Incentive-robust financial reform.
Calomiris, Charles W.
"Will Rogers, commenting on the Depression, famously quipped:
"If stupidity got us into this mess, why can't it get us
out?" Rogers's rhetorical question has an obvious answer:
persistent stupidity fails to recognize prior errors and, therefore,
does not correct them. For three decades, many financial economists have
been arguing that there are deep flaws in the financial policies of the
U.S. government that account for the systemic fragility of our financial
system, especially the government's subsidization of risk in
housing finance and its ineffective approach to prudential banking
regulation. To avoid continuing to make the same mistakes, it would be
helpful to reflect on the history of crises and government policy over
the past three decades.
The U.S. banking crises of the 1980s--which included the nationwide
S&L crisis of 1979-91, the 1986-91 commercial real estate banking
crisis (Boyd and Gertler 1993), the LDC debt crisis primarily afflicting
money-center banks from 1979 to 1991, the farm credit crisis of the
mid-1980s (Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock 1986; Carey 1990), and the
post-1982 Texas and Oklahoma banking crisis (Horvitz 1992)--were
disruptive and pervasive. The resolution costs of the thrift failures
alone amounted to about 3 percent of U.S. GDP. And, "large"
troubled financial institutions (e.g., Continental Illinois
Bank--actually a bank of moderate size and insignificant
affairs--Citibank, and Fannie Mae) were either explicitly bailed out by
the government or allowed to survive despite their apparent fundamental
insolvency.
The underlying policy failures that had contributed to these crises
were discussed and reasonably well understood by 1990. Clearly, the
monetary policy changes of 1979-82, which caused interest rates to
skyrocket and later decline, and which were associated with dramatic
changes in inflation, term spreads, exchange rates, and energy prices,
were the most important shocks driving events in the U.S. banking system
during the 1980s. Changes in tax law in 1986 that eliminated accelerated
depreciation were also important for promoting commercial real estate
distress. But the U,S. banking crises of the 1980s were not primarily
attributable to those shocks; three microeconomic policies substantially
magnified the severity of the losses experienced by banks. (1)
First, at the heart of the real estate disaster was a raft of
government subsidies for real estate finance that proved destabilizing,
especially to real estate markets and to financial institutions
operating in those markets. These distorting subsidies included special
advantages of the thrift charter, subsidized lending from the Federal
Home Loan Banks, "regulatory accounting" rules that purposely
masked thrift losses, the absorption of interest rate risk in the
mortgage market by the inadequately capitalized government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac, and the lending policies
of the Farm Credit System that promoted the farm land bubble of the
1970s and early 1980s.
Second, the increased protection of banks removed deposit market
discipline as a source of control over the risk-taking of banks and
thrifts. Protection from deposit insurance increased dramatically in
1980 and has been further expanded subsequently, which substantially
reduced the possibility that higher risk-taking by banks would lead
depositors to withdraw their funds. (2)
Third, ineffective prudential regulation failed to substitute for
the market discipline that deposit insurance and other government
protection of banks removed. That was especially visible in the failure
of supervisors to identify losses in failing banks and prevent those
losses from growing larger as the result of increased risk-taking by
"zombie" banks and thrifts.
In the wake of the banking crises of the 1980s, the U.S.
promulgated an ambitious program of reform to prudential banking
regulation and regulatory accounting practices, implemented through the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in
1989 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) in 1991. The Mickey Mouse arithmetic of regulatory accounting
for losses through the creation of special "goodwill" in the
1980s was eliminated, and the use of loan-loss reserves to count as
capital was curtailed. FIRREA and FDICIA focused on the setting of
higher capital standards for banks, and created a new "prompt
corrective action" protocol for intervening to shut down weak banks
and thrifts before they became insolvent, The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board was eliminated and replaced by the Office of Thrift Supervision,
which was charged with enforcing tougher supervisory and regulatory
standards on thrifts.
Too-big-to-fail bailouts also were addressed in 1991 by FDICIA in a
clever (but, it turned out, ineffectual) way: any protection of
uninsured deposits should satisfy a narrowly defined "least-cost
resolution" criterion (showing that the cost to the FDIC from
protecting insured deposits was minimized by whatever protections to
uninsured deposits were offered); failing that, the government, the Fed,
and the FDIC would have to make a special exception to protect any
uninsured deposits, and the cost of doing so would be financed by a
special assessment on the deposits of surviving banks. The hope was that
unnecessary bailouts of large banks (i.e., those that were not warranted
by bona fide systemic risks) would be avoided by the lobbying of other
large banks, which would bear a large proportion of the costs of the
bailout. Unfortunately, when the crisis arrived in 2008, FDICIA was
simply put aside, and blanket guarantees of bank deposits and other
support were provided irrespective of the contrary language of the
FDICIA law.
Reformers in 1989 and 1991 promised that, under the new rules,
banks' equity would now be sufficient to cover most problems that
would arise. If a bank suffered a significant loss, it would either have
to replace lost capital or face tough supervisory and regulatory
discipline. Thus, disorderly failures of banks and thrifts would be
avoided in the future. Also, the tough new rules would give banks an
incentive to maintain adequate capital, because if they did not, they
would be subject to the discipline of credible and orderly resolution,
whereby their operations, assets, and liabilities would be transferred
to new management before a disorderly failure could occur.
These rule changes were further enhanced by a continuous process of
fine-tuning by U.S. bank regulators, sometimes working within the Basel
Committee to set new global standards for measuring risk and budgeting
capital (under Basel I and Basel II), and sometimes acting on their own
(e.g., in the post-2000 reforms of off-balance sheet capital standards,
described in Calomiris 2009a). Furthermore, in response to objections by
European countries to the fact that investment banks were not regulated
under the Basel system, in 2002, U.S. investment banks (including Bear
Steams, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley) became
subject to the Basel capital requirements, under the supervision of the
SEC.
People who are unaware of this history of prudential regulatory
expansion during the 1990s and 2000s--or government officials who ignore
it because it is politically inconvenient to remember it--sometimes
wrongly refer to the 1990s and 2000s as a time of prudential bank
deregulation. Deregulation in the U.S. since 1980 did occur, but not
prudential bank deregulation. The deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s
had three main components: (1) interest rate ceilings on bank deposits
were largely phased out beginning in 1980, which promoted greater
competition in the deposit market; (2) banks' abilities to
underwrite corporate securities were substantially increased (the
so-called relaxation of the 1933 Act's "Glass-Steagall"
prohibitions) beginning in 1987, and those limits were eliminated in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999; (3) banks were permitted to branch
across state lines through a combination of state- and federal-level
initiatives that culminated in the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, which was
fully phased in by 1997.
