cost of crime by
about 12 percent, relative to a simple charter-style lottery with no
preferential treatment. Although this analysis does not consider the
possibility that a greater concentration of high-risk students could
have adverse effects on other students, it nonetheless highlights the
likely beneficial consequences of giving preference to disadvantaged
students in the admissions process for oversubscribed schools.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
Conclusion
In this study, I find that winning a lottery for admission to the
school of choice greatly reduces criminal activity, and that the
greatest reduction occurs among youth at the highest risk for committing
crimes. The impacts persist beyond the initial years of school
enrollment, seven years after the school-choice lottery was held. The
findings suggest that schools may be an opportune setting for the
prevention of future crime. Many high-risk youth drop out of school at a
young age and are incarcerated for serious crimes prior to the age of
high school graduation. For these youth, who are on the margins of
society, public schools may present the best opportunity for
intervention.
The end of busing and the implementation of open enrollment in CMS
was a significant policy change. The four neighborhood high schools to
which most of the lottery applicants were assigned lost more than 20
percent of their enrollment in a single year. In subsequent years, two
of these schools were restructured as magnet schools offering
specialized programs in a small school setting. Two middle schools that
lost significant numbers of students were subsequently closed. The open
enrollment policy thus sent a strong signal of parental demand to CMS
that may have resulted in the shutting down or restructuring of
low-performing schools. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 included a
provision that allowed parents to transfer students from
"persistently dangerous" public schools, but many states have
set the legal threshold so high that very few schools qualify. The
results here suggest that, to the extent that low-quality schools are
also persistently dangerous, allowing students to leave them might
benefit individual students as well as society as a whole.
Attending a better school reduces crime among those
age 16 and older, and for both middle and high school students. The
effect is
largest for African American males.
Youth with more and better schooling will gain access
to more and better opportunities for paid work, making crime
Less attractive.
For youth on the margins of society,
Public schools may present the best opportunity for
intervention.
David J. Deming is assistant professor of education at the Harvard
Graduate School of Education. This article is adapted from a study in
the November 2011. issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics.