Contemporary Sino-Southeast Asian relations.

Bolt, Paul J.

Southeast Asia has had a complex and sometimes bloody history since the end of the Second World War. Regional rivalries overlapped with the Cold War, producing violence and political realities that were often misunderstood by outside powers. Key political events that shaped Southeast Asia before the end of the Cold War include the Vietnamese struggle for independence against the French, Malaysian independence and consequent confrontation with Indonesia, the separation of Singapore and Malaysia, the 1965 coup and ensuing destruction of the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), the American war with Vietnam, the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the expansion of conflict in Vietnam into Cambodia and Laos, Cambodian genocide, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Chinese support for communist parties in Southeast Asia, fears of American withdrawal from the region in the 1970s, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and the rise of Japanese power and influence in the region by the 1980s. Thus, Southeast Asian countries have faced external challenges since gaining independence.

This relatively recent past is an important memory because it is too easy to think of the greater geopolitical stability brought about by the end of the Cold War and American unipolar power as "normal". It has in fact existed for only a short period of time, and the conditions that created it may be changing. Indeed, even the "golden period" of American power and political stability in Southeast Asia witnessed the disastrous 1997 economic crisis in the region.

Today, there are reasons to be optimistic concerning the prospects for Southeast Asia. Most countries of the region are experiencing strong economic growth. ASEAN encompasses all the states in the region (with the temporary exception of East Timor), serving to bind the area closer together economically and politically while also projecting the influence of Southeast Asia into the Asia Pacific region through various ASEAN-led institutions. Nevertheless, the rapid rise of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia is unsettling and brings into question the stability of the regional power balance, in spite of Chinese promises of peaceful development and a harmonious order.

In fact, due to geographic proximity and the small-to-medium power status of Southeast Asian countries, the region is a bellwether for how China's rise might affect the world. This article argues that on one hand, China's rapid growth has brought important benefits to Southeast Asia. China's "new diplomacy" has accommodated many of the region's political concerns and China's economic expansion has been an engine of growth for Southeast Asia. On the other hand, China's rise brings a whole series of challenges as well. China's rapid naval build-up, more intensified disputes in the South China Sea, environmental problems and questions over China's ultimate goals, create concerns in the region. Southeast Asia's strategy, while differing in details from country to country, has largely focussed on accommodating China's rise while striving to maintain the American position in the region and welcome the active engagement of a variety of other powers as well. This article argues that Southeast Asia has been successful in this strategy, although maintaining this balance will be increasingly difficult as China's power increases and perhaps its policies shift as a result. Thus, the future of Southeast Asia may unfold in a variety of alternative futures.

China's Policies in Southeast Asia

During the Maoist era, relations between China and Southeast Asia were unstable. In April 1955, China reached out to the region at the first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Zhou Enlai assured the region of China's good intentions and commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the ensuing "Bandung period" was one of relative harmony. However, by the late 1950s, China's foreign policy took a much more revolutionary turn. China supported insurgencies in Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma, Thailand and Laos. Moreover, in 1965, the Indonesian military blamed the PKI for killing six generals and attempting a coup, with China seen as supporting these actions. The result was General Suharto's ascension to power and hostile relations between China and Indonesia for many years. Fears of China were an important factor in the creation of ASEAN in 1967. Even China's alliance with Vietnam turned to enmity, with China's invasion of the country in 1979 tied to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Sino-Soviet rivalry. (1)

Beginning in the early 1990s, China tried to improve relations with Southeast Asia under the context of a "new diplomacy", which emphasised international cooperation that aims to foster economic growth and portray China as a responsible power. It has been characterised by a more active diplomacy, frequent leadership summits, particularly with the developing world, greater priority on people-to-people exchanges and an emphasis on "peaceful development" using soft power to achieve Beijing's international objectives. (2)

China's new diplomacy has been especially pronounced in Southeast Asia, driven by several motivating factors. First, Southeast Asia is strategically important to China. Southeast Asia is rich in important resources that China needs, and much of China's imported energy is transported through Southeast Asian sea lanes. For these and other reasons, a peaceful environment in Southeast Asia is an important precondition for China's continued rapid economic growth. Moreover, China continues to fear that the US will attempt to contain China. Good relations with Southeast Asia demonstrate that China is not a threat, and from China's perspective, would help deter any potential efforts at containment. Second, China has increasingly important economic ties with Southeast Asia in terms of trade and investments. The Chinese government has carefully cultivated these ties through diplomacy and aid. In particular, China earned widespread kudos in Southeast Asia when it refused to devalue the renminbi during the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997. Third, during the 1990s, Taiwan wielded a great deal of influence in Southeast Asia, particularly in the overseas Chinese communities. This influence was exhibited by Taiwanese government officials who took "vacation diplomacy" trips to the region. Beijing has successfully reduced this influence in recent years through a combination of political pressure and deepening economic ties with Southeast Asia. (3)

In sum, China has demonstrated diplomatic flexibility, making efforts over time to dampen fears of an increase in Chinese power. China's narrative has asserted that its growing economy and influence benefit Southeast Asia. According to Xue Hanqin, former Chinese ambassador to ASEAN and now a judge at the International Court of Justice, 1991 was a turning point for Chinese-ASEAN relations. Xue asserts that China's relations with ASEAN are based on mutual trust and cooperation, non-interference, equality and peaceful means of settling disputes, with economic relations and development as the driving force in the relationship. (4) The improved political climate between China and Southeast Asia has been marked by several milestones: in 1996, China became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN; in 1997, China announced its "new security concept", emphasising multilateral security; in 2002, it signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; and in 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

