首页    期刊浏览 2024年11月26日 星期二
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Malala versus extremism: not Taliban, but Talibanization.
  • 作者:Fazl-E-Haider, Syed
  • 期刊名称:Harvard International Review
  • 印刷版ISSN:0739-1854
  • 出版年度:2013
  • 期号:March
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Harvard International Relations Council, Inc.
  • 摘要:There is talk of launching a decisive battle against the Islamist extremists in Pakistan. But any military campaign against Taliban will be fruitless without a campaign against Talibanization.
  • 关键词:Radicalism

Malala versus extremism: not Taliban, but Talibanization.


Fazl-E-Haider, Syed


In October 2012, Malala Yousafzai was shot by the Taliban in Pakistan's northwestern town of Swat when she was returning home from school in a van. Why did the Taliban perceive a schoolgirl as a grave threat to its agenda of radicalizing youth? Armed with pen, enlightened with knowledge, and charged with the passion of fighting for the right to girls' education, 14-year-old Malala has had no less of an impact than a drone in combating Talibanization.

There is talk of launching a decisive battle against the Islamist extremists in Pakistan. But any military campaign against Taliban will be fruitless without a campaign against Talibanization.

It is not the Taliban but Talibanization that should be the real target in the war on extremism.

What needs to be applied here is the Malalaian theory, that education is the best drone to combat the radicalization of people in underdeveloped tribal areas. Today, as Malala recovers in a hospital in Britain, thousands of schoolgirls across Pakistan are heard shouting, "I am Malala Yousafzai ... I am Malala." Today, the country has thousands of young, bold, and energetic Malalas to carry out her mission. This is the miraculous outcome of the "Malalaian war" on extremism.

In the drone-hit tribal areas, everyone is a potential Taliban member. The drones are killing Taliban, but civilian casualties catalyze Talibanization. Here the Malthusian theory applies: as drone attacks increase arithmetically, the number of Taliban increases geometrically. The number of Taliban, which has multiplied during 11 years of the US-led war on extremists, confirms the accuracy of its application. Though the drone war has been effective in targeting the key leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, it has been counterproductive in containing Talibanization. If a drone attack kills one Taliban, it creates 10 more. The number of Taliban has increased over the past seven years and its influence has spread from Pakistan's tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to the settled areas of the country.

A frustrated individual, who has lost either his father, mother, brother, sister or entire family in a US drone attack is more susceptible to recruitment by the Taliban. As Pakistan is a US ally in the war on extremists, this individual cannot go to the Pakistani authorities to seek justice. Ultimately, he will feel that he has no choice but to join Taliban forces to avenge the killing of his family members. The US drone war is generating sympathy for the militants and public anger against both Islamabad and Washington due to civilian casualties. At least 250 children, according to one estimate, have been killed in the tribal areas so far.

In 2010, the United States killed at least 700 people in the 100 drone strikes it launched in the country's northwestern tribal areas. The 700 casualties fanned anti-US sentiments, giving birth to potential recruits to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Certainly, the airstrikes are not serving the interests of Washington, Islamabad or anti-terror allies; the Islamist militants are gaining political mileage as the number of civilian casualties rises. Hatred against the colonial agenda of the US and its allies in the Muslim world is acting as a catalyst for Talibanization. The Bush Administration policies spawned more and more suicide bomb squads and radicalized more groups in the tribal areas. Islamic militancy, in terms of cause and effect theory, is the result of the doctrine of force.

There will be no halt to violence when violence is used as chemotherapy to cure violence. Only education can bring about a change in the peoples' radical mindset. It is clear that the Malthusian model of drone attacks helped the Taliban to increase its strength, but the Malalaian model of education helped to contain its growing influence.

Therefore, what the tribal region needs are highprofile educational academies, technical training institutes, and universities, not military checkpoints and army garrisons. Frustration with poor socioeconomic conditions breeds social unrest and militancy in the tribal areas that currently serve as the terrorists' sanctuaries and as nurseries for the extremists.

Currently, Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan are the seven agencies that make up the Pakistan northwest tribal area, officially known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). With a population of six million people, mostly ethnic Pashtuns, FATA covers about 10,200 square miles of mountainous territory. The tribes in FATA are blamed for harboring Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. Pakistan's government has nominal control over FATA, but the writ of the Pakistani government became less effective there when Kabul fell to Taliban in 1996. The majority in the FATA favors the Taliban's conservative and obscurantist interpretation of Islam and supported Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The people are more prone to be radicalized, brainwashed, and ultimately used as suicide bombers. Ironically, the billions of dollars spent by the US government to bring down Taliban operatives have led to more destruction, more civilian casualties, and hence greater radicalization and hatred against US citizens in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

The United States has shelved the proposal to set up factories in Pakistan's troubled tribal areas along the Afghanistan border. The establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) was aimed at creating employment opportunities in the tribal areas and to fight terrorism. The goods produced in ROZs were proposed to be exported to the United States at zero tariff. The United States had agreed to accept duty free imports of items manufactured in backward areas to be designated as ROZs. Yet today, Washington has decided to shelve ROZs legislation, as it faced political obstacles in the Congress. The idea of setting up ROZs in areas close to the Afghanistan border was created when a US consulting firm issued an assessment report that emphasized the need to combat unemployment of young, educated males and reduce poverty in tribal areas. The poor distribution of wealth during past years deprived these and other districts of economic development, and as a result turned these areas into hubs for extremist fanatics. The ROZs can initiate fast-track industrial development in tribal areas.

