An imperial but classically liberal court?
Frohnen, Bruce P.
The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited
Government
by Richard A. Epstein (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2014)
Richard A. Epstein, a senior scholar rich in reputation and
accolades, has written a comprehensive critique of Supreme Court
jurisprudence from the Founding era to today. His motivation for this
book: to address judicial errors underlying America's declining
economic condition. Epstein's focus on economic structures and
practices is understandable given our recent descent into full-scale
social democracy; it also clearly arises from his own predilections.
Best known for his groundbreaking work criticizing judicial decisions
expanding the ability of our government to "take"
people's property for supposedly public use, he long has practiced
an economic study of the law. And there are areas of law in which his
approach bears much good fruit, including in this book. But the book
also shows the weaknesses of a narrowly economic jurisprudence in regard
to critical social structures and, more generally, the intrusive
judicial decision making required by a demand for economic efficiency
and justice defined as "no cross-subsidization."
Epstein's central thesis--that our Constitution was
established with the purpose of furthering the ideals of classical
liberalism--dominates the book's treatment of every major aspect of
constitutional law, from commerce to individual rights to religious free
exercise. It sustains a powerful critique of contemporary
"Progressive" (nationalist and state-centric) jurisprudence
and economic policy making. Unfortunately, it undergirds an equally
ideological reading of the Constitution and a determination to use
courts to transform the United States into a "classical
liberal" society it never was, and which the framers of our
Constitution never intended it to become.
In a number of places, Epstein sums up what he terms classical
liberal philosophy as demanding limited government, checks and balances,
and individual rights--especially property rights. This list of
political goods may capture with reasonable accuracy a doctrine
meaningfully termed "classical liberalism." But it is crucial
for Epstein to establish the accuracy of his own conception and,
especially, its central place in the thought of the framers as well as
in the American Constitution itself. Unfortunately, Epstein fails to
make this case, settling for assertions like this one: "Any close
reading of the historical materials shows that the Constitution is
grounded in the work of such great Enlightenment thinkers as Hobbes,
Locke, Hume, Madison, and Montesquieu." Hobbes, of course, was a
thinker whose work was repeatedly rejected by Americans of the era.
Epstein's list also elides substantive philosophical differences
between, for example, Hume the skeptical Tory and Locke the Old Whig.
Perhaps most important, this list highly overemphasizes
"enlightenment" thinkers at the expense of other more cited
sources, including most prominently the Bible. Assertion substitutes for
argument here, and it is a telling omission given the wealth of textual
material available, most of it substantiating alternative visions
relating to priorities such as faith, tradition, common law, and virtue.
For good or ill, John Calvin had more to do with the development of
American culture and politics than did John Locke.
Then again, it is not historical accuracy for which Epstein
strives. Classical liberalism, for him, is not a concrete fact of
historical development that, once established, can help us understand
ambiguities that may be found in the text of the Constitution. Rather,
it is an ideology. Epstein's "ambition," as he puts it in
his preface, is "to give a comprehensive account of how the various
provisions of the United States Constitution, dealing as they do with
both structural issues and individual rights, can best be explained in
light of classical liberal theory." He recognizes that "there
is always slippage between the world of ideas and the world of practical
politics, so that it would be a mistake to posit any perfect
correspondence between what the original Constitution prescribes and
what a classical liberal theory demands." But for Epstein the
theory does, in fact, "demand," and he does his best to show
how his intellectual ideal may be imposed upon the not-so-perfectly
liberal Constitution, and on American life, to make America over in his
preferred image.
To be sure, Epstein states that constitutional interpretation must
begin with the text, looking to theory only as a means to clear up
ambiguities. In this vein he provides a powerful critique of those
advocating a "living" constitution, going so far as to show a
number of cases of rank dishonesty in the interpretation of texts and
precedents. The case is particularly strong, as he notes, in the case of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Where a significant number of judges and lawyers have attempted to argue
that capital punishment should be seen as prohibited by this provision,
no honest reading of the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution will bear such an "interpretation." It rests on
pure policy preference and an attempt to exert raw will over a text that
specifically mentions capital crimes.
But we should not confuse Epstein's respect for the text, when
it is clear, for judicial restraint, a doctrine he blames in significant
part for the depredations of Progressivism. His argument here begins
with the notion of judicial parity, with the Supreme Court seen as part
of a set of coequal branches within the national government. Epstein
sees this view as a modest one, eschewing what he deems the worst kinds
of judicial activism. Yet it is incompatible with the document itself
and at the root of his own form of destructive activism.
When the authors of The Federalist Papers referred to the Supreme
Court as "the least dangerous branch," they were being neither
ironic nor metaphorical. They meant, quite literally, that the Supreme
Court, under the Constitution, would have the least amount of power and
authority of any branch, and hence the least ability to do harm--or
good. The Supreme Court would be supported by only such inferior courts
as Congress might see fit to create. Congress also might decide to take
away the Court's jurisdiction to rule on particular issues. And, of
course, the Court would possess neither purse nor sword, instead
depending on the other branches of government to put its holdings into
action. Certainly the Court was intended to hold a significant power,
namely, as stated in Federalist 78, "to declare all acts contrary
to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void." But this
understanding of the Court's duty to give the benefit of the doubt
to laws is at the heart of what Epstein rejects in both historical and
contemporary jurisprudence. He rejects the Supreme Court's
currently favored "rational basis analysis" for determining
the constitutionality of most economic regulations as too
pro-government. But his favored replacement, "strict
scrutiny," is no less rooted in judges' policy preferences,
merely balancing legislative costs and benefits in a manner more
weighted against the government. And "strict scrutiny," being
itself a creature of judicial policy preferences, remains likely to
undermine our constitutional structure.
