International perspectives on the communist party of China.

Shambaugh, David

Studies and analysis of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in universities and research institutes (think tanks) around the world are active, although there are considerably fewer scholars and specialists who focus their research on the CPC itself (as distinct from broader research on Chinese politics). In other words, CPC studies are a specialised subfield of the broader study of contemporary Chinese politics. Almost all of those who research the CPC have received PhD degrees in Political Science and serve in university Political Science departments. (1)

CPC studies abroad have evolved considerably over time. They can be divided into three broad periods.

During the 1950s-1960, Western scholarship tended to concentrate on the CPC's rise to power (particularly the Yan'an period); CPC ideology (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought) and its impact on Party and state policy; the "paramount leader" (Mao) and other senior CPC leaders; the CPC's relationship with the Soviet and other communist parties; factions inside the CPC; political campaigns (yundong) launched by the Party; the Party's relationship with intellectuals; Central Committee congresses, plenary sessions or work conferences; formal party institutions; or about specific localities. During these years, China was cut off for foreign scholars wanting to conduct research inside the country, so CPC studies were undertaken in Hong Kong, on Taiwan or abroad. Available research materials were limited to official public documents, newspaper articles, some journals and occasional internal (neibu) CPC documents that found their way out of China.

The scholarship of this first period necessarily had an abstract feel since scholars could not go to China to conduct research in situ. Another characteristic was that studies of the CPC were generally part of a broader subfield of "comparative communist studies". As such, the CPC was studied as a generic Leninist institution cloned from the Soviet model--thus there were efforts to understand the degree to which the Chinese version of Soviet Leninism had been "Sinicized" (or not). These differences became more apparent during the late 1950s, as the fissures in the Sino-Soviet relationship became evident. And, finally, following the Sino-Soviet Split, scholars of the CPC analysed the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution--as the Party itself came under attack from within and without.

During the 1970s-1980s, as China began to open up to foreign researchers, new research interests and research methods emerged. CPC scholars were still interested in subjects such as the senior leadership and the political succession to Mao, Zhou Enlai and other first-generation leaders. But there was less interest in studying the Party's ideology, political campaigns and party-to-party relations. New topics of research interest included: Party-Army (PLA) relations; central-provincial relations; relations between the Party and State Council (particularly during the dang-zheng fenkai policy of the late 1980s); the changing and declining role at the local level as a result of economic and social reforms; the role of rural party cadres; changing Party policies towards intellectuals; the development of Party and government-associated "think tanks" (zhinengku); the impact of new economic reforms on Party rule; and CPC history.

With the opportunity to visit China and conduct research in China, a wide variety of new research materials (newspapers, journals and books) became available. Some Party institutions became available for visits, (2) and interviews with some CPC members and officials became possible. As a result, a much more variegated and nuanced sense of the CPC emerged from this generation of scholarship. Another benefit was that interaction between Chinese Party historians and foreign scholars was initiated.

During the 1990s-2000s, foreign CPC scholars began to change their research focus again and a third period of scholarship opened. In the aftermath of 1989, many studied the impact of June 4th on the Party and its rule in China. After the collapse of East European and Soviet communist party-states, there was also an interest in comparing the CPC to these former regimes. But, as time passed and the CPC weathered the events of 1989-1991, scholars began to focus on some new subjects: the policy process (zhengce juece) inside the CPC; the role of "leading groups" (lingdao xiaozu); the nomenklatura system and Party personnel policy; individual "Third and Fourth Generation" leaders at the top of the system (Politburo level); the structure and function of Central Committee departments; the Party School system (dangxiao xitong) and new cadre training academies (ganbu xueyuan); new cadre management and training methods; the condition of local party committees; intra-party democracy, consultation, and transparency; the Party's attempts to recruit entrepreneurs from the emerging middle class; the Party's relations with intellectuals; the CPC's reaction to political dissent; the re-institutionalisation of the Party and party-building (dangjian); the political succession from Jiang Zemin/Zhu Rongji to Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao, and the pending succession at the 18th Party Congress to Xi Jinping and the "Fifth Generation" leadership.

While the available sources for the study of the CPC did not change much from the second to this third period, one new development was the occasional--but rare--opportunity to visit and carry out interviews in the main Central Committee departments: the Propaganda Department, Organisation Department, United Front Department, International Department and Discipline Inspection Commission. This author, for example, was able to visit and carry out interviews in each of these departments in the course of researching his book on the CPC. (3)

These are some of the topics that have interested foreign scholars of the CPC in recent years. As in previous years, foreign scholars have used a variety of published materials in their research, and they conduct interviews where possible--but it must be said that doing research on the CPC in China is still very difficult. Generally speaking, for foreigners, the CPC remains an extremely closed and not very transparent institution and system. In some ways, even the People's Liberation Army is a more open and accessible institution. (4) It remains extremely difficult to arrange meetings and interviews with Central Committee departments and individual CPC leaders or senior officials, to observe Party meetings in various institutions or classes at Party Schools, and to read inner-Party documents. Foreign scholars try to understand the CPC and its reforms, but the CPC generally does not foster or facilitate this research or understanding. The CPC remains a tough nut to crack. One has to rely on official sponsorship or personal connections to gain access to virtually all Party institutions. What has notably improved is gaining access to Party publications. This has become far easier than in the past (including online sources). Another encouraging sign was the CPC's willingness to host and co-sponsor a small international conference on "Party Building and Reforming the Communist Party of China", held in Beijing in June 2011. (5) The success of that conference has produced a follow-up conference on the implications of the 18th Party Congress. The CPC now seems more interested in publicising its procedures and accomplishments, in line with inner-Party instructions to improve "transparency" (toumingdu) and "public diplomacy" (gonggong waijiao).

So how do foreign CPC scholars view the state of the CPC today and in recent years? We turn our attention to this subject in the following section.

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE STATE OF THE CPC

Among Western scholars of the CPC, there is both consensus and dissensus concerning the current condition and future of the CPC. (6) Following the events of 1989, there was widespread agreement among foreign scholars that the CPC was afflicted and challenged by many severe problems and was in a state of atrophy (gradual decline).

The elements of atrophy include:

* lack of legitimacy due to the June 4th crackdown;

* possible fissures between the Party and PLA;

* lack of a coherent and persuasive Party ideology;

* decline of the Party-state's mobilisational capacity and decay of the organisational apparatus;

* entrenchment of predatory and corrupt local officials;

* widespread corruption within the CPC;

* rising economic and social tensions within society;

* rural discontent and rising incidents of unrest;

* increasing ethnic unrest;

* ineffective internal CPC monitoring and no external checks and balances on the Party-state;

* political patronage and factionalism among Party and state elites;

* fragmentation of institutional authority and erosion of institutional norms; and

* declining capacity of the state at all levels (central, provincial, local) to deliver public goods and perform good governance.

While there has been general consensus and agreement among Western scholars concerning these problems and challenges confronting the CPC, there has been significant disagreement over the scope, pace and degree of Party atrophy. Some have argued that the atrophy was so acute that collapse was inevitable and even imminent. Others argued that however much atrophy and discredit the Party had earned, it still maintained control over key organs of power (the military and security services, state finances and the personnel system) and thus could survive and rule indefinitely through a combination of coercion and Leninist organs. Once the CPC began to emerge from the 1989-1992 catharsis, and Deng Xiaoping took his Southern Sojourn (Nanxun) in 1992, political reforms were reinitiated. On Deng's trip, he criticised "leftism" and subsequently engineered a "soft purge" of "New Leftist/Neoconservatives" in the run-up to the 14th Party Congress (his last real political act). Subsequently, after Deng died in 1997, Jiang Zemin and his right-hand Party czar Zeng Qinghong initiated a wave of inner-party reforms (that lasted for 12 years until 2009). But there was sharp disagreement among analysts over both the aims and outcomes of the Party's reform attempts since the late-1990s. (7)

On these questions, international scholars of the CPC essentially divide into two groups. (8) One group, which I identify as the "Pessimists", believe and argue that the problems confronting the CPC are extremely severe, that the Party's efforts to deal with the problems have been insufficient, and that the Party faces a serious "legitimacy crisis" and is in real danger of collapse. The other group, whom I label "Optimists", also argue that the problems confronting the CPC are severe--but they believe them to be essentially manageable, that the CPC has been undertaking a series of reforms in recent years to address them and strengthen Party rule and that the CPC is not in danger of collapse.

