Social work ethics: is a moral consensus possible?

Noble, Carolyn ; Briskman, Linda

Introduction

Social Work as a profession is concerned about those people who are the most isolated, the disenfranchised and the poor in society. Social workers use their professional activity, skills, information and resources to address these inequalities and work toward individual and community empowerment (Holland and Kilpatrick 1991:138). In this task the social work profession argues that knowledge development, information and skills are not in themselves enough to carry out this particular professional and societal responsibility and the practice decisions which result. Although facts and skills are important, ethical judgements cannot be made on the grounds of factual information or professional skill alone. In this sense ethical decision making is recognised as an important component of practice (Fleck-Henderson 1991). Guidelines for ethical decision making are set out in the profession's Code of Ethics and are, in the main, regarded as a collective expression of agreed upon values which unite the social work profession nationally and internationally. In the social work curriculum the study of ethics is an important component of the professional development of the student.

The social work profession, like most professions, developed a Code of Ethics in order to set out the ethical standards that professional social workers are expected to follow. In particular, the Code of Ethics outlines the philosophy, purpose and standard of practice determined by the profession. Berliner details the important functions of a Code of Ethics:

 It imparts knowledge of the profession's standards of behaviour
 to the laity and to clients, helps socialise aspirants to
 the profession, clarifies the demarcation between social work
 and other professions, helps define the social worker-client
 relationship, supports clients rights and interests and provides
 the basis for evaluating whether a violation of ethical
 conduct has occurred. (1989:69)

However Rhodes (1985) in analysing the American National Association of Social Worker's (NASW) Code of Ethics argues that these guidelines are in fact so general, and at times posit such contradictory principles, that the result is a set of principles without any clear ethical framework and only a piecemeal political structure (Rhodes 1985:13).

Although social work has always had a progressive element within its ranks, it is only in the last twenty years that important sociological developments have had a dramatic effect on the social work knowledge base used for understanding social and political relations. These developments ultimately challenged the hegemony of conventional social work theories of 'person reform' and 'social reform'. The first challenge came from the radical social work movement informed by the classical Marxian perspective of class relations (Bailey and Brake 1975; Galper 1975 ; Moreau 1979). This was followed by the critical theorists (such as Mullaly 1993) and, more recently, the post modernist perspective (eg Best and Kellner 1993; Leonard 1994; Yeatman 1994), which has resulted in a direct challenge to the underlying social and political context of traditional practice. The major difficulty with these critiques is that so far, they have received inconsistent treatment in the literature and have been slow to progress beyond critical analysis of conventional social work. While there have been some individual attempts to develop an analysis and identify a form of practice that integrates the individual and structural perspective (see McNay 1992; Fook 1993; Thompson 1993; Mullaly 1993), in the main the conventional view and the progressive view stand in opposition to one another, representing conflicting philosophies and ideologies. The challenge of this paper is to address the moral and ethical concerns of the social work profession in the light of these theoretical developments and identify the dilemmas they pose to the conventional understanding about moral and ethical consensus. Particular attention is given to the Australian Code of Ethics.

Principally, this Code of Ethics, in the main, has been set apart from the emerging social and political debate, from incorporating notions of difference or specific notions of social justice and from the competing philosophical world views that characterise these positions. In fact there is support in the literature and in practice for the position that ethical codes should be, and are, considered separately from the social and political contexts of social work activity (Rhodes 1985: 15). For example, Rhodes argues, in relation to the American National Association of Social Workers (NASW), that their Code of Ethics is seen primarily as a guide to practice behaviour, as a set of principles without any clear underlying ethical or political justification or framework.

This is not to say that some critical thinking with regard to ethics and ethical issues cannot be found in the literature. Dobrin (1989), for example, argues that ethics is and should emerge as an important consideration for the social work profession. However, much of the recent focus has taken the form of: exploring codes of ethics and analysing particular moral dilemmas (Siporin 1982, 1983; Abramson 1983; Rhodes 1992); highlighting the sex difference in ethical judgements (Gillian 1982; Dobrin 1989); ethics as control for professional misconduct (Berliner 1989); and ethics and moral reasoning (Fleck-Henderson 1991). However, very little attention has been given to a critical perspective with regard to moral reasoning and the political and social context of that activity.

