Legitimacy-building and public sector reform in Macao: administrative measures to address political problems.

Chou, Bill K.P.

In the pre-handover era, the public administration of Macao was notorious for corruption, inefficiency and red tape. To build the legitimacy of the government after the handover of sovereignty in 1999, the leadership of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) relied much on the public sector reform. (1) The contributions of public sector reform to the legitimacy are, however, more than offset by a series of government malfeasances, epitomised by corruption involving ex-Secretary for Transport and Public Works, Ao Man Long, and numerous scandals of extravagance, patronage and incompetence.

This article attempts to discuss the contours of public sector reform in Macao since the handover. The reform is path-dependent. Further improvement in administrative performance--including efficiency, capacity and integrity--is held back by institutional structural weaknesses. It argues that the reform focuses too much on improving the technical aspects of the administration, and far too little on addressing the two major weaknesses in the politico-administrative institutions that cause corruption, wastage and mediocrity. The first weakness is the lack of autonomy and stability in public administration essential for safeguarding the merit principles against erosion by political loyalty and political calculations. Second, public participation through ballot boxes and in deliberative processes is too limited in scope to legitimate the policy outcome, provide sound policy advice and formulate widely accepted public policies. Administrative efficiency and effectiveness, which belong to the sphere of professional considerations, are easily displaced by the political decisions of distributing interests and power.

THE PUBLIC SECTOR BEFORE THE HANDOVER: A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY CRISIS

Macao's public sector in the pre-handover era suffered disrepute for its inefficiency and rampant corruption. The civil service was politicised; the spoils system buttressed a network of patronage extending from the top tier to the rank and file of the civil service. (2) Appointment at the political official level (that is, the governors and secretaries) and bureau director level (the highest-ranking career civil servants) were dominated by Portuguese officials who were proteges of the politicians in Lisbon. Middle-level officials were usually Macanese whose language proficiency in Portuguese and Cantonese enabled them to link the ruling class with those being ruled, composed largely of Chinese people. The terms of office of all political officials were not fixed; they were subject to arbitrary dismissal. All leading officials, that is, the directors of bureau (ju), department (ting), and divisions (chu), were also hired on fixed-term contracts.

An appropriate mix of political officials charged to ensure accountability of democratic institutions, where career civil servants are protected by tenure, is conducive to achieving the dual objectives of democratic accountability and administrative stability. However, Macao was not a democracy; accountability to the public was not the major concern of the ruling class. Rather, the appointment system allowed the president of Portugal considerable flexibility to reward friends for their loyalty with high-level appointments. Meanwhile, career civil servants in leading positions did not have adequate job security.

New public management advocates may claim that in comparison with tenure terms, fixed-term contracts can provide more flexible employment and avoid bureaucratic inertia on the part of civil servants.

In the case of Macao, however, fixed-term contracts led to job insecurity that, in turn, resulted in too much emphasis on factional loyalty and too little on work achievement: to protect themselves from political foes' attacks, they built up their factions which extended from the top to bottom echelons of the civil service. The competition among these factions for jobs, status and influence weakened inter- and intra-departmental coordination, encouraged corruption and discouraged the accumulation of organisational memory. (3)

Since competitive recruitment examinations were not mandatory, factionalism in the administration bred favouritism in the recruitment and appointment of civil servants. Position planning was un-institutionalised. The governor and secretaries had high discretion to create positions for their supporters and relatives, even if the latter did not meet basic qualifications. (4) Civil servants sometimes owed their positions to their relations with patrons rather than their performance and qualifications. Quality of service was not of their concern: it was rumoured that in order to better control the Chinese population who resented the Portuguese rulers, the police force recruited many new immigrants from China's Fujian province who felt marginalised by the Cantonese-speaking population. (5) The divide-and-rule philosophy, and the exploitation of the distrust and discrimination between two dialectic groups underscored the higher priority being placed on command and control instead of service to the community, such as improving professional policing, creating an efficient investigation and client-oriented crime reporting system and implementing effective crime prevention campaigns.