The Pessimists

The Pessimists see the Chinese political system as embattled, endangered and in a state of crisis. They argue that the system is very fragile and likely to collapse. For these analysts, it is a question of when not whether it will implode. (9) This perspective was shared by a surprising number of leading scholars in the United States (but not in Europe). Yet they disagree on how long the political system has been in a state of crisis (some date it to the Mao era, others to 1989, and others to more recent times). They see a growing disconnect between a vibrant, dynamic economy and society on the one hand, and a rigid political system on the other. They do not see many--if any--positive or progressive political reforms being undertaken by the CPC. Some scholars saw much "fragility" in the system, but not necessarily its coming collapse. (10) Others predicted that the weaknesses of the system and Party rule would give way to a peaceful transition to democracy. (11)

Even those observers who credit post-1997 CPC reforms see them as having stalled and even retrogressed since 2009. They view the harsh security measures being undertaken since 2009 as a sign of weakness, not strength, of the Party-state. Inner-party factionalism surrounding the purge of Bo Xilai is another indicator of instability. Moreover, they argue that the CPC has an ideological and moral "vacuum" and is no longer able to offer an inspiring vision of China's future. Increasingly, the Party is seen by many groups and individuals in society as largely irrelevant in their daily lives. They argue that people join the Party only for personal advancement and political protection, and they view the Party itself as ridden with corruption from top to bottom.

Other analysts in The Pessimist School argue that the CPC is not necessarily in danger of imminent collapse, but that it nevertheless faces a severe "governance crisis" and exhibits "state incapacity". (12) These scholars argue that the CPC's mass base of social support has substantially eroded, as it is now increasingly an elite-based Party (and a corrupt one). They also argue the Party suffers from an acute identity crisis and has no values or inspiring ideology, causing widespread cynicism and disenchantment among the masses towards the ruling Party. They also see a breakdown of accountability, pervasive and systemic corruption, with collusion of officials at all levels of the political system. The erosion of the Party's authority impacts the state's ability to govern and provide public goods. There is a paradox of a rising economy but declining government effectiveness. The difficulty to deliver public goods will deepen the alienation in society, they argue. Moreover, these scholars argue that Party cadres are "predatory"--preying on the population by seizing property and extorting money from citizens (particularly in the countryside). These analysts argue that because China has no regularised or institutionalised mechanisms for society to voice and vet grievances, social tensions will only grow sharper, and this is all a recipe for the breakdown of the Party system.

Thus, the Pessimists believe the situation is acute and that CPC rule is embattled and fragile. Some predict the fairly imminent collapse of the political system and Party rule, while other Pessimists envision prolonged stagnation.

The Optimists

The Optimists recognise many of the afflictions that the Pessimists identify, but are more circumspect about the evidence of the erosion of support for the Party and regime control, the potential for its collapse and systemic political change in China. In their assessments of the CPC's strengths and weaknesses, many Optimists conclude that the Party-state's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses.

Many scholars in this school argue that the CPC's Leninist control institutions (Organisation Department, Publicity Department, United Front Department, Central Discipline Inspection Commission, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security) remain strong and, in fact, have been strengthened in recent years. In addition to the organs of control, these scholars argue that the Party itself has been undergoing a thorough "re-institutionalisation" since the late-1990s--led by CPC leaders Zeng Qinghong, Wang Huning, He Guoqiang and Li Yuanchao. (13) This process of re-institutionalisation has involved the rebuilding of party cells, branches and core groups (dangzu); the move towards "inner-party democracy" (dangnei minzhu); mandating of more regular mid-career cadre training (ganbu peixun) in Party Schools (dang xiao) and the creation of three national cadre training academies (ganbu xueyuan) in Pudong, Jingganshan and Yan'an; (14) strengthening the "supervision" capacity of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission; and more careful annual personnel assessments (kaohe) and meritocratic promotions. These processes and this re-institutionalisation led some Western scholars to proclaim that the CPC was enjoying an "authoritarian resilience." (15)

