Trust and the growth of government.
Garen, John ; Clark, J.R.
An important part of post-World War II economic history is the
growth of government. In the United States, much of this growth has
taken the form of an increased scope of federal involvement in the
economy via income redistribution programs and in regulatory activity.
However, it has been accompanied by a large decline in trust of
government. Pew Research Center (2010) reports that respondents who
indicate that they trust government "most of the time" or
"just about always" fell from 76.6 percent in 1966 to 21.5
percent in 2010. (1) A good deal of anecdotal evidence is consistent
with the simultaneous growth in and mistrust of government (e.g., see
Lewis 2010, who discusses the decline of trust and civic life in Greece
as government has grown).
The decline in the public's trust of government, given its
increased importance in society, has caused great unease among many
commentators. A concern often raised is that trust is an important
aspect of social capital and its decline may detract from the
performance of government, as well as in the ease and efficacy of
economic and social interactions. Moreover, the simultaneous growth in
government and deterioration in trust in government presents something
of a paradox: How does a mistrusted institution grow and become so
large? This article develops a framework to understand this paradox as
well as related issues.
To do so, we utilize key findings in the economics, psychology, and
experimental literatures that illuminate the interrelationships among
trust in government, productivity, rent seeking, and government growth.
A good deal has been written about each of these phenomena
separately--and the fundamentals that underlie them--and this has
produced a number of important findings. We bring many of these findings
together in a unifying framework regarding trust, reciprocity, and
cooperation; social capital and productivity; and rent seeking and
political economy/public choice to understand equilibria and
interactions among them.
A basic outcome from our modeling is the mutual dependence of the
public's mistrust in government and the extent of
political/rent-seeking activity fostered by government. It seems
straightforward that trust in government is a declining function of
government actions that generate rent seeking and reward special
interests--and indeed this is an aspect of our model. However, a less
apparent implication is the feedback mechanism that generates greater
rent seeking as the degree of mistrustfulness grows; essentially, the
returns to rent seeking are relatively higher in a mistrustful
environment. It is this feedback effect that leads to a situation where
government growth and mistrust might perpetuate one another. Thus, an
initial small change in government policy that encourages rent seeking
can produce mistrust and multiply itself, leading to further growth in
government activity and mounting mistrust. This may help provide an
explanation of the historical comovement of government size and mistrust
in government.
Good government activity also occurs and we incorporate it into our
model. However, it is simply not plausible for government growth to be
regarded as predominantly good while leading to less trust in
government. Thus, much of our focus is on government action that fosters
rent seeking/political activity and rewards interest groups.
Extensions of our basic model also contribute to models of
Leviathan, i.e., how government growth may sustain itself and rarely
reverse. Important frameworks in this regard are developed by Higgs
(1987), Olson (1982), and Caplan (2003), but ours brings in the role of
the public's trust in government. In particular, a version of our
model has two equilibria--where one equilibrium is good, with high trust
and low rent seeking, and another is bad, with the converse--in which an
economy can become trapped in a big government/high rent-seeking/low
trust equilibrium. Once policies are adopted that move the economy from
the former to the latter equilibrium, moving back is difficult. A return
to the original policies is insufficient; the economy remains in a bad
equilibrium. There is a "trust trap" that impedes a reversal
in the growth of rent-seeking government and the decline in trust.
The article begins with a review of the literature indicating the
importance of citizen trust and cooperation with government in order
that the latter may function effectively. Many functions of good
government--such as property rights and contract enforcement, general
law enforcement, and dealing with externalities--raise productivity, and
a cooperative public enhances and enables this to occur. This relates to
ideas regarding the importance of social capital. Another strand of the
literature considers several key findings in the trust and reciprocity
research. Generally speaking, individuals are more likely to be
cooperative with other individuals or institutions if they are perceived
to be acting in a fair manner and/or are a legitimate authority. Trust
and cooperation decline with the extent of rent seeking that the
government encourages.
Next, we present a model based on the above findings as well as on
a political economy/public choice-style model of politicians. In
particular, we model government/politicians as self-interested
individuals who find it in their interests to reward rent
seeking/lobbying activity. Formally, the approach is comparable to that
of Grossman and Helpman (1994) regarding trade protection where special
interest groups end up being disproportionately favored. Similar to that
article, our framework has politicians that may offer favors in return
for political support. This distorts citizen effort away from productive
activity in the private sector toward political/rent-seeking activity.
The latter results in welfare costs and generates mistrust and a growing
government necessary to support the rent seeking. Mistrust, in turn,
erodes cooperation and social capital, lowers productivity, and induces
a substitution away from productive activity and toward rent seeking.
More welfare-reducing government activity ensues, followed by another
round of erosion of trust. Thus, we have the mutual reinforcement of
government growth and mistrust.
After formulating our basic model, we provide details regarding the
subsequent rounds of declining trust and increased rent seeking. The
mutual dependence of trust and political activity/rent seeking has
similarities to other articles that model the codetermination of
attitudes and economic outcomes. (2) Our framework, however, explicitly
brings the behavioral/experimental literature into rent-seeking models
to understand broad patterns of trust and government activity.
Next, we present a model with two equilibria and show how a
"trust trap" can emerge where once the economy moves to the
low trust, high rent-seeking equilibrium, it cannot easily move back.
The final section offers some concluding thoughts.
Background and Supporting Literature
This section provides discussion of some general background
literature, related models on the codetermination of trust and political
activity, as well as literature specific to trust, reciprocity, and
cooperation that are foundational to our model.