China has engaged institutionally with ASEAN in venues such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as part of its stated commitment to multilateral security cooperation. In addition, it has engaged in long-term cooperative frameworks, bilateral cooperation with various ASEAN states, high-level visits, port visits by naval vessels, exercises, security consultations and weapons sales to Southeast Asian nations. For example, the Thai and Chinese special forces have engaged in joint exercises, while China and Singapore hold an annual defence policy dialogue. In conducting these activities, China explicitly contrasts its approach to the hierarchical "hub-and-spoke" strategy of the United States, perhaps subtly attempting to reduce the regional influence of the US. (5)

Nevertheless, in spite of this rhetoric, there is also a "balancing" aspect to Chinese power in the region which is used to balance internal ASEAN rivalries, benefiting some countries at the expense of others. For example, regional observers note that China serves as a protector to Laos and Cambodia, countries that fear Vietnam will attempt to assert hegemonic influence over them.

China's efforts to improve its image in the region have been successful to a large extent. Indonesia, which was perhaps the country in Southeast Asia most suspicious of China due to the failed coup, purging of communists and widespread violence in 1965, has had a much more comfortable relationship with China since 1998. Other Southeast Asian countries have a similar viewpoint. Thus, William Overholt asserts that China has in essence become "an associate of ASEAN" and is now "the primary supporter of ASEAN's aspiration to prosperity and prestige through multilateral economic liberalisation". (6)

Benefits of Improved Sino-Southeast Asian Relations

China's rise has had political and economic benefits for Southeast Asia. From a political perspective, China's new diplomacy reduced tensions in the region. China has robust political relations with all the countries of the area. In particular, after 9/11, the US was perceived as being fixated on terrorism, while China focussed on economic growth and a broader range of issues that were important to Southeast Asian nations. Moreover, China's policies on nationality and citizenship have ended the lingering tensions over the political loyalty of Southeast Asia's ethnic Chinese.

China's deepening economic links with Southeast Asia are clear. In 2009, China's total trade with ASEAN stood at USD 178 billion followed by the EU-25 at USD 172 billion, Japan at USD161 billion and the US at USD 150 billion. Most striking is that as a share of total ASEAN trade, ASEAN's trade with China has risen from 3.5 per cent in 1998 to 11.6 per cent in 2009. While the accuracy of these statistics is questionable due to the fact that some trade occurs within foreign-owned firms and a significant share of trade goes unrecorded, the trends are clear. The implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 2010 has sparked further trade, and Chinese tariff reductions have benefited ASEAN exports. Thus, from January to August 2010, trade between ASEAN and China increased by 47 per cent, with ASEAN exports to China increasing by 54 per cent. In the realm of foreign direct investment (FDI), however, China so far is less of a player. China's net inflows into ASEAN countries stood at USD5.3 billion from 2007 to 2009. While significant, this trailed the EU-25 at USD34.6 billion, Japan at USD18.8 billion, the US at USD16.6 billion and South Korea at USD5.7 billion. (7)

Naturally, there are winners and losers in China's trade with the region. For example, in the Philippines, workers in electronics export and industry have benefited from trade with China, as has the agricultural sector. Losers include exporters of clothing, shoes, textiles and Christmas decorations. (8) Manufacturers in Southeast Asia have expressed concerns about competition from inexpensive Chinese goods due to CAFTA, and Indonesian firms in particular have protested against provisions of the agreement. Under CAFTA, China, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei were required to remove almost all tariffs in 2010, while Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar must reduce tariffs until they are eliminated in 2015. (9) There are additional concerns in the region that foreign investment has been diverted from Southeast Asia to China as well.

Nevertheless, the overall assessment in Southeast Asia is that China's economic rise has generally been good for the region, creating optimism. A tariff-free Chinese market is a huge boon for ASEAN exporters, and ASEAN has adjusted to the economic challenge from China through domestic policy reforms that favour business, regional free trade agreements (FTAs), the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and corporate restructuring. (10) The dualistic view of some in the West that China's increasing economic power reduces Western influence and is hence a threat is not widely held in Southeast Asia, at least not in this simple formulation.

There have been other signs of closer Sino-Southeast Asian relations as well. For example, Chinese tourism in Southeast Asia has been increasing at a rapid pace. In 2008, Chinese tourists visiting ASEAN reached almost 4.5 million, exponentially higher than in the 1980s. While tourist arrivals declined in 2009 due to the financial crisis, indications are that the general upward trend will continue. Thus, in 2010, Thailand received 45 per cent more Chinese tourists than in 2009. (11)

In the education realm, China has so far established 27 Confucian Institutes and 15 Confucian Classrooms in Southeast Asia for the promotion of the Chinese language and culture, with the largest number being established in Thailand. (12) China also attracts many students from Southeast Asia. China's Ministry of Education reports that Vietnam and Indonesia are the fourth-and fifth-ranked countries respectively in terms of international student enrolment in China. There are currently 3,478 Vietnamese students, 2,563 Indonesian students and 1,554 Thai students studying in China. This compares to 3,693 American students, 12,765 Japanese students and 33,353 South Korean students. (13) These various exchanges improve China's soft power and influence in Southeast Asia.