Re-conceptualising ethical debates

The most important work on critical thinking with regard to moral reasoning can be found in Rhodes' (1985, 1992) work. Her research provides an overview of key ethical perspectives and the moral commitments they pre-suppose, confronting the social worker with a confusing and contradictory array of belief systems (for example, utilitarianism, duty-based Kantianism, rights theories, Marxian ethics and relativism and more latterly post-modernist theory) as well as those of other cultures and religions, which characterise our pluralist society. Ethical judgements are made, she argues, according to our commitment to one's belief system, which must be understood in its social and historical context and the 'purpose' it serves. In addition, her work elaborates on the dilemmas of ethical conflicts inherent in the human services sector, in the social worker's various responsibilities to clients, the agency, the profession and society and in the worker's particular ethical and political assumptions inherent in this activity. Therefore, given the complexities of social work decisions and the conflicting choices of various ethical belief systems, social work could benefit from having systematic guidelines for resolving ethical issues that reflect the current concerns of its professional activity (Rhodes 1985,1992).

Rhodes (1985:12,13), also notes that the absence of any explicitly ethical or political framework comes out most clearly in what is said about the social worker's responsibilities to society. She argues that the responsibility to promote social justice and a better society can only have substance if we are told what makes for social justice and general welfare. In American society there is, in fact, no general agreement on these fundamental concepts. The authors would add that by implication, there is also no clear agreement on the ethical assumptions informing western society's belief systems.

Rhodes further states that given the existence of competing points of view, often informed by opposing political perspectives within the profession, a code of ethics, if it is to have any real value or to be of any real use, could serve as a focal point for reflecting on these basic conflicts and invite serious dialogue about these differences. This should take place, however, without the expectation that this should, or would, necessarily arrive at a professional consensus about the sort of society we are trying to create (Rhodes 1985:183). To date there has been very little response to this challenge.

Social work theory development

Social work theory development, on the other hand, has not stood still. In the past twenty years there has been a direct challenge to the underlying social and political context of traditional practice. The radical social work movement (Bailey and Brake 1975; Galper 1975; Moreau 1979) challenged the psychoanalytical focus of casework as narrow and politically repressive, and in response concern was turned to the socio- economic structural inequalities of clients in the capitalist system. In addition, feminist social workers drew attention to the role of patriarchal power relations and the nature and form of discrimination in relation to women (Dominelli and McLeod 1989). The gradual acknowledgment of the diversity of oppression followed, with black people, ethnic minorities, gay men and lesbians, people with different abilities and generational positions highlighting the specifics of oppression for a large number of citizens. Social work in the 1990s subsequently became aware of discrimination related to the power relations associated with class, 'race', gender, sex, disability and age. This prompted the development of an anti-discriminatory practice relevant to all spheres of social work theory and practice (Langan and Day 1992; Mullaly 1993; Fook 1993).

This anti-discriminatory perspective directly challenged the status quo by positing a theoretical framework for transforming the profession's understanding of social relations and thereby posing a direct challenge to traditional theory and practice. This deliberate move away from the psychological focus to a more sociological orientation was to herald further intellectual developments. A more diverse and pluralist notion of social agency and interaction emerged. The link between identity and oppression became significant.

Identity

Social workers who seek to develop an anti-discriminatory practice need not only to incorporate the social in relation to the individual but also to appreciate how the social element has a major impact on identity, particularly in political, social and economic terms (Thompson 1993). Hudson argues the need for a greater awareness of the structural aspects of identity. In particular

 the ways in which structural factors such as race, class and gender
 shape individual personality development and behaviour are
 considerable. It is important that these factors are acknowledged
 in the curriculum of social work training course and in the
 assessment that social workers make of their clients. (Hudson,
 quoted in Thompson 1993: 81)

This perspective shifts the debate from a monolithic and/or spurious notion of 'hierarchy of oppressions' to the acceptance that 'the dynamics of oppression are like a kaleidoscope where the configuration of, and relationships between, different forms of oppression are constantly moving and changing' (Thompson 1993:131).