Some General Background
The ideas of trust and cooperation are closely linked to social
capital, culture, and attitudes. There is large literature with many
studies showing their importance to economic outcomes. For example,
Knack and Keefer (1997) show that cross-country measures of trust are
positively related to GDP growth and investment. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2006) show that differences in cultural attitudes translate
into differences in entrepreneurship and savings. Greif (1994) contrasts
the culture and practices of the Maghribi traders and the Genoese
merchants, especially regarding contract enforcement, and suggests that
these led to different growth rates. At a perhaps more fundamental
level, Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) maintain that the development of a
moral system consistent with capitalism was an important ingredient to
the growth of the Western world. McCloskey (2010, 2015) argues that
favorable attitudes toward the bourgeoisie and civic virtue are much
more important than previously thought.
Related Models
The mutual dependence of trust and political activity/rent seeking
has similarities to other papers that model the codetermination of
attitudes and economic outcomes. For example, Francois and Zabojnik
(2005) discuss contract enforcement through kin and clan or through
external methods (e.g., government). Tabellini (2008) is similar in this
regard. In their models, parents "invest" in the honesty of
their children based on expected success, where the degree of honesty in
the populace and GDP are mutually dependent. Other notable papers that
relate closely to our approach include Clark and Lee (2001a, 2001b).
They emphasize that, while trust is important for government to
function, the trust of the public is earned by good performance of the
government, and they model this simultaneous relationship--that trust
enables government action, but government action affects the degree of
trust. This mutual relationship is evidently believed to be an important
one and has been noted in the nonacademic literature. Galston and
Kamarck (2008), in trying to revitalize progressive government, write,
"Change you can believe in needs a government you can trust."
In another closely related paper, Aghion et al. (2010) consider
cross-country correlations of trust in government with government
regulation. They find that governments that have heavy regulation, are
the least trusted. In their article, there are two equilibria: a good
one is where most people become civic and vote for little regulation,
and a bad one is where they are not civic and vote for heavy regulation.
In their model, heavy regulation reduces productivity but it is better
than light regulation of an uncivil populace. In a cross-country sample
with a mix of good and bad equilibria, one will find more government
regulation coinciding with less trust. While similar to our model in the
sense that certain behaviors are mutually reinforcing, the approach and
focus are different.
Good Government, Trust, and Productivity
There are a number of functions of government that most agree are
value increasing. These include establishing and enforcing property
rights and other personal rights, maintaining good contract law,
promoting competition, and dealing with public goods and externalities.
While these may raise value for several reasons, one reason is that they
raise productivity. Better courts, clear property rights, low
contracting costs, and a better public infrastructure raise productivity
by, for example, enabling less time and effort to be devoted to private
contract enforcement and property protection. (3)
Related to this, there is work regarding the importance of public
cooperation in enabling government initiatives to be effective. This
work is part of a larger literature illustrating many interrelated
aspects of trust and cooperation, as well as with trust in government
and the perceived legitimacy of government. In broad terms, it shows
that legitimacy engenders more trust which, in turn, tends to induce
cooperation.
Scholars in economics, political science, and psychology have
contributed to this literature in the past couple of decades. We do not
attempt to summarize this literature. However, in this subsection (and
the next), we review several of the central ideas that are pertinent to
our article.
Numerous people have argued that the public's trust in
government is important. Benjamin Franklin (1787) is quoted as saying,
"Much of the strength and efficiency of any government in procuring
and securing happiness to the people, depends, on opinion, on the
general opinion of the goodness of our government, as well as the wisdom
and integrity of its governors." (4) This view evidently is shared
by many--the secular decline in measures of trust in numerous democratic
governments around the world spawned a great deal of unease and study by
political scientists. (5) Moreover, Brennan and Buchanan (1984, 1988)
express concern that the approach to modeling government adopted in the
public choice literature may be detrimental to having favorable views of
government and may erode trust in it.
A variety of reasons are given for the importance of trust in and
cooperation with government. Many have to do with cooperation and
involvement in the political process and civic activities (e.g., jury
service, voting, volunteering, involvement in political campaigns,
membership in political groups, and willingness to work for the
government). The argument is that cooperation of the above type helps
government run more effectively. Other arguments suggest that trust in
government is important to attain honest tax reporting and voluntary
compliance with laws. (6) Governing is seen as being less costly and
more effective with citizen cooperation.
An equivalent way to view this is to consider that trust in and
cooperation with government enables and augments the
productivity-enhancing effects of the functions of government noted
above. Consider some examples of how this might work. Voluntary
compliance with the known and accepted parameters of contract and
property law limits disputes. This saves on transaction costs and
enables resources to be utilized elsewhere. Similarly, cooperation with
infrastructure projects, by refraining from challenging rights-of-way
and engaging in other legal impediments, saves resources. Cooperation
with police investigations makes it much easier to enforce laws and
improves property rights. These cooperative attitudes enable government
to work more easily and effectively and raise private-sector
productivity. (7)
Why Is There Trust and Cooperation?
In the above context, trust in and cooperation with government is
much like a public good, with the former raising aggregate social
productivity. Thus, one might expect the consequent free-rider problem,
so it is natural to ask how cooperative attitudes arise in this setting.
A great deal of work has been done in experimental labs trying to
understand issues of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. It is
repeatedly verified in a variety of laboratory settings that people
engage in some degree of reciprocal behavior--for example, trusting and
cooperation or withdrawal of trust and punishment. These results hold in
one-shot prisoners' dilemma games where the dominant strategy, from
the perspective of narrow self-interest, is to neither cooperate nor
punish. Such findings strongly suggest that behavior is in part
determined by perceived fairness, i.e., "fair" behavior by the
other party is rewarded and "unfair" actions are punished. (8)
Additionally, trust and cooperation are intertwined, with greater trust
inducing more cooperation.