In its first term, the Obama Administration showed commitment to the six-year-old promise by former President George W. Bush to set up ROZs in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2009, the ROZs bill was proposed by Democratic Senator Maria Cantwell of Washington and Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland, but it raised the concerns of domestic textile makers and unions. Since then, the bill has been bottled up in the US Congress due to feuding over labor standards and duty-free provisions.

Politicizing the Attack on Malala

The shooting of Malala by the Taliban has drawn a clear line between the pro-Taliban and anti-Taliban in Pakistan--those who consider war on extremists as their own war and those who still deem it a US war. Unfortunately, the attack on Malala was politicized in Pakistan. Some politicians condemned the media for providing one-sided coverage on Malala but ignoring Aafia Siddiqui, who has been languishing in a US jail for years. Some political and religious parties contend that Malala's attack is being exploited to launch a military offensive in North Waziristan, which has been branded by the United States as a global headquarters of Al Qaeda and Taliban-linked terrorists.

The Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the country's main opposition party, has refused to back any military action in North Waziristan that would push extremists to more violence and make the country more insecure. Tehreek-e-Insaf, or the Movement for Justice, opposes any type of military handling of the issue. The religious political parties have also strongly opposed any idea of launching a military offensive in the restive North Waziristan. So far, the Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is dominant in the southern port city of Karachi and urban areas of Sindh province, has been the only political party that has strongly condemned the attack on Malala and urged the armed forces to "crush" the extremists.

After failing to gather enough support for a military operation against extremists, the government merely fulfilled the formality of announcing a US $1 million bounty for the Taliban spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, who announced theat the Taliban was responsible for the attack on Malala.

A series of retaliatory terror attacks by the Taliban across the country and the resultant civilian casualties could also delay general elections, which are expected to be held in early 2013. Because of the timing and fear of the postponement of the elections, major political parties are not taking a clear position on a military operation in North Waziristan. Politicians are in a dilemma: if they support a military operation, it could ultimately lead to postponement of polls due to its fallout. Similarly, if they take an anti-Taliban line, they could be seen as supporting US interests. Hence, many political parties are not categorically supporting the North Waziristan operation.

Pakistan's rightist parties have warned the government and all political parties against tabling a resolution in the parliament to launch a military offensive in North Waziristan. Though there is a national consensus in the country to eliminate the scourge of extremism after the Taliban attacked Malala, politicians are still "divided" or "undecided" over launching a military offensive against extremists once and for all. The political parties oppose the North Waziristan operation by fueling conspiracy theories.

The political parties, which have been exploiting anti-US sentiments ahead of elections, condemned the attack on Malala but raised an important question: who will condemn the killing of women and children in US drone strikes in tribal areas? What would the condemnation of the attack on Malala mean to those lenient towards the attackers?

Besides other issues like corruption, an ongoing energy crisis, poverty, and high inflation, the growing religious extremism and violence is a major issue on which the election is likely to be contested. The Taliban factor is going to divide the popular vote between liberal and rightwing political parties during the next general elections in the spring. The people are expected to poll votes for the political parties taking pro-Taliban and anti-US lines or pro-US and anti-Taliban lines.

In reality, Pakistan is paying a heavy price for having a terrorist sanctuary in North Waziristan along the Afghanistan border. Ironically, there is still no consensus in Pakistan over a decisive battle against Islamist extremists, whose suicide bomb squads are targeting innocent people on sectarian lines across the country. However, the most pertinent question is, can Pakistan afford to bear the varied costs of the proposed military offensive against extremists? Is it politically, socially, and economically affordable for the strife-torn country to open a new military front in its tribal areas? The possible blowback and fallout from a North Waziristan operation could be a disaster for the nuclear nation. Socially, such an initiative would further polarize a society where inclination towards religious extremism and radical infiltration even within segments of the security apparatus is growing. A North Waziristan military operation, in terms of both direct and indirect economic costs, could be one of the most expensive military campaigns so far, and could be a disaster for an economy in troubled waters.

Being a frontline state in the global war on terror, Pakistan is under attack from Islamist extremists. Internally, the nuclear-armed country faces graver challenges on the security front as its armed forces are fighting a Baloch insurgency in the country's southwest and a Taliban-led insurgency in the northwest along the Afghanistan border.

