The transatlantic rift: US leadership after September 11. (Perspectives on the United States).

Solana, Javier

Forged in the aftermath of World War II, the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States has proven successful and resilient over the past half-century. The international environment changed radically with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, but its impact has only gradually manifested itself. The shock of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has shed light upon the developments in the relationship between Europe and the United States over the past decade. While Washington has been quick in reacting to new challenges, both in practice and in its definition of strategy, differences in perceptions and capabilities contain the seeds of a potential transatlantic rift. Nothing could be more dangerous for both sides. Europe and the United States have a common duty to nurture their relationship, which requires a serious debate about perceptions, values, methods, and capabilities.

Distinct Perceptions

While the end of the Cold War was a major victory for the West, it ushered in a period of adjustment and evolution that diminished the centrality of Europe for the United States. The disappearance of an existential threat, the reduced strategic importance of the European theater, and the increasing US focus on other priorities removed some of the glue from EU-US relations. This picture was compounded by other developments: the inability of Europe to tackle the Balkan crises without US assistance, the gap between the two partners in economic growth through the 1990s, and Europe's preoccupation with its own internal development. It is a tribute to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that relations remained strong despite these growing gaps; the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 and the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995 were intelligent steps toward a reinvention of the partnership after the end of the Cold War.

In Europe, the immediate impact of the September 11 attacks was to trigger a fresh wave of emotional solidarity with the United States. "We are all Americans," proclaimed Le Monde on the day following the attacks. Indeed, Europeans felt that the attack had been an attack on values they shared with the United States. Now, over a year later, the relationship looks considerably less rosy. A hard look at the facts reveals a more critical tone, a more complex mix of emotions, and some degree of exasperation in Europe--even from those who consider themselves staunch Atlanticists. In part, this is simply a normal effect of the passage of time, which has allowed political debate to resume just as bipartisan solidarity within the United States has inevitably eroded. More fundamentally, however, this friction reflects a new set of tensions between the two sides, fueled by differences in perceptions, priorities, and responses to the terrorist attacks.

Clearly, US perceptions of the world have been transformed. Where geography and military power once provided comfort and security, today there is an enduring sense of vulnerability and exposure. "Homeland security"--a phrase and concept alien before September 11--is now the overriding value in US policy with far-reaching consequences for changes in US domestic, economic, defense, and foreign policy initiatives.

In contrast, for the rest of the world--horrified spectators rather than direct victims of the attacks--September 11 was an iconic event, a brutal wake-up call to the dangers from a "mega-terror" that combines fanaticism with immense destructive power. For citizens of London, Paris, and Madrid, the deadly novelty of the Al Qaeda attacks lay in the appalling degree of death and destruction wrought, not in the fact that innocent civilians had been targeted on home soil without warning. For most Europeans today, the most important recent change in the security environment is the removal of the Soviet threat and not the emergence of a terrorist threat, which is the natural focus in the United States.

There is further disparity between the perceptions of the actual nature of this new terrorist threat. The choice of language on the two sides of the Atlantic is revealing: what for the United States is a "war on terrorism" is for Europe the "fight against terrorism." For many US citizens, the attacks were an act of war and an expression of evil. Europeans also unreservedly condemned the attacks, but at the same time, they view terrorism as the most extreme and reprehensible symptom of a broader and deeper political dysfunction. In part, these perceptual differences can be explained by the variance between the two actors' capabilities. A military response came more naturally for the world's preeminent military power than it would have for a civil power like Europe, which preferred a diplomatic response.

But these different characterizations also reflect the disparate nature of the two societies. The moral certainty of a comparatively religious United States is difficult to replicate in a largely secular Europe. A religious society explains evil in terms of moral choice and free will; a secular society looks for the causes of evil in psychological or political factors. This moral certainty is reflected in a political language whose starkness and unyieldingly clear moral distinctions has sometimes shocked Europeans, for whom compromise and differentiation are the norm. Even some religious leaders in Europe have been uncomfortable with the ethical abruptness of some US analyses. "Bombast about evil individuals," wrote Rowan Williams, archbishop-elect of Canterbury, "doesn't help in understanding anything. Even vile and murderous actions tend to come from somewhere." Interestingly, even ardent US realist Robert Kaplan makes a similar point in his book Warrior Politics: "Rarely can states be categorized as strict ly good or evil. Instead, they tend to act good for a while and bad for another, as they endlessly navigate for advantage. That is why the term 'rogue state,' though occasionally appropriate, may also expose the idealistic illusions of its user, since it misjudges the nature of states themselves."