Fehr and Gachter (2000) suggest that the pattern of behavior shown
in these experiments relates to how social norms might evolve or that
the social norms in place affect the degree of cooperation. Regarding
the latter, Henrich et al. (2001) report on findings from
prisoners' dilemma games in various small societies. They find that
that cross-societal variation in trust and reciprocity reflecting social
norms helps explain the variation in cooperation. Similarly, Hayashi et
al. (1999) indicate that "general trust" in the culture
explains some of their experimental findings showing higher levels of
cooperation in some societies. (9)
The experimental work deals with individual interactions, though
many of these interactions are anonymous and so may help explain
societal levels of trust and cooperation. The latter is the focus of the
largely separate literature on trust in government discussed in the
previous subsection. A subset of this separate literature discusses
reasons for the decline in trust in government, both in the United
States as well as other Western democracies. Various reasons are
proposed, including the decline of the perceived effectiveness and
legitimacy of government and affiliated public institutions.
For example, Blendon et al. (1997) note that the top four reasons
given in a 1995 survey for mistrust of government are
inefficiency/wasting money, spending on the wrong things, special
interests being too influential, and the lack of integrity of
politicians. Alesina and Warcziarg (2000) and Stevenson and Wolpers
(2011) find that better macroeconomic performance is associated with
more trust in a country's government, presumably based on the idea
that good government policy induces better economic performance. The
former also suggest that greater welfare spending is associated with a
polarized and dissatisfied electorate, especially by taxpayers and
groups not favored by the programs. Pharr (2000) finds a negative
relationship between misconduct by government officials and measures of
trust in government in Japan. Likewise, Yamamura (2012) finds government
size reduces trust among those likely to face the increased bureaucracy
of larger government. These findings are also consistent with
experimental studies on tax compliance. Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein
(1998) survey a number of studies that show participants are less tax
compliant if they perceive tax dollars are wasted or believe that their
taxes are unfair.
Psychologists have examined similar issues, and their literature
has arrived at closely related findings. For example, Levi, Tyler, and
Sacks (2008) consider why individuals comply with the law. They find
cooperation is dependent on whether the state is viewed as an
appropriate authority entitled to be obeyed. This, in turn, depends on
whether the authority is judged to be competent, be fair, perform well,
and be trustworthy. (10) In work extending these basic findings,
Nadler's (2005) results show that noncompliance spreads beyond the
perception of a particular law and also generates noncompliance
regarding seemingly unrelated laws. Thus, perceived illegitimacy of one
law reduces the willingness to comply with the law in general. (11)
Overall, these findings link to the idea of reciprocity and
cooperation as a social norm and suggest that this norm is applied to
government. If government is perceived to be effective, then this is
reciprocated with trust and with cooperation. Conversely, if government
is perceived to be ineffective, inefficient, or corrupt, this
reciprocated with mistrust and noncooperation. The upshot is that
individuals evidently gain utility through cooperation with persons or
institutions that they judge as being worthy.
Rent Seeking, Trust and Cooperation, and Social Equilibrium
This section develops a model of trust, cooperation, and government
that is built on the results of the foregoing literature, as well as on
more traditional models of rent seeking. We begin with a basic model of
rent seeking by individuals in order to gain government favors. We then
augment it with consideration of good government and how the mix of good
government and rent-seeking activity affects the perceived legitimacy of
and cooperation with government. The social equilibrium of rent seeking,
productivity, and cooperation is then shown.
Government Spending, Government Intervention, and the Market for
Political Support
Governments have significant power in allocating resources and in
providing favors and assistance to individuals and interest groups.
These may be in the form of taxes and subsidies, spending programs,
regulation, or other forms of intervention. Naturally, individuals and
interest groups desire to obtain this government support. In our model,
effort in providing political support is the mechanism by which interest
groups obtain government assistance. Thus, we take a public choice-style
approach where self-interested politicians may seek payment for
provision of favors. In exchange for government funding and favors,
members of interest groups supply effort in generating political support
for the government officials and/or programs providing the funds and
favors. In a broad sense, a wage is paid for units of political support
provided. A related approach is that of Grossman and Helpman (1994)
where interest groups bid for trade protection.
Political support comprises a whole set of things that help
politicians get elected: campaign contributions and assistance in
raising such funds; helping convince the public of the importance of
particular government programs; promoting the "jobs generated"
by the program and its help to the affected community, industry, and
occupation; favorable mentions in the media; and general endorsements of
programs and candidates.
Rent seeking and lobbying are terms related to this type of
activity and can be interpreted in a similar light. For example,
politicians may be willing to protect an industry or occupation from
competition, and interest groups engage in lobbying to obtain this
protection. One of the ways they do so is to provide political support
to the politician by, for example, suggesting compelling ways that can
convince the public of the efficacy of the protection and/or disguise
its harm. The lobbyists that do this most effectively are more likely to
obtain government assistance. In this interpretation, rent seeking is
not simply lobbying for favors; it is asking for favors with the quid
pro quo of supplying political support.
The types of programs just described lower welfare and simply
redistribute resources in inefficient ways. But not all government
activities have negative welfare effects, nor are all recipients of
government funding merely engaged in activities simply to make the
program look good in the eyes of the voting public. Olson (2000)
considers the conditions under which government has more
"encompassing" interests and is less inclined to cater to
special interests. Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2010) show that more
politically competitive governments are more likely to follow policies
that favor general interests. However, substantial amounts of government
programs do fit the rent-seeking description and, in order for trust in
government to fall as government grows, they must play a critical role.
Thus, we model these vis-a-vis value-enhancing government spending.
Choice of Productive Work and Political Support
A building block of our complete model is a basic model of the
representative individual who may supply effort toward productive
activity or toward political support activity. While couched in terms of
an individual, the unit of observation may be considered an organization
or interest group with the same sort of decision to make: how much
effort to devote to political support activity versus productive
activity.