None of those elements of deregulation can plausibly be regarded as
having contributed to the subprime crisis. Indeed, the ability of
investment banks to become commercial banks without ceasing to
underwrite corporate bonds and stocks mitigated the cost of the crisis
by allowing the orderly acquisitions of Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns by Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, respectively, and by allowing
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to convert to commercial banking
charters (to have expanded access to the government safety net) as the
crisis deepened in September 2008. Branching is also widely recognized
as a stabilizing influence on banks that promotes diversification and
competition (Calomiris 2000, 2010).
Despite the various reforms of prudential banking regulation from
1989 to 9.002, and the substantial addition of new prudential
regulations during that period, there were three key policy errors, all
of which had been at the core of the banking disasters of the 1980s,
which returned with a vengeance in the 2000s: (1) the government
subsidization of risk in mortgage finance, (2) the failure to measure in
a timely and forward-looking manner the extent of risk taken by banks
and require capital commensurate with that risk, and (3) the implicit
protection enjoyed by "too-big-to-fail" financial
institutions.
Subsidization of Mortgage Default Risk
With respect to the first of these problems, the successor to the
political protection for thrifts in the 1980s was the affordable-housing
mandates of the 1990s and 2000s. The federal government's support
for mortgage lending by U.S. banks dates from 1913. Prior to the
establishment of the Federal Reserve System national banks were
prohibited from mortgage lending, but as a political quid pro quo for
passing the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, agricultural interests demanded
a relaxation of that regulatory prohibition, which opened the door to
mortgage lending by U.S. commercial banks on a large scale. Mortgage
lending became further promoted by the establishment of a variety of
special institutions and requirements beginning in the 1930s and
continuing into subsequent decades (including Fannie Mae, the Federal
Home Loan Banks, federal thrift chartering, Freddie Mac, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)),
all of which encouraged growth in mortgage finance on an increasingly
levered and government-subsidized basis, and ultimately, with
deteriorating underwriting standards. (3)
Despite the new discipline applied to the thrift industry in 1989
and afterwards, regulatory reformers of the 1990s did not roll back
government subsidization of the mortgage market. On the contrary, the
retreat of the S&L industry was more than offset by the expansion of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks in the 1990s
and 2000s, with the clear understanding in the market that their
creditors enjoyed the implicit (now explicit) protection of the U.S.
taxpayers. Initially, until the late 1990s, the main risks related to
Fannie and Freddie were market risks (especially mortgage prepayment
risks). The reason for that was simple: Fannie and Freddie did not
absorb much default risk during that period. In the 1980s and 1990s,
their portfolios of high-risk mortgages were small, and they generally
required private mortgage insurance on risky mortgages (Calomiris 2001).
That began to change in the mid-1990s. The purposeful subsidization
of mortgage default risk in the 1990s and 2000s by Fannie and Freddie
was driven by the political agenda of promoting "affordable
housing" through a combination of government initiatives:
increasingly generous FHA loan guarantees provided explicitly by the
government, mandates for increased "affordable housing"
lending by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and CRA mandates on commercial
banks. HUD established mandates for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during
the 1990s, which required increasing amounts of their mortgage
portfolios to be dedicated to "low and moderate income" and
"underserved" and "special affordable" borrowers
over time (Pinto 2010a, 2010b; Wallison 2011). In 1996, the HUD goal for
Fannie Mae for underserved borrowers was 21 percent of its portfolio; by
2006 it had risen to 38 percent.
The growth in government mandates meant that the amount of
government-directed mortgage money chasing low-income borrowers was
rising dramatically, while the number of creditworthy low-income
borrowers did not rise commensurately. Filling that gap required the
deterioration of underwriting standards so that the government-mandated
increase of supply could be accommodated. The need to absorb the supply
of government-directed mortgage lending was the key driver behind the
dramatic reduction in downpayments during the 2000s, the changes in
Fannie's and Freddie's mortgage default protocols in the late
1990s (which required originators to be much more forgiving of
defaults), the decision by Fannie and Freddie to enter no-docs lending
aggressively in 2004 despite the concerns of risk managers about its
risks (Calomiris 2008), the GSEs' decision to turn a blind eye to
the fraudulent representations and warranties that became common in
subprime mortgage securitizations during the boom, and the federal
legislation in 2006 that sought to encourage more lenient ratings of
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). (4) All of this was associated with a
near tripling of subprime originations that year, and a further doubling
of them by 2006. According to Pinto (2010a, 2010b), Fannie and Freddie
ended up holding a $1.8 trillion exposure to subprime losses. Total
outstanding government-program related subprime exposure (Fannie,
Freddie, FHA, and CRA and other HUD related lending) totals $2.7
trillion, while other private exposure totals $1.9 trillion.
Prudential Regulation and Supervision's Failure to Measure ex
ante Risk and ex post Loss
Although it is tempting to blame the subprime crisis entirely on
the sins of commission of the government in affordable housing policy,
that would be an incomplete account. The warning signals of subprime
lending--including the adverse-selection problems of deteriorating
underwriting standards (especially in the form of no-docs lending), the
risk of a house price decline, and the inflation of ratings on subprime
mortgage-backed securities--were clearly apparent in advance of the
crisis (Calomiris 2009a), and some firms reacted to those warning
signals, thereby avoiding debilitating exposures to subprime risk.
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, HSBC, Standard Chartered,
Morgan Stanley, Santander, BBV, Credit Suisse, and Bank of America
(prior to its acquisitions during the crisis) suffered relatively little
from subprime losses, while others--Fannie Mac, Freddie Mac, Citibank,
UBS, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG--were deeply exposed to
subprime loans. What accounts for the different experiences of these two
groups?
Failures of prudential regulation and supervision are part of the
explanation for banking problems, but as this list of divergent
experiences shows, regulatory failure can only be a part of the story,
since the relatively successful and unsuccessful financial institutions
were regulated under similar rules by the same set of regulators.
Putting aside the decisions of Fannie and Freddie--which clearly
reflected political pressures that were unique to their charters
(Calomiris 2008) what explains why some institutions took the plunge
into subprime while other financial institutions avoided subprime? To
what extent can regulatory explanations of bank risk-taking be said to
be relevant, given that the same regulatory and supervisory policies
were associated with such different consequences across banks?
