Occupational licensing and interstate migration.
Mulholland, Sean E. ; Young, Andrew T.
In an overview of his book with Lowell Gallaway, Out of Work:
Unemployment and Government in Twentieth-Century America, Richard Vedder
(1993: 1) states: "Not only has the government contributed to the
instability and volatility of unemployment in several important episodes
in American history, but the overall long-term level of unemployment has
been raised by government policies"; furthermore, "the victims
of these well-intentioned government policies have been largely the
poor, the unskilled, and minorities, not the more affluent educated
middle classes." A substantial part of Vedder's writing and
research--much of it with Lowell Gallaway--has directly or indirectly
stressed this fundamental reality of government policies (e.g., Vedder,
Gallaway, and Sollars 1988; Vedder and Gallaway 1992a, 1992b).
Much of Out of Work concerns itself with federal government policy.
However, state and local governments also pursue policies that erect
barriers between individuals and employment opportunities, and those
opportunities are often ones that require relatively low levels of skill
and experience. At the level of state governments in particular,
occupational licensing laws represent a substantial complex of such
barriers, and occupational licensing has become increasing prevalent
across the U.S. economy. In the 1950s, about 1 out of 20 American
workers required a license for their occupation. By 2006, this ratio had
climbed to nearly 1 out of 3 (Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 2013). Today
more than 800 occupations are licensed in at least one state. (1)
There are some plausible justifications for occupational licensing
laws. For example, if it is difficult for consumers to distinguish
between higher-quality versus lower-quality labor services in a given
occupation, then licensing can provide incentives for individuals to
make investments in occupation-specific human capital (Ackerlof 1970,
Shapiro 1986). Occupational licensing can then essentially solve a
lemons problem. Consider electricians. If consumers cannot distinguish
higher-quality from lower-quality electrical work, or if it takes a
substantial period of time before consumers are able to make the
distinction (e.g., when one's house bums down years later), then
competition may crowd higher-quality electricians out of the market,
leaving only the lower-quality ones (i.e., the lemons). (2) Occupational
licensing may decrease consumer uncertainty regarding the quality of the
licensed labor service while also increasing consumers' demand for
that service (Arrow 1971). (3)
However, many of the occupations for which state governments
require licenses do not seem to fit the bill for being associated with
serious lemons problems. The information asymmetries that consumers face
in procuring these labor services seem relatively slight. For example,
according to the License to Work study published by the Institute for
Justice (Carpenter et al. 2012), occupations that require licenses in at
least half of the states include auctioneer, makeup artist, athletic
trainer, cosmetologist, barber, taxidermist, and massage therapist. For
those occupations, one needs a creative imagination to spin a tale where
lemons crowd out all of the higher-skilled competitors. Looked at from a
different perspective--but again one that calls the lemons problems
justification into serious question--Carpenter et al. (2012: 29) note
that "EMTs [Emergency Medical Technicians] hold lives in their
hands, yet 66 other occupations have greater average licensure burdens
than EMTs." Even a casual look across licensed occupations in the
United States suggests that licensure burdens do not have a clear,
positive relationship to information asymmetries and the need for
quality control.
A more persuasive explanation for the pervasiveness of occupational
licensing is regulatory capture (Stigler 1971). Existing members of a
given occupation represent a special interest. That special interest
stands to gain from erecting barriers to entry. Existing members of the
occupation stand to gain by insulating themselves from competition.
Occupational licensing imposes burdens on potential entrants to a
specific occupation, including fees, mandatory training periods,
apprenticeships, and examinations. These burdens act as barriers to
entry that secure rents for the existing members of the occupation. In
the case of regulatory capture, then, the demand for occupational
licensing is rooted in the existing members of the occupation being
licensed. Consistent with the idea of regulatory capture, the majority
of membership on licensing boards is almost always drawn from members of
the occupation being licensed (Kleiner 2000: 191).
Licensing of Low- and Moderate-Income Occupations
Licensing is often required for various types of high-skill,
high-education, typically high-income professions. For example, over 44
percent of U.S. workers with college education beyond a bachelor's
degree are licensed by government (Kleiner and Krueger 2013: S183).
These licensed professionals include medical doctors, engineers, and
lawyers. In contrast, only about 14 percent of workers with less than a
high school degree and 20 percent of those with only a high school
degree are licensed. However, in this article we are more interested in
the burden imposed by occupational licensing on the latter type of
workers. Low-skilled workers with relatively little experience are often
just trying to get footholds in the job market--perhaps to obtain their
first jobs that will, in addition to providing wages, allow them to
accumulate the additional skills and experience that will later on
translate into upward income mobility. For these workers, the burdens of
occupational licensing can be particularly onerous.
Notwithstanding their lack of formal education and work experience,
lower-skilled and inexperienced individuals may still be creative and
innovative, alert to new ways of providing for consumers and may profit
from doing so. For these individuals, the burdens associated with
licensing can effectively dampen or entirely snuff out the
entrepreneurial spirit. These individuals cannot simply "hang out a
shingle" and offer their labor services in ways that address
consumer preferences. For example, as of 2012, there were 36 states that
required licensing to be a makeup artist. This is an occupation that
requires little formal training or capital to start. Indeed, much of the
value that a makeup artist brings to the table is likely rooted in
inherent creativity and talent--an eye for the elegant, exotic, or
otherwise beautiful. Yet in states where a license is required,
potential entrants to that occupation must pay an average of $116 in
fees and complete 138 days of education and/or on-the-job experience. In
the case of the latter, the experience is often acquired as an
apprentice, which is essentially low- or no-wage labor provided to
existing members of the occupation. Relative to the opportunities
available to a high school dropout, these costs may be quite large.
Occupational Licensing and Migration
In a recent article in the Cato Journal, Vedder (2010: 171) noted:
"One important economic dimension of individual liberty is the
right to sell one's labor services without attenuation--that is,
without limits on the terms of die agreement (e.g., wage rates and hours
of work), or who will represent the worker in reaching those
terms." We concur with this claim and argue that the "terms of
the agreement" include not only wages and hours--and certainly
Vedder did not mean to limit it as such--but also the liberty to decide
where to offer one's labor services. An essential ingredient of the
freedom of contract with one's labor services is the freedom to
seek out those markets in which there are individuals with whom one
wishes to contract.
The barriers to entry that are erected in the form of occupational
licensing laws deprive individuals--especially low-skilled and
inexperienced individuals--of opportunities within their states of
residence, but also of opportunities to better themselves by moving to
greener economic pastures. Occupational licensing laws hinder the
allocation of labor across states, depriving the economy of gains from
trade in labor services that are based on comparative advantages and the
variation in market opportunities across the country. Much of
Vedder's early research with Callaway can be interpreted as
highlighting how migrants, both across regions and countries, exploit
these gains toward both their own betterment and the betterment of those
individuals to whom they eventually offer their labor services (see,
e.g., Gallaway and Vedder 1971a, 1971b, 1980; Gallaway, Ryden, and
Vedder 1973).
Pashigan (1979) reports that occupational licensing is an
economically important barrier to interstate mobility of workers in
high-skilled occupations. However, there are few empirical studies of
the analogous implications for lower-skilled labor. One such study by
Federman, Harrington, and Krynski (2006) finds that occupational
licensing laws for manicurists are an important barrier to Vietnamese
immigration into those states requiring licenses. They also argue that
licensing hinders the assimilation of Vietnamese immigrants by
preventing them from entering an occupation in which the costs of not
learning English are relatively low. We make a contribution in this
article by reporting the effects of interstate differences in
occupational licensing burdens on the probability of migrating across
state lines. Using a modified gravity equation, we focus on how
occupational licensing burdens affect the intra-U.S. movements of
individuals already in the labor force and, in particular, those
individuals without a college-level education.