Other Optimists argue that the CPC has begun to open itself up, by becoming more open and transparent, more regular in its procedures and more consultative with non-Party groups and the other eight "democratic" parties in China. Some scholars label these reforms as "Consultative Leninism". (16) Despite increasing consultative mechanisms --such as strengthening the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)--even the Optimist scholars question whether the CPC (or any Leninist party) can tolerate and accommodate genuine civil society (as distinct from co-opted and controlled social groups) and organised aggregation of social interests. They argue that Leninist parties are by their intrinsic nature intolerant and incapable of ceding such power to autonomous social groups.

Another CPC reform that the Optimists cite is the Party's attempt to be more inclusive of new social groups, particularly the effort by the Party to recruit private sector entrepreneurs (capitalists) into the Party under the "Three Represents" (san ge daibiao) policy. This attempt to transform Party membership--and hence the Party itself--from a typically proletarian worker-peasant basis to a more inclusive one that represents "advanced" sectors of society, culture and the economy, is consistent with the evolution of other East Asian ruling parties towards being elite-based parties. (17) While being inclusive, Western scholars essentially view the "Three Represents" initiative as a means of co-optation by the Party of the emerging middle class--which in other East Asian, European and Latin American societies frequently becomes the backbone of anti-authoritarian/pro-democratic movements. (18) This recruitment initiative is seen as an effort by the Party to "adapt" itself in order to save itself by co-opting, and thereby controlling potential opposition. While perhaps new to the CPC, this tactic is not new to communist parties. Several East European parties--notably Hungary and Romania--adopted such a policy. Even Khrushchev spoke of making the Soviet Communist Party a "party of the whole people" (quanmindang). If such advanced and progressive classes are not included in the Party-state and ruling elite, they are highly likely to form the basis of external opposition to it. So, such a move by the CPC can be interpreted as a pre-emptive tactic as much as it is an adaptive one. Some scholars who have studied this process argue that the tactic is working--that the middle class now is "embedded" in the Party-state and therefore has a greater stake in its longevity. (19) Yet this cosy combination of ruling political and commercial elites only fuels corruption on a national basis. Indeed, the perceived increase in corruption and its scale in recent years may, in part, be attributable to the Three Represents initiative.

Another adaptive initiative undertaken by the CPC, and widely written about by foreign scholars, is the transformation of Party elites and leadership. (20) Beginning with the establishment of retirement norms in the 1980s and progressing through recent Party Congresses, the CPC has pioneered regularised leadership transition and political succession--historically a chronic problem for Leninist party-states. As communist-type political systems have proven notoriously incapable of managing such successions peacefully and systematically, the Chinese example is a noteworthy and positive counter-example. The next big leadership turnover comes at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 when approximately 70 per cent of the Central Committee, the majority of the Politburo and all but two members of the Standing Committee, will retire and be replaced. To be sure, the lurid Bo Xilai Affair in the spring of 2012 was a major blemish on the carefully orchestrated succession. But, nonetheless, the process of elite turnover will take place as scheduled.

Thus, the Optimists see the CPC as proactively undertaking limited but important political reforms and adapting relatively successfully to various challenges the Party faces. As a result of the CPC's re-institutionalisation and revitalisation, the Party and its governing apparatus appear better qualified and more technically competent than at any other time in the post-Mao period. The multiple lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European states seemed to have been learned, as well as those from other political parties and systems around the world. (21) The response of the Party to introduce incremental reform at the grassroots level, while strengthening the capacity of the Party and state institutions at higher levels, has created a system characterised by "resilient authoritarianism". These observers do not deny the various challenges and problems that confront the CPC and Chinese government, but they see the system as holding together rather than collapsing, and the Party-state successfully adapting rather than failing to do so.

