The story of surplus: the forces behind trade.
Krugman, Paul
While trade shouldn't be viewed as competitive because an
increase in productivity means increased product for an entire market,
will differences in growth rates lead to political competition that
threatens free trade?
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I do not think that the difference in growth rates is the issue. I
do not think anyone is looking at Chinese growth and saying it is the
problem. The specific jobs that are being shifted overseas spurs
political debate; it is just not basically a growth rate issue.
Much media coverage has focused on exporting jobs and the
transition to a service-based economy. Is this an accurate depiction of
the future of the US economy and the balance of future economies of
developed and developing nations?
No. Everything we know from theory and from history says that
international trade is not going to lead to a net loss in jobs. It will
lead to all other kinds of consequences, but overall employment will be
just the same as it would have been without the trade. Overall, this is
not going to be a net negative for employment; the problem is that we
can not neglect the very real concerns of workers who lose their jobs.
Is international investment a stable method for growth and
development, or is capital flight still a legitimate concern?
Capital flight is still a legitimate concern. Hot money that flows
in and out of countries has been a big source of instability for the
past decade. That has been a major negative and we can not dismiss it.
For what it is worth, international investment has not been flowing
where it should. We have not seen a situation where savings from
advanced countries are being used to finance development in poorer
countries. If anything, the flows have gone in reverse. A lot of people
are rethinking international investment. There are still arguments for
relatively unrestricted investment, but the big upsides have not
materialized.
What would be the big upsides of international investment without
the risk of capital flight?
The theory was that international investment was going to deliver
capital to countries where capital was scarce. It was going to increase
investment in productive capacity in places that were short of
productive capacity. This just has not happened, anywhere. In both Latin
America and Southeast Asia there were brief periods of capital flow, but
it all dissipated. In fact, there was subsequent capital outflow as
countries moved into current account surpluses. The whole idea that
international investment was going to be a way to transfer savings from
already developed countries to countries on the way up, for whatever
reason, just has not happened.
Will regional trade agreements lead to economic growth or are they
means to political ends?
Regional trade agreements have turned out to be not that important.
If you were looking at the big story of US trade since 1990, NAFTA would
not be a big part of the story. If you looked at the likely impact of
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), assuming one is
possible, it would not be that big. Regional trade agreements turned out
to just be a hypothetical story. These agreements are largely political
gestures. They do offer some increase in trade between the parties that
sign the agreement; they do cause some problems for multilateral trade
because they distort the global system of trade. Ten years ago, regional
trade agreements looked like they were going to be the big thing of the
global economy, but this just has not panned out. It is not the big
story.
What are the implications of the increasing internationalization of
financial markets, including international investment, for third world
countries? What do you see as some of the obstacles to achieving truly
international finance markets?
Do that in reverse. The big obstacle is that international finance
has, for the last 15 years, been a source of problems rather than
solutions. Whatever we may say about the principle of free markets, the
fact is that we have had these disruptive large capital flows. I think
that a poor track record is the main obstacle for a country like China,
which will not be in any rush to liberalize or open up its financial
markets because similar countries that have liberalized have seen very
unpleasant crises as a result.
Given the increasing influence and hegemonic prowess of North
Atlantic countries, do you see the rest of the world's trade
politics conforming to western trade standards?
Actually, I would not have used any of those words. We have a
system of relatively open market standards that is embodied in the rules
of the World Trade Organization. By and large, countries are moving in
line with these rules. I am not sure it is a particularly North Atlantic
standard. I think that if you started form scratch with no particular
national background, you would have ended up with a similar set of
rules. The questions are always about the limits of globalization, which
is difficult to deal with, but I do not think there is a lot of
hegemonic coercion going on right now.
Do policy issues such as national security concerns, human rights
concerns, or environmental concerns pose a danger to free trade when
protectionism is justified in their names?
National security, definitely. The environmental and human rights
issues can be handled quite reasonably in terms of the free trade issue.
There will be occasional cases where a real conflict between free trade
and environmental standards exists, but not often. By and large these
things can work together. The same is true of human rights. I do not
think the threat is in any of those [concerns]; the real threat is in
domestic politics.
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So is the threat from domestic politics due to the increasing
demands on governments to provide a social safety net or welfare state?
No, not at all. The countries that have strong social safety nets
and welfare states are relatively able to deal with trade issues calmly.
It is the micro-politics. It is the US Gulf Region catfish industry that
resents competition and is hurt by competition from Vietnam, and has the
political influence to shut out such competition. It is the steel
industry that gets protection because West Virginia just might win the
election. And, of course, it is the European farmers. The problem is
that European agricultural policy is a disaster for the world. It is not
driven by the fact that France has or wants a strong welfare state; it
is driven by the fact that French farmers have too much power.
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How significant are the conflicts between international trade
regimes and domestic social norms? Will these conflicts materialize into
anything serious?
There is a little bit of conflict; there is some real instability.
The issue that trade poses is that it can lead to rather sudden loss of
job security for groups of people who thought they were secure. That is
what is happening with technology outsourcing. This is difficult for
society to swallow under any circumstances; this is the make or break
issue. I have not seen any way in which international trade undermines
things like national health care or strong unemployment insurance. Among
advanced countries, the United States has a very weak welfare state.
Western European countries have very strong welfare states. I do not
think that the United States is handling the pressure from international
trade any more easily than the European countries. This is just a fake
conflict; there is a welfare state issue and a trade issue, but the two
do not interact all that much.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) generally enter new markets
through foreign direct investment in the factors of production or
through trade. What role do you see MNCs playing in the proliferation of
tree trade policies and the opening of markets?
Not much. This seems to be my answer to a lot of things. MNCs tend
to be free traders only because they do not have a national center of
gravity and so they tend to be global in outlook. If you look at the
long record they have been on all sides of that issue. In some Latin
American countries, MNCs invested in import substituted industries and
they became advocates of continued protectionism. I do not think that
MNCs make that much of a difference.
So do you see MNCs as influencing the foreign policies of developed
and developing nations?
Corporations, not necessarily MNCs, do. Big political donors do. It
is not something new, but sure, there was a time when US trade policy
was significantly influenced by the Chiquita banana company. So, yes,
but not more so than domestic oil companies or other interest groups.
But multinational corporations are part of the story. I think that MNCs
have a lot less leverage in terms of actual direction than people
imagine. It is not that they are trivial. But if you look at
globalization success stories, you find that they run a gamut; some
places are like Singapore, which is basically an enclave for
multinational corporations to operate and other places are like South
Korea, where to the extent that there are multinational corporations, it
is because South Korean companies have gone multinational. I think that
you are overrating the role of multinational corporations. They are just
one of the actors in a process that has a lot going on.
an interview with PAUL KRUGMAN
PAUL KRUGMAN is an op-ed columnist with the New York Times. He is
also Professor of Economics at Princeton University. He has written and
edited over 18 books on international trade.