Challenges of China's Rise for Southeast Asia

Nevertheless, China's rise does produce challenges for the region. The first question revolves around the type of relationship China really wants with the states of Southeast Asia. Chinese official pronouncements call for a world of equality where sovereignty is respected. Nevertheless, Martin Stuart-Fox suggests that the Chinese historical worldview has regarded international society as hierarchical, with China at the top due to the superiority of the Chinese civilisation. That said, "China consistently denies any ambition to act as a 'regional hegemon'; but such denials ring somewhat hollow in the light of history". Carlyle Thayer similarly describes the Chinese vision as a system in which US influence is drastically reduced and China is seen as "first among equals". (14) Others suggest that so far, China has at least shown an unwillingness to bear the social, economic and political costs necessary to be a true leader in the region. (15) Particularly in the last few years, regional observers have noted greater policy differences between China and Southeast Asia and a willingness of Southeast Asian countries to speak out on concerns.

China has not hesitated to express displeasure with the policies of Southeast Asian governments when it deems necessary. For example, when Singapore's then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew went to the US in 2009 and called on the US to balance China in the region, Singapore received an unexpectedly harsh response from China. China has also reacted harshly to Singapore's overtures to Taiwan. In 2005, China condemned Malaysia's policy towards Malaysian Chinese citizens in a China Daily article, although such criticism has not been repeated thus far.

A more concrete threat to Southeast Asia is China's military build-up. China has had double-digit percentage increases in its defence budget since 1988, with approximately 15 per cent increases over the past decade. Modernisation efforts have centred on the navy, air force and the Second Artillery (China's missile forces). China has greatly updated it anti-access capabilities, as well as focussing on strategic modernisation, space and information warfare. China's naval build-up creates particular strategic uncertainty for Southeast Asia. In addition to the acquisition of new submarines, destroyers and frigates in recent years, China is developing an aircraft carrier programme, and has reached or is near operational capability on a ballistic missile designed to strike American carriers. Chinese vessels have harassed American naval vessels in the South China Sea, and Chinese naval squadrons have undergone extensive exercises further and further from the coast of China. In addition, China has established a new naval base on Hainan Island, which is close to Southeast Asia. This military build-up has not been accompanied by a level of transparency that brings comfort to the Southeast Asian governments. Indeed, it is hard to know if the build-up is being driven more by a coherent strategic plan or a nationalism fuelled by rising government revenue. (16)

China's military build-up is threatening to Southeast Asia in part because of China's disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan over the Spratly Islands and other islands in the South China Sea. While the islands are uninhabitable, they are important for the rights to oil, gas and fisheries in the surrounding waters that their sovereignty would convey. Some islands also serve as bases for military forces. In addition, the South China Sea is important strategically, with 25 per cent of the world's trade passing through these waters.

Tensions in the South China Sea have risen and ebbed over time. The early 1990s was a time of tension, although the 2002 signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signified a high point in de-escalation. However, in the last few years, tensions have again increased. In particular, since 2007, China has set up boundary markers in the region, seized Vietnamese fishing vessels, banned fishing in the South China Sea during certain months and administratively created Sansha County in Hainan, which from the Chinese perspective encompasses the Spratly Islands. (Vietnam claims the Spratly Islands as part of Truang Sa County in Khanh Hoa province.) In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam made a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that in essence made claims to the southern part of the South China Sea, infuriating Beijing. In 2011, the Philippines filed a formal protest in the United Nations over Chinese claims, while China accused the Philippines of "invading" the South China Sea. (17) The competition over sovereignty among the various claimants makes it difficult for the states involved to deal with common issues, such as joint resource exploitation, navigational safety, environmental protection and piracy. (18)

The disputes over the South China Sea were highlighted at the ASEAN meeting in June 2010 in Hanoi. Vietnam achieved a diplomatic success when US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton declared that "the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea", noting also that the issue was a "diplomatic priority" for the US and offering to help mediate the dispute. Beijing reacted angrily to the proposal. While technically the US position of not taking sides on the sovereignty issue did not change, Washington's calls for multilateral discussions directly challenged what the US perceived to be China's greater assertiveness and bilateral approach to the issue. It also forcefully reasserted the US role as guarantor of stability in Asia. (19)

Southeast Asian countries also struggle with the fact that they sometimes suffer the fallout from decisions that China makes on transnational and environmental issues, the best example of which centres on the Mekong River. In this case, China, being the upstream riparian country, builds dams on the Mekong and its tributaries that can affect the downstream riparian states of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. China has rejected multilateral approaches to regulating the Mekong, and has refused to join the Mekong River Commission. Timo Menniken refers to China's level of cooperation with the other Mekong states as "tentative and highly unsatisfactory". (20) While there is nothing illegal with China's actions, they create vulnerability for downstream states because China can control water levels.

In 2010, southern China and parts of Southeast Asia experienced a severe drought. As a result, the water level of the Mekong River in Southeast Asia fell dramatically. Many Thais and others in Southeast Asia pinned the blame on the four dams constructed by China on the upper stream of the Mekong, although it was not at all clear that the Chinese dams were to blame. The Bangkok Post proclaimed that "China is fast failing the good-neighbour test in the current Mekong River crisis". As a result, China was put on the defensive. As part of its response, China gave Southeast Asian officials tours of two of its dams and provided detailed technical information. (21) In addition to the controversy over Chinese dams, it is also true that other lower riparian countries have plans to build their own dams on the Mekong. This is clearly a complex multinational issue.