Outlook for the Future

While the Pessimists and Optimists are not in agreement about the current condition of the CPC, they are in agreement that the CPC needs to undertake real and serious political reforms for the Party to improve its governance, address serious inequities in Chinese society and create the necessary political conditions to fulfil the economic aims of the 12th Five Year Plan--and therefore to facilitate China's continued modernisation. Many foreign scholars believe that the political system in China today has become an impediment to continued economic growth and development. Even outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao seems to agree: "[Political] reform can only go forward and must not stand still or go backward, because that offers no way out". (22) Moreover, there is essential agreement among international observers that the CPC faces a new revolution similar to all political parties around the world: the "revolution of rising expectations." Citizens in all polities ask of their governments "what have you done for me lately?". Thus, meeting constantly rising societal demands in order to maintain political legitimacy is a dynamic process and this holds true for the CPC as all other ruling parties. In the case of the CPC, many foreign scholars agree that the Party needs to:

* improve public governance and be more responsive to societal demands;

* make the government and Party more transparent, accountable and law-bound;

* take tough and pervasive measures to control corruption at all levels (including inside the Central Committee itself);

* improve local-level implementation of central-level policies;

* dramatically improve the quality and behaviour of cadres;

* establish a clear and enforceable set of property rights;

* improve and enforce the rule of law in all respects at all levels of society and government;

* institute public mechanisms for feedback and improvement of Party policies;

* find a coherent and persuasive national vision to replace its discredited official ideology; and

* relax the excessive domestic security controls, tolerate dissent and enfranchise genuine civil society.

Unless these and other measures are undertaken, the majority of foreign scholars of the CPC see the Party as continuing in a state of decay and degeneration.

If the CPC continues in a state of atrophy (as most recognise it to have been in since 2009), then it is important to conceptualise this as a progressive, incremental and gradual process--rather than a zero-sum immediate implosion of power as occurred in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Not all political systems experience eruptions or implosions. Rather, many simply continue to "muddle through", even stagnate, while others attempt to proactively--but incrementally--cope with new governance challenges and changing circumstances. Some ruling parties engage in full systemic adaptive reforms. Some others seem stable--such as many regimes in the Middle East and North Africa--before suddenly erupting into mass protests (the "Arab Spring"). As long as ruling parties keep control of all means of coercive power, many authoritarian regimes--no matter how despotic--can remain in power for an extended period of time. Syria is the world's current example.

The world is full of examples of such regimes that never do experience a "democratic breakthrough". Even those outside observers who see the CPC as atrophying should recognise that it is a progressive condition, and it can take a very long time to reach a critical state. China is by no means a "failed state", and has many important differences from other single party-states that have declined or collapsed. Any country whose GDP grows by 10 per cent per year cannot be judged a weak state. Nor is it an illegitimate state, as the vast majority of Chinese citizens respect and support its rule.

While the Optimists have argued that the CPC had been very adaptive from the Jiang Zemin period through the late Hu Jintao era, undertaking a variety of political reforms (discussed above), several (including this observer) are now of the view that many of these reforms seemed to have stagnated, halted or even been reversed since the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee in September 2009. That important meeting was devoted to "Party building" (dangjian) and produced a very positive and forward-looking "Decision" (Jueding). In many aspects, the Decision was an embodiment of all the inner-Party reforms that had been undertaken over the previous 12 years. Yet, since that time, almost all foreign scholars of the CPC see: a failure to implement the "Decision"; a pervasively and increasingly corrupt Party; an unprecedented crackdown on dissidents and citizens; a dramatic upsurge in ethnic unrest among Tibetans and Uyghurs and stepped-up suppression of them; a stagnation and retrogression in inner-Party reforms; a retreat from economic liberalisation and re-emphasis on SOEs and central planning; and elite factionalism, purges and a generally risk-averse leadership. This adds up to a reactive not proactive, and insecure, not confident CPC.