The interaction of agency problems with prudential supervision and
regulation can explain the observed differences across banks in their
subprime risk exposures. The first line of defense against unwise
investing on the part of bank management should be its fiduciary
obligation to pursue the interest of stockholders. A manager that was
properly incentivized to identify investments with a desirable
risk-return profile should have avoided subprime investments during the
crucial boom period of 2004-06. Subprime securities on an ex ante basis
offered small expected returns relative to the outsized risks coming
from potential slowing or decline of house prices and the
adverse-selection problems related to no-does lending. As Rajan, Seru,
and Vig (2011) show, more than half of the difference between the actual
subprime loss experience and the losses forecast at the time of
origination of subprime securitizations is attributable to
adverse-selection problems related to no-does lending, and the remainder
of the difference reflects the effects of house price declines. These
adverse-selection problems should have been anticipated, and in some
cases were anticipated. If a lender makes it known in the market that it
will cease to verify employment and income information, then that lender
will predictably attract a biased and less-creditworthy group of
borrowers. Freddie Mac's risk managers were aware of that
principle, and had experienced these adverse-selection related losses in
the late 1980s, which was the basis for their vocal opposition to
entering no-docs lending in 2004 (Calomiris 2008).
Of course, not all employees or all organizations will choose to
avoid "value-destroying" investments like subprime, if
incentives within the organization encourage portfolio managers to take
excessive risks in the interest of growing the portfolios that they
manage. Poorly designed compensation systems for rewarding portfolio
managers can contribute greatly to that problem. For example, to the
extent that portfolio managers' compensation depends on the size of
assets under management (e.g., when managers receive a bonus in
proportion to the assets they manage), a portfolio manager may see
substantial private gains from expanding investment, even in an
undesirable security, if that security offers the easiest path to
growing the portfolio. That is especially the case if he believes that
competing portfolio managers (within or outside his firm) are riding the
same wave, based on the same exaggerated debt ratings; when the bubble
collapses, they all can expect to point to the supposed collective error
of judgment and the opinions of rating agencies to insulate themselves
from the reputational consequences of having made such bad investments.
Call that the "plausible deniability" equilibrium.
The key to avoiding these sorts of problems is to establish a
healthy risk management culture. Such a culture rewards long-term
performance of portfolios, not just short-term growth. It does so in
part through the structure of compensation, and by limiting the
concentration of investments in any one set of risks.
Not all organizations have equally effective risk management
cultures, and there is substantial evidence that variation in the
quality of risk management matters greatly for limiting the potential
exposure of an institution to risks like the subprime bubble. Ellul and
Yerramilli (2010) find that commercial banks with a strong commitment to
risk management (which they measure by the ratio of the compensation of
the chief risk officer relative to the compensation received by the
chief executive officer) fared much better during the subprime crisis
than those with weaker commitments. Those ex post differences were also
visible in ex ante implied volatility differences of stock prices. Banks
that paid their risk managers more experienced less ex ante risk and
less ex post loss.
While risk managers, acting in the interest of their own
stockholders, are the first line of defence against imprudent investing,
prudential supervision and regulation is the second line of defense. If
prudential regulation measures risk accurately, and requires the
budgeting of sufficient capital to absorb risk, then agency problems
should be substantially mitigated. The undesirable investments and the
concentration of risk that poorly managed institutions would fail to
observe and prevent should run afoul of the capital budgeting process
required by effective prudential regulation, enforced by attentive
prudential supervisors. Only ff regulations and supervisors fail to
establish a framework capable of accurately measuring risk and requiring
an adequate amount of capital (i.e., an amount sufficient to absorb
losses commensurate with that risk), can the failures of risk managers
lead to the disastrous level of excessive risk-taking observed in firms
like Citibank, UBS, Merrill Lynch, and AIG.
That is the sense in which ineffective prudential supervision and
regulation bears a significant share of the blame for the disasters that
befell those institutions. The failure of supervisors and regulators to
measure risk has been the rule rather than the exception in banking for
the past three decades, in the United States and abroad. Under the Basel
system--unbelievably--the risks of the largest banks are measured in two
ways: by employing rating agency opinions about the debts the
institutions hold to gauge the risk of those debts, and by asking the
banks themselves what they believe their risk is. Obviously, relying on
banks to gauge their own risks prevents prudential regulation and
supervision from identifying and correcting errors in risk measurement
and management that are occurring within the banks. The opinions of
rating agencies are also unreliable (as discussed further below), and
this has been known since at least the early 1990s (Cantor and Packer
1994, Calomiris 2009a). The regulatory use of ratings to control risk
means that regulated buy-side investors (at banks, pensions, mutuals,
and insurance companies) prefer that ratings be inflated. Ratings
inflation relaxes suitability rules and capital requirements that
otherwise would bind more tightly on the regulated buy side, and in
particular, rating inflation allows buy-side banks and insurance
companies to budget less equity capital when making their investments.
Given investors' natural desire to avoid regulatory mandates--which
is more pronounced if agency problems are present--rating agencies have
every incentive to cater to the preferences of their buy-side clients,
who prefer ratings inflation.
Not only has the regulatory framework failed to provide adequate ex
ante protection against aggressive risk-taking, supervision has also
failed to identify losses on a timely basis once they have occurred. The
pattern of delayed recognition of loss has been visible in many
countries for decades, and is generally understood to reflect a
combination of low supervisory effort (it is not their money, after
all), low supervisory skills (the smartest people are paid princely sums
to hide losses from less-smart and less-highly paid supervisory folk),
and the pressuring of supervisors by government officials to
"forebear" (that is, purposefully to delay the recognition of
losses) in the interest of postponing bank failures and continuing the
flow of bank credit.
Japanese banks in the 1990s pretended for a decade that their
losses were much smaller than they actually were, which allowed them to
delay the economic and political costs of recapitalizing, effectively
permitting banks to continue to gamble with the house's money (the
implied backing of the taxpayers) in a "heads I win, tails you
lose" game of "resurrection risk-taking." The Mexican
bank supervisory authorities allowed Mexican banks to pretend that their
capital was much larger than it was for several years after the Mexican
crisis of 1995, and only strengthened their accounting rules for loss
recognition as banks' profits and portfolio values rose
sufficiently to allow the banks to meet the more stringent and realistic
criteria. U.S. recognition of bank and thrift losses in the 1980s was
postponed for many years (until after the 1988 election) to avoid the
political consequences of recognizing the magnitude of those losses, and
avoiding the disruption that regulators feared might accompany an honest
accounting of the money center banks.
Notwithstanding an attempt to address the loss recognition problem
through FDICIA's prompt corrective action regime, the same pattern
was "visible in the post-FDICIA period (before and during the
recent crisis); failing banks were not identified as weak and forced to
recapitalize before they became insolvent. Contrary to the promise of
FDICIA, banks can lose capital over a long period of time with impunity,
as supervisors and regulators fail to force banks to recapitalize before
it is too late.