Finally, in the last couple of years, China's continuing commitment to its "new diplomacy" has come into question. China has taken a more assertive foreign policy that has troubled its Asian neighbours and the US. This has seemingly been caused by an odd mixture of confidence at having come out of the world financial crisis in better shape than Europe, Japan and the US, combined with a strong sense of domestic insecurity that results in tens of thousands of security forces turning out to stifle phantom demonstrations. In addition, nationalist elements in public opinion and a broader array of actors with foreign policy influence have contributed to this trend, along with an upcoming change in leadership that will take place in 2012. Examples of more aggressive Chinese foreign policy include strong support for North Korea after the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of the South Korean Yeonpyeong Island that killed civilians, the crisis with Japan after a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the strong reaction to US arms sales to Taiwan. (22)

China's more assertive policies have been felt in Southeast Asia as well. Ian Storey, a regional analyst based in Singapore, notes that in Southeast Asia, "the level of concern regarding the impact of China's rising regional profile has increased markedly". Storey attributes this to fears in Indonesia regarding CAFTA, new tensions in the South China Sea, negative opinions of China due to the Mekong River issues, tensions on the China-Myanmar border and the political crisis in Thailand which has weakened Sino-Thai relations. (23) In 2010, Donald Emmerson described "China's 'Frown Diplomacy' in Southeast Asia". (24) The Straits Times noted that "Beijing has shown it is increasingly assertive and intransigent in its diplomacy, making Asian countries nervous that a strong China would be a regional bully". As evidence of this diplomacy, the story points to an angry Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stating that "China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact" after a confrontation over the South China Sea at the June 2010 ASEAN meeting in Hanoi. (25) China has tried to counter this negative publicity with various diplomatic overtures, but clearly the damage has already been done.

The Southeast Asian Strategy for Dealing with the Rise of China

There are various studies which assert that Southeast Asian countries are attempting to balance against China or bandwagon with it. However, the predominant core of the literature suggests that most Southeast Asian countries, particularly the maritime states, are engaged in a complex hedging strategy. For instance, Evelyn Goh claims that Southeast Asian security approaches do not fit neatly into international relations theories. Instead, Southeast Asia has a two-pronged approach. The first prong of the strategy is labelled by Goh as the "omni-enmeshment" of the major powers of the region, including China and the US. This policy involves reaching out to as many powers as possible and binding them to the region through ARF, APT, multilateral ties, bilateral ties as well as FTAs. The second strategy, labelled the "creation of a complex balance of influence", entails efforts to maintain US preponderance in the region through base access agreements, exercises, ship repair facilities, as well as economic and diplomatic instruments. The ultimate goal, according to Goh, is to promote a regional hierarchy with the US in the first tier as a superpower, China in the second tier, India and Japan in the third tier, followed by ASEAN, Australia and South Korea in the fourth tier. (26)

Others have written in a similar vein. For instance, John Ciorciari asserts that in the post-Cold War world, developing states prefer flexible, limited alliances over tight alliances. Southeast Asian countries are no different due to heightened risks and diminished rewards of tight alliances. Thus, they will neither balance against China in establishing more formal ties with the US, nor bandwagon with it. Kuik Cheng-Chwee suggests that Singapore and Malaysia are hedging against China, with the ultimate goal for the ruling elites of further legitimising their own rule. Such hedging involves building diplomatic and economic links with China, while also maintaining close ties with the US. The strategy is feasible as long as there is no immediate threat, no strong ideological divisions similar to the Cold War and no serious great power rivalry. Similarly, Jing-dong Yuan sees ASEAN countries adopt both engagement and hedging strategies; Denny Roy sees Southeast Asian engagement with China while continuing links with the US and other large powers; while Evan Medeiros perceives China gaining influence in the region, but not at the expense of US relationships in Southeast Asia. (27)

There are numerous ways in which this complex game of hedging and engagement works. Through a multitude of defence and security arrangements, these include US bilateral defence treaties with Thailand and the Philippines; bilateral defence ties between the US and Malaysia and the US and Singapore; the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) involving Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand; the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) process; the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); the annual Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand involving the US and various states in the region; ARF; and the Five Power Defence Arrangements involving Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. (28) Similarly, in 2010, ASEAN foreign ministers decided to expand the East Asia Summit to include the US and Russia, a move that China opposed.

Another aspect of this complex strategy is increased defence budgets and a growing acquisition of modern arms. Through arms purchases, ASEAN states are attempting to strengthen their military capabilities. While most analysts are careful not to construe this as an arms race, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Thailand are significantly upgrading their arsenals. To some extent, this is in response to the growth of Chinese power and Chinese activities in the South China Sea. For example, Singapore has acquired F-15 fighters and is seeking Global Hawks from the US, and is the only Southeast Asian state involved in the US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Programme. Vietnam has ordered six Russian Kilo-class submarines and 12 Su-30MKK fighters for maritime use, Malaysia is acquiring submarines from a French-Spanish consortium, while Indonesia is also developing its naval forces. (29) Strikingly, in 2010, the Philippines proposed an 81 per cent increase in its FY2011 defence budget, in part due to the Chinese military build-up. In January 2011, Vietnam proposed a 70 per cent increase in defence spending, largely for its air force and navy in the South China Sea. (30)