While we focus on occupational licensing specifically, our article
contributes to a broader literature that examines the role of public
policies in determining migration flows. For example, early studies by
Cebula, Kohn, and Vedder (1973) and Kohn, Vedder, and Cebula (1973)
examine whether cross-state variation in Aid to Families with Dependent
Children created "welfare magnets" for economically
disadvantaged populations. (4) A later paper by Ashby (2007) reports a
positive relationship between differences in a broad measure of economic
freedom between destination and origin states and the associated
migration flows. Alternatively, other authors estimate the effect of
various policies on the migration decisions of specific demographic
types. For example, Shan (2010) and Farnham and Sevak (2006) report that
the elderly migrate to avoid property taxes that fund public schools;
they also migrate to states that have lower estate taxes (Bakija and
Slemrod 2004).
Migration in response to differences in occupational licensing
requirements between two states may affect migration patterns in a
neighboring state as well. For instance, with only 33 low-income
occupations requiring licenses, Georgia may attract a number of
in-migrants from states with a larger number of licenses, such as
Virginia with 46. Many of these in-migrants will choose to live in
Georgia, but some may choose to work in Georgia but live in the
neighboring states of South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, or
Alabama. Given that state net migration may depend on neighboring state
policies, this spatial dependency violates the conventional Gauss-Markov
regression assumption of independence between disturbance terms.
Therefore, ordinary least squares regression models produce biased
estimates, since they do not allow for spatial spillovers.
Since interstate migration rates exhibit spatial dependence, we
follow Mulholland and Hernandez-Julian (2013) and report the results of
estimating Bayesian spatial Durbin models (SDMs) of (log) odds migration
ratios on (log) occupational licensing burden ratios. This methodology
enables us to estimate: (1) the direct in-migration effect of the
differential licensing burden between two states; and (2) the indirect
in-migration effect of neighboring states' licensing burdens and
their net migration. For this purpose, we define a given state's
"neighbors" as those states sharing a border with it. In
examining bilateral interstate migration flows, we also control for
differentials in populations (levels and densities; also the percentages
that are retired), incomes, unemployment rates, average precipitation
rates, and temperatures; also the distance and distance squared between
a given pair of states. (5)
Does Licensing of Low- to Moderate-Income Occupations Decrease
Interstate Migration Flows?
Our migration data come from the American Community Survey (ACS)
for the 2008-12 window. Our occupational licensing data come from the
2012 Institute for Justice License to Work Study. This study is based on
observations made within the latter part of the ACS window. Since
occupational licensing laws and requirements exhibit substantial
persistence over time, relating the 2008-12 migration flows to the
License to Work data is reasonable. We focus on occupational licensing
for 102 occupations that are recognized by the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) as being associated with wage rates lower than the
national average. We are, therefore, focusing on licensing of low- to
moderate-income professions. For each state, we have data on the number
of occupations licensed, the average fees associated with obtaining a
license, and the average days of education and/or experience necessary
to obtain a license.
The SDM model is of the form:
(1) [y.sub.ij] = [alpha] + [rho] W[y.sub.ij] + [X.sub.ij] [beta] +
W[X.sub.ij] [theta] + [epsilon],
where our dependent variable, [y.sub.ij], represents an n x 1
vector of a (log) odds ratios of migrants from state i to state j:
(2) [y.sub.ij] = log([Migration.sub.ij]/1 - [Migration.sub.ij]).
This can be interpreted as the probability of migrating from state
i to state j, and we relate this to the (log) ratio of licensing burdens
in j (die destination) to i (the origin). The SDM model collapses into
the standard linear regression model if [rho] = [theta] = [lambda] = 0.
However, when this is not the case, the model allows for two types of
spatial dependence where "neighbor" relations are defined by
shared borders and a first-order contiguity weight matrix, W. (6) First,
migration flows from i to j can be related spatially to flows from i to
neighbors of j. Second, migration flows from i to j can be related not
only to the difference between i's licensing burden and j's,
but also that of j's neighbors. Intuitively, a resident of i who is
contemplating migration to j will take into account the relative burden
of that move, the relative burdens of nearby alternatives, and the
in-migration rates experienced by these alternative destinations.