The anti-graft organ, the High Commission against Corruption and Administrative Illegality (ACCCIA), was ineffective in combating corruption. Coming into operation in 1992, ACCCIA was an establishment of only 34 members, compared to the workforce of over 10,000 in the government. (6) The power of the ACCCIA was further constrained by its lack of authority to check civil servants' bank accounts and investigate non-public employees. These shortcomings encouraged average citizens to give bribes in return for particular treatments or to circumvent the cumbersome administrative procedures that slowed down the handling of their cases. (7) Without an effective anti-graft organ, many rent-seeking opportunities were created for both senior and junior officials. Police officers were left unconstrained to collude with the mafia and protect their criminal activities. Prison officers were bribed to smuggle prohibited items into the cells. Macao Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, was dissatisfied with the disciplinary force, referring to the blurred dividing line between police constables and criminals. (8) Without a proper democracy, the MSAR leadership could hardly pursue procedural democracy. The public maladministration and public discontent with the administration offered a window for the MSAR leadership to build its performance legitimacy through reforming the public sector.

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AFTER THE HANDOVER

Moon and Ingraham identified three factors that shaped the trajectory of public sector reform: politicians, bureaucrats and civil society. (9) Macao bureaucrats were unpopular with the public. Those at leading positions owed their positions to receiving special favours from the political officials rather than on the basis of their merits; they lacked autonomy under the political officials. Major societal associations and their leaders were co-opted by both the Macao and Beijing governments. Civil society was too weak to counteract the government. The legislature was replete with pro-Beijing politicians obliged to support the political leadership of the MSAR government. Hence, the executive branch led by the highly popular Edmund Ho could dictate the reforms. Despite serious administrative problems, Ho did not introduce sweeping reforms, such as empowering the anti-graft organ, streamlining the civil service, corporatising government departments or introducing the institutional set-up for improving performance management. As discussed in the following paragraphs, the reform was incremental in nature, reflecting Ho's greater concern for administrative stability, e.g., instilling higher public tolerance for inexperienced and incompetent civil servants and fostering a culture of conflict aversion that is characteristic of the political landscape instead of achieving tangible results in performance improvement. In addition, the improved economy and social order, and the consequent budgetary surplus as well as the government's high approval rating made implementation of more sweeping reforms less urgent. (10)

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PHASE I: 1999-2006

The public sector reform can be divided into two phases: from 1999 to 2006 and from 2007 onwards. In the first phase, three categories of reform can be identified: restructuring of departments, enhancing the customer-oriented culture and improving civil service management. In regard to the restructuring of departments, the judicial police and security forces were merged to improve the cooperation of the two departments and the competence of crime investigation. Some departments were corporatised for higher managerial flexibility. (11) New departments were established and charged with handling the new tasks of the booming casino-based economy, such as migrant workers recruitment, infrastructure construction, traffic management, environment conservation, influenza and contagious diseases prevention and municipal affairs. (12) The most controversial measure was to set up the Civic and Municipal Affairs Department in 2001 to take over the functions of two semi-autonomous and democratic municipal councils. The move was criticised for undermining democratic development and reducing the room of public participation. This held back the growth of the city's democrats--the major opposition force and most vigilant political power over the government.

To engender a customer-oriented environment, various departments outlined their own performance pledge to assure the public that a high level of quality public service would be maintained. One-stop service centres and enquiry centres were set up to bring the front desk of related departments under the same roof, so that better administrative coordination and improved accessibility of information concerning various public services could be achieved. E-government was promoted to increase the transparency of administrative procedures and streamline the application process of government offices, thereby reducing the submission time needed for citizens' applications. International Organization for Standardisation (ISO) 9002 certification was used to improve public service delivery. (13)

To improve civil service management, the Macao government stepped up civil service training to enhance the capacity of individual public employees. The training programmes focused on work-related skills and knowledge, such as law, language, administration, secretarial work, management, computer skills and psychology. The government also commissioned the Civil Service College of Singapore to organise short-term development programmes. In addition, the Peking University and National College of Administration were commissioned to run a master's degree programme in public administration for middle- and high-ranking civil servants to sharpen their managerial skills and widen their horizons. The tools used for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of civil servants were fine-tuned to strengthen staff development and personnel functions. In 2005, the performance appraisal was reformed to more clearly delineate the performance levels of civil servants and to make it easier to link their performance levels with rewards, punishment and promotion. (14)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The fairness principle was increasingly institutionalised in various personnel functions. An appeal system in the appraisal process was established to address performance-grading grievances. The coverage of retirement plans was also extended. In the past, most civil servants hired outside the establishment plan were not entitled to any kind of retirement benefits whilst permanent civil servants could enjoy defined pensions after retirement. To address the inequality, the government introduced a new provident fund scheme in 2007. As of April 2009, 9,363 civil servants (43 per cent of the total workforce in the civil service) had joined the new scheme. Among them, almost 2,000 civil servants were covered by the old pension scheme but they chose to switch to the new scheme because it would bring them higher retirement benefits. Meanwhile, defined benefit recruitment plans were phased out. Through this measure, the government can put a cap on its pension expenditure and save personnel costs in the long term. (15)

