How clinical diagnosis might exacerbate the stigma of mental illness.
Corrigan, Patrick W.
Autistic children never play normally with other children. They
often do not respond normally to their mothers' affections or to
any tenderness. (Freedman, Kaplan, & Sadock, 1976, p. 449)
The sociopath persistently violates the rights of others, shows
indifference to commitments, and encounters conflict with the law.
(Rathus, 1984, p. 451)
These quotes are two examples of how the use of diagnostic terms
can sometimes worsen the stigma of mental illness. Stigma can
significantly undermine the quality of life of people with mental
illness. The social opprobrium that results from stigma can rob people
labeled mentally ill of a variety of work, housing, and other life
opportunities commonly enjoyed by adults in the United States. It can
also prevent some people who might otherwise benefit from clinical
services from pursuing treatment in an effort to avoid the label. One
important part of the system of care--clinical diagnosis--may strengthen
the stereotypes that lead to stigma. Diagnosis may intensify both the
"groupness" and the "differentness" aspects
governing public perceptions of people with mental illness.
THE PROBLEM OF THE STIGMA OF MENTAL ILLNESS
Stigma harms people with mental illness in three ways: label
avoidance, blocked life goals, and self-stigma.
Label Avoidance
Epidemiological research has consistently shown that the majority
of people who might benefit from mental health care either opt not to
pursue it or do not fully adhere to treatment regimens once begun. As an
example, consider people with schizophrenia, the group that might be
construed as being most in need of services. Results from the
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study showed that only 60 percent of people
with schizophrenia participated in treatment (Regier, Narrow, Rae, &
Manderscheid, 1993). Taking into account symptom severity, Narrow and
colleagues (2000) found that people with serious mental illness were no
more likely to participate in treatment than those with relatively minor
disorders. The National Comorbidity Survey showed similar results
(Kessler et al., 2001); fewer than 40 percent of respondents with a
serious mental illness such as schizophrenia had received medical
treatment in the past year.
Research has suggested that many people choose not to pursue mental
health services because they do not want to be labeled a "mental
patient" or suffer the prejudice and discrimination that the label
entails. Results from the Yale arm of the Epidemiological Catchment Area
data showed negative attitudes about mental health inhibit service use
in those at risk of a psychiatric disorder (Leaf, Bruce, Tischler, &
Holzer, 1987). Findings from the National Comorbidity Survey identified
stigmatizing beliefs that might sway people from treatment (Kessler et
al., 2001). These included concerns about what others might think and
the desire to solve one's own problems. Sirey and colleagues (2001)
found a direct relationship between stigmatizing attitudes and treatment
adherence. Endorsing stigma was associated with whether 134 adults were
compliant with their antidepressant medication regimen three months
later. Hence, people may opt not to pursue treatment where labels are
conferred to avoid the egregious effects of stigma.
Blocked Opportunities
A primary goal of mental health and rehabilitative services is to
assist people in accomplishing their work, independent living, and
relationship goals. In part, difficulties achieving goals occur because
of the disabilities that result from serious mental illness (Corrigan,
2001). Some people with serious mental illness lack the social and
coping skills to meet the demands of the competitive workforce and
independent housing. Nevertheless, the problems of many people with
psychiatric disability are further hampered by labels and stigma. People
with mental illness are frequently unable to obtain good jobs or find
suitable housing because of the prejudice of employers and landlords.
Several studies have documented a consensus about the public's
widespread endorsement of stigmatizing attitudes (Bhugra, 1989;
Brockington, Hall, Levings, & Murphy, 1993; Hamre, Dahl, & Malt,
1994; Link, 1987). These attitudes have a deleterious impact on
people's ability to obtain and keep good jobs (Farina & Felner,
1973; Farina, Felner, & Boudreau, 1973; Link, 1982, 1987;Wahl, 1999)
and lease safe housing (Farina, Thaw, Lovern, & Mangone, 1974;
Hogan, 1985a, 1985b; Page, 1977, 1983, 1995; Wahl). Similar research has
shown that stigma may undermine the general medical care received by
people with mental illness (Druss, Bradford, Rosenheck, Radford, &
Krumholz, 2000).