This development introduced the notion of individuals as dialectically related to the social structure, where the structure and process interact and reinforce each other, since it is argued that power is manifested at all levels of people's lives (McNay 1992). Individuals, then are both the site and subjects of discursive struggle for identity. The individual is constantly subjected to discourse and through thought, speech or writing embraces quite contradictory modes of subjectivity at different moments in history (Weedon 1987). The concept of 'difference' and the emphasis on diversity has (perhaps naively) extended social work's theoretical concerns into the development of a more pluralist notion of theory development that incorporates some concepts from the postmodernist theories.

Difference

The debate within feminist discourse first highlighted the difficulties in discussing specific categories of peoples (eg women) when the traditional left identified serious antagonisms among women in relation to their class differences (Langan and Day 1992). Black feminists further challenged the earlier feminist movement's universal claim that it represented the interests of all women, and the implicit ethnocentricism and racism of the earlier movement's assumptions (Langan and Day 1992:4). Further, critique from lesbians, older women and women with disabilities helped to bury the old simplicities of a unitary category for women which resulted in the gradual emergence of a more diverse form of 'pluralistic' feminism with the assumption that there can be no political project common for all women (Langan and Day 1992). This was set in the context of the wider development of the post-structuralist and post-modernist theories, where there was general agreement in the rejection of the notion of a unified subject as an agent of social and political change, with the emphasis on the local, the particular and the different (Lovibond 1989). Difference becomes important and significant.

Barrett (1987, in Langan and Day 1992) distinguishes two distinct and to some extent contradictory theories of difference. First, there is the emphasis on 'experiential diversity', where personal experience of each woman's experience is assumed to guarantee authenticity and legitimacy. Second, there is the postmodernist conception of difference as 'positional meaning' (Barrett 1987). This concept challenges the singular notions of rationalism and universalism and the kind of democratic order they have informed. Further, it identifies those people positioned as 'other' to the status quo who, subsequently, find themselves marginalised in terms of citizenship status and rights (Yeatman 1994: viii). In this analysis examples of people being 'othered' are women, people from non-English speaking backgrounds, Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islander peoples, lesbians and gay men, children, the elderly, people with disabilities and ethnic and religious minorities. Their exclusionary position as 'Other', denies them a politically contested space, which results in discriminatory practices and the lived experience of oppression. The acknowledgment of these differently constructed positions, from a postmodernist perspective, mitigates against a uniformity of struggle; a jettisoning of the assumption of any common ground within the layers of oppression including the dangerous illusion of a commonality in experience (Yeatman 1994).

In other words these various specifications of difference cannot enunciate a shared narrative of social change and emancipation. In fact, grouping the different positions of these social actors together can introduce a 'moral terrorism' practiced on self and others (Yeatman 1994:7). The argument here is that stigmatised, marginalised and/or differently positioned social actors cannot be totalised into one large, broader struggle. Thus the universality of oppression and the notion of revolution lose cogency, for example, feminist specifications of agency contrast with masculinist specifications of agency; black and indigenous peoples with white ethnocentrism; able bodied people with disabled; and gay and lesbian sexuality with heterosexuality (Yeatman 1994). In accepting differently constructed discourses there is no privileged position of generality. Postmodern theorists then abandon the very concept of social system and society for a more fragmentary analysis, for a microanalysis of discrete institutions, discourses and practices (Best and Kellner 1993). For post-modernists, all 'that is possible is for differently positioned groups or individuals to come together to offer their perspective on how they should decide and manage their shared conditions' (Yeatman 1994:87). The emancipatory assumptions implied in the secular and rational concepts of equality, justice, empowerment, rights and responsibilities also come into question.