While recognising there has been stagnation or retrenchment, foreign scholars remain uncertain as to the causes of why there has there been such political stagnation and retrogression since the Fourth Plenum of September 2009. Some date the retrenchment earlier to the 2008 Olympics and the 2009 riots in Tibet. But other factors may also have played a role. Was it the Xinjiang uprising of July 2009 or the Tibet uprising of 2008? Was it the 60th Anniversary of the PRC? Was it the empowerment of the internal security services that are now out of "control" of the Party and state? Was it the uncertainty of the leadership transition to the next generation of leaders? Was it the reaction to the "Arab Spring"? Was it that the Party really feels threatened by dissidents like Liu Xiaobo, Hu Jia and Ai Weiwei? Was it that public protests and social unrest across the country have truly reached such a serious and pervasive level that the CPC is truly frightened that its rule is seriously in danger--or that society is about to explode into anarchy? Or was the cause more bureaucratic, i.e., a coalition of strong institutions (Ministries of State and Public Security, PLA, large SOEs and the conservative "apparatchik" wing of the CPC) coalesced to retrench reforms? Whatever the individual reasons (or all of the above), many longtime and seasoned observers of China and the CPC have noticed a distinct tightening up and lockdown of the system in 2009-2010 (which was paralleled by external assertiveness in foreign policy).

More broadly, when foreign scholars look at the future of the Chinese political system, they see a wide variety of possibilities. They can be captured in 15 different, but not mutually exclusive, alternative political futures that can be grouped into three broad categories.

International scholars and specialists of the Chinese political system and CPC have discussed and written about each of these possible alternative political futures. While there is no overall consensus among these foreign scholars, there seems to be a number of general points of consensus.

Concerning the factors of possible "change towards political collapse":

1. A military coup d'etat per se is not possible, as the PLA remains a "party-army" loyal to the CPC and the PRC, but it is conceivable that the military could take control of the nation if it erupted in chaos (luan) and social disorder (such as during the Cultural Revolution).

2. The nation is not about to geographically fragment--as during the Warlord Era (1916-1928)--although the possibility of continued unrest and discontent in Tibet and Xinjiang cannot be ruled out (any real attempt to secede from the PRC would be prevented, by force if necessary).

3. Widespread social chaos--as experienced during the Cultural Revolution or even in May 1989--is not really conceivable for three reasons: (a) social tensions do not seem to have reached anywhere near an anarchical "breaking point"; (b) there is no connection or common organisation among discontented groups across the county; and (c) the security services would suppress any such unrest. The possibility of a mass nationwide public uprising is also highly unlikely for the same three reasons.

Concerning the factors of "no change/status quo":

1. Technocratic economism may have been appropriate to the past stage of economic development, but it is no longer appropriate to the necessary next stage as outlined in the 12th Five Year Plan.

2. Corporatism is already evolving out of the current economic structure, albeit within a single Party-state system.

3. Strengthened Leninism is a reflection of an insecure party-state and not a recipe for progress.

4. Inner-party democracy is not real democracy. While it may make the CPC more adaptive and responsive, it does not empower the vast majority of the population.

5. The CPC does not seem tolerant of Authoritarian Pluralism or Consultative Leninism, as it requires truly sharing some degree of political power.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Concerning the factors under possible "change towards democracy":

1. The CPC does not seem capable of a managed transition to democracy from above as Chiang Ching-kuo and the Kuomintang did in Taiwan. Democracy is viewed with great suspicion by the CPC.

2. The current democratic system in Taiwan is far too chaotic and does not hold appeal for Mainland China.

3. The Singaporean model holds much more appeal in China, but it would require authorising and empowering real competitive political parties; having a real elected and accountable legislature and independent judiciary; authorisation and empowerment of non-government organisations and tolerance of non-seditious but real civil society; having a strong and capable civil service; and a total absence of political corruption. Thus, while appealing, the CPC does not seem interested in adopting these key elements of the Singaporean system.

4. The Hong Kong model would also require some degree of toleration and empowerment of real competitive political parties; defining "functional constituencies" on the mainland; putting in place a strong and capable civil service; rooting out corruption; and constraining the power of the Central executive.

Of these democratic alternatives, some combination of the Hong Kong and Singaporean model seems the best and most realistic possibility for China over the medium to long term. But even this would require the CPC to loosen much of its current political (and economic) control.

Thus, there is much debate, but no consensus, among international scholars and specialists about China's political future. It is always safest for analysts to assume that the future will be a lot like the present (linear projections), but such prognoses have frequently and repeatedly been proven wrong by unforeseen events--such as the end of one-party or military rule in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand or throughout Latin America; the collapse of communist party-states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; or more recently with the "Arab Spring" uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa.

