Immigration and economic growth.
Hanson, Gordon H.
As the 2012 presidential campaign gets under way, there will be
intense public debate about the direction of economic policy. The
continuing torpor of the U.S. economy and mounting government debt
oblige candidates to detail how they would improve prospects for
economic growth and reduce the federal budget deficit. We are sure to
hear a great deal about plans to lower taxes, reduce government
regulation, improve U.S. education, and rebuild infrastructure. But it
is a near certainty that no candidate will make immigration part of his
or her vision for achieving higher rates of long-run economic growth. To
be sure, stump speeches will contain pat pronouncements about securing
American borders, restoring the rule of law, or bringing undocumented
immigrants out of the shadows, depending on the candidate's
political orientation. Yet, it is a safe bet that after getting through
these bullet points candidates will seek to change the subject.
Immigration is a divisive issue that most national politicians prefer to
avoid. President Obama checked his immigration box by making a
halfhearted call for immigration reform in May 2011. That proposal was
quickly buried under many more pressing items in his legislative outbox.
Ignoring immigration may make short-run political sense but it is a
mistake if the goal is to build a coherent economic strategy.
Immigration policy affects the pace of innovation in the U.S. economy,
the supply of labor by high-skilled workers, the ability of regional
economies to adjust to business cycle fluctuations, and the
integrity of local, state, and federal government finances. While
current policies tend to do a poor job on these counts, designing a
system that would make immigration good for America is easily within
reach.
The Role of Immigration in Innovation
Past improvements in living standards for American households have
been largely the consequence of growth in the productivity of capital
and labor (Jones 1995). Productivity growth, in turn, is the result of
innovations that create new products and production processes. The
Windows operating system, the iPhone, Lipitor and other
cholesterol-reducing drugs, safe, fuel-efficient automobiles, and
improved agricultural varieties are a few among the many new products
that have appeared in recent decades and that have raised the level of
national welfare. Each was the consequence of intensive research and
development that culminated in a blockbuster product based on myriad new
patents. A binding constraint in generating innovations is the supply of
highly talented scientists, engineers, and other technical personnel.
Immigration helps relax this constraint.
Each year, U.S. universities conduct a global talent search for the
brightest minds to admit to their graduate programs. Increasingly,
foreign students occupy the top spots in the search. Data from the
National Science Foundation's Survey of Earned Doctorates show that
between 1960 and the late 2000s, the share of PhDs awarded to foreign
students rose from one fifth to three fourths in mathematics, computer
science, and engineering; from one fifth to three fifths in physical
sciences; and from one fifth to one half in life sciences. U.S.
university departments that have more foreign graduate students produce
more academic publications and have their work cited more frequently
(Stuen, Maskus, and Mobarak 2010). Once they graduate, U.S.-educated
foreign workers patent at a significantly higher rate than U.S.-born
workers (Hunt 2009). As a consequence, U.S. cities that attract these
workers produce larger numbers of patents in electronics, machinery,
pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, and other technology-intensive
products (Kerr and Lincoln 2010). Simply put, high-skilled immigration
promotes innovation. An additional benefit is that high-skilled
immigrants are likely to pay far more in taxes than they use in public
services, generating a positive net contribution to government fiscal
accounts.
What does the United States do to attract talented foreigners?
Foreign students who are admitted to U.S. universities can generally
obtain a student visa. While the process of awarding visas was beset by
onerous new restrictions after 9/11 (Alden 2009), many of these problems
have since been resolved. Today, the difficulty is not in attracting top
foreign students to America but in keeping here them after they
graduate.
High-skilled immigrants have three primary channels for obtaining
permission to work in the United States. The H-1B visa, which targets
highly trained professionals, permits holders to work in the United
States for a period of three years. It is renewable once, with the
annual number of visas capped at 65,000. Employer-sponsored green cards
permit holders to live and work in the country indefinitely. The annual
number of new visas is capped at 150,000. The third channel is a
family-sponsored green card, which requires marrying a U.S. citizen
(visas for which there is no cap) or having a close relative already in
the country legally (visas for which are capped at 640,000). Because of
the limited number of work-based visas, the family visa route remains
the most common path to legal residence for skilled workers. Rosenzweig
(2007) reports that in the early 2000s among immigrants who entered the
United States on student visas and ultimately obtained green cards, 55
percent did so by marrying a U.S. citizen. To make it in America,
foreign students not only need to be smart enough to get into a U.S.
university. They also need to be proficient at dating.
Despite many hurdles to their entry, high-skilled immigrants make
important contributions to U.S. productivity growth. By making it easier
for talented foreign students to stay on in the country once their
studies are finished, their contributions could be even larger.
Greasing the Wheels of the U.S. Labor Market
Opposition to immigration in the United States is strongest
regarding the admission of foreigners with low skill levels. There is
the perception that low-skilled immigrants tend to be in the country
illegally, to pay little in taxes while absorbing much in the way of
government services, and to make neighborhoods less safe. Less
appreciated are the contributions that low-skilled immigrants make in
improving the efficiency of the U.S. economy. To use the words of George
Borjas (2001), low-skilled immigration greases the wheels of the U.S.
labor market.