Another part of the Southeast Asian strategy has been for states to engage a variety of players, particularly India, and encourage them to be active in the region. India seems to be an ideal partner in light of its interest in both engaging and balancing China, its growing economy and its cultural links to Southeast Asia. In 1991, India initiated a "Look East" policy when its chief patron, the Soviet Union, collapsed. In 1996, India became active in ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences and ARF, and began summits with ASEAN in 2002. In 2005, India was included in the East Asia Summit at the insistence of Indonesia and other states in Southeast Asia. In some quarters, greater Indian involvement in the region is seen as a hedge to a potential loss of US commitment to the area. Singapore, in particular, wants to see a stronger role by India in Southeast Asia, including greater involvement by Indian firms using Singapore as a hub and Indian naval visits to the region. However, the growth of Indian involvement in the region has been slower than some have hoped for. For example, India's trade with ASEAN is less than a quarter of China's trade. Nevertheless, in 2010, India and ASEAN signed a free trade agreement, and India's ties with Indonesia, in particular, are deepening. (31)

In conducting its strategy, Southeast Asian leaders do not hesitate to play off China and the US. For instance, Singapore's former ambassador to the US Tommy Koh, wrote, late in the Bush administration, that "the new US president should be aware that Southeast Asia has many suitors beside the United States". In 2004, the Philippines began explicitly reaching out to China in an effort to "play the China card" and gain benefits from the US. (32) Most evidently, Myanmar plays off India and China, as both are larger neighbours contending for energy contracts in Myanmar and seeking to develop Myanmar's infrastructure. (33) Thus, Southeast Asia has sometimes been able to use its position between various powers to its advantage.

Of course, every country carries out its strategies in unique ways. For instance, the Philippines' relationship with the US has steadily improved since 9/11. The US has provided a great deal of military assistance in the name of counterterrorism. However, both the US and the Philippines regard the military assistance also as a hedge against Chinese moves in the region. While the Philippines moved closer to China under former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's rule, current President Benigno Aquino has further strengthened ties with the US, partly in response to provocative actions by China in the South China Sea. For instance, the Philippines lodged a formal diplomatic protest with China over the alleged harassment of a Philippine oil exploration ship by two Chinese naval vessels, and this directly affects the Philippines' ties with both China and the US. (34)

Vietnam maintains close ties with China. Economic relations are good, and the two countries have engaged in numerous joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and naval port visits. In 2009, Vietnam also cracked down on Vietnamese critics of China, indicating that relations with China are an issue in Vietnamese domestic politics. However, Vietnam is reaching out to other states as well, including Russia, India, Japan and the US. This has accelerated as China has pressured Vietnam over the South China Sea, including seizing Vietnamese fishing boats. In 2010, both Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates visited Vietnam. Port calls of American naval ships in Vietnam have become routine, and a US naval supply ship underwent repairs in Vietnam in 2010. (35)

Ability of Southeast Asia to Meet the Challenges

Southeast Asian countries have been quite successful over the past two decades in their strategy of maintaining autonomy through "omni-enmeshment" that preserves their autonomy and freedom of movement. In fact, Southeast Asia has a long history of dealing with stronger powers. Nevertheless, the shifting power balances in the region raise doubts about the ability of regional states to manage constant changes. In addition, political turmoil in key ASEAN states like Thailand weakens the ASEAN organisation.

One difficulty faced by Southeast Asia is the weakness of ASEAN as an institution. While ASEAN's accomplishments are significant, the organisation nevertheless has structural problems that would quickly surface in a crisis. Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, long-time observers of the region, assert that "nearly 40 years after its creation, there is still no real sense of an ASEAN community except among a small fraternity of officials and scholars who make their living off of it". This is partly because ASEAN member states "remain focussed on their own internal problems and bilateral relations with immediate neighbours". (36) The countries that make up ASEAN are extremely diverse in terms of political systems, levels of economic development and security priorities. Therefore, it is difficult to assert common interests on regional issues. It is reported that some countries regret the inclusion of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia into ASEAN, as they factionalise the organisation and make it less able to accomplish goals. In particular, the mainland states of Asia must by necessity take a different perspective on China than the maritime states.

Furthermore, there are internal squabbles within ASEAN, reinforced by a strong sense of nationalism. For example, Laos and Cambodia fear a Vietnamese inclination for hegemony. The shelling between Thai and Cambodian forces in 2011 had resulted in numerous deaths and injuries, threatening the core ASEAN interest of preventing war between its members. (37) Furthermore, there are militarised maritime disputes between Singapore and Malaysia; Indonesia and Malaysia; Indonesia and the Philippines; Malaysia and the Philippines; and Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines. In fact, in 1999, Malaysia occupied islands in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as China and Taiwan. When an ASEAN member state confronts China over the South China Sea issue, ASEAN sometimes takes a unified stance, while at other times, it does not. (38) Some argue that ASEAN cannot take a position against China on the South China Sea because members must have the freedom to take their own positions on their respective bilateral ties with China. China has made veiled threats to change the approach with which it deals with ASEAN if it faces a unified front over South China Sea disputes, and China has been quite successful in dividing ASEAN in this aspect.

There are further structural weaknesses in institutionalisation in Southeast Asia. For instance, in its founding documents, ARF proclaimed preventive diplomacy as its key goal. However, it has never moved beyond confidence-building due to its large membership, emphasis on non-interference, differing strategic visions and an inflexible adherence to the norms of consensus. (39) The APT is also hobbled by fundamental differences between China and Japan. In fact, the entire regional stable of multilateral institutions is muddled by a host of overlapping structures, all of which are guided by consensus and thus tend to be paralysed into inaction in the face of contentious issues.

