Malala versus extremism: not Taliban, but Talibanization.
Fazl-E-Haider, Syed
In October 2012, Malala Yousafzai was shot by the Taliban in
Pakistan's northwestern town of Swat when she was returning home
from school in a van. Why did the Taliban perceive a schoolgirl as a
grave threat to its agenda of radicalizing youth? Armed with pen,
enlightened with knowledge, and charged with the passion of fighting for
the right to girls' education, 14-year-old Malala has had no less
of an impact than a drone in combating Talibanization.
There is talk of launching a decisive battle against the Islamist
extremists in Pakistan. But any military campaign against Taliban will
be fruitless without a campaign against Talibanization.
It is not the Taliban but Talibanization that should be the real
target in the war on extremism.
What needs to be applied here is the Malalaian theory, that
education is the best drone to combat the radicalization of people in
underdeveloped tribal areas. Today, as Malala recovers in a hospital in
Britain, thousands of schoolgirls across Pakistan are heard shouting,
"I am Malala Yousafzai ... I am Malala." Today, the country
has thousands of young, bold, and energetic Malalas to carry out her
mission. This is the miraculous outcome of the "Malalaian war"
on extremism.
In the drone-hit tribal areas, everyone is a potential Taliban
member. The drones are killing Taliban, but civilian casualties catalyze
Talibanization. Here the Malthusian theory applies: as drone attacks
increase arithmetically, the number of Taliban increases geometrically.
The number of Taliban, which has multiplied during 11 years of the
US-led war on extremists, confirms the accuracy of its application.
Though the drone war has been effective in targeting the key leaders of
Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it has been counterproductive in containing
Talibanization. If a drone attack kills one Taliban, it creates 10 more.
The number of Taliban has increased over the past seven years and its
influence has spread from Pakistan's tribal areas bordering
Afghanistan to the settled areas of the country.
A frustrated individual, who has lost either his father, mother,
brother, sister or entire family in a US drone attack is more
susceptible to recruitment by the Taliban. As Pakistan is a US ally in
the war on extremists, this individual cannot go to the Pakistani
authorities to seek justice. Ultimately, he will feel that he has no
choice but to join Taliban forces to avenge the killing of his family
members. The US drone war is generating sympathy for the militants and
public anger against both Islamabad and Washington due to civilian
casualties. At least 250 children, according to one estimate, have been
killed in the tribal areas so far.
In 2010, the United States killed at least 700 people in the 100
drone strikes it launched in the country's northwestern tribal
areas. The 700 casualties fanned anti-US sentiments, giving birth to
potential recruits to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Certainly, the
airstrikes are not serving the interests of Washington, Islamabad or
anti-terror allies; the Islamist militants are gaining political mileage
as the number of civilian casualties rises. Hatred against the colonial
agenda of the US and its allies in the Muslim world is acting as a
catalyst for Talibanization. The Bush Administration policies spawned
more and more suicide bomb squads and radicalized more groups in the
tribal areas. Islamic militancy, in terms of cause and effect theory, is
the result of the doctrine of force.
There will be no halt to violence when violence is used as
chemotherapy to cure violence. Only education can bring about a change
in the peoples' radical mindset. It is clear that the Malthusian
model of drone attacks helped the Taliban to increase its strength, but
the Malalaian model of education helped to contain its growing
influence.
Therefore, what the tribal region needs are highprofile educational
academies, technical training institutes, and universities, not military
checkpoints and army garrisons. Frustration with poor socioeconomic
conditions breeds social unrest and militancy in the tribal areas that
currently serve as the terrorists' sanctuaries and as nurseries for
the extremists.
Currently, Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North
Waziristan and South Waziristan are the seven agencies that make up the
Pakistan northwest tribal area, officially known as Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). With a population of six million
people, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, FATA covers about 10,200 square miles of
mountainous territory. The tribes in FATA are blamed for harboring Al
Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. Pakistan's government has nominal
control over FATA, but the writ of the Pakistani government became less
effective there when Kabul fell to Taliban in 1996. The majority in the
FATA favors the Taliban's conservative and obscurantist
interpretation of Islam and supported Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The
people are more prone to be radicalized, brainwashed, and ultimately
used as suicide bombers. Ironically, the billions of dollars spent by
the US government to bring down Taliban operatives have led to more
destruction, more civilian casualties, and hence greater radicalization
and hatred against US citizens in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
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The United States has shelved the proposal to set up factories in
Pakistan's troubled tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. The
establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was aimed at
creating employment opportunities in the tribal areas and to fight
terrorism. The goods produced in ROZs were proposed to be exported to
the United States at zero tariff. The United States had agreed to accept
duty free imports of items manufactured in backward areas to be
designated as ROZs. Yet today, Washington has decided to shelve ROZs
legislation, as it faced political obstacles in the Congress. The idea
of setting up ROZs in areas close to the Afghanistan border was created
when a US consulting firm issued an assessment report that emphasized
the need to combat unemployment of young, educated males and reduce
poverty in tribal areas. The poor distribution of wealth during past
years deprived these and other districts of economic development, and as
a result turned these areas into hubs for extremist fanatics. The ROZs
can initiate fast-track industrial development in tribal areas.