Impact on social work theory, practice and ethics

These theoretical developments in social work theory represent not just another addition to ideas, but a fundamental challenge to norms and values, to the whole process of thinking and moral reasoning, which has held sway for centuries (Langan and Day 1992). The radical perspective challenged the simplicity of individual resistance which was gradually replaced with the recognition and acceptance of a collective, broad based approach to the resolution of social problems, exposing the need to create a new value system incorporating the notion of power and inequality in social justice terms (McNay 1992:55). Initially this resulted in the marginalisation of radical social work practice from mainstream thought. However in recent times this critique has gathered more momentum. For example, the emphasis on combating discrimination has to some extent been incorporated into the training and practice of social work which is more evident in the development of recent social work curriculum in the 'new' universities' social work programs (see Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Victorian Institute of Technology and University of Western Sydney, Macarthur curriculum documents). The gradual acceptance of the radical critique in practice has resulted in various attempts to develop a framework in which particular forms of oppression could be analysed so that structural and individual perspectives are integrated in order to develop an empowering mode of practice (Moreau 1979; McNay 1992; Fook 1993; Thompson 1993).

Aspects of the postmodern challenge, in particular the notion of identity, difference, fragmentation and the rejection of binary differentiation (Barrett 1987; Yeatman 1994) are newer concepts that are developing currency. Further they are creating a tension between the notions of social group change and the notions of individual difference and positional meaning, challenging any project of collective resistance based on the interconnections between people's oppression. In particular the emerging voices of the indigenous peoples and from within the multi-cultural debate highlight the almost irresolvable and irreducibly multiple perspectives of voices and differences within contemporary western society, challenging the coherence of a shared experience of discrimination and oppression (Yeatman 1994: 83). Both these theoretical developments place the profession's code of practice as the embodiment of ethical and moral behaviour into question, and introduce tensions between their competing and contradictory theoretical points of view.

Social work code of ethics: self-determination, individual freedom and concepts of social justice and social change

The intention in this section is to explore what these developments in contemporary social theory imply for the Australian Social Work Code of Ethics and to raise issues for further debate and research. In particular the focus for analysis will be on the notion of self determination and individual freedom. Additionally, the generalised notions of justice, empowerment and social change will be explored as they relate to ethical behaviour. An examination of other Codes of Ethics from North America and New Zealand complements this analysis. These countries were selected as all have recently revised their Codes. Additionally, each of these countries is familiar with the critique of the radical perspective as well as the emerging post-modernist perspective. A review of their revised standards might reveal whether these theory developments have impacted on the ethical and moral considerations of the social work profession.

The current Australian Social Work Code of Ethics (1990) was developed with direct reference to the International Federation of Social Workers' General Meeting, Puerto Rico, July 1976 and was undertaken within the aspirations of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (U.N. General Assembly, December 10, 1948) both in recognising its principles and promoting its observance. In 1990 it was revised and the focus was broadened to include reference to the achievement of 'social justice' while the 'clients' of the social work profession included societies.

In reviewing the current Code, it is clear that moral and ethical evaluation in relation to practice issues imply a universality of ethical claims which are measured by an implied (but not stated) concept of logic and reason as well as notion of agency. For example, in the first section it states, 'social workers are dedicated to service for the welfare and self-fulfilment of human beings as well as the societies in which they live. The achievement of social justice is thus co-equal with the attainment of fulfilment for the individual' (AASW 1990:1).

No definitions of justice and welfare are given, but an assumed political liberalism is implied. In its value statement the Code outlines the profession's broad brush commitment to social justice:

 Every human being has a unique dignity irrespective of nationality,
 ethnicity, social and economic status, gender, sexual preference,
 age, beliefs, or contribution to society and regardless of its form
 each society has the obligation to pursue social justice, protect
 its members from harm and provide maximum benefits for all.
 (AASW1990:1)

Finally, in the section on Standards of Practice, the profession's commitment to social justice is stated by delivering a global statement:

 The social worker will act to prevent and eliminate discrimination
 against any per son or group on the basis of race, gender, sexual
 orientation, age, religion, national origin, marital status,
 political belief, mental or physical disability or any other
 preference or personal characteristic, condition or status.
 (AASW 1990: 3)

These principles, while simplistic and vague, could suggest a pluralistic society which encourages diversity of belief (Rhodes 1992:13). But what are the shared values that it is premised upon? Is it that social workers should always act to bring about the greatest amount of good or happiness, or the least amount of harm in the world as a whole? Or is it the acceptance of the intrinsic value of freedom itself, freedom to act in particular ways and/or freedom to be protected from the arbitrary acts of others? These represent two quite different ethical positions, suggesting different political assumptions, even within the notion of a pluralistic society.