Is the Current Southeast Asian Strategy towards China Sustainable?

Southeast Asia's strategy has worked in the past. Today, the security of regional states, with the exception of disputed claims in the South China Sea, is not seriously threatened by outside powers and Southeast Asia enjoys robust economic relations with China, the US, Japan and the European Union. However, this strategy is predicated upon the maintenance of the status quo. Therein lays its vulnerability.

The status quo in terms of Goh's desired omni-enmeshment and hierarchy may in fact last into the indefinite future. While states with growing power tend to become more assertive, there are reasons to believe that China might maintain relatively benign policies towards Southeast Asia. China has major domestic problems to deal with, including the need to overcome inequality and stimulate further development in the western reaches of the country. The Chinese Communist Party believes that continuous economic growth is necessary to forestall social unrest. A peaceful Southeast Asia with prosperous economic linkages with China continues to be welcome and necessary to achieve these goals. At the same time, President Obama has given renewed emphasis on Southeast Asia in American foreign policy, presaging continued and even increased American engagement with the region.

However, growing Chinese assertiveness in the region brings the status quo into question. In addition, changes in power equations always threaten the existing structures. What make the situation in Southeast Asia more dangerous are territorial disputes, especially in the South China Sea.

There are three potential shifts that, singularly or in combination, could bring an end to the status quo. The first is a more forceful China that places greater demands on Southeast Asia. Such a China could perhaps use force in the South China Sea or make ultimatums on the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, motivated by the desire to appease nationalist political forces in China. While such a movement may appear unlikely, the broader signs of a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy are disconcerting. These include the seizing of Vietnamese fishing vessels, strong support for North Korea after the sinking of Cheonan, the ramming of two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and harassment of the USS Invincible in international waters. These foreign policy actions have been accompanied by domestic events that reduced China's soft power appeal, including increasing restrictions on information in China, the beatings and detainment of dissidents and lawyers, major shows of force in response to rumoured demonstrations in major Chinese cities and a more restricted political atmosphere.

Increased Chinese assertiveness, or US overreaction to the Chinese naval build-up, could lead to a new Cold War-like security environment. This would be a nightmare for Southeast Asia. The current strategy is predicated upon not having to choose between China and the US. Having to make such a choice would destroy ASEAN, reduce economic growth and lead to a whole series of new tensions and potential flashpoints. Nevertheless, recent assertiveness may only be a temporary phenomenon, related in part to China's upcoming changeover in leadership in 2012.

Another serious situation would be a sharp slowdown in the Chinese economy. It is highly improbable that China will maintain its spectacular 10 per cent growth rate in the long term due to rising wages, a declining number of new entrants to the workforce, the need to rebalance the economy gearing towards domestic consumption as the main driver of growth rather than exports, and a rapidly ageing Chinese population. However, if the Chinese economy were to rapidly contract as a result of the bursting of the property bubble or domestic unrest, Southeast Asia would suffer from slower economic growth and, in the worst case scenario, refugee inflows.

A second major potential disruptive change is partial disengagement from the region by the US. The current strategy in Southeast Asia calls for the US to be at or near the top of the international hierarchy. From a military perspective, the US Navy would be a dominant force in the region for a long time. Even with China's rapid naval build-up, operational skills away from home shores take a long time to develop. However, new weapons like China's "carrier killer" ballistic missile could alter the balance of power in the region much faster than expected. Another factor that compounds the scenario is if the US cannot get its fiscal house in order. If the US enters a prolonged period of sluggish growth and sustained high budget deficits, its political, economic and military influence will decline. (40)

The third potential change is increased conflict in Southeast Asia, both within and between states. The ASEAN structure can perhaps resolve regional conflicts peacefully. However, as attested by the recent fighting between Cambodia and Thailand, Southeast Asian nationalism is strong. There is a variety of potential flashpoints within the region that could have long-term consequences in regional stability.

In sum, neither history nor political theory can make guaranteed predictions about Southeast Asia's future and Sino-Southeast Asian relations. What is clear is that powers from outside the region have a disproportionate influence over what happens in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia's current strategy for regional security and prosperity has been successful. While the future is uncertain, Southeast Asian countries have shown a talent for maintaining their autonomy and freedom of action in a variety of shifting circumstances.

Paul J. BOLT *

* The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and in no way represent the opinion, standards or policy of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States government. The author would like to thank those who commented on earlier drafts of this article or contributed in other ways. These include Tony Nash, Tan Seng Chye, Ho Shu Huang, Daniel Jassem, Michael Kenny, Jonathan Kua, Li Mingjiang and Dan Martin. The author is also grateful for a Fulbright Fellowship that enabled much of the research for this article.

(1) For a full treatment of the history of China's relations with Southeast Asia, see Martin Stuart-Fox, A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2003).

(2) See Zhu Zhiqun, China's New Diplomacy (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), pp. 1-20.

(3) On China's diplomacy in Southeast Asia, see Zhu Zhiqun, China's New Diplomacy, pp. 165-93; and Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in the New Century (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2007), pp. 5-19.

(4) Xue Hanqin, "China-ASEAN Cooperation: A Model of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation", Presentation at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 19 Nov. 2009.