Epstein rightly points out that the Court has allowed the national
government to grow far more extensive, intrusive, and
"independent" of the electoral process than any rational
reading of the Constitution might allow. But then this largely is due to
the Court's failure to enforce the structural provisions of the
separation of powers, a duty he more or less dismisses in criticizing
the Supreme Court decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. In that
decision the Court held that Congress may not simply pass on (or
"delegate") to the president its power to legislate. The
Franklin Roosevelt administration had taken a broad mandate from
Congress to allow it to establish detailed codes of "fair
competition," involving pay rates, hours of work, and various other
industrial and labor standards. Epstein castigates the opinion as
"clueless" because Congress was in agreement with FDR's
grab for legislative power.
Not only does Epstein's mocking criticism miss the point of
the opinion; it misses the point of the central facet of the
Constitution itself, the separation of powers. Cooperation between
branches may negate the ability of checks and balances to function, but
such collusion does not negate the need to maintain limits on the powers
of each branch, including the insistence that each branch carries out
(only) its own duties. Our current unlimited government might still
exist without the massive delegation of powers so much a part of the
Washington establishment, but at least legislative power and hence the
making of administrative "rules" would be in the hands of
congressional committees. Members of Congress would have to take direct
responsibility for bureaucratic failures, which would be more open to
public scrutiny and debate.
Epstein chooses to focus on the expansion of national power under
misinterpretations of the Commerce Clause. While real, such
misinterpretations only exacerbate a structural problem he ignores:
Congress's abdication of its duty to legislate in exchange for the
ability to claim credit for "solving" national problems by
dumping them into the hands of the executive branch, while maintaining
an easier and more profitable role as investigator and ombudsman.
Schechter is a dead letter, of course. But then so, arguably, is the
Constitution itself. And Epstein's highly ideological thinking will
do nothing to bring it back to life.
Nonetheless, Epstein sees himself as setting out a practical
program of action to overturn bad decisions only where practical and
helpful to classical liberalism. To that end (in a move he himself deems
"cowardly"), Epstein eschews any attempt to correct recent
Supreme Court decisions regarding homosexual rights--decisions he openly
states lack any constitutional warrant. Cowardly or not, such a decision
comes at little cost to Epstein's ideological vision, which is
blind to the constitutive role of traditional, natural families and of
religion in American law and public life.
Epstein seeks to "reconceptualize" governmental power
regarding morals in order to make it more classically liberal than the
text and tradition would warrant. Thus, for example, he would strike
down laws forbidding polygamy because, in his economistic view, they
constitute an "anti-competitive restriction that protects some
religions at the expense of others." Likewise, Epstein dismisses
the Defense of Marriage Act as rooted in "disgust." Here we
see Epstein's ideology fully at work. His "general approach to
personal freedom writ large" only allows for government to forbid
acts causing harm to "the parties involved." That the state of
the family, and sexual mores in general, might involve certain
externalities--for example, impact upon children and the structure of
society--seems not to have occurred to Epstein. Cross
subsidization--laws favoring one social relation above any other (let
alone one faith above other faiths, or nonfaiths)--is the sole
"social" ill he seems willing to recognize.
The central problem is that Epstein, like most lawyers today,
rejects judges' proper role in a republican government: to
interpret and apply, but not to make, law. At the heart of this
rejection is a fundamental misunderstanding of what interpretation
entails. Like Ronald Dworkin and many others whose particular policy
preferences he rejects, Epstein has a conception of interpretation that
is wildly at odds with historical practice, though infinitely more
pleasing to the lawyerly ego. One telling example: in describing
"the task of a theory of federalism," he notes the fundamental
importance of "developing an ideal vision of a federal system
against which to compare the original constitutional design and its
subsequent transformation."
The very definition of ideological conduct is the creation of a
second, false reality through abstract reasoning, then attempting to
impose it upon reality. The "task" of judging, and even of
criticizing judging, most assuredly cannot be to reshape the
Constitution, and through it society, to fit an idealized theory--even
were it one that had been shown to be critical to the framers of the
document. Rather, it is to find (not conceptualize, but find) in law and
tradition the internal logic as well as the evident goals of that
document and interpret any ambiguous passages from the text in light
thereof. The result may not be as neat as Epstein would like. It
certainly will not have the modern libertarian leanings of his analysis
of individual rights. But it will be far more respectful of the
Constitution, of those who drafted it, and of the people who agreed to
be governed by it--and not by the theories of "living
constitutionalists" or Richard Epstein.
Bruce P. Frohnen is Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Jurisprudence
at Colgate University and professor of law at Ohio Northern University.