Remotely Russian.

Parrott, Bruce

Nikolai Zlobin's article ("Together But Separate: Russia and Europe in the New Century," Fall 2004) asks how Russia's relationship with Europe is likely to change in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Historically, geopolitics has been the most salient element of that relationship. Except during a few periods of internal disarray, Russia has played a central role in the European balance of power for three centuries. Its political and cultural relationship with Europe has been more variable. Usually the main lines of influence have run from Europe to Russia, but sometimes they have run in the opposite direction--especially in the early Soviet years, when communism claimed to offer solutions for the domestic crises of 1930s Europe. Economically, the dominant motif has been Russia's quest for the Western know-how and investments needed to industrialize and compete against other great powers.

The Soviet system's collapse has relegated Russia to Europe's geopolitical margins. Its remaining assets, such as its nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council, were inherited from the USSR. Moscow lacks reliable alliances with major powers, despite numerous declarations of strategic partnerships with other countries. Internally, Russia has struggled since the Soviet break-up to introduce liberal practices borrowed from the West, but this effort has triggered material hardships and social turmoil, and the political pendulum is now swinging toward authoritarianism. Although Russia has widened its economic engagement with Europe, it remains a peripheral actor in European economic life. The one important exception is its growing role as a major supplier of European energy, especially natural gas.

If present trends continue, Russia's prospects for closer relations with Europe are likely to remain modest. A further deterioration of US-European relations would permit more Russian cooperation with Europe, but within definite limits, because relations with the United States matter more than relations with Europe. In addition to possessing unequalled international power, the United States has a global agenda that directly affect Russia's but not Europe's security.

In the political-cultural sphere, Russian President Vladimir Putin's authoritarian turn and likely continuation of the brutal war in Chechnya will sharpen the differences with Europe--especially with the new EU members that previously experienced Soviet domination. Moscow's firm backing for authoritarian leaders in Belarus and possibly Ukraine will also cause friction. Unless Putin succeeds in the difficult task of diversifying the national economy, energy is likely to remain the core of economic relations with Europe.

Although both sides may continue to pay lip service to the idea of Russian-European integration, most of the substantive changes needed to realize this goal will be very difficult to achieve. Even if most major European states became seriously interested in admitting Russia to the EU--which seems improbable--Russia would still require decades to complete the internal political and legal transformation necessary to make membership practicable. Nor is Russian membership in NATO any easier to imagine. The Russia-NATO Council provides an umbrella for cooperation against terrorism and weapons proliferation, but Russian membership in NATO would presuppose fundamental changes in the country's domestic political order. Just as significant, it would require other NATO governments to commit themselves to defend Russian territory in Central Asia and the Far East--a step that would expand NATO's out-of-area burdens and could embroil it in unwelcome conflicts with China.

The challenge for Russian decisionmakers is to adapt to radical changes at home and abroad. In contrast to past centuries, Russia no longer faces a significant geopolitical threat from Europe. The main dangers now come from the territories to Russia's south as well as from East Asia, and deep fissures inside the country compound these. Closer relations with Europe are a precondition for Russia's socioeconomic modernization and security over the long term. However, systemic obstacles and mounting distrust within the Russian elite are likely to impede such a shift. Despite the tectonic changes in international politics and economics during recent decades, Russia's ambivalent position between Europe and Asia seems destined to continue.

Dr. Bruce Parrott is Professor and Director of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.