Let the following definitions hold:
h = effort in productive activity, e.g., hours of work (1 - t) w =
the after-tax return to productive activity, where t is the tax rate,
though it may be an explicit or an implicit tax (e.g., unfavorable
regulation)
s = effort in political support activity
r = the return to each unit of political support activity. This
payoff may be in-kind returns and is assumed not to be subject to tax.
C (h, s) = the utility cost of effort. Assume that there is
increasing marginal cost of each type of effort ([C.sub.ii] > 0, I =
h, s) and [C.sub.hs] > 0.
In the basic model, let the individual's utility function be
(1) U = (1 - t) wh + rs - C (h, s)
so that total utility is simply after-tax income from work plus the
payoff from political support effort less the utility cost of effort.
(12)
The first-order conditions for the utility-maximizing choices of h
and s are:
(2) [partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]h = (1 - t) w -
[C.sub.h] = 0
(3) [partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]s = r - [C.sub.s] =
0.
Each of these equations represents setting the marginal benefit of
each type of effort equal to its marginal cost. As expected, when (1 -
t) w increases, h rises and s falls. Similarly, as r increases, s rises
and h falls. An increase in the return to political support activity
diverts effort toward that end and away from work effort. The converse
holds for changes in the after-tax return to productive effort.
Aggregate political support is S = [summation][s.sub.i], where i
indexes individuals. Total transfers due to political support activity
are rS. As is well known, welfare is decreasing in this type of
government activity since it generates only rent seeking and transfers
of wealth.
Incorporating Good Government, Productivity, Trust and Cooperation
As noted above, there are a number of functions of government that
most agree are value increasing, including establishing and enforcing
property rights, maintaining good contract law, promoting competition,
and dealing with public goods and externalities. Denote government
spending and programs on these activities as G. In our framework, these
are modeled as raising productivity. This is expressed in a simple way.
Let w = w (G), with [w.sub.G]; > 0 (i.e., greater G raises the
productivity of work effort).
The literature reviewed previously indicates that citizen
cooperation with government enhances the productivity-augmenting effect
of G. To express this in our model, we consider a single representation
of the aggregate level of trust of and cooperation with the government
denoted by L. This aggregate cooperativeness is the summation of the
cooperation of each individual [l.sub.i] so that L =
[summation][l.sub.i]. Let the effectiveness of the G in raising
productivity be dependent on the aggregate level of trust and
cooperativeness. This is expressed in the following way: w = w (G, L),
with [w.sub.G] > 0, [w.sub.L] > 0, and [w.sub.GL] > 0. The
latter cross-partial conveys that the marginal product of G is increased
by L.
It is aggregate cooperation L that raises productivity, not
individual cooperation [L.sub.i]. We noted above that standard models
suggest that the free-rider problem entails a general lack of
cooperation. This is because each individual's cooperation is
infinitesimally small relative to that of the populace at large and has
no effect on aggregate L. But the literature shows that notions of
reciprocity and fairness indicate that individuals evidently gain
utility through cooperation with persons or institutions that they judge
as being worthy. This is incorporated into our model in the following
way.
Assume that individuals attain utility from trust and cooperation
from the single-peaked subutility function [beta][l.sub.i] - [phi]
([l.sub.i]), where [l.sub.i] is individual trust in and cooperation with
government, [beta] > 0, and [phi]' > 0. The coefficient
[beta] determines the utility gain from cooperation, and [phi]
([l.sub.i]) is the utility cost of cooperation. Let [beta] = G/(G + rS),
where G is good government and rS represents payments for political
support. If all government programs are expenditure based, then this is
simply the ratio of spending on good government to total government
spending. If programs are not all expenditure based, then (3 represents
the expenditure equivalent.
Trust and cooperation generate more utility if [beta] is larger
(i.e., for a government that devotes a larger share of its activities to
G), and more cooperation is forthcoming. A high value of
[beta]--indicating more good government--is reciprocated with trust and
cooperation. Governments that generate a larger share of political
activity--lowering [beta]--lower the utility from cooperation and are
"punished" with reduced trust and cooperation.
Trust, Political Activity, and Social Equilibrium
Putting the foregoing together yields an individual's utility
function as
(4) U = (1 - t) w (G, L) h + rS - C (h, s) + [beta]; - [phi] (l).
The individual chooses h, s, and l to maximize utility. The
first-order conditions for the choices of h and s are as before. The
choice of l, assuming that each individual l has an insignificantly
small effect on aggregate L, is
(5) [partial derivative]U/[partial derivative] = [beta] -
[phi]' (l) = 0.
This implies that cooperation l is an increasing function of
[beta]. Because the aggregate value of political support activity rS
lowers [beta], cooperation declines with S (and increases with G). (13)
The results regarding the choices of h and s described above are
hardly changed. (14) The only difference is that aggregate cooperation L
affects h and s. The reason is that a higher L improves the
effectiveness of G in raising productivity and a lower L does the
opposite. A lower L means that private-sector activities are more costly
to arrange and enforce, lowering the returns to productive effort. This
induces less h and more s. This, along with the l function, can be
expressed as h = h (L), s = s (L), and l = l (S), where h' > 0,
s' < 0, and l' < 0, and where other arguments of the
functions are suppressed.
In aggregate, H = [summation][h.sub.i], S = [summation][s.sub.i],
and [l.sub.i]. This implies an aggregate mutual dependence between L and
S, that is, L = L (S) and S = S (L). The total amount of cooperation is
a negative function of political support activity, and political support
activity is a negative function of aggregate trust and cooperation. The
final equilibrium L and S require that these relationships hold
simultaneously. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Point E in Figure 1 at
the intersection of the L(S) and S(L) loci shows the social equilibrium.