The one most important lesson seemingly to be learned from these examples is that stasis--maintaining the status quo--is a sure recipe for heightening "contradictions" in society and between state and society. Therefore, embracing some real forms of political change is a key to survival of the ruling party. This would suggest that managing change from above at a steady pace, and for a single ruling party to have the sense of political security to actually loosen political controls, might be a positive way forward. But this requires a political party to "open political space", become tolerant of dissent, allow civil society to function, create checks on executive power, curb corruption and empower other political parties and interest groups to compete and participate in the political process in a meaningful way.

There seems to be broad consensus among international scholars of global comparative politics, as well as those who specialise in the CPC, that this is what is required of single party-states (including China) if they are going to be able to continue to maintain power. Yet, even if such single ruling parties were to move down these paths, it may still result in their demise. It is a real conundrum: do not reform and lose power, or reform and still lose power! This is the choice many scholars see facing the CPC. Yet others--notably the Optimists above--believe and argue that through instituting a wide range of inner-party reforms, as was done from 1997-2009, the CPC was "changing with the times", was being proactive and was actually enhancing its chances of continuing to rule China effectively and indefinitely. But, as noted above, even these Optimists have been surprised, disappointed and worried by the stagnation of political reforms since 2009.

We will have to wait and see what, if any, changes are brought about by the 18th Party Congress in October 2012. Most likely, there will be a two- to three-year period afterwards during which the new generation of leaders consolidate their rule and build inner-elite consensus for the future course. Hesitancy, risk aversion and more stagnation could well be the result during this time. Less likely is a more serious retrenchment which results in a national security crackdown similar to the 1989--1992 period. More likely, the new leadership could simply return to the reformist agenda of 1997-2009. This would be consistent with the repetitive oscillating pattern since 1978 of fang and shou (opening and closing). Or, the new leadership could endeavour to undertake even bolder political reforms (unlikely). Time will tell, and the CPC's continued rule in China hangs in the balance.

(1) Scholars actively researching the CPC include Andrew Walder (Stanford University, USA), Alice Miller (Stanford University and Naval Post-Graduate School, USA), Roderick MacFarquhar (Harvard University, USA), Minxin Pei (Claremont College, USA), Andrew Nathan (Columbia University, USA), Richard Baum (University of California-Los Angeles, USA), Bruce Gilley (Portland State University, USA), Melanie Manion (University of Wisconsin, USA), Ezra Vogel (Harvard University, USA), Joseph Fewsmith (Boston University, USA), Charlotte Lee (Hamilton College, USA), Jie Chen (Old Dominion University, USA), Zheng Shiping (Bentley University, USA), David Shambaugh (George Washington University, USA), Bruce Dickson (George Washington University, USA), Jessica Teets (Middlebury College, USA), Cheng Li (Brookings Institution, USA), Richard McGregor (Financial Times, USA), Victor Shih (Northwestern University, USA), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh, USA), Pitman Potter (University of British Columbia, Canada), Timothy Cheek (University of British Columbia, Canada), Patricia Thornton (Oxford University), Frank Pieke (Leiden University), Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark), Kerry Brown (University of Sydney, Australia), Anne-Marie Brady (University of Canterbury, New Zealand), He Baogang (Deakin University, Australia), Frederick Teiwes (University of Sydney, Australia), Thomas Heberer (University of Duisburg, Germany), Heike Holbig (Goethe University, Germany), Sebastian Heilmann (University of Trier, Germany), Thomas Kampen (University of Heidelberg, Germany), Suzanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (University of Vienna, Austria), Maria Edin (Uppsala University, Sweden), Michael Schoenhals (Lund University, Sweden), John Burns (Hong Kong University), Yan Xiaojun (Hong Kong University), Zheng Yongnian (National University of Singapore), Bo Zhiyue (National University of Singapore) and Chen Gang (National University of Singapore). Apologies to any I have unintentionally omitted.