The recruitment process was reformed to reduce nepotism and improve the qualifications of the rank and file in the civil service. More entry-level positions were brought under centralised recruitment. With the expansion of tertiary education, more college graduates were recruited; civil servants with low educational attainment (junior high school and below) fell in number (see Figure 1). Many civil servants thus had higher education than required. For instance, positions of "technician" rank required the academic qualification of a high school diploma. In 2008, half of the civil servants at this rank had post-secondary education qualifications and above. (16) To improve the capacity of the police force, notorious for its corruption and incompetence before the handover, the government raised the minimum educational requirement of police constables gradually from primary six to junior high school, and then to senior high school. In 2008, their salary at entry level was raised by more than 30 per cent. (17)

PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM PHASE II: 2006-PRESENT

Phase Two of the public sector reform was in large measure a response to the legitimacy crisis beginning in 2005 and also an attempt to rebuild government legitimacy. After the monopolisation of the casino industry ended in 2002, and the relaxation of outbound tourism to Macao by the Chinese government in 2003, the economy boomed. The roaring economy created many job opportunities and raised income levels substantially, but at the same time caused social problems such as inflation, unaffordable housing prices and serious traffic congestion. Meanwhile, government malfeasance appeared from time to time. Owing to lack of financial control, the actual expenditure of the 4th East Asian Games held in 2005 amounted to Macau pataca (MOP) 4.4 billion (or USD550 million), (18) far beyond the budgeted MOP2 billion. Although the Audit Commissioner uncovered the reasons for the overspending in the East Asian Games, no senior officials were held responsible or subject to disciplinary action. Other financial irregularities such as lax control on the subsidies given to societal associations and abuse of public funds by former municipal councils were left unattended. The migrant worker policy also lacked transparency. Large enterprises could recruit more migrant employees than they required while small-and-medium enterprises had tremendous difficulty in applying for sufficient migrant workers. The policing of illegal workers was not effective. Also working-class people were aggrieved that their jobs were "stolen" and that they failed to benefit from the overheated economy. The arrest of the then Secretary for Transport and Public Works, Ao Man Long, in 2006 for his implication in a series of corruption scandals involving bribes of more than MOP800 million culminated in deep public discontent. The police's mishandling of the mass protest on 1 May 2007 provoked further outcry. Public support of the once highly popular Edmund Ho plunged to a record low (see Figure 2).

2006 may be considered a watershed year in terms of collective action. After the handover, mass protests were sporadic, small in scale and unorganised. On Labour Day 2006, thousands of protesters were organised to air their anger against the government. Since then, demonstrations with thousands of participants have become common. With greater use of the internet, the younger generation who had been regarded as politically apathetic, were mobilised to participate in various demonstrations. To rebuild its legitimacy, the government outlined a blueprint for public sector reform known as the "Public Sector Reform Roadmap" (hereafter "Roadmap") in 2007. It identified two major areas of reform: policy processes and internal management. The policy processes included the sub-reform areas of consultation mechanism, policy evaluation, decision-making process and policy implementation. Reform to internal management includes reform of organisational systems, organisational structures, civil service management, financial management and work processes. Each sub-reform area was further subdivided into several reform measure implementations. In all, there were 34 reform measures.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The increased role of public participation in policy processes during the second phase of the reforms set it apart from Phase One. Acknowledging the shortcomings of the political system in channelling public opinion, the government is now adopting wider public consultation in policy formulation and implementation. Three district-based consultative commissions were set up, with the participation of the appointed members from all walks of life. More consultative papers were issued for policy advice. More consultative meetings were also arranged to listen to the opinions of the public on a wide range of issues and legislation, such as urban renewal, transport policy, land management, heritage conservation and the legislation of a National Security Bill. A government spokesperson system was established to improve communication with the mass media, and above all, the public. (19)