Table 1 reports the results of this analysis. Following LeSage and
Pace (2009) we calculate the direct, indirect (i.e., the cumulative
effects of neighbors' policies and, in turn, their neighbors), and
total effects of differences in occupational licensing burdens. We
report results for two samples. The first three columns (direct,
indirect, and total effects) use total migration flows; tire next three
columns are based only on migrants without college education. In both
SDM estimations, the estimate of [rho] is around 0.200 and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. The estimate suggests that there is
indeed spatial dependence in the data and the SDM model (rather than a
basic linear regression model) is appropriate.
For the full sample, the direct and indirect effects point
estimates for the differential in the number of occupational licenses
required in the origin versus the destination ("Licenses") are
both negative. They are not statistically significant at the
conventional 10 percent level, but we note that the marginal
significance levels are just shy of that cutoff, particularly for the
direct effect (p-value = 0.114). In terms of the point estimates, the
direct effect is dominant (-0.708 versus -0.179). The total effect (the
sum of the direct and indirect effects) is negative and, again, just shy
of the 10 percent significance level (p-value = 0.115). All of the
effects associated with differentials in required fees
("Fees") and days of educations and/or experience required
("Days of Exp. & Edu.") are negative but never
statistically significant.
When we turn to migration flows based only on individuals without a
college education, the results are qualitatively similar to those based
on the full sample, but now the direct and total effects associated with
"Licenses" are statistically significant at the conventional
10 percent level. Furthermore, the indirect effect estimate just misses
the cutoff: p-value = 0.103. Based on the point estimates, the direct
effect is again dominant (-0.653 versus -0.205). Since the dependent
variable is a (log) odds ratio, we interpret this direct effect as
indicating that if a destination state has 10 percent more occupational
licenses than a potential origin state, the individuals without a
college education residing in that origin will be 6.5 percent less
likely to migrate to that destination. This is a large effect. The mean
number of low- to moderate-income occupations for which licensing is
required across states is about 43. The standard deviation across the
different states is about 10.6. In other words, a standard deviation is
about 24 percent of the mean.
As a more informal perspective on the size of the estimated direct
effect, one of the two authors of this article works in West Virginia,
where 49 low- to moderate-income occupations are licensed; the other
author works in Massachusetts, where only 37 occupations require
licensing. The difference between the two states is 12 occupations, or
what would represent about a 24 percent decrease in West Virginia's
licensing if it were to match that of Massachusetts. Roughly, our
estimate suggests that if West Virginia were to decrease the number of
low- to moderate-income occupations that are licensed by 12, then, all
else equal, the probability of noncollege-educated people migrating from
Massachusetts to West Virginia would increase by more than 15 percent.
This would, of course, be of direct benefit to the noncollege-educated
migrants. It would also indirectly benefit West Virginia residents with
college educations, as well as potential migrants to the state who have
college educations. In addition to production complementarities between
relatively low- and high-skilled labor types, lower occupational
licensing burdens would attract migrants who would offer broadly desired
amenities. In West Virginia specifically, a decrease in occupational
licensing might be associated with greater variety and affordability in
preschools, child care, private security, and a wide variety of
contractor services.
As in the case of the full sample, when we examine only
noncollege-educated migrants, we find that only differentials in the
number of occupations that require licensing matters; not the average
fees or days of educations and/or experience required. We find this
troubling. If occupational licensing laws were enforced by boards in a
predictable, rule-based fashion--as would be consistent with the lemons
problems justification for their existence--then we would expect that
these latter variables capture the real burdens of licensing more
accurately. But they apparently do not. This seems consistent with
regulatory capture. In particular, it may suggest that licensing boards
act discretionarily in ways that restrict entry (and protect the rents
of existing members of an occupation) and are independent of the
ostensible rules of the game.