One contribution of low-skilled immigrants is to make it possible
for high-skilled workers to spend more time on the job and less time
doing non-work related chores. Women account for an ever increasing
share of the U.S. high-skilled labor force. In 9.008, 48 percent of
workers with a college degree were female (as were 54 percent of
currently enrolled undergraduate students, meaning the female share of
highly educated labor is likely to rise in the future). The majority of
highly educated women are married to highly educated men (Isen and
Stevenson 2010: 13). For both to work outside the home often requires
hiring outside labor to care for children, clean the home, launder
clothes, and tend to the yard. In a study of immigration's impact
on U.S. cities, Cortes (2008) finds that metropolitan areas that have
had larger influxes of low-skilled immigrants have lower prices for dry
cleaning, child care, housing cleaning, yard care, and other
labor-intensive services. Lower prices for these services translate into
more hours spent at work for high-skilled workers, particularly among
women with a professional degree or PhD (Cortes and Tessada 2009).
Low-skilled immigration thus indirectly contributes to productivity
growth by raising the effective supply of high-skilled labor.
Another consequence of low-skilled immigration is to increase the
mobility of the labor force. Low-skilled U.S.-born workers tend to be
immobile across regions. When, say, the demand for low-skilled labor
picks up in North Carolina, native-born workers in other regions are
slow to move in (Notowidigdo 2010). Why this is the case is poorly
understood. The consequence of the immobility of low-skilled labor is to
gum up the labor market, slowing the pace of growth in booming regions
and the pace of recovery in slumping regions. Relative to low-skilled
natives, low-skilled immigrants are more mobile geographically (Card and
Lewis 2007). They may hang dry wall in Texas in the winter, clean and
pack poultry in Arkansas in the spring, and harvest vegetables in
Georgia in the summer. True, many of these workers are in the country
illegally. Approximately three-fifths of immigrant workers with less
than a high school education are undocumented. Yet, their mobility
across jobs and zip codes helps smooth fluctuations in the U.S. economy
and ease the burden on U.S. workers when the unemployment rate rises.
Since the last U.S. business cycle peak in 2007, the population of
illegal immigrants has declined by about one million individuals (Passel
and Cohn 2011). Many of those workers returned to their home countries
after jobs in U.S. industries disappeared during the Great Recession.
Flexibility in the employment of immigrant labor helps reduce volatility
in employment for native labor. Undocumented workers are particularly
flexible as they lack restrictions on moving between employers to which
low-skilled workers on H-2A or H-2B temporary visas are subject.
Not all workers in the United States benefit from low-skilled
immigration. While employers see their factories and farms become more
productive and high-skilled workers enjoy lower prices for goods and
services they purchase, low-skilled native-born workers face increased
competition in the workplace. Borjas (2003: 1370) finds that during the
1980s and 1990s low-skilled immigration reduced the wages of U.S.-born
high-school dropouts by nine percent. Not all economists agree with his
findings and the wage impact of immigration remains a topic of academic
debate (Card 2005). Still, it is hard to imagine how more low-skilled
immigration could be good for low-skilled native workers in the United
States.
When assessing the labor market consequences of low-skilled
immigration, it is important to keep in mind that any wage losses to
low-skilled native workers represent a change in the distribution of
national income but not in the level of national income. If low-skilled
immigration pushes down wages for low-skilled labor, U.S. employers gain
and U.S. low-skilled workers lose, with the gains to the former
offsetting the losses to the latter. Moreover, economic theory suggests
that immigration generates a surplus by malting capital and land more
productive, meaning that gains to U.S. employers are likely to exceed
any losses to U.S. workers. In practice, the immigration surplus from
low-skilled immigration in the United States appears to be small (Borjas
1999, Hanson 2007). But the point remains that one shouldn't count
wage losses to low-skilled immigrant workers as a net loss from
immigration, however painful it might be for the individuals who are
negatively affected.
Immigration and the Tax Burden
Immigration's impact on government spending attracts much
attention but is not well understood. A common criticism of immigration
is that it increases government spending (Camarota 2004). If true,
reducing immigration, and illegal immigration in particular, would help
to narrow the scope of government. The relationship between immigration
and public finances is complex. Under current tax and spending rules, an
exodus of low-skilled immigrants probably would reduce the net burden on
U.S. taxpayers. But if reducing immigration requires substantially
higher levels of enforcement the drain on government budgets could
actually increase. A more sensible approach than a pure-enforcement
strategy would be to allow low-skilled immigration to occur but to
shield taxpayers from negative effects.
Low-skilled immigrants, whether legal or illegal, pay taxes and use
government services (Camarota 2004). They pay sales taxes when they make
purchases and property taxes for the housing they rent or own. A worker
who presents a Social Security number to an employer, be the number
valid or not, will have payroll taxes deducted from his or her paycheck,
with those taxes sent on to the federal government. All workers are
subject to federal income taxes, though in practice most low-income
workers owe little in tax and most illegal workers appear not to file
tax returns (GAO 2010). To be eligible to receive welfare benefits
financed by the federal government, an individual must be a U.S.
citizen. Not only are illegal immigrants excluded from receiving
federally funded entitlements but so are noncitizen legal immigrants.
