Mending NATO: sustaining the transatlantic relationship.

Kwok, James

In a recent interview with a reporter from Le Monde, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder pointed out that NATO is "no longer the primary means for dialogue in the transatlantic relationship." While this is hardly surprising in a contemporary context, it would surely have shocked the US and European representatives who negotiated the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Indeed, the US-European relationship has come a long way since the Cold War began. What started as a shield against possible Soviet aggression has transformed into something of an albatross around Europeans' and Americans' necks. However, assuming that NATO is in its death throes is spurious. The Cold War is over; and Europe is no longer under the clear danger it once was from the Soviet Union. Yet NATO remains the touchstone of the transatlantic relationship. While the current state of the bond between Europe and the United States is anything but rosy, US-European collaboration is a fundamental ingredient not only in their liberal ideals and freedom, but also in the stability of the world order.

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NATO is not dead because it was never intended as a purely strategic relationship based solely on self-interested security policies. It was during the immediate post-World War II years that NATO was established, ostensibly to protect Europe from a possible Soviet invasion from the East. However, US Senate testimony by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Senator Warren Austin before the Senate Foreign Relations committee in 1949 seemed to deny NATO's "balance of power" underpinnings. Rather, Acheson stressed that NATO was not geared toward resisting the Russian state precisely because "it is aimed solely at armed aggression." NATO was not defined as a marriage of convenience between a weak, war-torn Europe and a militarily strong United States. While substantively the alliance may have been a facet of Cold War containment policy, it took on a type of high-ground morality that has sustained the alliance very well. The key to understanding this type of mentality behind NATO lies in the North Atlantic Treaty itself. Signed initially in 1949 by Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Treaty provides no mention of the Soviet Union. Importantly, Article 2 of the Treaty states that:

"The parties will contribute toward further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."

NATO cannot be placed in the tradition of realism, with its shifting alliances and balances of power. The North Atlantic Treaty, in its content and proponents, took on a tone of sweeping moralism that transcended the realm of pure geopolitics. While some articles of the treaty, like Article 5, are somewhat outdated--Europe, for example, is not in any danger of armed aggression--the fundamental goals of the Treaty were crafted so as to be without end or fulfillment.

Power and Polarity

The goals of any country do not always match up with those of its multilateral institutions, but the European Union as it stands has not rendered NATO obsolete. If anything, the European Union needs to rely on NATO for the military force that underpins any sort of cultural or "soft power" that Europe can lend to international politics. Currently, the military expenditures of the three largest countries in the European Union--the United Kingdom, France, and Germany--hover around US$40 billion. In stark contrast, the United States spent roughly US$370 billion equipping its military forces in 2004, more than the aggregate of the three countries' military expenditures. Close association with the US ability to marshal massive resources is necessary if Europe wishes to invoke the threat of military force to back its diplomacy; it inevitably will need to when its influence and voice grow.

While the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is starting to provide another basis for EU primacy in its own security affairs, NATO still stands as a key determinant in transatlantic security. That the United States is some sort of power mongerer wishing to emasculate transatlantic security for its own sake is a specious notion. In 2002, the administration of US President George W. Bush called for a highly responsive "rapid reaction force" within NATO, comprising 20,000 troops. At a time when the European Union is developing military capabilities of its own, it seems that US policy is trying hard to establish a diplomatic relationship with Europe that is reliant on a common multilateral institution.

Part of the problem, say pessimistic onlookers, is precisely that the United States is in a unipolar world. Simply put, it does not have to listen to anyone else. In a sense, it dominates policy across the globe. While it could be argued that it is the most powerful country in the world, the United States certainly is not above listening to the opinions of others. Contrary to the belief of intellectuals, the current Bush Administration is paying a great deal of attention to what Europeans think. Bush's trip to Europe early in 2005 may have been pejoratively labeled a "charm offensive," but it hints at an underlying issue that no recent presidential administration has been able to deny: Europe exerts a sizable influence in the world, and even on the United States.