Stability of the equilibrium occurs when the relative slopes of the two
loci are as shown.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Government Behavior and Changing the Equilibrium: Growth in
Government and Declining Trust
This section shows how the trust and rent-seeking equilibrium
changes, resulting in a self-reinforcing cycle of greater rent seeking
and less trust. We start by showing how greater powers for politicians
to reward interest groups result in a higher return to rent-seeking
activity. This, in turn, shifts the equilibrium.
The Politician's Choice of the Reward for Political Support
We suppose that an important motivation of politicians is that they
seek to retain office, in part, for the benefits and perks of power.
(15) Increasing the return to S to stimulate political support can be
beneficial to the politician in this regard even though it is welfare
reducing. This is because welfare-enhancing policies sometimes translate
into votes in a muted way and political support often translates more
strongly. There is no direct compensation to the politician for raising
GDP, for example. It is likely that an effective way of retaining office
is through generating other means of political support (e.g., favorable
media mentions, endorsements, claims of job creation, and campaign
contributions). Suppose that political support activity S generates
benefits f(S) to the politician by increasing the chances of retaining
office and consuming the perks of power.
Thus, let the politician's utility function be the following:
(6) [U.sup.P] = [theta]f (s) + (1 - [theta]) U
where U is the typical citizen's or organization's
utility and 0 < [theta] <1. Thus, politician utility is a weighted
average of the support generated from political activities and the
support received by raising the utility of the average individual in the
economy. The latter is affected by r as well as G. We assume that the
political system determines the weight [theta], that is, how political
support activities translate into favorable outcomes for the politician
vis-a-vis average citizen utility. A higher [theta] indicates that the
politician can more readily transform S into his or her benefit. Thus,
it is a proxy for the power and discretion held by the politician.
Politicians choose r and G to maximize [U.sup.P]. They do so
recognizing that S depends on r. There is also a balanced budget
constraint. If all government programs are budgetary in nature, paying r
for each unit of S is a part of government spending and must be paid for
by tax revenue. Total spending on political support is rS and is G on
good government. If tax revenue derives solely from the tax t on
productivity, it sums to twH. Then the government budget constraint is
twH = G + rS, where H and S (and L) are at the social equilibrium.
It is straightforward to show that the utility per person falls
when the return to political support activity r rises. This occurs for
familiar reasons. This increase necessitates a rise in government
spending. Thus, there is a standard Harberger welfare loss; the
increased spending requires a tax increase, which reduces work effort
and production. Additionally, there is a Tullock loss. A higher r
induces more resources to be devoted to political support activity,
which produces nothing but simply transfers wealth.
If the rewards for political activity and/or the means to support
it are off budget, then a balanced budget need not hold. For example, a
restriction on entry into a market aids the incumbent firms in the
market and raises prices to consumers, just as a tax on consumers and
cash payments to incumbents would, but there is no direct budgetary
consequence. Of course, this means of increasing r also is value
reducing.
An increase in G can be welfare enhancing. There is still the
Harberger loss associated with the increased taxation to pay for G, but
if G raises productivity by enough to offset this loss, then this type
of spending can raise value.
The first-order condition for politician utility maximizing choice
of r is given by
(7) [partial derivative][U.sup.P]/[partial derivative]r =
[theta]f' (S) [partial derivative]S/[partial derivative]r + (1 -
[theta]) [partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]r = 0.
This is the usual marginal benefit equals marginal cost
formulation. The marginal benefit of raising r is that it generates more
political support, valued at [theta]f'. The marginal cost is that
it lowers citizen utility ([partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]r
< 0), which carries the weight 1 - 0. (16)
If politicians were somehow constrained to act only in the
interests of the public, the weight [theta] = 0 and no value-reducing
government would ensue. However, in our framework, political power and
rational ignorance are likely to generate rewards to the politician for
using that power to retain office. This implies that [theta] > 0 and
the f(x) function matters. Increased powers in the hands of the
government raise [theta] and increase these rewards as well as the
ability to remunerate people who help sustain it.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an increase in [theta]. Suppose
[theta] = [[theta].sub.1]. The curve labeled [[theta].sub.1]if'
[partial derivative]S/[partial derivative]r shows the marginal benefit
of increasing r, and the locus (1 - [[theta].sub.1]) [partial
derivative]U/[partial derivative]r represents the marginal cost. Point X
is the equilibrium. The politician selects the reward for political
support activity at [r.sub.1]. Suppose that [theta] rises to
[[theta].sub.2], shifting the marginal benefit function to
[[theta].sub.2]f' [partial derivative]S/[partial derivative]r and
the marginal cost function to (1 - [[theta].sub.2]) [partial
derivative]U/[partial derivative]r. With the higher 0, the politician
pays more attention to political support and less to citizen welfare.
The equilibrium moves to point Y, corresponding to r = [r.sup.2].
Naturally, the higher value of r implies a higher value of rS, which
manifests itself either in the form of greater political support
spending or in intervention to reward political support.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
A Mistrusted But Bigger Government
We are now in a position to illustrate how a one-time increase in
[theta] generates mistrust that leads to an even larger government. Note
that our measure of government is G + rS. Increases in rS and in G may
take the form of greater expenditures, but the former also can be in the
form of greater intervention that transfers wealth.