The major drain on government finances from immigration comes from
public education--all children, regardless of legal status, must attend
school--and public health care. The U.S.-born children of immigrants are
eligible to receive Medicaid and other subsidized health services. Some
ineligible immigrants obtain health services through hospital emergency
rooms, often at public expense.
The net fiscal impact of low-skilled immigration is the subject of
heated debate. Poring over the many recent studies--most of which offer
only partial views of immigration's fiscal consequences and produce
estimates that require strong assumptions that are difficult to
verify--it does appear that the net fiscal impact is negative (CBO
2007). In the mid-2000s, Camarota (2004) put the annual fiscal cost for
the federal government at $12 billion (in 2011 dollars), with the net
fiscal cost for state and local governments (whose total budgets are far
less than the federal budget) exceeding this amount. Yet, even if these
figures are true, it does not necessarily follow that the correct policy
response is to attempt to eliminate illegal immigration.
One problem with reducing low-skilled immigration is that doing so
is not costless. Lowering the illegal population requires devoting more
resources to policing U.S. borders and monitoring U.S. worksites. Even
though in the last seven years the U.S. Border Patrol has more than
doubled the number of officers on the U.S.-Mexico border (to 20,000
agents), illegal immigration continues. Encouraging the departure of the
11 million illegal immigrants currently in the country would require
substantially more intensive interior enforcement. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement has increased scrutiny of U.S. businesses and more
and more employers use E-Verify to validate the eligibility of
prospective workers for employment. But we still have around eight
million undocumented workers in the U.S. labor force (Passel and Cohn
2011). Driving illegal immigration to zero would require additional
enforcement at additional expense. If the extra cost of such enforcement
is larger than the net fiscal cost of illegal immigration, then driving
illegal immigration to zero would fail a cost-benefit test. In truth, we
don't know if current levels of enforcement spending are justified.
The 2011 combined budgets of Customs and Border Protection and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the two federal agencies charged
with immigration enforcement, was $15 billion, with not all of these
funds going to immigration-related activities. Before ramping up
enforcement further, the U.S. government should tell the American people
exactly how much immigration enforcement costs and how much it saves
taxpayers by removing immigrants who would otherwise be a net fiscal
burden on the U.S. economy. To date, the government has failed to
provide such information.
A second issue with reducing low-skilled immigration relates to how
fiscal burdens are shared across levels of government and across
individuals. Whereas the federal government enjoys revenues from payroll
taxes and income taxes generated by immigrants, states and localities
tend to be responsible for funding K-12 education and public health care
for the children of immigrants. The federal government thus enjoys more
of the fiscal benefits of immigration while states and localities are
stuck with a much higher share of the costs. Such inequities in burden
sharing have provoked protest by governors in high-immigration states
(Goodnough 2010).
Another source of unequal burden sharing is that U.S. employers
enjoy benefits from immigration, in terms of higher productivity for
their operations, while taxpayers pay for the education and health
services that immigrant households receive. Taxpayers thus subsidize
employers in agriculture, construction, meatpacking, restaurants and
hotels, and other sectors that have high levels of employment of
low-skilled immigrant labor. A reasonable solution to the current
predicament is to eliminate such subsidies by making employers
internalize the fiscal cost of immigrant workers. One way of achieving
internalization is to subject employers to an immigrant labor payroll
tax that would fund the benefits that their immigrant employees, and
their family members, receive. Such a tax would make employers bear the
fiscal consequences of immigration, releasing taxpayers from the burden
and perhaps easing political opposition to immigration.
Aligning Incentives, Sharing Gains
Immigration moves workers from countries where they are less
productive to countries where they are more productive. Simply by
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexican workers see their hourly wage
increase by a factor of 2.5, adjusting for cost of living differences
between the United States and Mexico (Hanson 2009: 192). Students from
Vietnam, Ghana, or Bolivia who obtain graduate degrees in the United
States develop the potential to publish academic research or create
patentable technology that they could not have accomplished at home. For
the world as a whole, international migration appears to increase total
income and generate large gains for those who take the risk of moving
from one nation to another.
Convincing the American public that immigration benefits them, and
not just migrants, is a task few politicians are willing to embrace.
Yet, evidence suggests that for the United States immigration of
high-skilled labor accelerates the rate of productivity growth and
immigration of low-skilled labor improves the efficiency of the labor
market. The downsides of immigration, brought about in part by the entry
of undocumented workers, include adverse consequences for U.S.
taxpayers. The problem is not immigration per se but rules governing
taxes and spending that fail to make U.S. employers internalize the
fiscal consequences of hiring low-skilled foreign labor. The nation
could preserve the benefits from immigration and increase its public
support by shifting the fiscal burden of immigration from taxpayers to
employers. If we as a nation are going to continue to support
immigration, we need to find arrangements that align the incentives of
employers, households, and workers.
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Gordon H. Hanson is Professor of Economics at the University of
California San Diego and Director of the Center on Emerging and Pacific
Economies.