In conclusion, we find that noncollege-educated residents appear to
migrate toward states with fewer occupational licenses. States with a 10
percent lower relative number of occupational licensees experience a 6.5
percent higher in-migration rate for individuals without a college
education. Although the effects are just short of statistical
significance for total migration flows, noncollege-educated migration
flows are where we would expect to see significant effects for licensing
of low- to moderate-income occupations. We also note that the 2008-12
time frame of our study and the recent increases in the number of
occupational licenses may contribute to a lack of precision of our
estimates. First, migration rates tend to be pro-cyclical (Greenwood
1997, Milne 1993, Pissarides and Wadsworth 1989). Therefore, the
economic downturn in 2007 likely depressed overall migration rates for a
number of years. Second, the long-run trend in internal state migration
in the United States has been declining since the 1980s. In the 1980s,
between 2.5 to 3 percent of individuals migrated from one state to
another on an annual basis; by 2010, only 1.7 percent of individuals
experienced interstate migration. This decline in migration rates is
present for all age groups, all education groups, all race/ethnicity
groups, all nativity groups, all income groups, households with and
without children, employment status, and home ownership status (Molloy,
Smith, and Wozniak 2011).
Third, over this time period, the number of occupation licenses for
all types of occupations has increased. Given the increase in the
occupational barriers, our results may also suggest that occupational
licenses and other barriers to employment may be at least partially
responsible for the decline in mobility experienced by those living and
attempting to work in the United States. Occupational licenses also
provide a hurdle to exit. Given the investment required and the higher
return provided for those with licenses, current holders are less likely
to migrate at all. The increase in the number of occupations with
licenses therefore lowers the probability that a license holder
considers and finds it beneficial to migrate to another state. Further
research on the effects of increases in licenses on migration rates over
time may prove valuable.
Conclusion
We quoted Richard Vedder (2010: 171) as having stated: "One
important economic dimension of individual liberty is the right to sell
one's labor services without attenuation--that is, without limits
on the terms of the agreement (e.g., wage rates and hours of work), or
who will represent the worker in reaching those terms." We cannot
help but believe that Vedder understates the importance he attaches to
labor market freedom. As evidence, we can point to his statement that
preceded the above passage:
The most essential ingredient embodied in the liberty championed by
the classical liberal writers of the Enlightenment and beyond is
individual choice and right of expression--the right of persons to say
what they think, decide for themselves what groups they want to join,
what religion they want to profess, what person they want to marry, what
goods they want to buy or sell, and what persons they want to represent
them where necessity requires collective decision-making [Vedder 2010:
171].
With this lead in, what is subtly labeled "one important
dimension of individual liberty" becomes an essential component of
individual liberty.
An important infringement on individuals' labor market
freedoms is occupational licensing, where certain types of employment
are illegal without licensure by the government. Today, there are more
than 800 occupations that require licensing in at least one state. Many
of these are low- to moderate-income occupations; types of employment
for which, in principle, individuals with little formal education and
experience could "hang out a shingle" and try to offer their
services in mutually beneficial exchanges with customers. While
proponents of such licensing will often point to externalities and
lemons problems, the widespread licensing requirements on auctioneers,
makeup artists, hair stylists, and massage therapists belies these
justifications. That most licensing of low- to moderate-income
occupations is symptomatic of regulatory capture seems more plausible,
and unfortunately so. The labor market freedoms that Vedder has
consistently emphasized are being denied to precisely those individuals
who need them most: younger, less-educated, and inexperienced
individuals who are looking to gain a foothold in the job market;
individuals who may often have initially the least to offer, but are
also the most eager to find something to offer to consumers so that they
can start earning income, gaining skills, and becoming experienced,
productive members of the workforce.