As indicated above, an increase in 0 raises the level of r selected
by the politician as illustrated by the movement from X to Y in Figure
2. This, in turn, increases the amount of political support activity S,
and the size of government rises and the value of [beta] falls. Note
that the value of G chosen by the politician also determines [beta] =
G/(G + rS). An increase in [theta] raises the denominator by increasing
rS. However, G may also change. The first-order condition for G is
[partial derivative][U.sup.p]/[partial derivative]G = (1 - [theta])
[partial derivative]U/[partial derivative]G = 0. Though this looks as if
G is unaffected by an increase in [theta], the higher rS can affect the
level of G. The value of G may fall or rise, but the value of rS
relative to G rises, [beta] falls, and under plausible conditions, total
government G + rS rises.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
The new equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. It augments the
loci of Figure 2. Suppose that the original level of r is [r.sub.1].
This entails the original S function given by S(L,[r.sub.1]) as shown in
Figure 3. The increased [theta] results in an r = [r.sub.2] >
[r.sub.1]. The direct effect of this is to shift the S function to
S(L,[r.sub.2]) as shown, i.e., more political support activity for each
level of L. This is shown by the arrow emanating from point [E.sub.1]
toward F. If there were no effect on public cooperation, this is the end
of the story. Citizen utility is reduced--any movement on the graph to
the south, east, or southeast from the original equilibrium lowers
utility-government is larger, but there is no change in the level of
trust.
However, more government spending on political support activities
lowers [beta] and undermines trust in and cooperation with government.
Thus, the society moves southeast on the L function. This, in turn,
reduces the productivity-enhancing effects of G, lowers the return to
productive effort, and--as illustrated by the arrows--generates further
distortion of effort toward political activity. This causes further
growth in rent-seeking government activity and reductions in trust. With
the S and L loci as drawn, this spiral in government and mistrust
eventually weakens and a new equilibrium is reached at point [E.sub.2].
This equilibrium is where the size of government has grown to a
multiple of its initial increase, accompanied by a lower level of trust
in government. Growing government occurs with increased mistrust,
leading to higher equilibrium levels of both. Thus, putting together
some basic building blocks of rent seeking and the psychology of trust,
reciprocity, and cooperation yields a straightforward framework to help
understand the pattern of trust in government and the growth in
government.
Several other aspects of the experimental economics literature
buttress our approach and findings, as well as suggest related outcomes.
For example, a robust finding in public goods games is that strong
free-riding emerges more frequently after several rounds of play (see,
e.g., Isaac, Walker, and Williams 1994), suggesting that more
free-riding occurs as more is learned about the game and the play of
others. In our context, this indicates that, as more rent seeking
emerges from government growth, individuals learn that mistrust is the
appropriate response. This suggests that the longer-run response (i.e.,
after learning) of trust to government-induced rent seeking is much
larger. In Figure 3, this makes the long-run L(S) curve steeper,
implying that the new equilibrium entails even lower levels of trust and
more rent seeking than at point [E.sub.2]. Thus, the long-run effects
are more severe than the short run.
Related to this, public goods experiments find that free-riding is
more likely to occur as the benefits of free-riding rise. See, for
example, Smith and Walker (1993) and Isaac and Walker (1988). In the
setting of our model, a continued growth of government increases the
resources available for rent seekers. This heightens rent-seeking
activity and magnifies the corresponding decline in trust. In Figure 3,
these suggest a flatter S(L, r) function and a steeper L(S) locus. Both
lead to lower trust and raise rent seeking more than depicted in Figure
3 in response to a shift in the S(L, r) function.
Additionally, the experimental literature shows that free-riding is
more common when it is known that other players are free-riding (see,
for example, Croson 2007; Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001 on
"conditional cooperators"; and the survey by Chaudhuri 2011).
This effect is apparently stronger when "leaders" are
free-riding (see Gachter and Renner 2014). This applies to our context
in that if politicians are known to be encouraging rent seekers and
lobbying, then the public will respond with a sharper reduction in trust
as government grows. As before, this implies a steeper L(S) function in
Figure 3 and an equilibrium with yet more lobbying and mistrust.
Another factor that could be brought into the model that reinforces
and magnifies these results is investment in human capital. An increase
in the return to political activity induces more activity in that
regard, but also generates more human capital investment into political
skills. This makes the response of S to an increase in r much larger and
generates a larger shift in the S(*) function, forcing the new
equilibrium to be at an even lower L, a higher S, a larger government,
and lower citizen utility.
Multiple Equilibria and the Trust Trap
A number of frameworks have been proposed suggesting that there is
a "ratchet effect" in the size of government where it grows
much more readily than it shrinks. For example, Higgs (1987) argues that
crises generate more government activity and this greater government
involvement becomes accepted by the public, thereby limiting any
reversal of government growth. Olson's (1982) analysis indicates
that once distributional coalitions form, the complexity and level of
government grows in certain ways that are not easily changed. In an
agnostic framework, Caplan (2003) shows how bad government can be
self-perpetuating.
An extension of our model leads to a related outcome. We show how
interactions of trust with rent seeking and government growth may lead
to a low trust/high rent-seeking/big government equilibrium that is not
readily reversed. This occurs when we have multiple equilibria, leading
to discrete jumps in the equilibrium and a trust trap at a bad
equilibrium.
Multiple Equilibria and Discrete Jumps
In the above figures, the curvatures of the two functions are such
that the equilibria depicted are stable and unique. This situation does
not necessarily have to occur. There are a number of possible other
cases when the curvatures of the two loci differ and there are multiple
equilibria, some of which are stable and some of which are not.
One that is of particular interest is where there is a movement
from one stable equilibrium to another. Consider Figure 4 in this
regard. This figure depicts equilibria in L-S space as in Figure 3, but
with differently shaped functions. Assume that the L(S) and S(L,
[r.sub.1]) functions represent the initial situation. There are three
equilbria: points [J.sub.1], [O.sub.1], and [M.sub.1]. Only points
[J.sub.1] and [M.sub.1] are stable. The equilibrium at [J.sub.1] is a
good one with high trust, low political activity, and high utility.