Other principles and standards in the document reiterate the more traditional concepts pertaining to the individuality of the client. "The social worker will make every effort to foster maximum self determination and social responsibility on the part of the clients and, the social worker will apprise clients of their rights and the implication of services available to them" (AASW 1990: 2, 5).

The rest of the Code refers to more traditional aspects of practice such as developing social work knowledge, integrity of the profession, service and professional conduct But is there agreement about what reflects contemporary social work practice issues? Again there is an assumption that there is general agreement about the basic requirements a society must meet in order for individuals to be treated with respect and dignity. For differing political perspectives this is not the case. For example a Marxian perspective would imply working towards more reciprocal relations between client and worker and for a more democratic decision-making as well as for more resource allocation to the poor and disadvantaged. This position would conflict with more rights based theories where society is viewed as a battleground of different interests, where individual interests must be balanced against those of others and where, in the main, the dominant view takes precedence (Rhodes 1992:33,37). The post-modernist perspective would reject any possibility of 'transcendental' meaning or purpose, emphasising 'meanings constructed through necessarily fragmented discourses' (Barrett in Langan and Day 1992:4). Let's now look elsewhere for other perspectives.

The Code of Ethics of the Canadian Association of Social Workers, formulated in 1983, has a similar commitment to social justice principles as its Australian counterpart. It states that social work itself is founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals and is committed to the values of acceptance, self determination and respect of individuality and

 to the development and disciplined use of scientific knowledge
 regarding human and societal behaviours; to the development of
 resources to meet individual, group, national and international
 needs and aspirations; and to the achievement of social justice
 for all. (CASW 1983:2)

In addressing social justice, social workers are

 pledged to serve without discrimination on any grounds of race,
 ethnicity, language, religion, marital status, gender, sexual
 orientation, age, abilities, economic status, political affiliation
 or national ancestry. (CASW 1983:2)

As to the 'how' it states,

 Social work is a profession committed to the goal of effecting social
 changes in society and the ways in which individuals develop within
 their society for the benefit of both. Advancement towards this
 purpose is achieved through the complementarity of social reform
 and therapeutic approaches premised in the belief that social
 conditions of humanity can be
 bettered. (CASW 1983:2)

In the Social Work Declaration section, point 10 states 'I will act to effect social change for the overall benefit of humanity' (CASW 1983: 2). The last section, on Responsibility to Society, refers (in part) to the prevention and elimination of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and to such activities as advocating for policy and legislative change to improve social conditions and to improve social justice and the expansion of choice and opportunity for disadvantaged and oppressed groups. However the bulk of the Code discusses such factors as integrity, quality service, social worker-client relationship, confidential information, outside interests, responsibility to the workplace and responsibility to the profession in respect to individuals. The latter implies an agency for the individual as if the person (as a singular category) is afforded full participatory rights with a socially provided position designated with specific privileges. This is surely a paradoxical position for those persons defined as marginal, disenfranchised, excluded and 'other'.

The 1990 Code of Ethics of the National Association of Social workers (USA) is probably the most 'conservative' of those reviewed. The overall focus in regard to ethical behaviour relates social work actions towards clients in terms of competence, personal development, integrity, scholarship and research. It states that 'the social worker should serve clients with devotion, loyalty, determination, and the maximum application of professional skill and competence' (NASW 1990:2). In relation to colleagues, organisations, and the profession as a whole 'the social worker should uphold and advance the values, ethics, knowledge and mission of the profession' (NASW 1990:2). The last section, The Social Worker's Ethical Responsibility to Society, makes reference to the elimination of discrimination (acknowledging specifics of race, colour, sex and sexual orientation), as well as the promotion of conditions which encourage respect for the diversity of cultures, the improvement of social conditions and the promotion of social justice. However, again there is no clear notion of what sort of social justice, what sort of relationships and what form of general welfare is being referred to.