Calomiris and Herring (2011) calculate the ratio of the market
value of equity relative to the market value of assets of the largest
U.S. financial institutions from 2006 to 2008. That ratio declined
persistently over many months prior to the September 2008 collapse. The
market for equity capital was wide open, and in the year prior to
September 2008 global banks raised about $450 billion in new capital
(Calomiris 2009a). But Merrill Lynch, Lehman, and AIG (among others)
chose not to raise substantial amounts of capital prior to September
2008, in hopes that equity prices would rise, allowing them to
recapitalize with less dilution of existing stockholders. And regulators
did not intervene to force them to raise capital. The bailout of Bear
Stearns (and the expectation of too-big-to-fail protection that resulted
from that bailout) further encouraged the delay in raising capital,
since banks felt protected on the downside if matters got worse.
If the measurement of risk and the measurement of loss are such
crucial problems in prudential regulation and supervision, then why
haven't these problems commanded more attention? After all,
Treasury Secretary Geithner argued before Congress that the key to
effective reform was "capital, capital, capital." Of course,
sufficient capital is essential, both to discourage banks from wilfully taking on excessive risk (because they are playing with the house's
money), and because capital is the absorber of shock that keeps banks
from failing when adverse shocks occur. But the emphasis should be on
maintaining a sufficient amount of capital commensurate with risk. If
equity capital is raised by 2 or 3 percentage points (as envisioned
under the new Basel rules) but banks are free to increase risk as much
as they like, then banks can offset the stabilizing effect of higher
capital with higher risk.
The importance of budgeting capital relative to risk is illustrated
nicely by the experience of the recent crisis. Differences in bank
capital ratios prior to the crisis did not predict which banks would
suffer the worst fates during the crisis. Some of the banks with
relatively high amounts of equity did very poorly (Citibank being an
obvious example), while other banks with lower capital ratios (e.g.,
Goldman Sachs) survived much better. In April 9.006, Citibank's
market equity ratio (defined as the ratio of Citibank's market
value of equity relative to the sum of the market value of equity and
the face value of debt) was above 13 percent, while Goldman Sachs market
equity ratio was half that (Calomiris and Herring 2011). The obvious
source of the difference between the experiences of the two institutions
was their levels of risk, not their capital ratios.
Furthermore, choosing an initial capital level during good times
does not guarantee that capital will be maintained. When banks suffer
loan losses, those losses destroy capital. If supervisors fail to
recognize those losses, book values of capital will become overstated,
and will cease to be an adequate buffer for future losses.
In summary, the focus of prudential capital regulations must be on
the credible measurement of risk and the budgeting of capital
commensurate with that risk, and the amount of capital must be monitored
continuously to ensure that it has not disappeared as the result of
losses. These challenges have a technical component, but they are not
merely or even mainly technical. For the measurement of risk to be
credible, the incentives of the party doing the measurement are the key
factor. Banks cannot be trusted to measure their own risks, and (under
existing incentives) rating agencies cannot be trusted to measure
banks' risks either.
Before deposits were protected by government insurance, depositors
(especially large, informed depositors, many of which were bankers
themselves) played the role of supervising banks, imposing discipline on
banks that were seen as too risky by withdrawing their deposits, which
forced banks to deleverage, and encouraged transparent and credible risk
management. In the absence of that discipline, weakly incentivized
government-employed supervisors, many of whom are less skilled than
their more highly paid counterparts at the banks, and who rely on the
opinions of conflicted parties to measure risk and capital, are unlikely
to provide a substitute for that sort of discipline. The key to
resolving the incentive problems of adequate prudential capital
regulation, therefore, comes down to finding ways to produce and use
information about ex ante risk and ex post loss that are informed and
"incentive-robust," by which I mean that the measures are not
undermined by the incentives of banks, rating agencies, supervisors,
regulators, and politicians to understate both ex ante risk and ex post
loss.
Too Big to Fail
After the bailout of Bear Stearns, large and complex financial
institutions with global reach had a reasonable expectation (albeit not
a sure thing) that if they faced mounting losses, the government would
step in to provide some assistance in support of an orderly acquisition
by another firm, as it did in JP Morgan's acquisition of Bear
Stearns. During the crisis, that expectation of protection likely led
Merrill Lynch, Lehman, and others to delay the issuance of substantial
amounts of stock, especially in the summer of 2008. Firms reasoned that
prices could improve, and sought to avoid the dilutive consequences of
issuing stock into an illiquid and worried market.
Whatever the economic pros and cons of too-big-to-fail bailouts,
the path of least political resistance will generally be to bail out
large, complex firms. It is hard to manage the orderly transfer of
control over operations, assets, and liabilities of large firms with
complex subsidiary structures, operating in many countries and engaged
in a large number of counterparty transactions with other large
financial institutions. Without a clear and credible plan (a so-called
living will) in place that would guide the orderly transfer of
operations, assets, and liabilities, and allocate losses in a way that
would be transparent, legally enforceable, and perceived as unlikely to
create further knock-on failures related to losses imposed on
counterparties, the pressure for the government to avoid potential
problems with a bailout will be too tempting. Furthermore, the
coincidence of the failure of Lehman and the post-September 2008
financial collapse has decreased the prospect for "tough love"
decisions in the future.
Reform proposals to address too-big-to-fail usually focus on the
creation of credible procedures for taking control of troubled financial
behemoths in a way that would limit adverse systemic consequences of
their failure while avoiding blanket bailouts of creditors and
stockholders. The too-big-to-fail problem also adds urgency to the need
to design reforms that would address the key challenges of credible risk
measurement and loss measurement; too-big-to-fail protection aggravates
the incentives of large institutions to minimize equity capital and
raise risks in order to profit from risk-taking at public expense.
Dodd-Frank to the Rescue?
Yogi Beta might have said of the Dodd-Frank Act of 9010,
"It's deja vu all over again!" As in the regulatory
response to the 1980s crises, regulatory reformers have promulgated many
prudential reforms, including new capital standards, new supervisory
procedures, and new protocols resolving "too-big-to-fail"
financial institutions, which advocates say will end taxpayer-supported
bailouts of large banks. And once again, the three core problems of the
subsidization of housing finance risk, the failure to credibly measure
bank risk and loss, and the too-big-to-fail problem remain largely
unaddressed by the reforms.
Although Dodd-Frank calls for the imposition of higher capital on
banks, especially on systemically important financial institutions, its
very long list of new regulatory initiatives and mandated studies does
little to address the problem of risk measurement and nothing to address
the problem of credible loss measurement and timely replacement of
capital.
