Pareto optimality in a Becker model of time allocation.
Holtman, A.G. ; Idson, Todd L. ; Qian Ding 等
I. Introduction
Though it is widely known that Gary Becker's (1965) classic
model on the allocation of time does not result in unambiguous
comparative static results (see Holtmann, 1972; DeSerpa, 1975; Pollak
and Wachter, 1975), his model has been a major tool of analysis for
empirical studies of consumer activities which require significant
amounts of time, e.g., health care activities (see Holtmann, 1972;
Vertinsky and Uyeno, 1973), church activities (see Azzi and Ehrenberg,
1975), and criminal activities (see Ehrlich, 1973). Nevertheless, it is
sometimes suggested that this model does not result in a Pareto
efficient allocation of resources (see Borland and Pulsinelli, 1989). In
fact, there has been a paucity of studies of the welfare implications of
this popular model. The issue of Pareto optimality arises in this model
specifically because consumers base their choices on full costs-both
time and money costs-with the result that marginal rates of substitution are not equated for different individuals (see Kraus, 1979; Borland and
Pulsinelli, 1989).
Although it is true the marginal rates of substitution will tend to
differ for each individual in a Becker model, Pareto optimality does not
necessarily require that marginal rates of substitution are equal for
all consumers. For example, in an economy with Samuelsonian public goods
(see Samuelson, 1954), Pareto optimality requires that the sum of the
marginal rates of substitution of public for private goods be equal to
the marginal rate of transformation of public for private goods, thereby
implying that marginal rates of substitution of public for private goods
will not be equal among consumers. Nevertheless, the question still
remains as to whether the Becker model is consistent with Pareto
optimality. In this paper we will show that Becker's model does, in
fact, fulfill the conditions for a Pareto optimal allocation.
II. The Model
Consider a traditional Becker household consumption model in which
the consumer uses goods to produce commodities that generate utility. In
this case, the consumer's problem is to maximize the following:
[Mathematical Expression Omitted] where [U.sup.1] is individual
1's utility function; the Q's are commodities produced
according to the input-output technology
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
[T.sub.1] and [T.sub.2], are the time used to produce commodities one
and two respectively; [X.sub.1] and [X.sub.2] are the goods used to
produce the commodities one and two respectively; [t.sub.1] and
[t.sub.2] are the time input-output coefficients; [b.sub.1] and
[b.sub.2] are the good input-output coefficients; T is total time
available; w is the wage rate; [p.sub.1] and [p.sub.2] are the
goods' prices; [Lambda] is a Lagrange multiplier and [T.sub.L] is
work time. The constraint in (1) is derived from the time constraint T =
[T.sub.L] + [T.sub.1] + [T.sub.2] and the commodity constraint
[T.sub.L]W = [p.sub.1][X.sub.1] + [p.sub.2][X.sub.2]. The first-order
conditions for a maximum of (1) are:
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
Thus,
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
This is the standard result, showing that the marginal rate of
substitution of the commodities must be equal to the full price ratio
for each consumer. To investigate the issue of Pareto optimality in a
time allocation context, assume a welfare function of the form
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
and a production possibility function
[Mathematical Expression Omitted].
In this case, superscripts refer to each of two consumers, though the
model generalizes to n consumers and commodities. Subscripts refer to
the two commodities and their respective inputs of time and goods (where
the symbols are as defined earlier), where
[Mathematical Expressions Omitted]
Then, maximizing W subject to f, we have:
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
From (3) we see that the marginal rate of substitution of commodities
is not necessarily equal among consumers when welfare is maximized.
Furthermore, when we recognize that some of the commodities being
produced are attributes such as good health, this result is not
surprising-different consumers are not likely to have either identical
time prices or input-output coefficients.
Nevertheless, the central question is whether or not these results
are consistent with equation (2) for all consumers: Does this system
support a Pareto optimal allocation of resources? To answer this
question, move the second term of the first two equations in (3) to the
right hand side and divide the first equation in (3) by the second
equation, giving:
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
Now, from the constraints on (1) note that
[Mathematical Expressions Omitted]
Further, from f(. . .) = 0, we know that
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
and [Delta] X.sub.1]/[Delta] X.sub.2] =
-([Delta]f/[Delta][X.sub.2])/([Delta]f/[Delta] X.sub.1]). Hence, we
can rewrite (4) as:
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
This last result is, of course, the same as we obtained in (2'),
which indicates that the consumer's maximization of utility is
consistent with Pareto optimality derived from (3). The result will hold
for all consumers. In general, the t's and b's will differ
among consumers, so that the marginal rates of substitution of Q's
will rarely be equal among consumers. However, as we have shown,
equality among the marginal rates of substitution is not a requirement
for Pareto optimality.
III. Conclusions
This paper has investigated the Pareto optimality properties of
Becker's time allocation model, and has found that the model is
consistent with a Pareto efficient allocation. The key point in deriving
this result is that we must consider all actual constraints when we are
deriving the Pareto conditions for the economy. If we cannot substitute
one person's time for another's in certain consumption
activities, we must then recognize that constraint in deriving our
Pareto conditions. However, we should recognize that input goods are not
carefully defined in this general model and there may be more
substitution possibilities than suggested by the model. For example, I
can substitute a physician's time for my time in producing
"good health." In our analysis, we have allowed wages and
input prices to be equal among consumers, but, if there are differences
in productivity among suppliers of labor, these should be reflected in
the different wages and different marginal rates of transformation by
type of consumer.
Of course, if there are imperfections in the input markets, these
would violate the conditions for Pareto optimality. Differences in
wages, of course, do not imply market failure when workers are not
homogeneous. In the Becker model different wages, for example, would
simply mean that marginal rates of transformation of labor for other
inputs would vary among workers of different productivities. In any
case, the Becker model will generate Pareto optimal results in an
economy with efficient input or goods' markets.
References
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