In this brief overview of the values and principles governing social work practice as outlined in the Code of Ethics in Australia, Canada and the United States of America, it is evident that each of these countries is informed by and places a high value on individual independence and on the homogeneity of the client, characterised by the liberal democratic philosophy. This is despite espousing some anti-discriminatory concepts. This is particularly evident in the focus on self determination and the goal of personal autonomy and personal liberation as defined in each of these countries' Code of Ethics. In essence then, each Code of Ethics, it can be argued, implies a liberal construction of group identity where all persons (clients and workers) are regarded as having full and active participation in all aspects of the society and polity to which they belong (Yeatman 1994). This is contradictory to the progressive critique that recognises oppression, discrimination and exclusion of certain social groupings. There is no recognition of structural disadvantage and marginalisation from society as the clients are accorded a clearly bounded integrity, viability and citizenship in which they are assumed to have equal and full participation. This is a classic liberal premise, one which does not easily accommodate ambiguities, contradictions, multiplicities of intention and purpose that vulnerable groups represent. This liberal, methodological individualism treats the group in question as an individual, more specifically a corporate individual with a homogeneity of purpose and perspective (Yeatman 1994:81). This notion of individuality also supports the middle class notion of professions in their role of assuring status, individuality, resources, access to decision making, social mobility and more life choices to those who are members of this particular group. But is there a consensus on the notion of individuality and its concept of social justice and social change? What implications then would there be for a progressive form of practice?

Discussion: Australian code of ethics

1. Self-determination and individual freedom

In asserting the value of the individual in relation to freedom and autonomy the Australian Code of Ethics implies a specific notion of the person and of agency with a mutual recognition and existence. This could mean one of two concepts. First, it could represent what Porter defines as a 'static autonomy', that is, one that pursues knowledge and being by severing subject from object and emanates from an impetus to control knowledge, possessions or persons (1991:116,181). This notion of individual is based on the utilitarian view of individual freedom where all individuals are entitled to a minimum of freedom and where all other individuals be restrained from depriving anyone of this right. By implication the model citizen is represented as a rationally-orientated, freely contracting subject However, the progressive critique would disagree. For example, when focusing on the issue of gender, the feminist critique would argue that in this context human agency would systematically equate with male nature, rights and expressions, leaving woman as a disembodied subject, unanchored in history (Porter 1991). This concern about exclusion would also be expressed by the elderly, the differently abled and people with different sexual preferences and cultural backgrounds to the dominant norm.

Second, it could represent an acceptance of a 'dynamic autonomy' in the Frankfurt School tradition where 'it is only in conjunction with other self actualising selves that freedom can be assumed to be a principle of communal life' (Porter 1991:117). The concept of agency in this sense stresses a mutuality of interests and well being which incorporates an autonomy that repudiates separateness, control or domination and 'provides scope for radical consequences in relationships in the private and public domains' (Porter 1991:117). This perspective emanates from the idea of personal strength facilitated through interaction with others, that prompts a general re-evaluation of personal capacities for creating and choosing alternatives that neither oppress others, nor are intrinsically oppressive (Porter 1991:181). Everyone should have the freedom to think and act differently from others.