Self-Stigma
People with mental illness who live in a society that widely
endorses stigmatizing ideas may internalize these ideas and believe that
they are less valued because of their psychiatric disorder (Link, 1987;
Link & Phelan, 2001; Ritsher, Otilingam, & Grajales, 2003). Like
public stigma, self-stigma includes "buying into" a set of
stereotypes: "That's right; I am weak and unable to care for
myself!" Self-stigma leads to automatic thoughts and negative
emotional reactions; prominent among these are shame, low self-esteem,
and diminished self-efficacy. Self-stigma may also have a behavioral
effect. Low self-efficacy and demoralization have been shown to be
associated with people's failing to pursue work or independent
living opportunities at which they might otherwise succeed (Link, 1982,
1987). Fueled by shame, their consequent behavior is to escape and avoid
future similar situations.
A SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEFINITION OF STIGMA
Researchers working at the interface of social work and psychology
have framed the stigma process in terms of four cognitive structures:
cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. This model (Figure 1)
parallels a cognitive behavior model of action by specifying signal,
cognitive mediator, and behavioral result (Corrigan, 2000). The process
begins with stigmas, which are the cues that signal subsequent prejudice
and discrimination.
Goffman (1963) adopted the term stigma from the Greeks who defined
it as a mark meant to publicly and prominently represent immoral status.
Stigmas are typically the marks that, when observed by a majority group
member, may lead to prejudice. Goffman noted that some stigmas are
readily apparent and based on a physical sign such as skin color (a cue
for ethnicity) or body size (a cue for obesity). Other stigmas are
relatively hidden; for example, the public cannot generally tell who
among a group of people falls into such stigmatized groups as gay men,
Catholics, undereducated people, and people with mental illness. Instead
of an unequivocal physical cue, hidden stigma is signaled by label or
association (Link, Cullen, Frank, & Wozniak, 1987; Penn &
Martin, 1998). Labels may be self-promoted ("I am a gay male")
or given by others ("That person is mentally ill"). Hidden
stigma can also be ascertained based on association; for example,
observation of someone leaving a psychiatric clinic might lead to the
assumption that the person is mentally ill.
Theorists in this area of study view stereotypes as knowledge
structures that are learned by most members of a cued social group
(Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994; Judd & Park, 1993; Krueger,
1996). Stereotypes are especially efficient means of categorizing
information about social groups. Just because most people have knowledge
of a set of stereotypes does not imply that they agree with them
(Devine, 1989; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995). For example,
many people can recall stereotypes about different racial groups but do
not agree that the stereotypes are valid. People who are prejudiced, on
the other hand, endorse these negative stereotypes ("That's
right; all people with mental illness are violent") and generate
negative emotional reactions as a result ("They all scare me")
(Devine, 1995; Krueger). In contrast to stereotypes, which are beliefs,
prejudicial attitudes involve an evaluative (generally negative)
component (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Prejudice, which is fundamentally a cognitive and affective
response, leads to discrimination, the behavioral reaction (Crocker,
Major, & Steele, 1998). Discriminatory behavior manifests itself as
negative action against the out-group. Out-group discrimination includes
outright violence (for example, lynching experienced by African
Americans and assaults directed at gay men) and coercion (for example,
laws that restrict the full rights of people in an ethnic or religious
minority group, such as the Jim Crow laws of the late 1800s through the
early 1960s). Out-group discrimination may also appear as avoidance, not
associating with people from the out-group. This can be especially
troublesome when employers decide not to hire and landlords decide not
to rent to people from an ethnic or religious minority group to avoid
them.
DIAGNOSIS AS STEREOTYPE
Stereotypes are one way in which a naive public identifies and
describes a stigmatized group, in this case people with mental illness.
