Multi-stakeholderism: the Internet governance challenge to democracy.
Denardis, Laura
On December 5, 2012, the US Congress unanimously passed a
resolution with an extraordinary 397-0 vote calling for US opposition to
government control of the Internet and the preservation of a
multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. The bipartisan
resolution was responding to global proposals surrounding a 2012 Dubai
gathering known as the World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT). The event was convened by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the UN specialized agency for information
and communication technologies, to review the International
Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs), a global treaty adopted in 1988 to
establish guidelines for how telecommunications operators exchange
traffic across national borders.
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One of the more controversial proposals circulating in advance of
the Dubai meeting, but which did not make it into the revised ITRs,
emanated from an association of European telecommunication operators
raising the prospect of "sending party network pays" in
international interconnection. In traditional voice communication, the
payment burden rests primarily with the originating caller and network.
Extending this model to the Internet would potentially create an
economic transformation amounting to a charge on content companies such
as Google every time a user chooses to download a YouTube video. This
type of regulatory and pricing burden on content providers would have
democratic implications because it would potentially create economic
disincentives for new content companies and innovations and also
fragment the Internet if content companies opted to avoid these payments
by withdrawing their content in parts of the world imposing fees. A
separate proposal from Russia, China, and several Arab nations asserted
the sovereign right of UN Member States to establish international
policy in the realm of Internet governance.
Against a backdrop of hyperbolic media reports about the UN trying
to "take over the Internet" and after two weeks of contentious
deliberations, the conference ended with nations divided about whether
they would sign a revised treaty. While the circumstances surrounding
this epoch were technically and institutionally complex and shaped by a
protracted history of global Internet governance tensions, the United
States and many other advanced economies ultimately refused to sign the
treaty because they objected to the inclusion of any language about the
Internet, even as part of a non-binding resolution. These countries
believed that the scope of the treaty, or even future discussions,
should not be expanded to include Internet architecture or content but
remain more narrowly tailored to telecommunications interconnection. The
global controversy over this treaty provides a moment of opportunity to
address the implications of Internet governance methods and structures
for democracy.
Twenty-first century conflicts over Internet governance are
increasingly proxies for global political struggles. The same
technologies creating new potentialities for citizen engagement and
global access to knowledge are providing governments with extraordinary
opportunities for censorship and surveillance. At the most extreme
level, repressive nation states unable to influence the flow of citizen
information by traditional means have turned to infrastructure control
systems to terminate communication networks during political uprisings.
For example, a prolonged late-2012 Internet blackout in Syria reportedly
curtailed the ability of citizens to coordinate political action
internally or disseminate information to the outside world via Internet
videos or blogs about government atrocities.
Countries Limiting Internet Information
Belarus Cuba Maldives Saudi Arabia Turkmenistan
Burma Iran Nepal Syria Uzbekistan
China Libya North Korea Tunisia Vietnam
Reporters Without Borders
Internet governance is enacted by private corporations and new
global institutions as much as nation states. The corporatization of
many aspects of Internet governance involves its own challenges related
to the legitimacy of private entities establishing public policies
related to individual civil liberties. Understanding connections between
Internet governance and freedom requires understanding the underlying
technological systems of Internet governance, the institutional
frameworks of control over these systems, and the core policy decision
points with heightened implications for the democratic public sphere.
Internet governance decisions increasingly determine the extent of
political and economic liberty. Multi-stakeholder governance of the
Internet, though itself problematic, provides the distributed balance of
power necessary to foster democratic conditions of Internet freedom.
The Internet and Political and Economic Struggle
A significant shift in the 21st century has been the co-opting of
Internet governance technologies for political and economic uses quite
distinct from their original design and function. One example of this
phenomenon is the use of technologies of Internet governance to
terminate access and services, such as the Egyptian Internet outage that
lasted for several days when then-President Hosni Mubarak ordered a
severing of communication services during political unrest directed
against his regime. The Internet disruption prevented citizens from
accessing the Web, sending email, or using social media.
One of many approaches for terminating Internet services is via the
Internet's routing and addressing infrastructure. Networks that
interconnect to form the global Internet use a standard exterior gateway
protocol called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to advertise to each other
unique sets of Internet addresses that can be reached via each network.
This protocol is a set of rules specifying how networks should broadcast
and which customers, services, and web sites can be accessed within or
through a network. As such, it is one of many core governing
technologies keeping the Internet operational.
Unfortunately, this system can also be used to disrupt the
Internet. Simply terminating these advertised routes makes everything
that was previously accessible via a network disappear. All of the sites
and resources are still present, but they are not reachable on the
Internet. When the Egyptian Internet outage occurred, the collection of
reachable Internet addresses advertised to the world from various
Egyptian network operators simply disappeared. Cell phone service was
also terminated, as the government ordered various network providers to
suspend services.
The Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) has also increasingly
become a primary tool for blocking and filtering content. The DNS is a
central technology of Internet governance because it translates between
the alphanumeric names that humans use (e.g., www.lauradenardis.org) and
the binary numbers that computers use to route information to its
destination over the Internet. DNS filtering and redirection is one
method China uses within its so-called Great Firewall. When an
individual types a domain name, the domain name either fails to resolve
into the requested site or is redirected to another site. This is
technically easy to accomplish, usually involving a government official
directing the Internet registry overseeing a particular top-level domain
(e.g., web sites ending in ".cn") to alter the record that
translates a domain name into an Internet address.
The Domain Name System has also become a tool for content control
economically related to intellectual property rights enforcement. For
example, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency of the US
Department of Homeland Security directs Internet registries, such as
.com registry VeriSign, to redirect domain names from sites that sell
counterfeit goods or copyrighted media to a site with a law enforcement
method.
When Wikipedia, Reddit, and other prominent Internet content
companies blacked out their online sites in January 2012, this boycott
was protesting legislation moving through the US Congress that would
increase the use of the Domain Name System for copyright and trademark
enforcement. The two proposed bills were the "Stop Online
Piracy" Act (SOPA) and the "PROTECT IP" Act (PIPA). The
boycotts were not protesting the anti-piracy intent of the bills but the
mechanism for how intellectual property enforcement would be executed.
Internet service providers would be asked to alter the authoritative
records the Internet registries provided for resolving Internet names
into addresses, possibly fragmenting the Internet and creating security
concerns within the DNS. SOPA and PIPA were ultimately rejected.
What will be the consequences of this increasing interest in
Internet governance technologies for controlling content online?
Internet governance technologies have already been a politically-charged
area of international relations, but that will only worsen as complex
and top-down interventions increase. As Google's Chief Internet
Evangelist and the inventor of the core TCP/IP protocols on which the
Internet operates, Vint Cerf, said to the US Congress in hearing
testimony, "If all of us do not pay attention to what is going on,
users worldwide will be at risk of losing the open and free Internet
that has brought so much to so many."
The Privatization of Governance
While government interventions in Internet governance have been
controversial, privatized governance creates a different set of
concerns. On September 11, 2012, an act of terrorism at the US
diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya resulted in the killing of four US
citizens including Ambassador Chris Stevens. The attack occurred
contemporaneously with widespread protests over the release of an
amateurish YouTube video entitled "The Innocence of Muslims."
During the height of rioting and protests across the Arab world, the
Obama administration asked Google to remove the video from its YouTube
platform. Google refused, indicating that the video failed to constitute
a violation of its terms of service. Governments frequently ask private
companies to remove content, whether for political reasons, law
enforcement actions, or national security concerns. This is a very
complicated area of content governance for corporations because they are
subject to an enormous variety of laws varying from country-to-country
in content regulation areas such as defamation, decency, and freedom of
expression.
The informal corporate motto of Google is "Don't be
Evil." The private corporations that serve as information
intermediaries such as search engines, social media platforms, and
content aggregation sites wield a tremendous amount of power over
communicative expression and other core democratic freedoms. The
adjudication of expressive freedom takes place in many ways, including
discretionary and delegated censorship in which corporations determine
whether to acquiesce to government requests to take down content or
terminate a user account and through private decisions to remove content
or terminate an online presence because of a violation of an end user
agreement or some more arbitrary reason.
The terms of use policies and content removal decisions of
companies, apart from government takedown requests, are privatized forms
of governance that make decisions about privacy, reputation,
cyberbullying, and free expression. During the 2012 London Olympics,
Twitter suspended the personal Twitter account of a British journalist.
The company stated that it terminated the account at the National
Broadcasting Corporation's (NBC) request after the reporter tweeted
the personal email of an NBC executive, a violation of Twitter rules.
The journalist had been posting tweets criticizing NBC's coverage
of the games and, because Twitter had a cross-promotional partnership
with NBC during the Olympics, it was criticized for terminating this
account. Twitter ultimately restored the journalist's account, but
the fact that this termination was within Twitter's rights as a
private corporation sheds light on the democratic implications of the
corporatization of Internet governance. Similar controversial examples
of privatized and infrastructure-based governance of the public sphere
followed the WikiLeaks release of US diplomatic cables. Online financial
transaction companies, like PayPal, ceased providing services to
WikiLeaks. Web hosting intermediary Amazon similarly cited a violation
of its terms of service when it ceased providing web hosting services to
WikiLeaks.