In this article, we have offered some evidence of how important
these restrictions on labor freedoms can be. In particular, we have
explored how differences in the licensing burdens for low- and
moderate-income occupations across states affects the probability of
interstate migration flows. This reflects two types of costs: (1) the
costs to individuals who are unable to enter another state's labor
market to improve their own employment situation; and (2) the broader
costs to the economy from preventing the reallocation of laborers toward
their comparative advantages. We find that states with a 10 percent
lower relative number of occupational licensees experience a 6.5 percent
higher in-migration rate for individuals without a college education. To
put this in some perspective, our estimate suggests that if West
Virginia (a state with relatively burdensome licensing) were to decrease
the number of low- to moderate-income occupations to the level of
Massachusetts (a state with relatively light licensing) then, all else
equal, the probability of noncollege-educated people migrating from
Massachusetts to West Virginia would increase by more than 15 percent.
(Notably, the median income of West Virginia is only about 60 percent of
that of Massachusetts.)
These results suggest that the potential gains from removing the
barriers to labor market entry and mobility are large. Furthermore,
these gains include not only the direct benefits to noncollege-educated
migrants but also indirect benefits to college-educated residents and
potential migrants with college educations. If a state like West
Virginia decreases its occupational licensing burden to along the lines
of Massachusetts, the resulting influx of labor would be complementary
to the state's college-educated labor, and it would represent a
ready pool of employees for entrepreneurs to utilize in the starting-up
and growing of new businesses. Furthermore, residents of West Virginia
would enjoy greater variety and affordability in broadly desired
amenities such as preschools, child care, private security, and a wide
variety of contractor services.
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(1) This number comes from a Council of State Governments (1994)
report. It is certainly a lower bound on the number of occupations
licensed today.
(2) Certification is a way to solve this problem without licensing.
(3) Kleiner (2000) provides an overview of the economic
justifications that have been put forth for occupational licensing.
(4) Greenwood (1997) provides an overview of the earlier
literature.
(5) We also include two additional binary variables: (1)
[Stay.sub.ij], which equals 1 for observations where the origin and
destination are the same state; (2) [Move.sub.ij], which equals 1 when
the origin is different from the destination. These are included to
separate out the effects of internal state migration. In addition to
variables indicating economic costs and benefits, the inclusion of
temperature and precipitation rates acknowledges the importance of
noneconomic "quality of life" factors in migration decisions
(Cebula and Vedder 1973).
(6) The matrix has nonzero values in columns j for states that have
borders touching each state in row i. The nonzero values take the value
1/k, where k is the total number of bordering states for state i. See
Mulholland and Hernandez-Julian (2013: 68) for more detail on this
weighting scheme.
Sean E. Mulholland is Professor of Economics at Stonehill College.
Andrew T. Young is Associate Professor of Economics at West Virginia
University. They thank Joshua Hall and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments.
TABLE 1
BAYESIAN SPATIAL AUTOREGRESSION OF (LOG)
ODDS MIGRATION RATIO ON (LOG) OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING BURDEN RATIOS
Full Sample
Variable Direct Indirect Total
Licenses -0.708 -0.179 -0.877
(0.114) (0.132) (0.115)
Fees -0.170 -0.043 -0.208
(0.197) (0.212) (0.197)
Days of Exp. -0.270 -0.067 -0.329
& Edu. (0.945) (0.947) (0.945)
[rho] 0.192 ***
(0.000)
Observations 2,304
[R.sup.2] 0.262
No College
Variable Direct Indirect Total
Licenses -0.653 * -0.205 -0.854 *
(0.094) (0.103) (0.094)
Fees -0.273 -0.081 -0.353
(0.696) (0.699) (0.696)
Days of Exp. -0.336 -0.106 -0.437
& Edu. (0.410) (0.412) (0.411)
[rho] 0.242 ***
(0.000)
Observations 2,304
[R.sup.2] 0.256
NOTES: * and *** denote, respectively, statistical significance
at the 10 percent and 1 percent levels; p-statistics are in
parentheses.