However, it is the differences in political approaches, rather than some alleged moral relativism, that best explain why European politicians chose not to break their contact with Yasser Arafat before Palestinian elections. Similarly, differing political analyses, not a fundamental disagreement about ultimate goals or moral judgments, are what encourage Europeans to bring about reform in Iran through engagement rather than through isolation.

US policymakers see the new terrorism threat as the overriding challenge to international security and order, almost to the exclusion of all others. Europeans, on the other hand, tend to see it as one of several threats, alongside poverty; unresolved regional conflicts, pandemic diseases, and climate change. Left and right, hawks and doves, politicians and public alike, all support an active policy to address the problems of sustainable development and the potential for regional conflagration. Europeans are more inclined to see these issues in terms of their potential for security and insecurity; and consequentiy to support a preventive strategy; than their US counterparts. In his June 2002 speech at the US Military Academy at West Point, President George Bush proclaimed, "We must confront the worst threats before they emerge ... [for] if we wait for these threats to materialize, we will have waited too long." This doctrine, in the view of Europeans, applies compellingly to issues such as climate change, rath er than to pre-emptive military action.

Changing Course

The Bush administration has been quick in responding to the new challenges, both in practice and strategic thought, as evidenced by the recently published National Security Strategy (NSS). This important document represents the US response to both the shock of September 11 and the end of the Cold War. The former has accelerated developments foreshadowed by the events of 1989: a new geopolitical architecture involving closer relations between the United States and Russia, and perhaps China, the overwhelming dominance of the United States as the major military power, and the redefinition of the NATO alliance. It has also provided a new impetus and rationale for decisive action by the United States, with or without the international community. In that respect, it is in line with the more skeptical view of multilateralism adopted by Condoleezza Rice before she took up her present post as US national security advisor: "Foreign policy," she wrote, "will most certainly be internationalist, but it will also proceed f rom the firm ground of national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community."

The NSS states US policy objections with admirable clarity, though it raises a number of questions and confirms the existence of different perceptions across the Atlantic. As its title indicates, this is a national strategy, but it is one with wide international implications. Moving from a system of containment and deterrence to a world of military pre-emption defined by one state represents a dramatic change in policy that will directly impact Europe and everyone else in the world. As Henry Kissinger stated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September, "It cannot be either the American interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of pre-emption against its own definition of threats to its security." As a European, I wonder whether it is in the common interest of the international community to develop principles that grant a single country such an unfettered right. The threat of terrorism linked to weapons of mass destruction may very well justify a revision of the traditional categories of containment and deterrence that have guaranteed peace in Europe since World War II. But the preventive use of force needs a wider legitimation, either through the UN Security Council or at least through some form of multilateral backing. If the United States claims that power for itself, it will only foster resentment and hostility abroad and ultimately undermine its own national interests.

Furthermore, underlying the admittedly broad internationalist NSS approach to policy areas, such as development aid, regional cooperation, and trade, is a strong message emphasizing US military supremacy and the use of military force to respond to new threats. It is not only their relative weakness on the military level that prompts Europeans to take a less sanguine view in that respect, but also their genuine belief that a military response alone will not solve the problem of terrorism and that it may actually reinforce the risk of asymmetric threats. A new global security doctrine must combine prevention, protection, and repression strategies to meet the terrorist menace. The European Union, with its specific culture of security based on conflict prevention, dialogue, and sensitivity to the economic and social roots of violence, has an important contribution to make in that respect. Ultimately, however, the credibility of such a strategy rests on Europe's capacity to also give itself the means to use force when all other means have failed.