No systematic evaluation of the notion of individuality mentioned in the context of the Australian Code's principles and practices has been articulated or evaluated. The meaning of individual agency is thus left unaddressed and the contradictions and ambiguities for interpretations emerge. What can be implied is that the use of the 'dynamic autonomy' is probably what guides the Code's principles in that it would be consistent with the notion 'all and equally different'. In experiencing a positive relationship between one's own individuality and that of others, this autonomous self

 chooses in ways that involve his or her understanding of his or her
 connectedness and of how the capacity to choose is enhanced by the
 wealth (the social capital) which he or she shares with the
 political community of selves to which he or she belongs. (Yeatman
 1994:79)

This position situates individuals within a self-determining political community of self determining individuals (Yeatman 1994:79). However if we accept the postmodernist notion of differently positioned subjects rather than the liberal respect for the 'difference' of the 'minority voice' (which it is argued can only be expressed as one voice), then the marginalised, stigmatised, poor and/or differently positioned social actors cannot be totalised into one big collective struggle or assumed to share a unified value and moral perspective. The transparency of 'good intentions' hides a dangerous illusion of collective good bounded by a community which clearly defines those included and those to be excluded (Yeatman 1994).

2. Social justice and social change

In accepting the post-modernist perspective of 'difference' as differently constructed discourses by differently positioned actors, then, a privileged position of generality cannot exist. In accepting the notion that western societies are differentiated, especially in the sense that there are various axes of oppression which group people as either oppressed or dominant in relation to race, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, sexuality and class, it then seems inevitable that these principles of social grouping work to generate distinct perspectives on what justice should look like, and how it might operate (Yeatman 1994:87). In contesting their oppression these groups posit a rethinking of justice and social change in relation to their heterogeneity and differentiation. There is evidence for this occurring. Black groups in America, for example, in repositioning themselves in relation to their oppression (eg Black is Beautiful), have directly contested their oppression. They have re-valued and positively reclaimed what makes them different in relation to the dominant norm. In human service work, for another example, advocates of a multi cultural service incorporate cultural/ethnic difference 'orientated to the substantive particularity of individual and groups needs, where this orientation is a function of ongoing dialogue between service users and service deliverers', including cross-cultural dialogue (Yeatman 1994:86). Justice is assumed to exist as a result of a negotiation as these differently positioned groups or individuals come together to 'offer their perspective on how they should decide and manage their shared life conditions' (Yeatman 1994:87) and the provisional settlements they achieved as a result. In other words, if people from the dominant group are to know something about those from the oppressed group then we need to listen to how they represent themselves, as there is no reason that permits us to know the representation of those groups to which we do not belong, other than from their self-representations (Yeatman 1994).

In accepting this perspective, what seems possible is to seek to make connections, to build bridges between the various struggles for self determination, to explore similarities, and to acknowledge differences,

 If there are to be legitimate connections made between differently
 positioned representations these have to arise out of negotiated
 agreements constructed by the differently positioned social actors
 coming together to work on the terms of their coexistence.
 (Yeatman 1994:7)

The question now is, how to achieve negotiated agreements with those people who are traditionally discriminated against, disenfranchised and oppressed in society as well as incorporating a progressive view of justice and social change and have that reflected in the Code of Ethics?

Starting point: the New Zealand code

The starting point, for any discussion on this issue must be based on the assumption of specificity of perspective (Yeatman 1994). The New Zealand Association of Social Workers (NZASW) Code of Ethics, re-formulated in 1993, stands out as being important in this regard. It attempts to accommodate difference in an emancipatory and social justice sense which in turn offers some direction and hope. One of the three parts of the Code of Ethics includes the Bicultural Code of Practice of the NZASW. In particular it acknowledges that the legal, cultural and governmental identity of Aotearoa should be based upon the Treaty of Waitangi. (One of the Objects of the NZASW is to ensure that social work in New Zealand is conducted in accordance with the articles contained in this Treaty) (NZASW 1993:3).