The one important change in the Act with respect to risk
measurement is the elimination of the regulatory use of rating agency
opinions. It may make sense to eliminate the regulatory use of ratings
eventually (which has been the primary source of the incentive for
ratings inflation). But absent a better measure of risk, eliminating
ratings only adds more weight to the internal assessments that banks
make of their own risks. Furthermore, ratings are currently an integral
part of the Basel system of measuring risk, in which the United States
remains a key participant. For both reasons, there are already many
calls for repealing the elimination of the regulatory use of ratings.
After the bailouts of Bear Steams and AIG, and Lehman's
chaotic failure, Congress and the Obama administration regarded the
status quo of available resolution procedures for large financial
institutions as unacceptable. In 9008, the government chose between, on
the one hand, extremely generous bailouts (as in Bear Stears and AIG,
where their creditors remained whole and even their stockholders avoided
being wiped out), and on the other hand, allowing a potentially
disorderly failure (as in Lehman). The goal of Dodd-Frank's
resolution reform was to find a middle way--to give the government the
power to take over failed firms in an orderly manner, avoiding adverse
systemic consequences while imposing some losses on creditors and
stockholders.
The reforms of bank and nonbank resolution procedures under
Dodd-Frank are meant to address the too-big-to-fail problem by creating
new powers and procedures that will govern the resolution of large bank
and nonbank financial institutions. My reading of Dodd-Frank, however,
offers little hope that generous bailouts of creditors will be avoided
in the future. Despite the stated intentions to impose costs on
creditors, the likely path of least political resistance will be
generous bailouts, rubber-stamped by whichever politicians, judges, and
bureaucrats are asked to provide their approval. Financial institutions
in trouble will argue that anything less will bring the world to an end,
and few politicians, bureaucrats, or judges will want to bear the
personal risks of standing in the way. That is especially so when one
considers that the funding for those bailouts will take the form of a
special assessment on large financial firms. That tax will, of course,
be borne by the clients of those banks just as if the taxpayers had paid
for the bailouts from general government funds, but politicians will
still find comfort in claiming that special assessments imposed on banks
avoid costs to taxpayers. For these reasons, I see Dodd-Frank's new
resolution authority as likely to result in the institutionalization of
bailouts, rather than their avoidance.
That is not to say that there is no hope for improving Dodd-Frank
resolution policies. The key to achieving some improvement is to add
rule-based constraints to the process to ensure some expectation of loss
on the part of creditors of failed institutions, even in a
taxpayer-assisted resolution. Expected losses by creditors of failed
firms would encourage the ex ante market discipline necessary to
restrict excessive risk-taking.
What Would Work Better?
In this section, I briefly describe a set of proposed reforms that
would address the four fundamental problems outlined above: (1)
distortions induced by mortgage risk subsidization, and the prudential
regulatory challenges of (2) inaccurate risk measurement, (3) inaccurate
loss measurement, and (4) too-big-to-fail bailouts. A fuller program for
reform addressing a broader range of issues is presented in Calomiris
(2011b); here I focus on the parts of that program that pertain only to
the aforementioned four goals.
A central principle that should guide all proposed reforms is
"incentive robustness." An incentive-robust reform is one that
satisfies two key criteria: (1) market participants will not find it
easy to circumvent it via regulatory arbitrage, and (2) supervisors,
regulators, and politicians will have incentives to enforce it. Indeed,
I suggest that all future proponents of regulatory reforms should have
to fill out an "incentive scorecard" in which they explain why
they believe that their proposed reforms would meet these two
incentive-robustness criteria.
Eliminating Mortgage Risk Subsidization
The central problem in mortgage risk subsidization has become the
tolerance for extremely high leverage by government-subsidized lenders.
Without high leverage the subprime boom and bust could not have
happened. In particular, risky no-docs lending (a major driver in the
subprime loss experience) was made possible by high leverage;
noncreditworthy borrowers would have been unwilling to deceive lenders
if they had been required to pledge a large amount of their own savings
as a downpayment. House price declines would not have produced huge loan
losses if homeowners had retained, say, a minimum 20 percent stake in
their homes.
During the 1990s and 2000s leverage tolerances on U.S.
government-guaranteed mortgages rose steadily and dramatically at
FHA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. The average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
of FHA mortgages rose to 96 percent, and a third of Fannie and
Freddie's purchases leading up to their insolvencies had LTVs of
greater than 95 percent. Not only are high LTVs destabilizing, they
undermine the objectives of housing policy. Its central goal is
promoting stronger communities by encouraging residents to have a stake
in them. But a 97 percent LTV creates a trivial stake; homeowners become
renters in disguise, able to abandon homes at little cost.
I propose a three-part plan for redesigning housing finance: First,
replace leverage subsidies with means-tested downpayment assistance
alongside reduced LTVs; second, offer means-tested assistance in
mitigating interest rate risk; and third, offer means-tested,
tax-favored savings accounts for would-be homeowners.
An obvious alternative to subsidizing mortgage risk is subsidizing
down payments. This is the approach of Australia's
(nonmeans-tested) housing policy, which gives A$7,000 to all first-time
home buyers. An improved variant would offer means-tested subsidies for
first-time home buyers, while also phasing in increases in minimum down
payments. For example, first-time home buyers with houses worth less
than a (regionally adjusted) maximum, who earn less than a maximum
family income, would be eligible for a lump sum housing grant equal to
the smaller of, say, $10,000 or 30 percent of the down payment on their
home.
Minimum down payments on all mortgages would rise by, say, 1
percent a year over 17 years to the new minimum of 20 percent.
Phasing in the rising down-payment requirement would avoid
disruptive declines in housing prices that might result from a sudden
change in mortgage finance. Given the potential for government bailouts
of mortgages even when they were not explicitly part of any government
program, this rising minimum should apply to all mortgages, not just
those of buyers receiving explicit government assistance.
Recipients of down-payment assistance would pay no interest on
their grants. The assistance would take the form of a junior equity lien
on their homes (senior to their own equity investments, but junior to
mortgages). Principal would be repaid in full upon sale or refinancing
of the house.
Reducing the cost of locking in a long-term fixed rate--of
particular importance to low-income households--should be the second
part of supporting affordable housing. Rather than providing invisible
interest rate subsidies through FHA, Fannie, and Freddie, the government
should subsidize low-income buyers of privately supplied mortgage
interest rate swaps (limiting the subsidy to, say, the lower of $5,000
or 30 percent of the cost of the swap).
Tax-favored treatment of savings accounts that could be used by
low- and moderate-income families to accumulate adequate down payments
would further encourage "skin in the game." Given that
low-income Americans pay little or no income tax, it may be desirable to
allow some reduction in payroll taxes on funds placed into "Home
Savings Accounts."