The most obvious evidence that the European Union is not an US lackey is the poorly publicized EU-China relationship. Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to France in 2004 was met with an elaborate parade and illumination of the Eiffel Tower, in stark contrast to Bush's muted visit in 2005. Hu's wonderful reception is just a symbol of Europe's increasingly close relationship with China, who at present is the European Union's largest trading partner. In a move that has become a bone of contention with the United States, the European Union is still entertaining the possibility of lifting the decade-old arms embargo on China. As of March 2005, renewed signs of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan have called this elimination into question, yet importantly, France and Germany, two EU mainstays, are still adamant that it should be pushed through, making it likely that the issue will reappear on the European Union's agenda. If this indeed comes to fruition, it will be the first time that the European member-states and China can trade arms since the embargo's inception in 1989. Economically as well, the United States is not totally dominant; the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) of the European Union is capable of rivaling the United States' nearly US $11 trillion national income. The United States is very conscious of the role of Europe in their foreign policy. Though critics increasingly believe the current administration is "going it alone," the Bush Administration is well aware that consultation and multilateralism when possible is

optimal.

Europe and the United States are increasingly framing prognoses of international politics using these ideas of multipolarity and unipolarity. French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine summed up the pre-eminence of the United States by coining the term "hyperpower." However, a world with weak powers is inherently unstable. During the Thirty Years' War in the 1600s, Europe's population sank and social structure deteriorated, precisely because no one political entity could single-handedly end the war. Instability was pervasive until the French and the Austrian Hapsburgs became dominant powers in Europe. More than three centuries later, this small-states theory of an international system has lost none of its potency and danger. Europe, in a truly multipolar world, would not be militarily able to become primus inter pares. A truly multipolar world then, is not the solution to Europe's problems with the United States. Rather, close integration with multilateral institutions like NATO is the best way to attain stability. Contrary to the central tenet of balance of power politics, conflict does not always lead to an equilibrium state of stability; however, interdependence ensures it.

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The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between "cowboys" and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in Brussels--NATO's headquarters--to ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.

European Estrangement

Despite these misconceptions, there clearly is a problem with US-European relations. NATO is the lifeline of the transatlantic relationship, but the recent US-European estrangement hints at something deeper than just the usual political squabble. The apparent incongruity of the NATO relationship is a function of the US and European mindsets that inevitably arises out of their past histories.

At least part of the problem is that national opinions clash, creating instability in the alliance. In reference to British Prime Minister Tony Blair's supporting the Iraq War, French President Jacques Chirac delivered a stinging rebuke against Bush in November 2004 by saying that "... Britain gave its support, but I did not see anything in return. I'm not sure it is in the nature of our American friends at the moment to return favors systematically." However, this antagonism is nothing new in the transatlantic relationship. During the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, French President Charles De Gaulle tried to steer French foreign policy away from its US counterpart. As an ardent nationalist, he strongly believed that "it is intolerable for a great State [France] to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State [the United States]...." This sentiment paved the way for France's development of, and subsequent transformation into, a nuclear power. France's development of nuclear weapons underscored the fundamental problem in NATO at this period of time. Essentially, France then had the option of enacting an autonomous foreign policy free from US control, by virtue of its possession of nuclear arms.

De Gaulle ultimately failed to flex France's newfound muscle, partly because Germany did not choose to join France and shift away from US foreign policy, and partly by way of US pressure. Nonetheless, De Gaulle's Machtpolitik is a throwback to the European state system in the days of Metternich, the most visible foreign policy architect of post-Napoleonic Europe. Chirac obviously had France's past history in mind when he told a NATO conference that a durable transatlantic partnership demands, "a close, steadfast and balanced relationship between America and Europe."

US foreign policy stands in stark contrast to this belief in shifting alliances and unstable international order. Still enlisting Wilsonianism after roughly 90 years, the United States believes in a form of collective security in which all parties to alliance would be represented. During his tenure as President, John F. Kennedy advocated NATO cohesiveness, calling for a new initiative called the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF). This represents the quintessential US ideal of collective security. Essentially, the MLF was a group of ships acting as a weapons platform from which intermediate-range missiles would be launched in case of an emergency. As a key addendum to this initiative, Kennedy called for multinational crews to man these ships. While this project ultimately failed to gain the support of other European countries, one cannot help but see the parallels between this US initiative and the Bush Administration's rhetoric today.

