Ethics-R-Us.

Witkin, Stanley L.

It is hard to think about social work without also thinking about ethics. Our history, professional identity, and mission are grounded in moral principles. The people we serve, the issues we care about, and our own actions, are subject to and constituted by judgments about right and wrong. Even the stereotypical notion of social workers as "do-gooders" suggests the centrality of ethics to the public's perception of our profession.

This issue of Social Work addresses ethical issues relevant to our profession: how we prepare students for the complex task of ethical decision-making, attitudes about sexual contact with clients, legal concerns regarding sexual harassment and confidentiality, the nature of ethics violations, approaches to new and complex ethical issues, and the implications of alternative ethical systems. Several other manuscripts on ethics remain in the publication queue. I do not know whether this abundance reflects increased concern with ethics, the perception that Social Work is seeking such articles, or some other reason; however, I do believe that ethics is a topic of currency and interest to all social workers.

What follows are some loosely connected musings about ethical issues that were stimulated by my reading of these articles. I do not pretend to have the answers to the complex, difficult issues raised. Rather, I offer these thoughts in a spirit of invitation to join and perhaps broaden our discourse on this topic.

Ethics Violations

The literature on social work ethics is concerned more with ethics violations than with ethical conduct. This focus is understandable; the consequences of unethical conduct for clients and the profession can be substantial. Emphasizing ethics violations and the negative sanctions they evoke helps the profession regulate the conduct of its members. However, there may be costs attached to this emphasis: over-conformity, the discouragement of alternative perspectives, and lack of attention to more positive strategies.

The complexities and ambiguities of ethical situations contrast with the prescriptions of ethical codes. Rather than risk the consequences of engaging in conduct that could be interpreted as unethical, some social workers may adopt a cautious, formal relational style with certain clients. Although this may protect them from unwarranted ethical accusations, it also may diminish the quality of those relationships. This same cautiousness may discourage social workers from considering alternative ethical perspectives. The formal authority ascribed to written codes of ethics overwhelms (and overlooks) different ethical systems such as those emphasizing collective rather than individual responsibilities. It would be risky to justify one's actions using ethical reasoning not articulated in the code, because such reasoning has no authority and may itself be considered unethical. These possibilities generate their own ethical conundrum: How do we regulate our own ethical conduct while not overly restricting our ability to develop positive relationships and enabling us to remain receptive to a diversity of ethical positions? One modest counterbalance to our codes and sanctions might be to approach ethics from a strengths perspective and focus more on practices and situations that encourage ethical relationships. Perhaps in addition to the list of ethics violators that appear in each issue of the NASW News, we could have a list of people who displayed laudatory ethical conduct.

A second strategy might be to generate narratives of actual ethical situations that practitioners encounter. These reports could describe the complexities of ethical situations more richly and realistically, encouraging tolerance and openness. I invite letters from readers on this topic.

Professional and Client Ethics

The articles in this issue focus on professional ethics--the appropriate or inappropriate conduct of social workers or issues related to such conduct. Like other professions, social workers have a code of ethics that identifies the values and ethical standards against which our conduct is judged. The Code of Ethics serves several functions: providing guidance to social workers, protecting and reassuring the public, legitimizing our claim to professional status, and fostering the allegiance of members to the profession (a more extensive discussion of the purposes of the Code can be found in Reamer, 1998). Thus, from the perspective of the profession, the focus on professional ethics is critical.

In contrast to our concern with professional ethics, little has been written about the ethical conduct of clients. This seems strange because clients' ethical conduct is discussed informally among social workers and addressed frequently in the popular media. In addition, clients certainly see their own challenges as moral issues (Goldstein, 1987). I suspect this discrepancy between written and verbal discourse is related to the current, scientifically-informed view of professional conduct that avoids moral judgments or judgments about morals and discourages us from addressing clients' moral issues. Also, whereas professional ethics are inscribed in a written code, no comparable document exists for clients. Instead, they are judged by an implicit code that combines culturally-based moral injunctions (for example, "be honest") and a blame-the-victim ideology about marginalized people.

Because the "code" is implicit, clients do not necessarily know all the rules or standards or which ones apply in particular situations. And unlike ethical prescriptions (such as the NASW Code of Ethics, 1997) that are based on judgments about the consequences and intrinsic nature of particular acts within a professional context, "client ethics" tend to reflect virtues--character traits considered good in themselves--about them as individuals. Thus, a client who withholds certain information about her family may be viewed as dishonest (that is, lacking in the virtue of honesty). However, the client may view her conduct as entirely justified given her circumstances, her perception of the worker, the policies of the agency, and the potential consequences of giving complete information. From her perspective, her conduct expresses neither an ethical violation nor a lack of virtue, but a reasonable, perhaps even inevitable, response to a particular situation.

Of course, we do not talk about virtues; it would not be professional. Instead, we substitute psychological terms for moral ones: dishonesty, indolence, and the like become "boundary issues" or "depressive affect," and their meaning shifts from virtues to symptoms.