The small costs (relative to current programs) of these proposals
include: the time value of money and losses from default on downpayment
assistance, the cost of interest rate swap subsidies, and forgone
payroll taxes. All these costs should be recognized explicitly in the
government's budget. These programs would replace existing implicit
mortgage risk subsidies provided through FHA, Fannie, and Freddie. FHA
mortgage guarantees would end, Fannie's and Freddie's assets
would be sold into the market; and Federal Home Loan Banks would also be
phased out.
Measuring Risk: Credit Rating Agency Reform
What is the evidence that rating agencies performed badly in
measuring credit risk on the debts that they rate? Were rating agencies
suborned, and if so, by whom and to what purpose? The evidence of rating
agency failure shows up in inflated ratings and low-quality ratings. The
inflation of ratings is the purposeful underestimation of default risk
on rated debts. Low-quality ratings are ratings based on flawed measures
of underlying risk. The recent collapse of subprime-related
securitizations revealed both problems in the extreme.
What harm do these deficiencies do? Inflation subverts the intent
of regulations that use ratings to control risk-taking, resulting in
ineffectual prudential regulation. If rating inflation is accompanied by
low-quality ratings, this causes deeper problems. Investors can
"reverse engineer" a debt rating that is merely inflated and
recover the true measure of risk; the revelation of severe flaws in risk
modelling that usually occur in response to a financial shock leaves
investors unsure how to price the debts they are holding, and unwilling
to buy additional debts of similar securitizations, resulting in severe
market disruption.
Evidence abounds that severe errors in subprime ratings were
predictable. The two most important modelling errors relating to
subprime risk were both assumptions that contradicted logic and
experience, namely that U.S. house prices could not decline, and that
the underwriting of no-docs mortgages would not lead to a severe
deterioration in borrower quality (Rajan, Seru, and Vig 2011).
Who was behind these biased models? Many policymakers incorrectly
believe that securitization sponsors are the constituency that controls
ratings. That is false. Ratings that exaggerated the quality of
securitized debts were demanded by the buy-side of the market (i.e., the
institutional investors whose portfolio purchases are being regulated
according to the ratings that are attached to those purchases) because
inflated ratings benefited them.
Ratings that understate risk are helpful to institutional investors
because they (1) increase institutional investors' flexibility in
investing, (2) reduce the amount of capital institutions have to
maintain against their investments (the objective of re-remics alchemy),
and (3) increase their perceived risk-adjusted profitability in the eyes
of less-sophisticated ultimate investors (mutual fund, bank, and
insurance company shareholders, pensioners, or policyholders) by making
it appear that a AAA-rated investment is earning a AA-rated return.
If buyers wish rating agencies to inflate ratings to overcome
regulatory hurdles and make them appear more favorable in the eyes of
their ultimate investors, rating agencies can reap substantial profits
from catering to buyers' demands for inflated ratings, This has an
important implication: rating inflation on securitized debts is done at
the behest of the buy-side.
Consider the case of the collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
market. CDOs were constructed using unsold debts from other
securitizations (often subprime MBS). CDO issuance volume increased
dramatically in the early 2000s, rising from $100-150 billion a year in
1998-2004 to $250 billion in 2005 and $500 billion in 2006.
Were institutional investors aware of the high risk of CDOs prior
to the 2006 boom? Yes. Moody's published data on the five-year
probability of default, as of December 2005, for Baa CDO tranches of
CDOs which showed that these Baa debts had a 20 percent five-year
probability of default, in contrast to Baa corporate debts, which showed
only a 2 percent five-year probability of default. Despite the rhetoric
rating agencies publish claiming to maintain uniformity in rating
scales, institutional investors knew better: in 2005 CDO debts of a
given rating were 10 times as risky as similarly rated corporate debts.
Why did institutional investors play this game? Asset managers were
placing someone else's money at risk and earning huge salaries,
bonuses, and management fees for being willing to pretend that these
were reasonable investments. On one occasion, when one agency was
uninvited by a sponsor from providing a rating (because the rating
agency did not offer to approve as high a percentage limit for AAA debt
as the other agencies), that agency warned a prominent institutional
investor not to participate as a buyer but was rebuffed with the
statement: "We have to put our money to work."
Strong evidence that buy-side investors encouraged the debasement of the ratings process comes from the phenomenon of "ratings
shopping." Before actually requesting that a rating agency rate
something, sponsors ask rating agencies to tell them, hypothetically,
how much AAA debt they would allow to be issued against a given pool of
securities being put into the CDO portfolio. If a rating agency gives
too conservative an answer relative to its competitors, the sponsor just
uses another rating agency.
It is crucial to recognize, however, that for ratings shopping to
result in a race to the bottom in ratings, the race to the bottom must
be welcomed by the buyers; if institutional investors punish the absence
of a relatively good agency's rating of an offering (by refusing to
buy or paying a sufficiently lower price), then would-be ratings
shoppers would have no incentive to exclude relatively reputable rating
agencies. Thus, the evidence that ratings shopping tends to produce a
race to the bottom implies that the buy side favors the low-quality,
inflated ratings that result from the race to the bottom.
Under pressure from Fitch, Congress and the SEC also played a role
in encouraging the debasement of ratings of subprime MBS and related
securities. Congress passed legislation in 2006 that prodded the SEC to
propose "anti-notching" regulations that would have
facilitated ratings shopping in the subprime MBS market.
"Notching" arose when CDO sponsors brought a pool of
securities to a rating agency to be rated which included debts (often
subprime MBS) not previously rated by that rating agency. When asked to
rate the CDOs that contained those subprime MBS, Moody's, say,
would offer either to rate the underlying MBS from scratch, or to notch
(adjust by ratings downgrades) the ratings that had been given by, say,
Fitch.
The new anti-notching rules would have forced each rating agency to
accept ratings of other agencies without adjustment when rating CDO
pools. This policy constituted an attack on any remaining conservatism
within the ratings industry: trying to swim against the tide of ratings
inflation would put a rating agency at risk of running afoul of its
regulator.
Once one recognizes that the core constituency for low-quality and
inflated ratings is the buy-side in the securitized debt market, that
carries important implications for reform, Proposals that would require
buy-side investors to pay for ratings, rather than the current practice
of having securitization sponsors pay for ratings, would have no effect
in improving ratings.
Any solution to the problem must make it profitable for rating
agencies to issue high-quality, non-inflated ratings, notwithstanding
the demand for low-quality, inflated ratings by institutional investors.
This can be accomplished by objectifying the meaning of ratings,
and linking fees earned by rating agencies to their performance. If fees
are linked to the quality of objectified ratings, then ratings agencies
would find it unprofitable to cater to buy-side preferences for
inflated, low-quality ratings. How could this be done?
