UN-paid dues: The costs of cooperation. (Global Notebook).

Huebner, David ; Haddad, Raja

On September 24, 2001, only 13 days after the tragic events in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the US House of Representatives approved a US$582 million payment in back dues to the United Nations.

Despite a history of squabbling and heated debates, this measure's passage faced almost no opposition. In the context of the US-led international campaign against terrorism, it may have seemed a way to reach out to an international community long neglected by Washington.

In August 1995, UN member states owed a total of US$3.7 billion in outstanding assessments. Of this amount. US$850 million constituted dues owed for UN regular activities, and US$2.85 billion was owed for UN peacekeeping. Although several UN member states had some responsibility for these dues, the United States owed almost one-third of the debt: US$525 million in regular funding and US$740 million for peacekeeping operations.

The US Congress continuously refused to cooperate; in 1994 it rejected a bill that would have paid US$300 million for UN peacekeeping, and in 1995 it turned down a proposal that would have given the United Nations US$672 million. It seems ironic that the United States, which was establishing itself as a leader in the resolution of international conflicts-as illustrated by its actions in Somalia and the Balkans-was unconcerned with assuming such a role in the international body created specifically for that purpose.

By 1995, many members of the international community, particularly countries that paid their dues on time, were frustrated with the situation. British Secretary of State Malcolm Rifkind explained that there was no way the UN system could work correctly under such circumstances. He described the United Nations as "on the verge of financial collapse" and demanded a policy reminiscent of the American Revolution: "No representation without taxation." Andre Quellet, the Canadian foreign minister at the time, also spoke out, complaining that Canada "cannot accept that member states, some of which rank among the richest in the world, fail to meet their financial obligations to this institution. This is even more difficult to accept when we consider that a number of the poorest countries in the world meet their payments in full and on time."

The situation did not get any better in following years. Not only did the United States continue to default on payments but also other countries felt less obliged to pay dues. In 1996, of US$689 million in unpaid dues, the United States was responsible for US$527 million, 76 percent of the total debt. In peacekeeping, the total dues amounted to US$1.72 billion, of which the US share was 53 percent. Furthermore, countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia, which had fulfilled their payments in previous years, began accumulating debts in both budgets. The United States was becoming a model to follow and to the detriment of the United Nations, which found itself the subject of a growing international change in prioritization.

As the problem grew, the US Congress saw the need to respond; in October 1998 it passed a bill that would have paid US dues. However, US President Bill Clinton, though a strong proponent of paying off the debt, vetoed the legislation on grounds that it was inappropriately linked to an unrelated abortion issue. Instead, he signed a separate bill allowing the United States to pay just enough to retain its voting rights in the UN General Assembly. In June 1999, the chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, proposed a bill that would allocate the necessary funds to pay back US debt in exchange for reforms in the UN management structure and an overall reduction of the US share in the UN budget.

Although Helms's legislation passed, failed negotiations for the implementation of reforms left the United States in the same situation as it had been the previous year, barely a week away from losing its vote in the UN General Assembly-but not its Security Council seat-because of accumulated back dues. At the last minute, the Clinton administration released US$51 million, enabling Washington to maintain its voice in UN affairs.

The United States thus entered the year 2000 with Richard Holbrooke, its ambassador to the United Nations, attempting to lower the US financial contribution from 25 percent to 22 percent of the regular budget. After numerous negotiations and small payments, a compromise was reached in December 2000 when UN members cut US dues for the first time in over 25 years. While Holbrooke reached the 22 percent plateau for the regular budget, the US share in peacekeeping funding was only cut to 27 percent, despite the 1997 agreement of the Clinton administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that prevented funds from being given to the United Nations if a 25 percent level was not reached.

Even though the settlement could have been considered a breakthrough, the international community nevertheless retained its resentment of the United States; on May 4, 2001, the United States was voted off the UN Human Rights Commission. This was the first time since the commission's 1947 creation that the United States was not elected a sitting member. US hostility toward other international treaties helps to explain the frustration that led various nations to participate in this historic eviction. The new arrangement obviously angered the US government, and the fact that Sudan and Pakistan were given membership led to further discord. The vote, conducted in secret, proved that some of the United States' close allies were upset by US policies and sided with certain developing nations' anti-US views. The United States learned not to expect automatic re-election on key councils. Superpower status was simply not enough: the international community would not follow US-imposed policies unquestioningly.

William H. Luers, president of the UN Association of the United States, saw the vote as evidence that the United States was "in an organization full of enemies." In this context, many in the US government could not find a reason to make an effort to pay back dues. Later that month, the US Congress decided to withhold US$244 million earmarked for the United Nations based on the agreement that Holbrooke had reached in late 2000. In the view of much of the international community, this act was just another sign of US self-centeredness.

The dues stalemate continued until October 6, 2001, when US President George Bush released US$582 million to the United Nations, hoping that the payment would accentuate the "close bond" between the United States and the United Nations. Interestingly, Bush's statement came only a few hours after Kofi Annan had appealed to the United Nations to be an active player in the war on terrorism-a campaign spearheaded by the United States. The move was also a sign of the United States' outreach to the international community intended to ease relations with other UN members.

Through six years of dues-related tensions, the United States has not always paid enough attention to the opinions of the international community. Historically, the United States has used various international organizations to serve its own ideology and interests. In the case of the UN Human Rights Commission, the United States criticized the countries that it opposed while backing its strategic allies with human rights records that were equivalent or worse. Similarly, it appears that the United States decided to pay back its dues last year simply because it needed help from the international community. The United States was looking for support in its coalition against terrorism and it was essential to satisfy UN member states by eliminating this major source of frustration. The United States' decision to pay its UN dues in a time of crisis reveals the limits of its superpower status: the United States realized the need to improve its relations with the rest of the international community to generate an effec tive response in the face of a global crisis.