Mental health professionals use diagnosis and nosology to describe this
group. As outlined in systems such as the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., or DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 1994) and the International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (10th ed.) (World
Health Organization, 1992), diagnosis is fundamentally a classification
enterprise. (Classification is not the only approach to diagnosis;
continuous dimensions, which are discussed more fully later in this
article, provide an alternative paradigm that is less prone to the
stigma associated with categorization.) Thus, diagnosis assumes that all
members of a group are homogeneous and that all groups are distinguished
by definable boundaries (APA, 2000). Diagnostic classification serves
several goals. It neatly corresponds with a dominant cognitive
efficiency used by humans to understand a large amount of information
(First, Frances, & Pincus, 1997; Rosch & Mueller, 1978). It
provides clinicians with an efficient means for describing their
patients that includes not only presentation of symptoms, but also
expected course and prognosis. Diagnostic categorization may also
suggest the causes of a syndrome as well as specific interventions that
may ameliorate the disorder.
Despite these benefits, mental health professionals also recognize
pitfalls to diagnosis and categorization (APA, 2000); one of these
pitfalls is their impact on stigma. (The role of diagnosis in the stigma
process is outlined in the bottom half of Figure 1.) First, the label
provided by a diagnosis may act as a cue that signals stereotypes.
Second, the criteria that define a diagnosis may augment the stereotypes
that describe mental illness. Three processes--groupness, homogeneity,
and stability--that influence the cognitive structures of stigma (that
is, cues, stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination) illustrate how
diagnosis may exacerbate stigma. They are used here to further
illustrate how diagnosis may exacerbate stigma.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Perceived Groupness
Groupness, or entitativity, is the degree to which a collection of
people is perceived as a unified or meaningful entity (Campbell, 1958;
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Groups have a sense of differentness from
the population, based on a salient and socially important
characteristic. Eye color and foot size are generally not qualities that
lead to meaningful groups, whereas skin color and bizarre behavior are.
Diagnosis adds to the salience of groupness for the collection of people
with mental illness (Link & Phelan, 2001). It distinguishes people
who are somehow different in terms of their psychiatric status from the
general population. Note that the collection of people with mental
illness still has a sense of groupness even without diagnostic systems.
Research has shown a nonspecific prejudice against people who are
mentally ill compared with people with other health conditions (Corrigan
et al., 2000; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). However, diagnostic
labels such as schizophrenia and psychosis seem to worsen the level of
prejudice (Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 2000).
Groupness and stereotypes have a bidirectional causal relationship
(Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002;Yzerbyt, Leyens, &
Schadron, 1997;Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; Yzerbyt, Schadron,
& Leyens, 1997). Stereotypes only make sense in terms of a
meaningful group of people; the public fails to regularly recall
stereotypes for amorphous classes. Hence, diagnoses that increase the
sense of groupness will strengthen the stereotypes associated with
mental illness. Conversely, stereotypes are the negative attributes that
provide description to the group (Link & Phelan, 2001). Perceptions
of groupness do not endure when not associated with attributes that
describe them.
Is It the Label or the Bizarre Behavior? Does diagnosis make the
stereotypes worse or does it merely highlight meaningful differences
from the population that in fact occur because of abnormal psychiatric
symptoms? Put another way, is aberrant behavior and not labels per se
the source of stigma from the public (Gove, 1982; Clausen & Huffine,
1979)? According to Gove (1975), the label does not elicit negative
stigmatizing reactions; rather, negative reactions result from the
bizarre behaviors displayed by people with mental illness.