The Taliban has started to target leaders of liberal political parties as the election calendar unfolds in Pakistan. The Taliban claimed the responsibility of killing Bashir Ahmed Bilour, the leader of the ruling Awami National Party (ANP) in northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the second most senior member of the provincial Cabinet. Bilour was among nine people killed on December 22, 2012 in a suicide bomber attack during the ANP meeting in the provincial capital, Peshawar. The Taliban had threatened to target the political gatherings of the ANP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the country's secular and liberal political parties.

Malala under Fire

As she recovers in a British hospital, Malala is under fire from hardline Islamic groups and right-wing political parties. There has been talk of issuing a fatwa (religious decree) against Malala for her public statements in support of the occupying US forces in the region and alleged mocking of the hijab (veil) and jihad (holy war), perceived to be key symbols of Islam.

The Taliban have purportedly launched a campaign to malign her struggle and her sacrifice for women's rights to education. Malala is being portrayed as a US agent, working to serve US interests. The attack on her becomes a drama to pave the way for launching a military operation in North Waziristan. Critics of Malala want to see "no more Malalas" who challenge the radical and theocratic mindset emerge as role models for young generations in Pakistan.

Pakistan's right-wing political parties smell a rat in the Malala incident, although the Taliban has not only accepted responsibility for the attack, but also threatened to attack her again if she survives. Maulana Fultz Reitman, leader of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (jUI-F), a religious and rightist political party, termed the attack on Malala a drama because there was no sign of an injury after the bandage on her head was removed.

The rightist parties do not condemn the extremists for the death of 40,000 innocent Pakistani citizens, including women and children, who have become the victims of terrorist attacks in cities and towns across the country. There has been no outcry over the thousands of police and army personnel who were attacked, beheaded, and wounded in the war on extremism. The Taliban, who declared the Westrninister model of democracy un-Islamic, has labeled all politicians who are part of the democratic system in Pakistan as liberal infidels.

Malala, who emerged in 2009 as a voice for oppressed girls in Swat, has now become an international icon after the attack. Her victimization at the hands of the Taliban has inspired thousands of Pakistani schoolgirls who want to become like Malala. The Taliban campaign against Malala aims to reduce the number of her followers by maligning her.

The Taliban, however, has not jettisoned its agenda of targeting schoolgirls after attacking Malala. Hina Khan, another schoolgirl from the former Taliban stronghold of Swat, is reportedly receiving death threats from extremists. The teenaged Hina is now on the Taliban's hit list for raising her voice publicly against Taliban atrocities in Swat in 2009. She fled with her family from Swat to Islamabad for safety reasons. Hina publicly denounced the intolerance of the Taliban towards girls seeking education and also held a peace rally in Islamabad to draw attention towards the Swati women's problems.

The Taliban's Vision of Pakistan

Meanwhile, the Taliban has threatened to target MQM, the only liberal political party that has been a vocal critic of the Taliban and Talibanization in the nuclear-armed country. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has vowed to target this largest political party in the southern port city of Karachi after MQM announced a public referendum on whether the people want a Pakistan run by the Taliban, or the one envisioned by its founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah intended Pakistan to be a democratic and progressive country where minorities could enjoy all their rights to practice their religion. In the Taliban's Pakistan, there would be no room for liberal and secular political forces. Thus, the Taliban's threat to MQM is rooted in its radical ideology of intolerance.

The Taliban has openly announced its plans to remake Pakistan according to its vision of an Islamic state. The Taliban has declared the parliamentary democratic system and the state judicial system "un-Islamic." Remaking the nuclear-armed Pakistan along Taliban lines raises international concerns about burgeoning Islamist violence across the region, which may imperil world peace. This year, the Taliban endangered the lives of hundreds of thousands of children in Pakistan's troubled northwestern tribal belt when they banned immunization campaigns in protest against US drone attacks. The Taliban argues that the polio campaign is a cover for espionage.

What would the Taliban's Pakistan be like? Afghanistan under the Taliban before the US attack in late 2001 or Swat as a Taliban stronghold in 2009 present practical models for a "Talibanized state." The Taliban banned women from employment and education. They showed intolerance to religious minorities, forcefully imposed their theocratic agenda, and beheaded those who raised their heads against them. Criticism and difference of opinion would not be tolerated in the Taliban's Pakistan, where political opponents and critics could expect nothing more than a death sentence. Even teenage schoolgirls have been targeted for going against the Taliban's agenda against women's education. Malala and Hina were actually targeting Talibanization through their fight for the right to girls' education, which was denied by Taliban militants in their former stronghold of Swat. If their fight is not to have been in vain, the memorials and protests on their behalf must translate into action toward the goals they envisioned.

SYED FAZL-E-HAIDER is a development analyst and freelance columnist in Pakistan. His areas of expertise include Pakistan's economy and Pakistan-China economic ties. He is the author of the book, Economic Development of Balochistan.
联系我们|关于我们|网站声明
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有