While these content and account intermediation decisions and
delegated censorship requests are quite high-profile, privatized
Internet governance exists in areas concealed in much more technological
complexity. For example, much of the digital world is funded by online
advertising. The data retention and aggregation practices of information
intermediaries and third party online advertising companies influence
the extent of individual privacy online. These types of
privately-established and privately-mediated policies raise questions
about the legitimacy of these organizations to set these policies, the
role of corporate social responsibility, and the appropriate role of
traditional governments as a check on this power. At a minimum,
principles of disclosure and transparency of processes and some level of
public accountability can provide some degree of consistency and
accountability.
Limitations of Multi-Stakeholder Governance
The Internet is already governed, just not in the traditional
hierarchical sense of sovereign nation-state or intergovernmental
governance. From a technical and administrative standpoint, Internet
governance involves the design and administration of technical
architecture and the enactment of substantive public policy issues at
technical control points. This technical Internet governance is enacted
through the design of technical architecture, the privacy policies of
private corporations, the coordination of critical Internet resources by
relatively new but increasingly powerful global institutions, the
agreements of international treaties, and the laws of traditional
governments within national borders.
For example, technical standard-setting institutions such as the
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the World Wide Web Consortium
(VV3 C), and the Institute for Electronics and Electrical Engineers
(WEE), design the standards (e.g. HTTP, XML, Wi-Fi) necessary for
interoperability among devices. These standards perform a highly
technical function but also make various public policy decisions. The
functions and critical Internet resources (CIRs) that ICANN (Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) oversees are another form of
technical governance. Unique CIRs such as domain names and Internet
addresses are necessary to keep the Internet operational and the
administration and control of these finite resources has historically
been a contentious topic, particularly because of a global impasse over
the United States government's historic connection to ICANN and the
new power of the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) in controlling
increasingly scarce Internet addresses.
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A constantly shifting balance of powers between private industry,
international technical governance institutions, governments, and civil
society is necessary to create democratic conditions for online economic
and expressive liberty. This balance of powers is often called
"multi-stakeholderism." The mantra of multi-stakeholder
governance has been elevated to a value in itself in the Internet
governance arena, primarily because it serves as a foil against the
prospect of greater government restrictions on political and economic
freedom. Unfortunately, the concept of multi-stakeholderism can also be
deployed as an impediment to the diverse types of governance, or absence
of governance, necessary for promoting conditions of democracy.
The limitations of multi-stakeholderism arise in several forms,
including the democratic challenges presented by private sector
governance and the risk that multi-stakeholderism becomes a formalized
mechanism of multistate power rather than power distributed more broadly
among civil society, private industry, global institutions, and formal
nation states. Multi-stakeholder approaches in international arenas can
become centralized governance processes because they, to be
multi-stakeholder in practice, require some type of formal procedural
mechanism, and even hierarchy, to ensure that appropriate voices are
heard. The argument of some is that only governments have the necessary
legitimacy to create and enforce processes that are adequately
multi-stakeholder. The top-down procedural enforcement this entails is
exactly the opposite of the Internet's bottom-up and
expertise-based administration, such as traditional
standards-development procedures of the Internet Engineering Task Force.
Enforcing democratic conceptions of multi-stakeholderism in
international fora similarly raises the question of whose conception of
democracy to instantiate in Internet policies. For example, China and
Russia are prominently involved in multi-stakeholder discussions in
United Nations fora. Their conceptions of implementing democratic values
on the Internet are more concerned with restrictions on access to
knowledge than with freedom of expression. Finally, multi-stakeholder
deliberations, such as the World Conference on International
Telecommunications mentioned earlier, often become relegated to multiple
governments rather than multiple stakeholders, with nongovernmental
actors limited from participating in formal deliberations and lacking
any voting power.
A formalized system of intergovernmental control over Internet
governance could produce any number of adverse consequences such as
limiting private industry and civil society input into policy decisions,
centralizing an inherently decentralized system, slowing innovation and
growth, and creating additional administrative pathways for surveillance
and censorship. As governments increasingly turn to Internet governance
technologies like protocols and the Domain Name System for content
control--whether good or bad--it is not surprising that there is
increasing interest in gaining more formal jurisdiction for controlling
these infrastructures.
Despite the limitations of multi-stakeholder Internet governance,
it has succeeded in keeping the Internet operational and providing
possibilities for access to knowledge and free expression. The next
tests for the efficacy of multi-stakeholder governance will occur in
addressing emerging challenges to democratic Internet freedom, such as
the increasing privacy concerns over the practices of online
advertising, government proposals to limit personal anonymity online,
and the trend away from universal Internet interoperability in favor of
proprietary approaches that privilege dominant corporations. On these
and other policy issues surrounding the online public sphere, it is
vital that the public is engaged in these debates, because as goes
Internet governance so goes Internet freedom.
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LAURA DENARDIS is an Internet governance scholar, an Associate
Professor in the School of Communication at American University and the
author of Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance.
She resides in Washington, D.C.