More extensive public consultation and information about the rationale of government decisions might meet the demand for more consultation and responsiveness to public needs. Nevertheless, the expansion of public consultation followed a top-down approach. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) framework of public participation, public consultation in the Phase Two reform is considered as second-level participation underscored by a two-way relationship in which citizens are able to provide feedback to the government, but not the third and highest level of participation: active participation. Active participation is based on forging partnerships with the government in which citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policymaking. It acknowledges equal standing for citizens in setting the agenda, proposing policy options and shaping policy dialogue. (20)

The public consultation in the Phase Two reform is an example of middle-level public participation, not high-level participation which engages citizens in formulating policies, refining policy implementation plans and setting the policy agenda. The members of district-based consultative commissions are not elected but appointed by the government. The commissions' chairpersons are government officials who dictate the agenda and method of consultation. It is the government which decides which policies are put forward for consultation, who is consulted and how the collected public opinions are used. The participants may not be equipped with relevant expertise in the issues of consultation. They may not be the representatives of professional bodies or geographical constituencies. With little public involvement in electing their representatives to participate in consultation and set consultation agenda, there is no knowing whether the participants can truly reflect the opinions of their constituency, and whether the policies put forward for consultation are indeed matters of public concern.

In addition, the Roadmap seeks to further institutionalise various personnel activities so that the civil service can perform better. To reduce the opportunities for senior officials to manipulate the appointment and promotion processes and establish their patronage, open recruitment was made mandatory unless exemption was granted by the Chief Executive on the basis of written explanation of the departments concerned. The salary of civil servants in leading positions was raised by around 10 per cent. Through this means, it was expected that the morale of civil servants would improve. Leading positions at the director and deputy director ranks were included in the regular performance appraisal system to provide more information about their actual performance level. More promotion opportunities were offered to civil servants who were consistently rated satisfactory in annual performance evaluation. (21) Nevertheless, there is no knowing whether the performance grade accurately reflects the performance level of civil servants. Some civil servants complained about the equalitarian approach used in performance grading: a top performance grade was assigned to those who had not reached their ceiling pay grade, rather to those at the ceiling payscale, even with outstanding performance. (22)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Another significant reform measure was the stepped-up fight against corruption. The Ao Man Long scandal severely damaged the image of the Macao government. Macao's corruption perception index, compiled by Transparency International, dropped from 6.6 in 2006 to 5.7 in 2007, and dipped further to 5.4 in 2008. At the same time, Macao's ranking also fell from 26 in 2006 to 34 and 43 in 2007 and 2008, respectively. (23) Fighting corruption became a top priority on the government's agenda. In 2009, the Legislative Assembly revised relevant legislation to extend the investigative authority of the anti-corruption organ, the Commission against Corruption (CCAC), to the private sector. This expansion of authority is believed to increase the deterrent effect against bribe-giving. The CAAC's manpower was also expanded from 96 to 109 in 2003, and from 109 to 165 in 2009. (24) Its budgeted expenditure has been raised by twofold since 2000. The actual expenditure was increased by even more (see Figure 3). In addition, the government reviewed the processes of land sale, government procurement and tendering which were the sources of corruption in the Ao Man Long scandal. E-government and government information centres were used more extensively. With higher procedural transparency in the public service, it is hoped that the public will have less incentive to obtain services through the offering of bribes to government officials.

CHALLENGES TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM

Though it takes time for the real impact of reform measures to crystallise, a comprehensive evaluation of the reforms is possible. Several issues concerning the reforms' impact merits attention. The upper echelon of the public sector in the post-handover era is no longer subject to the influence of Portuguese party politics and partisan politics in the appointment of political officials. Hence, political leadership has been stabilised. All principal officials, except the former Secretary of Transport and Public Works, Ao Man Long, were able to finish the two full terms of ten years in office. After being elected as the new Chief Executive in 2009, Chui Sai On inherited the entire cabinet of political officials except the Commissioner for Audit. Having stayed in office for a long period of time, the political officials have had the luxury of time to develop and hone their political skills and expertise in the specialised areas they oversee.