In an effort to resolve differences between labeling theory and
actual symptoms, Link (1987) conducted a study in which label and
aberrant behavior were independently manipulated in a series of
viguettes. Results indicated that members of the general public were
likely to stigmatize a person labeled mentally ill even in the absence
of any aberrant behavior. Subsequent studies have replicated this
finding (Link et al., 1987; Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, &
Pescosolido, 1999). Link and colleagues (1987, 1999) posed a modified
labeling theory to make sense of the diverse literature, concluding that
psychiatric labels are associated with negative societal reactions that
exacerbate the course of the person's disorder. Although the debate
over the mechanics of labeling remains unresolved, it seems clear that
stigmatization has a negative impact on the lives of people with mental
illness (Link & Cullen, 1983; Mechanic, McAlpine, Rosenfield, &
Davis, 1994).
Homogeneity of Group Membership
Members of stereotyped out-groups are seen as more homogeneous than
in-groups (Ashton & Esses, 1999; Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, & Hill,
1997; Tajfel, 1978). This leads to an overgeneralization error; namely,
that all members of a group are expected to manifest the characteristics
attributed to that group. All people diagnosed with schizophrenia are
expected to hallucinate and all people with depression are assumed to be
suicidal. Diagnosticians have noted this concern when advising
clinicians in the text revision of the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) to use
clinical judgment and flexibility to ensure that the description of
individual cases is not solely voiced in terms of the diagnostic
criteria: "There is no assumption that all individuals described as
having the same mental disorders are alike in all important ways"
(p. xxxi).
Despite this concern, clinical writings are replete with examples
in which people with specific disorders are reduced to caricatures based
on their diagnoses. In his classic text on neurotic styles, Shapiro
(1965) described diagnoses thusly:
Hysterical people, we know, are inclined to a
Prince-Charming-will-come-and-everything-will-turn-out-all-right
view of life. (p. 118)
In the paranoid person, even more sharply
and severely than in the case of the obsessive-compulsive,
every aspect and component of
normal autonomous functioning appears in
rigid, distorted, and in general hypertrophied
form. (p. 80)
More recently, Millon (1981) described people with personality
disorders in terms of the group with which they are classified:
Narcissists feel justified in their claim for special
status, and they have little conception that their
behaviors may be objectionable, even irrational.
(p. 167)
Most borderlines exhibit a single, dominant
outlook or frame of mind, such as a self-ingratiating
depressive tone, which gives way
periodically, however, to anxious agitation or
impulsive outbursts of inappropriate temper or
anger. (p. 349)
These examples are more than 20 years old, and there is evidence
that diagnosticians are writing in a less stigmatizing tone now. The
Institute of Medicine (2001) provided a comprehensive summary on the
international state of neurological, psychiatric, and developmental
disorders. This text is remarkable in the ways in which people with
specific disorders were portrayed: not in terms of specific
characteristics that automatically represent them because of diagnosis
but instead as a range of dimensional probabilities. The Institute of
Medicine text did a marvelous job of describing diagnoses while
respecting the heterogeneity of individuals with that diagnosis.
Nevertheless, there continue to be contemporary examples of professional
texts that equate diagnosis with person. For example, a book by Fischler
and Booth (1999) attempted to explain vocational disabilities in terms
of psychiatric diagnoses.
People in the "dramatic" cluster are rarely capable
of empathy. They are often self-centered
and prone to temper tantrums. They tend to be
irresponsible, impulsive, and remarkably free of
remorse. Deceit, superficiality, and arrogance
cloud all of their relationships. (from chapter
5, p. 175)
Perhaps most troubling about these kinds of messages are the poor
prognoses and limited implications for treatment that often accompany
them. In writing further about people with diagnoses in the
"dramatic" cluster, Fischler and Booth (1999) said, "They
have great power to create confusion, disruption, and violence in the
workplace; their presence there is a stick of dynamite waiting for a
match" (p. 222). This clearly undermines any attempt to place an
individual with this diagnostic label in a work setting. Tying diagnosis
to vocational rehabilitation plan in this fashion is especially
disconcerting given that research has largely suggested that diagnosis
is not predictive of a person's success in working with
rehabilitation providers in obtaining employment (Bond et al., 2001).