Require all agencies wishing to qualify as Nationally Recognized
Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs)--the rating agencies whose
ratings are used in regulation--to submit ratings for regulatory
purposes that link letter grades to specific estimates of the
probability of default. For example, for NRSRO purposes BBB could be
defined as a forecast of a 2 percent five-year probability of default
from the date of origination, and A could be defined as a forecast of a
1 percent five-year probability of default.
Once the ratings are equated to numbers, rating agencies could be
held accountable for their ratings. For example, if an NRSRO's
ratings at origination for a particular product were found to be
persistently inflated to an egregious (quantitatively defined) degree,
then it would face a penalty. That penalty could "claw back"
fees the agency had earned on that product (enforced by requiring that
agencies post some of their fees as a "bond" to draw upon).
Alternatively, a rating agency found to have exaggerated its ratings
could simply lose its NRSRO status for a brief time (say, several
months), which would also provide powerful incentives not to inflate.
The second approach likely would be the easier one to implement. It
would be desirable to use a several-year moving average of actual
experience when gauging performance, That approach would preserve the
"through the [business] cycle" quality of ratings and also
ensure a sufficient sample size. The universe of rated products would be
divided into several categories (MBS, credit cards, etc.). Each category
would use an identical defirfition of BBB and A (2 percent and I percent
probabilities of default). If either the five-year backward looking
moving averages of the proportion of rated BBB tranches or the
proportion of rated A tranches substantially exceeded their 2 percent
and 1 percent respective benchmarks, then the rating agency would be
barred from providing ratings for regulatory purposes for that class of
debt instruments for several months. The threshold for substantially
exceeding the 2 percent target could be 4 percent, and the threshold for
substantially exceeding the 1 percent target could be 2 percent. The
reason to focus on BBB and A is that these are sufficiently risky that
their default experience will be observable over short periods of time.
If A and BBB ratings are reasonably accurate, that will go a long way in
constraining the overrating of the related AA and AAA tranches.
Why is this approach to ratings reform incentive-robust? First, it
creates strong incentives for rating agencies to provide high-quality,
non-inflated ratings. If a rating agency is suspended from being able to
provide NRSRO ratings for a significant period of time on a class of
debt, that would have a major impact on their fees. Second, there is no
discretionary role for supervisors, regulators, or politicians in this
proposal, and thus no concern that they will shirk or forbear from
enforcement. And the record of ratings is observable to the public,
ensuring that no hidden forbearance could occur.
Using Loan Spreads to Measure Loan Default Risk
For debts held by banks, reformed ratings could provide reasonably
accurate measures of default risk, but how can regulators credibly
measure the default risk of bank loans? Ashcraft and Morgan (2003) show
that, not surprisingly, interest rate spreads (all-in interest cost on
the loan minus the comparable maturity riskless interest rate) are
accurate forecasters of the probability that a loan will become
nonperforming. In Argentina in the 1990s, interest rate spreads were
used as a measure of loan risk for purposes of budgeting capital buffers
for loans; higher loan spreads required higher capital budgeted in
support of the loan. As Calomiris and Powell (2001) show, the Argentine
approach to prudential regulation worked quite well in the 1990s.
This means of measuring risk is incentive-robust because banks
cannot easily circumvent it. Clearly, banks would not have an incentive
to lower interest rates just to reduce their capital budgeting against a
loan, since doing so would reduce their income. To avoid any attempt to
manipulate the formula using teaser rates, regulation should use the
highest possible all-in spread during the life of the loan as the
measure of the all-in spread. If this rule had been applied to subprime
loans, the capital budgeted against those loans would have been
substantially higher, and the subprime boom and boost might never have
occurred.
Measuring Loss and Ensuring the Timely Replacement of Capital
Calomiris and Herring (2011) develop a contingent capital
certificate (CoCo) requirement proposal whose primary intent is to
identify equity losses and incentivize banks to replace lost equity with
new offerings on a timely basis. Calomiris and Herring (2011) show that
the large declines in the market equity ratios of large U.S. and
European banks occurred gradually over many months. Markets for raising
new equity were open, and there was plenty of time to raise capital, but
some banks (most notably, Lehman and Merrill) avoided significant equity
issues, which they viewed as dilutive, hoping the crisis would pass and
they would be able to avoid issuing equity or issue it at a higher
price. And even most of the banks that issued significant amounts of
capital prior to September 2008 allowed their market equity ratios to
decline dramatically over the period from March 2007 to March 2008.
Calomiris and Herring (2011) show that CoCos, if properly designed,
would be an incentive-robust means of encouraging the timely replacement
of lost capital. The three key features of that proper design are: (1) a
sufficiently large quantity of CoCos (e.g., roughly equal as a
proportion of assets to the tier 1 capital ratio, which they also
propose raising significantly above its current required ratio), (2) a
conversion trigger based on the moving average of the market equity
ratio, and (3) a sufficiently dilutive conversion ratio, if conversion
occurs.
The market equity ratio is a desirable trigger because it is an
observable and forward-looking market indicator of the value of bank
equity capital. Using a market trigger means that the implementation of
CoCo conversion is automatic, rather than subject to regulatory
discretion (as is the case when the trigger is defined using a book
value of equity ratio). Using the market equity ratio as the trigger
avoids supervisory forbearance problems, and also implies that the
prospective variation over time in the ratio can be modelled
quantitatively, which also permits the embedded conversion option to be
priced by the market (a highly desirable feature for any financial
instrument).
By making conversion predictable, by making the amount of converted
CoCos sufficiently large, and by making the conversion ratio
sufficiently dilutive, the prospect of a triggered conversion would be
so dilutive of existing stock that management would be keen to avoid
conversion, if possible. Since the conversion trigger is based on the
market equity ratio, banks could avoid conversion by issuing equity into
the market to replace lost equity. Thus, the key advantage of a properly
designed CoCo requirement is the incentive that it provides for the
voluntary timely replacement of lost capital via preemptive issues of
equity that are intended to avoid conversion. In cases where equity
offerings are not feasible (e.g., if the decline in equity is caused by
reports of accounting fraud), then a sufficient decline in the market
equity ratio would trigger conversion of the CoCos, which would reduce
the amount of debt and debt service payments made by the bank, and thus
improve its prospects for surviving, and reduce resolution costs to
taxpayers if it fails.
Reforming Too-Big-to-Fail Resolution Policy
The above reforms to risk measurement, loss measurement, and the
encouragement of timely replacement of lost capital would go a long way
toward reducing the moral hazard problems and taxpayer loss exposures
associated with the too-big-to-fail problem. There is also potential for
improving the resolution procedures under DoddFrank in a way that would
make the imposition of losses on creditors of large failed banks more
credible, which would also ameliorate the moral hazard and fiscal costs
of too big to fail.