The weakest link in the public sector reform lies in the lack of measures to tackle political issues. The reforms are not aimed at addressing the shortcomings in political institutions that can jeopardise the efforts to improve administrative efficiency and performance. One of the institutional weaknesses is the inadequate autonomy of the government from major societal forces and political influences. In his theoretical framework of embedded autonomy, Evans identified the variables of embeddedness and autonomy in influencing the success of developmental strategies. Embeddedness is a relative concept that defines the degree of interconnectedness of the public administration with the major economic sectors. The more embedded the government is within the economy, the easier it is for senior government officials to understand how to formulate policies to identify key industries and support their development. Autonomy is another relative concept that defines the public administration's degree of independence from political meddling. An independent public administration is an assurance that the rank and file of the civil service is managed strictly according to the principles of meritocracy, such as job recruitment by open examination and job promotion based on the evaluation of candidates' track record and potential. Political patronage can then be ruled out from the public administration to achieve high administrative stability. Civil servants are able to make unbiased decisions and implement them based on professional considerations without fear of being interfered with by stakeholders with close political connections. (25)

The Macao administration is now sufficiently embedded in the economy, with the governmental representatives in various important public utilities and enterprises, such as electricity, telecommunications, airport management, television and radio broadcasting. The appointment of business leaders in different consultative committees on economic and social development ensures close contact and alliance between the government and economy. Nonetheless, no measures are made to increase the autonomy of the public administration. Macao's political system is buttressed at the apex by a modified corporatist system dominated by pro-Beijing union leaders, social elites and above all, the business class, all of whom were co-opted by Beijing. The political system may be described as a half-baked democracy introduced in 1976 by the new Portuguese leaders, who were ushered to power by the 1974 coup in Portugal and by the subsequent democratisation. After the coup, the newly appointed Macao Governor, Garcia Leandro, called for a fully elected Legislative Assembly. Later, he changed his mind and introduced a partially elected Legislative Assembly, composed of members appointed by the governor, directly elected by the qualified citizens, and indirectly elected by functional constituencies of societal associations. Leandro explained in his Portuguese autobiography that the limited democracy was the result of the advice of "several people". These people believed that the voter turnout rate, especially among the Chinese community which makes up 90 per cent of the population, was expected to be low. A fully elected Legislative Assembly would not reflect the view of the society. (26)

The societal interests were further entrenched in the political system framed by the 1987 Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration and Macao Basic Law--Macao's mini-constitution. Through indirect election on functional constituencies of societal associations, the interests of business associations and co-opted societal groups are allocated with a significant number of seats in the Legislative Assembly and Election Committee--the organ electing the Chief Executive. They are free from the competition of other social forces for political power. Moreover, they are allowed to expand their power even further by running in direct elections and mobilising public support through pork-barrel politics; their interests in public policies are often over-represented. (27)

The tendering of public works manifests how local business interests trump the professional decisions of the public administration and undermine the principles of administrative efficiency and integrity. A well-institutionalised tendering process should encourage competition among potential contractors bidding for public works contracts. Competition in a transparent process can help reduce the cost of public works, improve work quality and alleviate corruption and collusion between contractors and government officials. (28) The booming economy in recent years has attracted many construction companies from Mainland China and Hong Kong to set up subsidiaries in Macao. Being small in scale and inferior in terms of construction quality, Macao's construction companies can hardly compete with the new players. Mak Soi Kun and Lau Veng Seng, both legislators and leaders in the construction industry, have called for the government to allocate public works contracts on a rotating basis so that even the less efficient and competent local players can benefit from the government's huge public works expenditure. (29) As revealed in the judicial proceeding, Ao Man Long had instructed the Bureau Director of Public Works not to grant contracts according to the terms that the Public Works Committee assigned to the tenders. Instead, the contracts should be "equally distributed". (30) What Ao Man Long did was analogous to the unreasonable demands of major business interests.