(5) For details, see Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Sept. 2010, pp. 19-22, 48-55; "Sino-Thai Military Special Forces Launches Joint Anti-Terrorism Training", People's Daily Online, 11 Oct. 2010, at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7162608.html> [12 Oct. 2010]; and "China Seeks to Advance Military Ties with Singapore", Global Times, 14 July 2010, at <http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-07/551359.html> [15 July 2010].

(6) William H. Overholt, Asia, America, and the Transformation of Geopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 183. For Indonesia's relations with China, see Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-Engagement", Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2009): 591-608; and Lim Tin Seng, "Seeking Closer Cooperation: Indonesia's Approach to the Rise of China", EAI Background Brief no. 314, Dec. 2006.

(7) Statistics are from ASEAN Statistics, Table 19, at <http://www.aseansec.org/stat/ Table19.pdf> and Table 2, at <http://www.aseansec.org/stat/Table26.pdf>; Table 14 and Table 15, ASEAN Community in Figures, 2009 at <http://www.aseansec.org/ publications/ACIF2009.pdf> [15 Mar. 2011]; and "China-ASEAN Trade Leaps 47%", China Briefing, 21 Oct. 2010, at <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/10/21/ china%E2%80%93asean-trade-leaps-47.html> [10 May 2011]. See also Liu Yunhua, "ASEAN and China: Managing Competition and Exploring Complementarities", in Southeast Asia in the Global Economy, eds. Helen E.S. Nesadurai and J. Soedradjad Djiwandono (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 59-86.

(8) For a discussion of winners and losers in Southeast Asia, see Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).

(9) See Liz Gooch, "Asia Free-Trade Zone Raises Hopes, and Some Fears About China", The New York Times, 31 Dec. 2009, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/business/global/ 01trade.html?emc=atl> [4 Jan. 2010]; "Indonesia May Seek Tariff Delay in Asean-China Pact", The Straits Times, 5 Jan. 2010, at <http://www.straitstimes.com/Money/Story/ STIStory_473663.html> [5 Jan. 2010]; and Walden Bello, "China's Neo-Colonialism", Transnational Institute, Mar. 2010, at <http://www.tni.org/article/china%e2%80%99sneo-colonialism> [25 Mar. 2011].

(10) See Manu Bhaskaran, "The Economic Impact of China and India on Southeast Asia", Southeast Asian Affairs 2005 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 62-81. See also Brantley Womack, "China-ASEAN Pact Offers More than Win-Win", Asia Times, 7 Jan. 2010, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/LA07Cb01. html> [7 Jan. 2010].

(11) ASEAN tourist statistics are at <http://www.aseansec.org/Stat/Table29.pdf> [12 May 2011]. See also "Thailand Eyes Its Share of Chinese Tourists", Bangkok Post, 24 Jan. 2011, at <http://www.bangkokpost.com/travel/news/217812/thailand-eyes-its-share-of-evergrowing-number-of-chinese-tourists> [12 May 2011].

(12) See <http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm> [12 May 2011].

(13) Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China statistics, at <http://202.205. 177.9/english/international_3.htm> [12 May 2011].

(14) Martin Stuart-Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: The Role of History and Culture in Shaping Future Relations", Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 1 (2004): 117; Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, 2010, p. 54.

(15) See, for example, Elizabeth Economy, "China's Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States", Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (2005): 423; and Robert G. Sutter, The United States in Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 267-70.

(16) See Office of the Secretary of Defence, "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2010", at <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_ CMPR_Final.pdf> [26 Mar. 2011]; Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism", International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 46-81; and "China's Naval Modernisation", INSS Proceedings, June 2010.

(17) See "Philippines Protests China's '9-Dash Line' Spratlys Claim", The Straits Times, 15 Apr. 2011, at <http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_657120. html> [15 Apr. 2011]; and Tessa Jamandre, "China Accuses PH of 'Invasion"', ABS-CBN News, 19 Apr. 2011, at <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/04/19/11/china-accusesph-%E2%80%98invasion%E2%80%99> [15 Apr. 2011].

(18) For details on the dispute over the South China Sea, see Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers, eds., Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime (London: Routledge, 2009); Li Minjiang, "China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: Recent Developments and Future Prospects", Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 64 (Mar. 2010): 300-3; and Carlyle A. Thayer, Southeast Asia: Patterns of Security Cooperation, 2010, pp. 31-5.

(19) See Mark Landler, "US Challenges China on Island Chain", The New York Times, 23 July 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html?scp=1&sq=land ler%20Us%20challenges%20china&st=cse> [23 July 2010]; Greg Torode, "How the US Ambushed China in its Backyard, and What Happens Next", South China Morning Post, 25 July 2010, at <http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/how_the_us_ambushed_china. htm> [25 Mar. 2011]; and Andrew Jacobs, "China Warns US to Stay out of Islands Dispute", New York Times, 26 July 2010, at <http://wvww.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/world/ asia/27china.html?scp=1&sq=China%20Warns%20US%20to%20stay%20out%20of%20 island%20dispute&st=cse> [27 July 2010].

(20) Timo Menniken, "China's Performance in International Politics: Lessons from the Mekong", Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007): 97-120, quote on pp. 98-9.