(2) For example, the Central Committee Central Literature Research Office (Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi), Party History Research Office (Zhongyang Dangshi Yanjiushi), Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (Zhongyang Bianyi Ju), Contemporary China Research Institute (Dangdai Zhongguo Yanjiusuo), Central Party School (Zhongyang Dangxiao) and local Party research organs.

(3) See David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley and Washington, DC: University of California Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008); Shen Dawei, Zhongguo Gongchandang: Shousuo yu Tiaoshi (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe yu quanguo baixing chubanshe, 2011).

(4) See David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

(5) "International Symposium on "Party Building and Reforming the Communist Party of China", cosponsored by the CPC International Department and the China Policy Program of George Washington University, 6-7 June 2011, Beijing.

(6) This article attempts to capture for readers the range of opinion and points of consensus among foreign China specialists and CPC scholars. It does not necessarily represent the author's own personal views.

(7) These reforms are traced in Shambaugh, China's Communist Party, Chapters 6-7. See also Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian, eds., Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003); Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004).

(8) These categories are elaborated further in Shambaugh, Chinas Communist Party, Chapter 3.

(9) See Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Anatomy of Collapse", New York Review of Books, 26 Sept. 1991, pp. 5-9; Roderick MacFarquhar, "In China, Fear at the Top", New York Times, 21 May 2012; Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001); Gordon G. Chang, "Halfway to Collapse", Far Eastern Economic Review (June 2006): 25; Arthur Waldron, "The Chinese Sickness", Commentary (July 2003): 36-42; Arthur Waldron, "The End of Communism", Journal of Democracy 9, no. 1 (1998): 41-7; Arthur Waldron, "Cracks in the Middle Kingdom", Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 171-9; Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall (New York: Free Press, 2006).

(10) See Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

(11) See Bruce Gilley, China's Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and Where it Will Lead (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

(12) Minxin Pei's writings are the best illustration of this genre. In particular, see his China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

(13) This is a central theme in Shambaugh, China's Communist Party; and Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers (New York: Harper, 2010); Kjeld Erik Bradsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London: Routledge, 2006).

(14) See Frank Pieke, The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Todays China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), David Shambaugh, "Training China's Political Elite: The Party School System", The China Quarterly (Dec. 2008); Gregory Chin, "Innovation and Preservation: Remaking China's National Leadership Training System", The China Quarterly (Mar. 2011); Charlotte Lee, "Party Adaptation, Elite Training, and Political Selection in Reform-Era China", PhD diss., Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 2010.

(15) See Andrew Nathan, "China's Resilient Authoritarianism", Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (Jan 2003): 6-17; Sebastian Heilmann and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., Mao's Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

(16) I believe Richard Baum coined this term. See his chapter "Studies of Chinese Politics in the United States", in China Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan, and the United States, ed. Robert F. Ash, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi (London: Routledge, 2007).

(17) See Bruce Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Politics of Private Sector Development in China (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

(18) See Bruce Dickson, "Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation", Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 4 (2000): 517-41.

(19) See Jie Chen and Bruce Dickson, Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

(20) See Alice Lyman Miller's contributions to China Leadership Monitor, at <http://www.hoover.org/ publications/china-leadership-monitor>; Alice Lyman Miller, "Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics" and Jing Huang, "Institutionalization of Political Succession in China", in China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, ed. Cheng Li (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Cheng Li, Chinas Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Joseph Fewsmith, Elite Politics in Contemporary China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Andrew G. Walder, "The Party Elite and China's Trajectory of Change", China: An International Journal 2, no. 2 (Sept. 2004): 189--2009. Also see many articles published by Cheng Li.

(21) See David Shambaugh, "Learning from Abroad to Reinvent Itself: External Influences on Internal Reforms", in Chinas Changing Political Landscape, ed. Cheng Li.

(22) Zhu Zhe, "Wen Sets Out the Agenda: Premier Highlights the Challenges and Opportunities at His Final NPC News Conference", China Daily, 15 Mar. 2012.

David Shambaugh (shambaug@gwu.edu) is Director of the China Policy Program and Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Michigan. His research interests include national-level Chinese politics, the Communist Party of China, Chinese bureaucratic practices, China's foreign policy worldwide, China's military and security, China's propaganda system and pursuit of soft power and the international relations of Asia.