Meanwhile, the stable political leadership has not prevented patronage from lingering at the expense of meritocracy. The authority of the Chief Executive and Secretaries in appointments and job creation remain unchecked by other branches of power. The former Commissioner of Audit, Fatima Choi alias Choi Mei Lei, was acclaimed for her fearless exposure of government departments' breaching of financial regulations and abuse of public funds. Her audit reports on the serious wastage incurred in the organisation of the 4th East Asian Games in 2005 were particularly striking due to the acute over-budgeting and the involvement of the then-Secretary for Social Affairs and Culture, Chui Sai On, the number four in the MSAR government. After Chui was elected Chief Executive in 2009, he replaced Choi with ex-Director of Chief Executive Office Ho Veng On, who had neither academic qualifications nor relevant work experience in audit and accountancy. In his explanation for not appointing Choi, Chui Sai On said principal officials had to share the same "ideas of governance" with the Chief Executive. (31) Chui's statement implied that he ranked like-mindedness and loyalty as higher priorities than competency in weighing his decision to replace Chui with Ho and as his criteria for selecting principal officials.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy underscores the significance of administrative stability to efficiency. This principle was undermined by the prevalence of patronage right down to the upper echelons of the civil service. In 2010, the new Chief Executive, Chui Sai On, reshuffled a number of leading positions in the civil service. The appointment contracts of former President of Macao Trade and Investment Promotion Institute, Lee Peng Hong, and former Director of Financial Services, Lau Ioc Ip, were terminated before expiry. Other casualties included former Director of Cultural Affairs, Heidi Ho, and former Director of Housing, Chiang Coc Meng. It was rumoured that they lost their positions because they did not belong to Chui's faction. Unlike the "revolving door" in Western liberal democracies which provided many career opportunities for ex-officials in state-owned enterprises, think-tanks, and academic institutions, the small economy of Macao makes it almost impossible for former leading officials to find employment with equivalent status or remuneration outside the government. (32) Administrative instability extended throughout the bureaucracy. Now, almost all civil servants at entry level--except those in the disciplinary force which requires more stability for security reasons--are employed on fixed-term contracts; civil servants on tenure terms are, however, reduced when analysed as a ratio to the rank and file of the civil service (see Figure 4).

Out of fear of losing favour and ultimately their jobs, senior civil servants may give up professional considerations when they clash with the political motives of the principal officials. One classic example is the corruption scandal involving Ao Man Long in the tendering of public works. According to the government procurement regulations, open tendering procedures were used to select contractors for public works projects. All tender submissions from contractors had to be screened by a committee formed by the Bureau of Public Works. This committee ranked the tenders according to the predetermined criteria. After making the rankings, the decision had to be referred up the administrative hierarchy for approval from the division director, department director, bureau director and Secretary for Transport and Public Works. If the Secretary was dissatisfied with the ranking, he could instruct the committee to re-rank the tenders. The committee had no means to oppose the intervention out of professional considerations due to the low job security of the committee members. (33)

Unlike the legitimacy crisis faced by the Macao colonial government, the challenges posed to the MSAR government are more related to institutional shortcomings, such as the low level of democracy and insulation of the administration from political influence, rather than administrative inefficiency and incompetence. Continuing the practice of setting targets for the technical aspects of managerial improvement can hardly restore public trust in the government. The public demands a greater share of benefits from the booming economy, a cleaner and more transparent administration and a lower social cost burden resulting from traffic congestion, environmental degradation and disappearing urban spaces. These demands cannot be met and the consequential legitimacy crisis cannot be resolved without institutional reforms that shift more political power from the hands of a few to a wider community.

CONCLUSION

Public sector reform is an important strategy for the MSAR government to build up its legitimacy and address its legitimacy crisis. The reforms are convergent with the paradigm of public management prevalently adopted in many Western, especially English-speaking countries. Fixed-term employment contracts, believed to be conducive to achieving cost-saving objectives and work incentives, are now widely used. Performance management is strengthened by extending the performance appraisal system to senior officials, specifying clear standards of performance for civil servants, and linking performance level with rewards and punishment. To foster a customer-oriented culture, one-stop service centres, complaint offices and government information centres are established; and ISO 9002 certification is introduced to rationalise administrative procedures. Administrative integrity has been much emphasised. Open recruitment is made mandatory in order to filter out nepotism and favouritism in recruitment processes. The anti-graft organ was appropriated with larger budgets and extended investigative powers.

Public sector reform in Macao is piecemeal in nature. It is essentially an administrative reform that seeks to tackle the problems behind the legitimacy crisis, with a focus on technical aspects to improve administrative efficiency, cultivate service culture and rationalise the organisational structure and process. The institutional shortcomings that hold back public participation and weaken the autonomy of the public administration are left unreformed. Reform planners cautiously separate the administrative issues from political issues although the two are necessarily intertwined. The lack of extensive public participation in policy-making and implementation processes affects the transparency of the administration and undermines the general public's capacity to give informed policy advice. It also waters down the input side of procedural legitimacy. The dysfunctional, semi-democratic and inadequate institutional autonomy induces civil servants to yield to political decisions which may be biased, unfair, and above all, detrimental to legitimacy-building at the expense of professional considerations and accountability to the people. The positive impact of public sector reforms geared to efficiency enhancement and integrity is consequently watered down. Political patronage is persistent. This is evident in the appointment and selection of senior officials from a small circle of like-minded subordinates, and not from people who are focussed on efficiency, competence and integrity.