(21) See "Response from Beijing Needed", Bangkok Post, 10 Mar. 2010, at <http://www. bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/34171> [10 Mar. 2010]; Thomas Fuller, "Countries Blame China, Not Nature, for Water Shortage", The New York Times, 1 Apr. 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/world/asia/02drought.html> [5 Apr. 2010]; and Jonathan Manthorpe, "China Succumbs to Mekong Nations", 30 Aug. 2010, at <http:// www.canada.com/vancouversun/news/editorial/story.html?id=9b7484be-3a1f-4f42-b275ff257cb42545> [1 Sept. 2010].

(22) See Thomas J. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China", Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (Mar./Apr. 2011): 54-67.

(23) Ian Storey, "China's 'Charm Offensive' Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia (Part I)", China Brief 10, no. 9 (29 Apr. 2010): 7-10, quote on p. 7; and Ian Storey, "China's 'Charm Offensive' Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia (Part II)", China Brief 10, no. 10 (13 May 2010): 7-10.

(24) Donald K. Emmerson, "China's 'Frown Diplomacy' in Southeast Asia", Asia Times, 5 Oct. 2010, at <http://atimes.com/atimes/China/LJ05Ad02html> [5 Oct. 2010].

(25) Peh Shing Huei, "Smaller Nations Eye China's Rise Nervously", The Straits Times, 29 Sept. 2010, at <http://www.straitstimes.com/PrimeNews/Story/STIStory_584321.html> [29 Sept. 2010].

(26) Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia", International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 113-57.

(27) John D. Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers since 1975 (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Kuik Cheng-Chwee, "The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China", Contemporary Southeast Asia 30, no. 2 (2008): 159-85; Jing-dong Yuan, "China-ASEAN Relations: Perspectives, Prospects and Implications for US Interests", Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Oct. 2006; Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?", Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no. 2 (Aug. 2005): 305-22; and Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China's Rise, 2008.

(28) See Ralf Emmers, "The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture", RSIS Working Paper, no. 195, 20 Apr. 2010.

(29) See Richard A. Bitzinger, "A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions", Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 50-69; and John Pomfret, "Concerned About China's Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build up Militaries", The Washington Post, 9 Aug. 2010, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR2010080802631.html?wprss=rss_world> [11 Aug. 2010].

(30) "Defence Budget (Philippines)", Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-Southeast Asia, 2 Sept. 2011, at <http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-AssessmentSoutheast-Asia/Defence-budget- Philippines.html> [25 Mar. 2011]; and "Defence Budget (Vietnam)", Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment-Southeast Asia, 17 Mar. 2011, at <http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Southeast-Asia/ Defence-budget-Vietnam.html> [25 Mar. 2011].

(31) See Zhao Hong, "India and China: Rivals or Partners in Southeast Asia?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007): 121--42; Eul-Soo Pang, "Embedding Security into Free Trade: The Case of the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement", Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 1 (2007): 22; and Harsh G. Pant, "The India-Indonesia Alignment", The Wall Street Journal, 25 Jan. 2011, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527 48703398504576101024293509588.html> [27 Jan. 2011].

(32) Tommy Koh, "The United States and Southeast Asia", in America's Role in Asia: Asian and American Views, The Asia Foundation, 2008, p. 48; and Renato Cruz De Castro, "The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an Emerging China Challenge", Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 3 (2009): 411-2.

(33) See Renaud Egreteau, "India and China Vying for Influence in Burma--A New Assessment", India Review 7, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2008): 38-72. Nevertheless, Egreteau asserts that the India-China rivalry over Myanmar tends to be overstated.

(34) See Renato Cruz De Castro, "The US-Philippine Alliance: An Evolving Hedge against an Emerging China Challenge", pp. 399-423; David Capie, "Between a Hegemon and a Hard Place: The 'War on Terror' and Southeast Asia-US Relations", Pacific Review 17, no. 2 (June 2004): 223-48; and Al Labita, "Philippines Embraces US, Repels China", Asia Times, 23 Mar. 2011, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MC23Ae01. html> [23 Mar. 2011].

(35) See Shawn W. Crispin, "Chinese Shadow Over Vietnamese Repression", Asia Times, 12 Sept. 2009, at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KI12Ad04.html [12 May 2011]; Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Defensive Diplomacy", The Wall Street Journal, 19 Aug. 2010, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870364900457543847 4083884494.html> [22 Aug. 2010]; and Seth Mydans, "Shared Concern about China Aligns US and Vietnam", The New York Times, 10 Oct. 2010, at <http://www.nytimes. com/2010/10/11/world/asia/11vietnam.html> [12 Oct. 2010].

(36) Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, Chasing the Sun: Rethinking East Asian Policy (New York: Century Foundation, 2006), p. 97.

(37) See Bilveer Singh, "Thai-Cambodian Skirmishes: Endangering ASEAN's Raison d'Etre?" RSIS Commentaries Series, 15 Feb. 2011.

(38) For a discussion of maritime disputes within ASEAN, see J.N. Mak, "Sovereignty in ASEAN and the Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea", in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, eds. Sam Bateman and Ralph Emmers, 2009, pp. 110-27. For details on ASEAN unity in the face of Chinese claims, see in the same volume, Christopher Chung, "Southeast Asia and the South China Sea Dispute", pp. 95-109.

(39) Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan, "The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice", RSIS Working Paper, no. 189, 7 Dec. 2009.

(40) See Christopher Layne, "The Waning of US Hegemony--Myth or Reality?" International Security 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 147-72.

Paul J. Bolt (Paul.Bolt@usafa.edu) is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests include Chinese foreign policy, Asian politics and defence policy.