In a sense, NATO is a synthesis of European interest in self-protection and US aspirations for global security. However, the North Atlantic is not a hotspot for international conflict. Karl Marx, peering into the present, would have a great deal of trouble convincing any European that the Communist "specter" is haunting the West. Whereas past generals like Dwight Eisenhower gained great media attention while serving as the Commander-in-Chief of NATO in Europe, the most visible general today is General John Abizaid, commanding officer of CENTCOM in the Middle East. Recent US military action falls well outside the sphere of Europe, including Afghanistan and Iraq. While reviled for their regimes' lack of human rights, these so-called "rogue states" did not pose massive threats to Europe. This feeling of insularity from US conflicts, concomitant with Europeans' divergent security desires, has made NATO less effective as it had been at the onset of the Cold War.

A Revamped Role

However, the concept of NATO was not solely a military role. This means that it can change to meet the demands of the future. NATO can move beyond providing security in the heartland of Europe to working on projects in which the United States and Europe have common interests.

EU member-states under NATO have been paying close attention to Eastern Europe and Eurasia, a point that usually fails to garner much attention in US foreign policy. Recently, the US command in Europe decided to shift its NATO-affiliated personnel from western European countries like Germany to places closer to Eurasia, such as Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. With the recent expansion of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Malta, there is a closer emphasis on looking eastward into trouble spots to which NATO previously could not extend. On March 2, 2005, NATO signed an agreement with Georgia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zourabichvili to allow transit of supplies from Europe to reach war-torn Afghanistan. Collaboration with NATO can also bring countries on Europe's periphery closer into the international community.

Additionally, there is the frequently ignored humanitarian struggle that fails to garner sufficient attention from geopolitical gurus and pundits. Poverty, malnutrition, and lack of economic development are still problems that lack satisfactory solutions. This is something to which no one country has been paying marked attention. However, they cannot be blamed, as most countries lack the substantial resources needed to meet their geopolitical goals as well as their humanitarian ones. NATO provides a broad base from which substantial soft power can emanate. Recently, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary-General of NATO, told an audience in Spain that spreading democracy "remains the best answer to terror." This may well intersect with UN initiatives, but de Hoop Scheffer believes that "the most effective way [to fight terrorism] is to have a combination of all the things in our inventory, and that goes from nation-building to intelligence to diplomacy, political talks, and if necessary, military power." It is here that NATO has been focusing its attention, and it is in this direction that NATO should focus more of its energies in the future.

Even given these goals, no one onlooker can provide a comprehensive checklist for what NATO needs to accomplish. The international representatives who arrived in Washington in 1949 to sign the North Atlantic Treaty were probably well aware of this. Articles 10 to 14 in the Treaty open the possibility for changes that member countries may later enact. The revisions may concern not only "the North Atlantic area," but also "regional arrangements ... for the maintenance of international peace and security." Too often, critics concern themselves with only the concrete aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, they miss the crux of the relationship: there is an undeniable similarity in ideals between NATO's member countries that needs to be affirmed. To say that NATO is obsolete because its function as a military alliance is obsolete confuses means with ends. In this respect, it is very clear why early proponents of NATO shied away from referring to it only as an alliance.

Renewed commitment is key; the fundamental problem is that arguing can render liberal democracy ineffective. As Kagan wrote in Paradise and Power, France thinks of the United States as "the American Leviathan unbound," while US cartoonists see Europeans as stuffed shirts. However, the petty differences must be thrown out. What we now think of as "the West" needs to gain greater coherency not only for its own sake, but for the world's benefit. Their role in a great multilateral framework like NATO demands that they also have a measure of responsibility to work together to help maintain the stability of the world order.

RELATED ARTICLE: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE

In April 1949, ten countries of Europe, the United States, and Canada united to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization under the Washinton Treaty. Formed in order to protect their collective security, the alliance is faced with redefining its mission or becoming useless. In this effort, ten new Eastern European countries have been added since 1999.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization

associate editor

JAMES KWOK