Point [M.sub.1] represents a bad equilibrium with the converse.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Suppose that the initial equilibrium is at [J.sub.1]. Now, as
above, consider an increase in [theta] that raises r from [r.sub.1] to
[r.sub.2]. This shifts the locus S(L, [r.sub.1]) to S(L, [r.sub.2]),
i.e., there is a higher level of S for each L. The new equilibrium moves
to [J.sub.2], with a somewhat lower L and a slightly higher S, and lower
welfare. An infinitesimally higher [theta] and r shift the S(*) function
infinitesimally further to the right, and the equilibrium makes a
discrete jump to J2a with drastically different values of L, S, and
utility--lower, higher, and lower, respectively. A minor change in
policy that enables government to slightly increase the reward for rent
seeking induces a big growth in government and a large drop in trust.
Any further increase in r--say, to [r.sub.3], that shifts the S(*)
function to S(L, [r.sub.3])--causes smaller changes.
Figure 5 illustrates this in a different way. This figure graphs
utility per citizen U on the vertical axis and the return to political
activity r on the horizontal axis. The initial equilibrium at [J.sub.1]
in Figure 4 is also denoted as [J.sub.1] in Figure 5, with r = [r.sub.1]
and U = [U.sub.1]. An increase in [theta] that raises r to [r.sub.2]
moves the economy to [J.sub.2]. An infinitesimally higher [theta] and r
drop the economy "off a cliff' to [J.sub.2a] with a
drastically lower utility. Further increases in r lower utility, but not
radically; e.g., a further increase of r to [r.sub.3] moves the economy
to [J.sub.3] with a smaller reduction in U.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
The Trust Trap
The transitional gains trap of Tullock (1975), and its variant in
Clark and Lee (2003), indicates that government programs which generate
investment in durable capital (human or otherwise) tied to those
programs makes it especially difficult to undo those programs.
Eliminating programs entails a loss to those who invested in the
relevant capital specific to the program. These potential losers will
suffer a capital loss and oppose any reform efforts. This issue can
arise in the expanded version of our model that includes investment in
human capital. (17)
However, another type of trap emerges in our model--a "trust
trap." In the setting with two stable equilibria, as in Figure 4,
once the economy has slipped from a good equilibrium like point
[J.sub.1] to a bad equilibrium like point [J.sub.3], moving back to a
good equilibrium is problematic. Simply undoing the policies that got
the economy to the bad outcome is not sufficient. Returning to a good
equilibrium entails lowering [theta] to a lower level than initially. If
this does not occur, the economy is trapped in a bad equilibrium.
Companion Figures 6 and 7 illustrate this. These are expanded
versions of Figures 4 and 5. In Figure 6, consider an economy where
[theta] increases such that r rises from [r.sub.1] to [r.sub.3]. This
shifts the S(*) function from S(L, [r.sub.1]) to S(L, [r.sub.3]) and the
equilibrium from [J.sub.1] to [J.sub.3]--we move from a good to a bad
equilibrium. In Figure 7, this also is denoted as a move from [J.sub.1]
to [J.sub.3] in the graph in (U, r) space. The economy goes "off
the cliff."
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
Now consider undoing this move. Assume that reform moves [theta]
back to its original level so that r is moved back to [r.sub.1]. The
relevant S(*) function again is S(L, [r.sub.1]), but the equilibrium
does not return to [J.sub.1]; it stays in the bad region at point
[M.sub.1] in Figure 6. In Figure 7, this is also labeled [M.sub.1].
There are only modest increases in trust and utility and a reduction in
political activity.
In order to get back to the good region, the S(*) function has to
shift in further. The value of r where utility moves discretely upward
is (infinitesimally below) [r.sub.0], corresponding to the S(L,
[r.sub.0]) function where the equilibrium jumps discretely from point
[J.sub.0a] to [J.sub.0] in both Figures 6 and 7. If such a value of r is
achieved, the equilibrium is at [J.sub.0], which is better than the
original [J.sub.1], but it entails a more ambitious degree of reform
than simply undoing what got the economy into the bad equilibrium in the
first place.
There is an economic intuition to this. In Figures 4 and 6, the
shape of the L(S) function is such that it is inelastic for low values
of S, becomes elastic, then returns to inelastic for high values of S.
Starting from a low S, the value of L initially changes very little as S
rises, but then hits a threshold where the L(*) function becomes elastic
and L drops off rapidly. Once this threshold is crossed, trust and
cooperation move to low levels and the economy is in a bad equilibrium.
To return to a good equilibrium, S must fall by enough to go back across
this threshold, entailing a big increase in trust and cooperation. Small
reductions in S are not sufficient; L is locally inelastic and so trust
is mired at low levels and the economy remains in a bad equilibrium.
The range of values of r between [r.sub.0] and [r.sub.2] are those
relevant for the trust trap. If one begins in a bad equilibrium, these
values of r leave one trapped in the bad equilibrium, represented by the
segment [J.sub.0a][J.sub.2a] in Figure 7. This is despite the fact that
the same values of r, when starting from a good equilibrium, leave one
trapped at a good equilibrium (along the segment [J.sub.0][J.sub.2]).
Thus, there is a wide range of values of r that leave one with a good
outcome, but once a threshold is crossed to move to a bad equilibrium,
an overlapping range of values of r leaves one in a bad equilibrium.
An outcome like this relies on the shape of the L(S) function,
i.e., the function that determines the relationship of trust and
cooperation with authority. Though we do not bring empirical work to
bear on this, this function having the requisite shape does not seem
implausible. Such a shape simply says that, for authorities with a
well-established (good or bad) reputation, some change in their behavior
has little effect on citizen trust and cooperation. But once a tipping
point is reached, citizen trust can change dramatically.