As discussed above, Dodd-Frank institutionalizes the bailouts of
creditors of large, complex banks that fail. FDIC officials and
politicians,
of course, deny this, and argue that they can be trusted to use their
discretion to impose losses on creditors. Maybe, but why not be sure?
Why not require that any deviations from strict priority enforcement of
creditors' rights during a resolution (i.e,, bailouts) must impose
a minimum haircut on unsecured creditors of, say, 10 percent of
principal and all accrued interest? Adding this simple amendment to
Dodd-Frank would place a hard limit on discretionary bailouts, and thus
put a roadblock on the political path of least resistance.
Why not make the minimum haircut 20 or 30 percent of principal plus
all accrued interest? There certainly may be good economic arguments in
favor of a larger minimum haircut than 10 percent of principal, but
there is an incentive-robustness argument against raising the minimum
haircut to too high a proportion of the debt exposure: If politicians
and regulators can make a reasonable sounding argument about potential
"systemic risks" from "daisy chains" of failing
banks, brought down by the losses imposed on concentrated exposures to a
failed counterparty, then that could encourage ad hoc bailouts that
sidestep the rules-based resolution system established under the law. If
that seems farfetched, note that this is precisely what happened during
the recent crisis: the FDICIA safeguards against bailing out uninsured
bank creditors simply were put aside in the heat of the moment.
The implication is clear: If a rule has too much tough love, it
will be less credible. That is a reason to limit minimum haircuts to 10
percent, a number too small to permit a reasonable fear of systemic
risks from counterparty losses of failing banks. In other words, no
counterparty would be able to argue reasonably that losing 10 percent of
the principal of the debts it holds from another large bank would create
systemic risk.
The Clear ex ante Allocation of Legal and Regulatory Authority over
Resolution
It is much harder to impose losses on creditors of failed global
banks if the regulatory and legal authorities governing the disposition
of the assets and liabilities of the bank are not clearly established in
advance. During the Lehman bankruptcy, for some of the assets of the
company it was not clear which country's subsidiary had legal
ownership of those assets. Banks, of course, have little incentive to
clarify such matters in advance, since the lack of clarity improves
their chance of receiving a bailout.
It is not realistic to expect legal systems or regulatory systems
to be able to coordinate actions effectively in real time on an ad hoc
basis in the middle of a crisis, especially since the regulators will
often have conflicting incentives (each will want to maximize his claim
on assets, and minimize his claim on liabilities). It is necessary,
therefore, to establish a "ring-fencing" approach, whereby
every asset and liability of the bank is assigned in advance, as part of
a "living will," to a particular location. Those assignments
should be approved in advance and in writing by the regulatory
authorities of each of the countries in which the bank operates, to
ensure accountability and to avoid potential disagreements during the
crisis. This arrangement would make speedy and orderly resolution
possible, and thus encourage the imposition of haircuts on failed
banks' creditors, thereby mitigating too-big-to-fail problems. And,
of course, this is just one of the many aspects of resolution that
should be dealt with in advance by the living will, to ensure a speedy,
orderly, and predictable means of resolving failed global banks.
Conclusion
Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is possible to craft fairly
simple rules that would be effective in meeting the main challenges that
have destabilized the U.S. financial system in the past several decades.
Indeed, simpler rules (which tend to be more transparent and
predictable, and therefore, more credible) are more effective,
particularly if they are crafted to be "incentive-robust."
Incentive-robust rules (which take into account the incentives of market
participants, supervisors, regulators, and politicians) are designed to
be difficult for market participants to circumvent, and easy for
supervisors, regulators, and politicians to enforce.
This article argues that four crucial goals of financial reform-(1)
the elimination of destabilizing subsidization of mortgage risk by the
government, (2) the credible measurement of bank risk and the
establishment of prudential capital requirements commensurate with that
risk, (3) the credible measurement of loss and the incentivizing of the
timely replacement of lost capital, and (4) the reduction of
too-big-to-fail costs associated with moral hazard and taxpayer exposure
to bank losses--are attainable through simple, incentive-robust rules.
Those proposed rules include (1) the replacement of mortgage risk
subsidization with a new means-tested down-payment assistance program,
(2) the reform of the regulatory use of ratings that would quantify the
meaning of debt ratings and hold NRSROs accountable financially for
egregious inaccuracy in forecasting the probability of default of rated
debts, (3) the use of loan interest rate spreads to forecast
non-performing loans for purposes of budgeting capital to absorb loan
default risk, (4) the establishment of a contingent capital (CoCo)
requirement that would measure loss and incentivize large banks to
replace lost capital in a timely way, (5) a reform of resolution
procedures for large financial institutions that would require a minimum
haircut on unsecured creditors whenever the resolution authority employs
taxpayer funds in the resolution (i.e., whenever there is a departure
from the enforcement of strict priority in the resolution process), and
(6) the establishment, as part of the "living wills" of global
financial institutions that govern their prospective resolution, of
clearly demarcated lines of legal and regulatory jurisdiction over the
disposition of all the assets and liabilities within the bank.
This program of reform would be effective in addressing the real
challenges that have threatened our financial system for decades, and
continue to threaten it. And this approach would avoid much of the
collateral damage that comes from the many hundreds of pages of costly
and misguided mandates and limits that can be found in the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010.
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(1) Similarly, while loose monetary policy undoubtedly contributed
to the underpricing of risk in 2002-05, and the housing and mortgage
bubbles that culminated in the subprime crisis, the history of banking
crises across countries and over time suggests that monetary policy
errors alone are generally not enough to produce severe banking crises.
Severe banking crises result from the incentives to finance risky assets
during an asset price boom with high leverage. History suggests that
absent microeconomic distortions, asset price booms and busts produced
by monetary policy tend not to be associated with banking crises
(although there are some counterexamples). For an overview, see
Calomiris (2011a).
(2) For discussions of the effectiveness of deposit market
discipline in limiting banking system fragility, historically and today,
see Calomiris and Wilson (2004) and Calomiris and Powell (2001).
(3) Government subsidies can be created, and were created, through
a variety of mechanisms, including underpriced deposit insurance for
thrifts, underpriced mortgage insurance by FHA, unfunded CRA and
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) mandates that
effectively taxed businesses to finance the government-imposed subsidy,
and the implicit government guarantee of the debts of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.
(4) The federal government's actions in trying to prevent
"notching" is a little-known attempt to encourage the rating
agencies to relax their standards. See Calomiris (2009a, 2009b, 2009e)
for further discussion.
Charles W. Calomiris is the Henry Kaufman Professor of Financial
Institutions at Columbia Business School, and a Research Associate at
the National Bureau of Economic Research.