Unions, economic freedom, and growth.
Holcombe, Randall G. ; Gwartney, James D.
The freedom to enter into contracts and to direct the use of
economic resources one owns are essential to the operation of a market
economy. Allowing employees to form unions to bargain collectively over
wages and employment conditions is consistent with economic freedom, and
any government intervention preventing unionization would be a violation
of economic freedom. Nevertheless, American labor law, especially since
the 1930s, has 'altered the terms mad conditions under which unions
collectively bargain to heavily favor unions over the finns that hire
union labor. Labor law has given unions the power to dictate to
employees collective bargaining conditions, and has deprived employees
of the right to bargain for themselves regarding their conditions of
employment. While unions and economic freedom are conceptually
compatible, labor law in the United States, and throughout the world,
has restricted the freedom of contract between employees and employers.
The effect of unions on growth and prosperity can be examined at
two levels. Narrowly, one can examine the effects that union contracts
have had on unionized firms and industries. More broadly, one can look
at the way that unions have affected labor law. Unions have successfully
lobbied to increase the power of unions over firms, which in turn has
allowed unions to impose more constraining conditions on employers.
Union contracts likely would not contain some of the provisions they do
were it not for the bargaining power labor law gives unions relative to
the employers of union labor. Unions have 'also 'affected
labor law by lobbying for conditions under which nonunion labor can be
employed. Two notable examples are the minimum wage law and the
Davis-Bacon Act, which require the federal government to pay the local
prevailing wage rate--that is, the union wage rate--on all contracts.
If one takes the narrow view of simply evaluating the effects of
union workers and union contracts on growth mad prosperity, the effects
in the United States will be small and concentrated in a few industries.
If one takes the broader view of examining the effects of union-promoted
labor law that affects both union and nonunion workers, the effects will
be larger.
The most visible effects of unionization in the U.S. economy are,
first, the migration of the workforce away from unionized industries and
professions toward nonunion employment, and second, the decline in those
unionized firms and industries that have been unable to escape their
unions. While market forces appear to generate a movement of labor away
from unionized firms, those market forces are absent in public sector
employment, so while unionization in the private sector has declined, it
remains strong in the public sector. Looking ahead, perhaps the largest
ramifications of unionized employment in the United States will be felt
in the public sector, where unions have already imposed substantial
costs on governments in the form of unfunded pension and retirement
liabilities.
Economic Freedom and Prosperity
Freedom is something to be valued on its own merits, which provides
a fundamental reason to question labor laws that impinge on
workers' freedom of contract. Economic freedom also generates
prosperity, so labor laws that reduce economic freedom also have a
detrimental effect on a nation's standard of living. The evidence
on the relationship between economic freedom and prosperity is
substantial and persuasive. Mokyr (1990) and 'Landes (1998) provide
excellent historical accounts showing that since the beginning of the
industrial revolution, nations that have adopted the institutions of
economic freedom have grown and prospered, while those that have not
have languished in poverty.
Gwartney and Lawson (2005) have produced a quantitative measure of
economic freedom in their Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index,
which is updated annually. While the idea that free markets and
prosperity are linked has a long history, one might question what,
exactly, constitutes a free market, and how one might evaluate whether
some countries are more economically free than others. The EFW index was
designed to address this question, providing a quantitative measure of
economic freedom at a national level for 127 countries. The EFW index is
composed of 38 different measures of economic freedom, aggregated into
four major areas, which are then combined to get a single numerical
index for each country. The four major areas are: (1) Size of
Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises; (2) Legal Structure
and Security of Property Rights; (3) Freedom to Trade Internationally;
and (4) Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business.
Hundreds of studies have been undertaken using the EFW index as a
measure of the degree to which the existence of market institutions
affects outcomes in various dimensions. Berggren (2003) surveys a number
of these studies, and Gwartney and Lawson (2005) outline additional
results. Countries that have more economic freedom, as measured by the
EFW index, have on average higher per capita incomes, and countries that
increase their economic freedom exhibit higher rates of economic growth.
In addition, countries with more economic freedom have lower
unemployment rates, lower percentages of children in the labor force,
higher life expectancies, and more political freedom.