In its first term, the Obama Administration showed commitment to
the six-year-old promise by former President George W. Bush to set up
ROZs in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2009, the ROZs
bill was proposed by Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington and
Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, but it raised the concerns
of domestic textile makers and unions. Since then, the bill has been
bottled up in the US Congress due to feuding over labor standards and
duty-free provisions.
Politicizing the Attack on Malala
The shooting of Malala by the Taliban has drawn a clear line
between the pro-Taliban and anti-Taliban in Pakistan--those who consider
war on extremists as their own war and those who still deem it a US war.
Unfortunately, the attack on Malala was politicized in Pakistan. Some
politicians condemned the media for providing one-sided coverage on
Malala but ignoring Aafia Siddiqui, who has been languishing in a US
jail for years. Some political and religious parties contend that
Malala's attack is being exploited to launch a military offensive
in North Waziristan, which has been branded by the United States as a
global headquarters of Al Qaeda and Taliban-linked terrorists.
The Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former. Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, the country's main opposition party, has refused to back
any military action in North Waziristan that would push extremists to
more violence and make the country more insecure. Tehreek-e-Insaf, or
the Movement for Justice, opposes any type of military handling of the
issue. The religious political parties have also strongly opposed any
idea of launching a military offensive in the restive North Waziristan.
So far, the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is dominant in the
southern port city of Karachi and urban areas of Sindh province, has
been the only political party that has strongly condemned the attack on
Malala and urged the armed forces to "crush" the extremists.
After failing to gather enough support for a military operation
against extremists, the government merely fulfilled the formality of
announcing a US $1 million bounty for the Taliban spokesman Ehsanullah
Ehsan, who announced theat the Taliban was responsible for the attack on
Malala.
A series of retaliatory terror attacks by the Taliban across the
country and the resultant civilian casualties could also delay general
elections, which are expected to be held in early 2013. Because of the
timing and fear of the postponement of the elections, major political
parties are not taking a clear position on a military operation in North
Waziristan. Politicians are in a dilemma: if they support a military
operation, it could ultimately lead to postponement of polls due to its
fallout. Similarly, if they take an anti-Taliban line, they could be
seen as supporting US interests. Hence, many political parties are not
categorically supporting the North Waziristan operation.
Pakistan's rightist parties have warned the government and all
political parties against tabling a resolution in the parliament to
launch a military offensive in North Waziristan. Though there is a
national consensus in the country to eliminate the scourge of extremism
after the Taliban attacked Malala, politicians are still
"divided" or "undecided" over launching a military
offensive against extremists once and for all. The political parties
oppose the North Waziristan operation by fueling conspiracy theories.
The political parties, which have been exploiting anti-US
sentiments ahead of elections, condemned the attack on Malala but raised
an important question: who will condemn the killing of women and
children in US drone strikes in tribal areas? What would the
condemnation of the attack on Malala mean to those lenient towards the
attackers?
Besides other issues like corruption, an ongoing energy crisis,
poverty, and high inflation, the growing religious extremism and
violence is a major issue on which the election is likely to be
contested. The Taliban factor is going to divide the popular vote
between liberal and rightwing political parties during the next general
elections in the spring. The people are expected to poll votes for the
political parties taking pro-Taliban and anti-US lines or pro-US and
anti-Taliban lines.
In reality, Pakistan is paying a heavy price for having a terrorist
sanctuary in North Waziristan along the Afghanistan border. Ironically,
there is still no consensus in Pakistan over a decisive battle against
Islamist extremists, whose suicide bomb squads are targeting innocent
people on sectarian lines across the country. However, the most
pertinent question is, can Pakistan afford to bear the varied costs of
the proposed military offensive against extremists? Is it politically,
socially, and economically affordable for the strife-torn country to
open a new military front in its tribal areas? The possible blowback and
fallout from a North Waziristan operation could be a disaster for the
nuclear nation. Socially, such an initiative would further polarize a
society where inclination towards religious extremism and radical
infiltration even within segments of the security apparatus is growing.
A North Waziristan military operation, in terms of both direct and
indirect economic costs, could be one of the most expensive military
campaigns so far, and could be a disaster for an economy in troubled
waters.
Being a frontline state in the global war on terror, Pakistan is
under attack from Islamist extremists. Internally, the nuclear-armed
country faces graver challenges on the security front as its armed
forces are fighting a Baloch insurgency in the country's southwest
and a Taliban-led insurgency in the northwest along the Afghanistan
border.
The Taliban has started to target leaders of liberal political
parties as the election calendar unfolds in Pakistan. The Taliban
claimed the responsibility of killing Bashir Ahmed Bilour, the leader of
the ruling Awami National Party (ANP) in northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province and the second most senior member of the provincial Cabinet.