(1) Sonny S.H. Lo and Herbert S. Yee, "Legitimacy-Building in the Macau Special Administrative Region: Colonial Legacies and Reform Strategies", Asian Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2005): 51-79.

(2) Shiu-hing Lo, "Bureaucratic Corruption and its Control in Macao", Asian Journal of Public Administration 15, no. 1 (1993): 32-58.

(3) A conversation with a deputy director in Apr. 2003; interview with a civil service union leader in Oct. 2003, and with a senior police officer in Dec. 2003.

(4) Bill K.P. Chou, "Public Sector Reform in Macau after the Handover", China Perspectives 52 (Mar.-Apr. 2004): 56-63.

(5) "Aomen fengyun zhi kaiqiang wuzui, zaofan youli?" (Macao in Disturbance: Isn't Gun-Shooting a Fault and Rebellion is Justified?), 4 May 2007, at <http://prhk_blog.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=562539> [30 Sept. 2010].

(6) Commission against Corruption, History of the Commission, at <http://www.ccac.gov.mo/> [3 Oct. 2010].

(7) Lo, "Bureaucratic Corruption and its Control in Macau", pp. 32-58.

(8) "Zhijie xiang teshou fuze: Aomen lianzhenggongshu diwei shangsheng" (Commission against Corruption Directly Responsible to the Chief Executive: Its Status is Rising), Muzi Web, at <http://home.muzi.com/cc/fanti/10321,19931.shtml?q=53308&cc=13611&a=on> [4 Aug. 2010].

(9) Myung-jae Moon and Patricia Ingraham, "Shaping Administrative Reform and Governance: An Examination of the Political Nexus Triads in Three Asian Countries", Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 11, no. 1 (1998): 77-100.

(10) Government Policy Plan for the Year 2000 Financial Year of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the Chief Executive Edmund Ho, 29 Mar. 2000, p. 6, at <http://www.macao.gov.mo/policy/en2000_policy.pdf> [7 Oct. 2010]. For discussion on the political culture of conflict aversion and its reasons, see Herbert S. Yee, Macau in Transition: From Colony to Autonomous Region (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 143.

(11) Chou, "Public Sector Reform in Macau after the Handover", pp. 56-63.

(12) " 'Gonggong xingzheng gaige luxiantu' zongjie ji zhi xing qingkuang baogao, biao yi 'gonggong xingzheng gaige luxiantu' zongjie ji zhixing qingkuang baogao--xingzheng gaige xiangmu" (A Conclusion and Implementation Report on 'Public Sector Reform Roadmap'--Table 1, Administrative Reform), at <http://www.gov.mo/suggestion/public/reform/report.jsf> [12 Oct. 2010].

(13) Macau Productivity and Technology Transfer Centre, Directory of ISO 9000/ISO 14001 Certified Organizations in Macau, at <http://www.cpttm.org.mo/quality/Info/org_iso_c.htm> [5 Mar. 2010].

(14) "Gonggong xingzheng gongzuo renyuan gongzuo biaoxian pinghe yiban zhidu" (Public Sector Employee Performance Appraisal System), at <http://app.gov.mo/desempenho/index.asp> [19 Apr. 2010].

(15) "Gongwu renyuan zhicheng zhidu" (Civil Service Position Classification System), at <http://carreira.safp.gov.mo/> [1 June 2010].

(16) Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, 2008 Aomen tebie xingzhengqu renli ziyuan baogao (An Overview of Human Resources in the Public Sector of Macao SAR, 2008) (Macao: Public Administration and Civil Service Bureau, 2009), p. 44.

(17) Macao SAR Law no. 2/2008, at <http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2008/16/lei02_cn.asp> [4 Apr. 2010].

(18) In February 2011, USD1 was approximately equal to MOP8.

(19) "Zhengfu fayanren ban teshou pishi sheli" (The Establishment of a Government Spokesperson was Gazetted), Aomen ribao (Macao Daily), 23 Feb. 2010, p. A2.

(20) OECD, Citizens as Partners: Information, Consultation and Public Participation in Policy-Making (Paris: OECD, 2001), p. 23.