Stability of Group Descriptors
Stereotypic descriptions about stigmatized groups often include a
component of stability; namely, the traits that describe a group are
believed to remain relatively static and unchanging (Anderson, 1991;
Kashima, 2000). This quality of stereotypes can be especially
problematic for health conditions because it suggests that people with
specific disorders do not recover from those disorders. This can lead to
unnecessarily pessimistic attitudes about prognosis and the treatment
efficacy.
Research has suggested that stability attributions can be
especially troublesome for people with psychiatric diagnoses. Studies
have shown that people with psychiatric disorders are viewed by the
public as less likely to overcome their disorders than those with
physical illnesses (Corrigan et al., 2000; Weiner et al., 1988). This
coincides with an especially egregious myth about people with mental
illness, especially those with serious psychiatric disorders; namely,
that people with mental illness do not recover (Harding & Zahniser,
1994). This kind of myth leads to a general pessimism that can undermine
people's sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy, which, in turn,
prevents many people with psychiatric disorders from pursuing their life
goals (Corrigan, in press).
SOLUTIONS TO THE STIGMA PROBLEM
Thus far, I have provided evidence that suggests that an unintended
consequence of diagnosis is the exacerbation of the stigma of mental
illness. In part, I hope that highlighting this link may diminish ways
in which social workers and other professionals write about, and
otherwise describe, individuals with psychiatric disorders using
stigmatizing language. In addition, there are three ways in which the
stigma that results from diagnosis may be reduced.
Understand Diagnosis as a Continuum
As suggested earlier, an alternate way to understand diagnosis is
dimensionally rather than categorically (Widiger, 2001). Rather than
assign someone to a class of people with similar symptoms, course, and
disabilities, dimensional diagnosis seeks to describe a person's
profile of symptoms on a continuum. This changes the question of
diagnosis from "yes or no, the person is mental illness
'X'" to "the person is having the following sets of
problems compared with a standard." This also changes the notion of
treatment from moving the person out of the diagnostic class to
decreasing his or her problems as indexed by the symptom and disability
continua.
Experimental psychopathologists have convincingly argued that
diagnoses may be better described in terms of dimensions, which vary
continuously on symptom and other deficit indicators, rather than as
independent classes or taxa, which are described by discrete syndromes
(Widiger & Clark, 2000). In part, support of a dimensional view is
based on the inability to support taxometric models with empirical
research (Widiger, 2001). Support of dimensional models also rests on
the descriptive and prognostic benefits sowed by multidimensional,
continuous models of disorder (Widiger, 1983). In terms of diagnosis as
an instrument of stigma, a dimensional model diminishes the groupness of
psychiatric disorders. Instead of people with mental illness being
qualitatively distinct from the "normal" population, mental
illness falls on a continuum that includes normalcy. Interestingly,
although the DSM-IV already recognizes the utility of a dimensional
approach, it has not yet adapted this view because dimensions are less
familiar to clinicians and less descriptive than categorical labels
(APA, 2000). Perhaps future iterations of the DSM will move toward a
dimensional approach that will decrease the stigmatizing effects of
diagnosis.
Have Contact with the Individual
One problem with diagnosis as classification is replacing
idiographic perceptions of the individual with normative statements
about the group. One way to overcome this problem is to stress the
individual over the group. Research on stigma change shows that contact
between the public and people with mental illness leads to significant
change in stereotypes about mental illness (Corrigan, 2001; Corrigan et
al., 2002). Contact counters the stigma by highlighting people as
individuals with complex lives that exceed the narrow descriptions of
diagnosis.