Bilour was among nine people killed on December 22, 2012 in a suicide
bomber attack during the ANP meeting in the provincial capital,
Peshawar. The Taliban had threatened to target the political gatherings
of the ANP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the country's
secular and liberal political parties.
Malala under Fire
As she recovers in a British hospital, Malala is under fire from
hardline Islamic groups and right-wing political parties. There has been
talk of issuing a fatwa (religious decree) against Malala for her public
statements in support of the occupying US forces in the region and
alleged mocking of the hijab (veil) and jihad (holy war), perceived to
be key symbols of Islam.
The Taliban have purportedly launched a campaign to malign her
struggle and her sacrifice for women's rights to education. Malala
is being portrayed as a US agent, working to serve US interests. The
attack on her becomes a drama to pave the way for launching a military
operation in North Waziristan. Critics of Malala want to see "no
more Malalas" who challenge the radical and theocratic mindset
emerge as role models for young generations in Pakistan.
Pakistan's right-wing political parties smell a rat in the
Malala incident, although the Taliban has not only accepted
responsibility for the attack, but also threatened to attack her again
if she survives. Maulana Fultz Reitman, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
(jUI-F), a religious and rightist political party, termed the attack on
Malala a drama because there was no sign of an injury after the bandage
on her head was removed.
The rightist parties do not condemn the extremists for the death of
40,000 innocent Pakistani citizens, including women and children, who
have become the victims of terrorist attacks in cities and towns across
the country. There has been no outcry over the thousands of police and
army personnel who were attacked, beheaded, and wounded in the war on
extremism. The Taliban, who declared the Westrninister model of
democracy un-Islamic, has labeled all politicians who are part of the
democratic system in Pakistan as liberal infidels.
Malala, who emerged in 2009 as a voice for oppressed girls in Swat,
has now become an international icon after the attack. Her victimization
at the hands of the Taliban has inspired thousands of Pakistani
schoolgirls who want to become like Malala. The Taliban campaign against
Malala aims to reduce the number of her followers by maligning her.
The Taliban, however, has not jettisoned its agenda of targeting
schoolgirls after attacking Malala. Hina Khan, another schoolgirl from
the former Taliban stronghold of Swat, is reportedly receiving death
threats from extremists. The teenaged Hina is now on the Taliban's
hit list for raising her voice publicly against Taliban atrocities in
Swat in 2009. She fled with her family from Swat to Islamabad for safety
reasons. Hina publicly denounced the intolerance of the Taliban towards
girls seeking education and also held a peace rally in Islamabad to draw
attention towards the Swati women's problems.
The Taliban's Vision of Pakistan
Meanwhile, the Taliban has threatened to target MQM, the only
liberal political party that has been a vocal critic of the Taliban and
Talibanization in the nuclear-armed country. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP) has vowed to target this largest political party in the southern
port city of Karachi after MQM announced a public referendum on whether
the people want a Pakistan run by the Taliban, or the one envisioned by
its founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah intended
Pakistan to be a democratic and progressive country where minorities
could enjoy all their rights to practice their religion. In the
Taliban's Pakistan, there would be no room for liberal and secular
political forces. Thus, the Taliban's threat to MQM is rooted in
its radical ideology of intolerance.
The Taliban has openly announced its plans to remake Pakistan
according to its vision of an Islamic state. The Taliban has declared
the parliamentary democratic system and the state judicial system
"un-Islamic." Remaking the nuclear-armed Pakistan along
Taliban lines raises international concerns about burgeoning Islamist
violence across the region, which may imperil world peace. This year,
the Taliban endangered the lives of hundreds of thousands of children in
Pakistan's troubled northwestern tribal belt when they banned
immunization campaigns in protest against US drone attacks. The Taliban
argues that the polio campaign is a cover for espionage.
What would the Taliban's Pakistan be like? Afghanistan under
the Taliban before the US attack in late 2001 or Swat as a Taliban
stronghold in 2009 present practical models for a "Talibanized
state." The Taliban banned women from employment and education.
They showed intolerance to religious minorities, forcefully imposed
their theocratic agenda, and beheaded those who raised their heads
against them. Criticism and difference of opinion would not be tolerated
in the Taliban's Pakistan, where political opponents and critics
could expect nothing more than a death sentence. Even teenage
schoolgirls have been targeted for going against the Taliban's
agenda against women's education. Malala and Hina were actually
targeting Talibanization through their fight for the right to
girls' education, which was denied by Taliban militants in their
former stronghold of Swat. If their fight is not to have been in vain,
the memorials and protests on their behalf must translate into action
toward the goals they envisioned.
SYED FAZL-E-HAIDER is a development analyst and freelance columnist
in Pakistan. His areas of expertise include Pakistan's economy and
Pakistan-China economic ties. He is the author of the book, Economic
Development of Balochistan.