(21) Macao SAR Law no. 14/2009, at <http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2009/31/lei14_cn.asp#14> [6 May 2010]; and Macao SAR Law no. 15/2009, at <http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/2009/31/lei15_cn.asp> [6 May 2010].

(22) Studies of "One Country Two Systems" Editorial Board, " 'Zeren zhengfu yu zeren shehui--gonggong xingzheng gaige de fangxiang yu zhongdian' xueshu yantao hui jiyao" (Responsible Goverrnment and Responsible Society--The Direction and Key Points of Public Sector Reform), Yiguo liangzhi yanjiu (Studies of One Country Two Systems) 2 (2009): 90-105; Sonny Lo, "Bureaucratic Capacity and Civil Service Reforms in Macau", Macau Closer, Aug. 2008, at <http://www.macaucloser.com/older_issues/MacauCLOSER_Site_august_2008/bureaucratic_capacity.html> [19 Apr. 2010].

(23) Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index" (various years), at <http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009> [29 Mar. 2010].

(24) Commission against Corruption, History of the Commission, at <http://www.ccac.org.mo/> [23 Mar. 2010].

(25) Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

(26) The author was indebted to the advice of one of the reviewers for this point. For details about the report on Garcia Leandro's consideration behind Macao's political reform, see "Youthful Energy", Macau Business, 26 Apr. 2011, at <http://macaubusiness.culiasolutions.org/news/youthful-energy/8795/> [23 May 2010].

(27) Bill K.P. Chou, "Interest Group Politics in Macao after Handover", Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 43 (2005): 191-206.

(28) Sue Arrowsmith and Martin Trybus, eds., Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003); Andrew Erridge and John McIlroy, "Public Procurement and Supply Management Strategies", Public Policy and Administration 17, no. 1 (2002): 49-61.

(29) Mak Soi Kun, "Aomen jianzhu chanye shichang jingzheng xianzhuang tantao" (A Study of the Market Competition in Macao's Construction Industry), Aomenyan jiu (Journal of Macao Studies) 51 (2009): 108-11; "Baiyi yuan touzi gonggong gongcheng. Jianju shanghui chang zhengce qingxie zhu tongye" (Public Construction Projects are Worth 10 Billion Patacas. Macao Association of Building Contractors and Developers Suggest the Government Support their Members), Aomen ribao (Macao Daily), 12 Nov. 2008, p. B6.

(30) "Ou an: Zhongyuan shoudu chuanzhao shiming zhengren zuogong zhi beigao chushi yubiebutong" (Ao Case: Court of Final Appeal Indicted 10 Witnesses for the First Time. The Accused were Said to be Distinctive in Conducting Businesses), Huaqiao bao (Jornal Vakio) 13 (Nov. 2007).

(31) "Cui Shian xinbanzi liangxiang, lianzheng. Shenji renming re zhiyi" (The New Political Leadership under Chui Sai On has been Announced. The Appointment of New Commissioner against Corruption and Commissioner of Audit was Queried), Zhongguopinglun xinwen wang (China Review News), 25 Nov. 2009, at <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1011/4/6/6/101146662.html?coluid=0&kindid=0&docid=101146662> [14 May 2010].

(32) Liao Kong, "Guanyuan diaoren cheng heque luanfei zhuang. Wenhua chuangyi huhuan xianneng gancai" (The Appointment of Officials is Uninstitutionalised. Talents Are Required in the Policy Area of Culture and Innovation), Xunbao (Son Pou), 29 Jan. 2010. Xu Ying, "Zhuxi 'bei li zhi' shi xian xiqiao. Mou ge 'qu he hua' chuxian duanni" (The Appointment of Chairperson to New Position Aroused Suspicion. The "De-Ho-ization" by a Big Brother is Revealed), Xunbao (Son Pou), 22 Jan. 2010.

(33) "Gongwuju zhengren zhi pingshen gongcheng pigei shou dao shangji koutou zhishi" (The Witnesses from Public Works Bureau said that Verbal Instructions Were Received from Their Supervisor When Choosing Tenders", Huaqia bao ( Jornal Vakio), 13 Nov. 2007.

Bill K.P. Chou (KPChou@umac.mo) is Associate Professor of Public Administration and Politics in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau. He received his PhD from the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. His research areas include public sector reform, national identities and China's policies with its borderland and their international implications.