At the same time, we must ensure that security responses are not just comprehensive, integrated, and long-term, but also broadly owned and managed. In so doing, we help ensure that the values that the terrorist rejects--rule of law, liberty; democracy--do not themselves become victims of our struggle. Defending our peace, spreading our values, and sharing our prosperity will not be possible in a world of anarchy and chaos. The struggle for a world of order will be more legitimate and more effective if it is based on international cooperation and respect for global rules and institutions. That view is why skeptical Europeans welcomed Bush's commitment to pursue US leadership through and not outside the UN Security Council on the issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. For Europeans, this is more than diplomatic window dressing; it constitutes the difference between a course of action that strengthens international law and one that erodes it.

Europeans do not advocate multilateralism because of some herd instinct or because they view themselves as Lilliputians trying to tie down a Gulliver. European attachment to multilateralism is based on experience. The post-1945 emergence of the European continent from the disaster of war and destruction and the prison of narrow-minded nationalism was a success for multilateralism and for US leadership. It was the United States that invented modern multilateralism as a working system in the aftermath of World War II. By pooling their sovereignty into the European Union and other multilateral organizations, European states have followed that lead and succeeded in enhancing regional security and stability. The price has been a commitment to a system of permanent negotiation that requires patience and compromise.

We are convinced that global problems--be they economic, environmental, or political--require global solutions. Goods, services, and people circulate more than ever. Greenhouse gas emissions do not respect borders, and neither do terrorists or other criminals. Conflicts spread from one country to another, and financial crises have spillover effects worldwide. In this globally interdependent world, a commitment to multilateralism represents a long-term investment insecurity. If the weakest and poorest feel that their voice is not being heard, then they will soon become the angriest as well.

Even the strongest country in the world needs friends and allies, as the NSS rightly points out throughout its text. But allies must be treated as such and allowed to participate not only in the execution, but also in the formation of policy. The notion of ad hoc coalitions of docile followers to be chosen or discarded at will is neither attractive nor sustainable in the long run. Europeans and US citizens are members of one family and share a community of values, but that situation will change if Europeans conclude that they have little say in shaping the definition, promotion, or defense of those shared values. Fundamental values are more lasting than any particular objective. The transatlantic partnership, if it is to endure and thrive, must be more than a purely utilitarian and ad hoc association.

The legacy of the past is actually quite encouraging in that respect: in times of need, the United States and its European allies find themselves on the same side and act as true partners. There remains the hope that the relationship between the United States and Europe increasingly will be molded by the link between the United States and the European Union itself. After successfully constructing an internal market, creating the euro, and launching the irreversible process of reuniting the continent, the European Union will, over the coming years, tackle its next major challenge: constructing a strong and credible foreign policy. The success of that endeavor will in many respects determine the future of the

transatlantic relationship. Tackling the major international questions of the coming decades will be much easier if the United States can work together with a strong, confident Europe.

Heeding Churchill

A convincing military victory in Afghanistan has fueled US self-confidence and assertiveness, and the NSS reflects the stunning extent of US "hard-power" supremacy. Both proponents and critics of the muscular use of US supremacy; not all of whom reside in the Europe, increasingly talk of imperial tendencies. According to Kissinger, "The United States is enjoying a pre-eminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past." Those who see in the United States a new empire for the 21st century should, however, heed the wise words of Thucydides about the Athenians: "So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the Athenians that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and what was impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The reason for this was their extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes."

The modern world is complex and interdependent. The broad security agenda that we must confront demands the possession of not just military but also economic, diplomatic, and industrial strength. As a recent study by the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States shows, US foreign policy attitudes are not so different from those in Europe: most US citizens favor an active foreign policy to deal with a wide range of international issues, show strong support for multilateral rather than unilateral approaches to foreign policy, and exhibit more readiness to use military force multilaterally rather than unilaterally.

What is needed and wanted--on both sides of the Atlantic--is not US empire, but US leadership. "The price of greatness," according to Sir Winston Churchill, "is responsibility." Those words carry a message to both the United States and Europe. For Europe, which aspires to greatness, they remind that influence comes at a significant price and must be earned through the assumption of obligations and duties. To the United States, which has achieved greatness, the same words warn that power is no substitute for persuasion and that power exercised with restraint and legitimacy is a power that will attract allies and repel enemies.

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JAVIER SOLANA is EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Former NATO Secretary-General.