Although such explanations seem more enlightened, clients may have less opportunity to renegotiate the meanings of their actions. Psychological discourse is self-validating. Although most people are familiar with moral language and understand its tenets, psychological language and knowledge are esoteric and "owned" by professionals. Thus, diagnoses may not be shared on the grounds that clients would not understand them or could not "handle" them. In addition, anything clients say may be interpreted within the context of their diagnosis. In the example given, even the client's explanation of her conduct may be interpreted as further evidence for her "condition." Finally, psychological diagnoses place clients in a treatment system that may be difficult to exit. Don't get me wrong, I am not defending moral branding, only suggesting that the superiority of psychology over morality may not be so clear. (Personally, I am glad that as a child my parents called me lazy rather than depressed.)

Ethics as Discourse

Rather than viewing ethics as a system of rules, we can think of it as a form of discourse. To engage in "ethics talk" is to direct attention toward the moral dimension of our actions ("the good"). In contrast, when we engage in research or scientific talk we highlight the ontological dimension of our existence ("the real"). Although as discourse the real and the good are interdependent, historically and culturally situated ways of construing the world, we think of reality as existing prior to and independently of moral precepts. This latter way of thinking structures the real-good relationship and influences ethical judgements.

Ethical positions are justified by reasons, and good reasons generally are those considered to be supported by evidence (what is real). But this very practice presumes (and thereby preserves the idea) that the distinction between the real and the good is itself real, enabling those who can establish reality claims to define the parameters of ethical argument. For example, once attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a biological condition is considered real (in the sense described earlier), it forms the arena within which certain conduct is considered ethical. Thus, we might inquire about the ethics of giving or withholding particular treatments, while ignoring questions about the ethics of school environments that produce this label.

Descriptions of the world (the real) are suffused with values. For example, when we describe child abuse, we are prescribing good and bad ways to treat children. Indeed, the very notion of child abuse is a value-laden concept the definition of which is historically and culturally based. There simply is no way to separate the "fact" of abuse from our values about children and parenting. Does this make child abuse less "real" in the sense that we should not be concerned? Absolutely not. What it does suggest is that what is and what ought to be refer to language usage (rather than different realities) and are not separable. If the real is not independent of the good, then it becomes important for us to examine how each contributes to the other, to assess the benefits and costs of our current articulations, and to consider alternatives.

The preceding discussion suggests the dangers of restricting moral discourse to formal or approved approaches. Like all dominant discourses, mainstream ethical beliefs tend to function in ways that preserve the social order. Codes and rules, although necessary and well-intentioned, have a transcontextual quality that favor people in socially advantageous positions. For people who see themselves as victims of that order, ethical prescriptions may seem more like instruments of control than moral guides. When the playing field does not appear level, and when the rules of the game favor one side over the other, the meaning of moral imperatives, no matter how righteous sounding, can be threatening.

To assume the superiority of our ethical beliefs is to silence others and diminish our social resources. Given the complexities of social life, we need the insights and wisdom of, for example, Buddhist or Africentric ethical systems. As Whitbeck (1998) reminded us, "The moral vocabulary of any speaker or group is historical, rather than timeless, and subject to revision and augmentation. Particular words go out of use. The point of not restricting the moral vocabulary is to be alert to the nuances of moral situations, rather than to enshrine the particular terms at one's disposal" (www.onlineethics.org/text/bib/part1).

Without alternative perspectives the limits of our own belief systems become more difficult to assess. Sure, we engage in ethical discussions, but only within the boundaries of the taken-for-granted. I am concerned, for example, that our ethics discourses are more reactive than proactive, more about acts of commission than omission, more about individual conduct than collective responsibility, more about right or wrong than issues of power (see, for example, Brown, 1994, chapter 8), more about sexual improprieties than draconian economic policies, more about poor people than rich people, and more about individuals who suffer from physical and emotional pain than those who restrict and profit from their care.

Finally, as social work becomes increasingly global in scope, our ability to hear, respect, and learn from others whose ethical systems differ from our own is critical to international cooperation. To engage in collaborative discourse, according to Gergen (1994), "enables 'the problem' to be refracted through multiple lenses, thus enriching the range of understanding and broadening sensitivity to its manifold consequences" (p. 109). We are fortunate to be part of a profession that values both collaboration and diversity. Integrating these values into our ethical discourses will benefit us all.

NOTE: I first heard the expression "ethics-r-us" in an ethics workshop that I taught for the Vermont Department of Social Welfare.

References

Brown, L. S. (1994). Subversive dialogues: Theory in feminist therapy. New York: Basic Books.

Gergen, K. (1994). Realities and relationships. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Goldstein, H. H. (1987). The neglected moral link in social work practice. Social Work, 32, 181-186.

Reamer, F. (1998). Ethical standards in social work: A critical review of the NASW code of ethics. Washington, DC: NASW Press.

Whitbeck, C. (1998). The philosophical theory underlying Ethics in engineering practice and research (Appendix). In Ethics in engineering practice and research (Online). Available: www.onlineethics.org/text/bib/part1.html.