There are nevertheless significant limitations to contact. Mental
health providers, for example, have frequent contact with people labeled
mentally ill but unfortunately tend to endorse the stigma (Chaplin,
2000; Lyons & Ziviani, 1995; Mirabi, Weinman, Magnetti, &
Keppler, 1985). In part, this may reflect their focus on diagnosis and
psychopathology, largely seeing people in terms of diagnostic groups
rather than as individuals. This may also be a consequence of the type
of contact that professionals have with people with mental illness;
namely, professionals tend to interact with people when they are most in
need of services, when they are acutely ill. Professionals are much less
likely to interact with their clientele when they have recovered and
when they are living a life that challenges the stigma. Stigma might be
better challenged if professionals round out their picture of
individuals with mental illness by purposefully interacting with those
who have recovered (Corrigan & Lundin, 2001). Student training, for
example, may include encounters with people in recovery so trainees can
learn early that psychopathology is only one side of the illness coin;
recovery is the other.
Replace Assumptions of Poor Prognosis with Models of Recovery
The stability of stereotypes has led to the notion that many people
with mental illness fail to respond to treatment and recover. This
phenomenon is reflected in classic writings about the prognoses of
people with serious mental illness. Kraepelin (1913), for example, said
that people with schizophrenia and other serious mental illnesses will
inevitably experience a progressive downhill course, ending up demented
and incompetent. The impact this has had on treatment is insidious; why
try valiant interventions if the person is going to eventually end up on
a back ward of a psychiatric hospital? Longitudinal research, however,
has failed to support Kraepelin's assertion. For example,
researchers in Vermont and Switzerland followed several hundred adults
with severe mental illness for 30 years or more to find out how mental
illness affected the long-term course of the disorder (Harding, 1988).
If Kraepelin was right, the majority of these people should have ended
up on the back wards of state hospitals. Instead, researchers discovered
that between half to almost two-thirds of the sample no longer required
hospitalization, were able to work in some capacity, and lived
comfortably with family or friends; they recovered. Although
Kraepelin's work is almost 100 years old, it is still reflected in
modern psychopathology tests and even in the third revised edition of
the DSM (APA, 1987). Professionals need to broaden their perspectives to
include notions of recovery.
CONCLUSIONS
Sociologists have developed models of stigma that are helpful for
understanding the impact of diagnosis. They defined structural stigma as
institutional efforts that unintentionally lead to discrimination of a
group (Hill, 1988;Wilson, 1990). For example, many universities and
colleges use the SAT or ACT to limit admission to students who have
earned high scores, believing this to be an unbiased way to select
students. However, given that African American and Hispanic students
typically score lower than white students on these tests, universities
that rely on the SAT and ACT are likely to prevent a disproportionate
number of black and Hispanic students from receiving an education with
them (Pincus, 1999). In this case, structural stigma unintentionally
leads to race discrimination. Diagnosis is an example of structural
stigma as applied to mental illness. Although diagnostic systems are
developed by social work and other mental health professionals to better
understand mental illness, they unintentionally exacerbate the stigma of
mental illness. Diagnostic classifications augment public perceptions of
the groupness and differentness of people with mental illness. These
classifications are perceived as homogeneous, and composite traits are
seen as stable. As a result, individual members of a diagnostic class
tend to be seen in terms of their diagnosis instead of the idiosyncratic nature of their problems. One way to change this kind of stigma is to
challenge the very foundation on which it rests. Changing to a
dimensional perspective of diagnosis undermines the sense of difference
perpetuated by diagnosis and replaces psychiatric classification with a
continuum that includes normal life. Stressing the evidence that
supports recovery will diminish the stigma related to diagnosis.
Facilitating interactions between professionals and people in recovery
will also challenge the stigma.
The diagnostic enterprise has much value for clinical care. I do
not mean to suggest that it be discarded. Instead, my effort here is to
alert the reader to the insidious effects of diagnosis on stigma.
Following the recommendations in this article may ensure that diagnosis
does not add to the prejudice and discrimination experienced by many
people with mental illness.
Original manuscript received June 8, 2004
Final revision received July 10, 2005
Accepted October 25, 2005
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Patrick W. Corrigan, PsyD, is professor of psychology, Institute of
Psychology, Illinois Institute of Technology, 3424 South State Street,
Chicago, IL 60616; e-mail: corrigan@iit.edu.