The inclusion of The Treaty of Waitangi in the development of the NZASW's Code of Ethics, where the significance of the Maori point of view is to be negotiated in relation to a Pakeha point of view, is evidence of the possibility of:

 a partnership in which irresolvable different Maori and Pakeha
 conceptions of justice are to find a voice, and in -which a shared
 conception of justice must represent, not a rational consensus, but
 some kind of negotiated compromise in relation to these different
 conceptions of justice. (Yeatman 1994:88)

In addition to this incorporation of difference, the NZASW'S Code of Ethics clearly commits itself to the radical notion of social justice. Section A, Principles, is drawn from the International Federation of Social Workers' Declaration of Ethical Principles 1990, and includes such headings as Liberation through Solidarity, Non Discrimination, Democracy and Human Rights and Dismissal of Brutality. Section B on the Social Workers Ethical Responsibilities has some traditional individual focus although it places it in the context of non-discrimination, gender, race, sexual orientation as well as advocacy for social justice and inclusion. However Section C which includes the Bicultural Code of Practice is the most ambitious, applying the Principles in Section A to Maoris and giving a positive valuation of difference. In its introductory statements to this Section, there is recognition that power over resources and decision-making is at present held by Pakehas, and acknowledgment that 'bicultural practice must occur at a structural as well as an individual level to achieve social justice for Maori' (NZASW 1993:1617).

In acknowledging that power is diffuse and not simply located in one place, comes the recognition of the 'anti-determinist idea of multiple and interacting subjectivities which connect to the political' (Leonard 1994:19). In practice it is the articulation of a Maori point of view, a Pakeha point of view and, in Australia, this would incorporate an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander point of view. In so doing, it is argued a negotiated position would follow.

This example of oppressed groups coming together to offer their different perspectives on how they should decide and manage their shared life conditions is encouraging. The NZASW, in accommodating positional difference of the Maori, illustrates that in attaining social justice for oppressed groups and individuals a pragmatic wisdom is feasible. It also indicates that in order to achieve social justice and full participatory citizenship, oppressed groups in contesting their oppression have to revalue and reclaim what is different in relation to the dominant norm. As Yeatman argues, in order to do this e.g. to claim a Maori position, 'they (oppressed groups) have had to contest the norm itself and to reconceptualise a res publica in a manner that makes it adequate to difference in a positive sense' (1994:87). This is not simply liberal respect for 'difference' of the minority voice but respect for 'difference' by articulating and preserving differences to avoid potential repression and manipulation of the stronger by imposing their will on the weaker, via the Eurocentrism and androcentrism of modern thinking (Leonard 1994:19). The question now is where does this argument lead to?

Where to now? issues for further research We argued earlier that, despite theoretical developments, "progressive" social work has been slow to make a significant impact in Australia and that a structural examination of professional ethics has largely been ignored. The challenge for the profession, it seems to us, is to ensure that emerging perspectives in theory development contribute to a widening of ethical and value frameworks by conceiving a way to incorporate 'difference' so that a pathway is found for social work ethics to join with political considerations. There is clearly a tension between the perceived need for a universal code to inform professional practice and to reflect its value base, and the need to acknowledge difference and to engage in anti-discriminatory practice.

It is our contention that the current AASW Code of Ethics does little to reflect both theory development and the current realities of Australian social work practice. The next challenge, as we see it, is the exploration of the relationship between the professional Code of Ethics and what might exist if it was developed and based on the radical or progressive ideological/philosophical tenet, where progressive social workers working with people experiencing discrimination were consulted in the reworking of the Ethical Code and for this Code to be tested against 'hard' cases from practice.

To this end, it would be our intention to adopt an action research framework and explore with such workers in services such as women's services, services for people from non-English speaking backgrounds, gay and lesbian rights groups, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples' organisations and disability services, the following pertinent issues: What kind of society would you and your clients like to live in? What is your and your client's concept of social justice? Are they the same? What are the values underpinning your practice and why? What is the service philosophy of the organisation where you work? To what extent does the current Code inform your practice? To what extent does the current Code reflect the unique nature of the target group with which you work? and, What sort of Code of Ethics should we have, if any at all?

If social work as a profession is genuine in its concern for empowerment and with concepts of social justice, then a reworking of the current Code of Ethics, in the light of this kind of research, is urgently needed. Social work may then achieve a moral consensus currently lacking within the profession.

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Carolyn Noble is a senior lecturer, University of Western Sydney, Macarthur, Linda Briskman is a senior lecturer, Deakin University.