Research in the experimental economics literature speaks to the
difficulties of getting out of a trust trap. For example, Gachter and
Renner (2014) find that contributions in a public goods game are
influenced by a "leader's" contribution as well as prior
beliefs about other's contributions and the equilibrium of the
game. If free-riding was common in past play, beliefs are strongly
altered that lead to smaller contributions. Once these beliefs are
established, it is difficult for a leader's behavior alone to
improve cooperation. This reinforces our findings regarding the trust
trap. Getting out of the trap would seem to take a very strong
commitment by key leaders to refrain from cheating, perhaps coupled with
a sanctions mechanism for those who continue to cheat.
Conclusion
The concept of social capital has become a noteworthy one in
economics and has linked together ideas in economics, psychology,
political science, and sociology. Public attitudes--including the degree
of trust and cooperativeness--are aspects of social capital that
contribute to an economy's productivity. Thus, it is sensible that
public policy analysts have paid considerable attention to them. Often
lacking from their analysis, however, is the idea that the actions and
nature of government are likely to be important in inducing cooperative
attitudes and other aspects of social capital. A good deal of evidence
suggests that this is the case. Building this into a model illustrates
the mutually reinforcing nature of trust, government, and rent
seeking--that is, bad government induces rent seeking that erodes trust
and social capital, with the latter reducing the productivity of private
enterprise relative to rent seeking, prompting further rounds of rent
seeking and mistrust. Thus, we may observe the paradox of growth in both
the size and mistrust of government.
Interestingly, our approach relates to the work of McCloskey (2010,
2015), who underscores the significance of maintaining or cultivating
the appropriate attitudes/norms in a citizenry. While our model applies
specifically to government and so has a different emphasis, both our
approach and McCloskey's indicate the importance of respect for
(and cooperation with) institutions that are competent and productive.
In our framework, such attitudes are critical but do not evolve alone;
rather they are determined simultaneously with government activity. We
suggest the appropriate attitudes in this respect are cultivated by a
refrain from certain government activities; in particular, government
that encourages rent seeking erodes the kinds of attitudes that are
important.
An important initial motivation of this article is the negative
association of trust in and growth of government in the United States in
the post-World War II period and the possibility of falling into the
"trust trap." However, it seems that similar trends have
occurred in developed countries worldwide. One may wonder why these
phenomena seem to be relevant only after World War II. Outside the
United States, a long-term mechanism at work may be the long, historical
decline of monarchies and growth of democracies in the 19th and early
20th centuries. It may take a long period of adjustment for a populace
and politicians to learn to "work the system" for political
favors and rewards, so that these phenomena are relatively recent in
appearing. Another possibility, for the United States and elsewhere, is
that the Great Depression shook the public's confidence in markets
and World War II increased it in government. This implies that more
power was ceded to government, raising the parameter [theta] in the
model and starting a shift toward more rent seeking.
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(1) Many more details are in Pew Research Center (2010). For other
discussions of trends in measures of trust in government for the United
States, see Nye, Zelikow, and King (1997) and Hunter and Bowman (1996).
(2) See Clark and Lee (2001a, 2001b), Francois and Zabojnik (2005),
Tabellini (2008), and Aghion et al. (2010).
(3) Though these aspects of government are productivity enhancing,
they may have other positive effects on utility.
(4) Also see a related quote by Abraham Lincoln (1858): "With
public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.
Consequently he who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who
enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes and decisions
possible or impossible to be executed."
(5) Some examples are Nye, Zelikow, and King (1997), Hunter and
Bowman (1996), Warren (1999), Dalton (2004), Blind (2006), Hetherington
(2005), and Pharr and Putnam (2000).
(6) Many of these arguments are implicit in the works cited in the
previous footnote. More specifics are offered in Nye (1997) and Dalton
(2004).
(7) There is a related and broad literature on social capital that
discusses norms that assist in social cooperation. These can raise value
in the private sector, in both commercial and noncommercial settings, by
reducing transactions costs and utilizing embedded knowledge. For a
short summary, see Fukuyama (2000).
(8) The literature on this topic is quite large. For a short and
succinct summary of many of the issues and findings, see Fehr and
Gachter (2000).
(9) Also, see Paldam (2009) for discussion and empirical work on
the coevolution of economic development and generalized trust. Bjomskov
(2006) also considers cross-country determinants of generalized trust.
(10) Though this is a substantial literature, similar works in this
vein are De Cremer and Tyler (2007) and Tyler (1990).
(11) Also see Mullen and Nadler (2008).
(12) The terms in the utility function are analogous to the payoff
function for any organization (i.e., there is an after-tax return to
allocating resources to production), a return to allocating resources to
political support, and a cost of each.
(13) Consistent with the psychology literature, we assume that the
individual chooses a level of cooperation that applies broadly and does
not tailor his or her cooperation toward particular programs.
(14) The simplicity in this regard is due, in part, to the
separable utility function used in the analysis.
(15) There may be other motivations as well (e.g., to "do
good," to impose a viewpoint), but we implicitly hold these
constant.
(16) We assume that f(S) adds less to politician utility than S
reduces individual utility, so there is a net loss of S.
(11) Full consideration of the transitional gains trap would have
to consider a multi-period model.
John Garen is Professor of Economics at the University of Kentucky,
and J.R. Clark is the Probasco Chair of Free Enterprise at the
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. For helpful comments, the
authors thank Randall Holcombe, participants in sessions at the Southern
Economic Association and the Association of Private Enterprise Education
conferences, workshop participants at the University of Kentucky, and an
anonymous reviewer.