Labor market regulations, including the laws outlining the rights
and obligations of unions, are a component of economic freedom, but one
can see from the EFW index that many other factors come into play. Thus,
one would be hard-pressed to find a simple correlation between union
activity, labor law, and prosperity. Regulation of labor markets is a
small component of economic freedom, and while its effects on prosperity
are important, they will be small compared with other aspects of
economic freedom. In addition, there is not necessarily a close
correlation between labor market regulations and unionization. As
discussed in more detail below, some countries with low rates of
unionization have very restrictive labor laws. Unionization tells only a
small part of the story when looking at labor market restrictions on
economic freedom.
Unionization itself does not constitute a reduction ha economic
freedom, nor does it necessarily reduce prosperity. That depends on the
labor law that governs the rights of workers and the power of unions.
Unionization of labor is completely consistent with economic freedom.
People have property rights to their labor, and a right to control under
what conditions they exchange their labor for income. The right to
freedom of contract means that individuals have the right to join with
other individuals to bargain collectively over their terms of
employment. Similarly, freedom of contract also implies that employers
have no obligation to contract with a union, or to bargain collectively
if they choose not to. However, labor law has eroded those freedoms
rather than supported them, so in fact, unionization has compromised
economic freedom.
Labor Law in the United States
Throughout the 20th century, labor law ha the United States has
reduced the ability of individuals to contract for the terms of their
employment, and has reduced the ability of employers to contract with
the individuals they employ. Labor law has not only solidified the
rights of unions to bargain collectively for their employees; it has
compelled employees to be party to collective bargaining whether they
want to or not. Meanwhile, employers have no freedom to avoid entering
into collective bargaining with unions. They are required to bargain
"in good faith," which essentially means arriving at an
outcome satisfactory to union leaders. Reynolds (1987: chap. 2) gives a
good summary of the changes in U.S. labor law over the 20th century.
The first significant piece of union legislation in the 20th
century was the 1914 Clayton Act. It gave unions an exemption from the
provisions of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act, declared acts such as
picketing by unions to be lawful, and limited the use of court
injunctions in labor disputes. The biggest changes in labor law, though,
took place in the 1930s. The Davis-Bacon Act of 1931 required
government-financed construction projects to pay local prevailing wages
for labor, which essentially meant union wage rates. The Davis-Bacon Act
eliminated the ability of nonunion labor to compete by offering to work
for less. The 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act made nonunion employment
agreements unenforceable in federal courts, sheltered unions from
liability from wrongful actions under antitrust law, and gave unions
immunity from damages in private lawsuits. The 1935 Wagner Act, the most
significant piece of union legislation, specified as unfair a number of
labor practices that businesses had used to resist unions, and created
the federally appointed National Labor Relations Board to enforce the
Act. The creation of the NLRB allowed unions to avoid relying on court
decisions, which were more likely to be anti-union than those of a
politically appointed board. The NLRB enforced union elections, decided
who had the right to vote in union elections, and enforced monopoly
bargaining for all employees in a bargaining unit. The NLRB also
enforced union pay rates for all employees represented in the unit,
regardless of whether they were union members. This provision prevents
nonunion workers from competing for jobs by undercutting the
collectively bargained union wages.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 set a federal minimum wage for
many nonagricultural workers. Originally 25 cents an hour, the federal
minimum wage is now $7.25 an hour, and many states mandate minimum wages
higher than the federal minimum. While the minimum wage law does not
directly address union workers, it raises the cost of nonunion labor,
providing a benefit to unions by limiting nonunion price competition.
As a reaction to the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in
1947, which created a list of unfair labor practices to balance the
Wagner Act's list of unfair practices for employers. One of the
provisions of Taft-Hartley was to restrict union shops--where all
employees are required to be union members--to states that did not pass
right-to-work laws. A total of 22 states have passed right-to-work laws,
meaning that in those right-to-work states employees do not have to join
a union, even if the union undertakes collective bargaining for the
employees as a requirement of the Wagner Act. The Landrum-Griffin Act of
1959 enacted regulations on the internal affairs of labor unions and
established rides governing the relationships of unions with both
employers and union members.
The rhetoric in labor law tends to be couched in terms of
workers' rights, but review of U.S. labor law shows that in fact
workers have lost a substantial amount of their freedom to contract for
the terms of their employment, because labor law has given union leaders
the right to dictate conditions of employment. Of course, unions must
reach an agreement with employers, but here too employers have lost the
ability to negotiate with employees, being required by law to negotiate
"in good faith" with the union leadership. Also, employers are
covered by antitrust law, making employment agreements among employers
illegal, while unions are exempt from antitrust law, so there is no
limit to the scope of their bargaining power. For example, the United
Auto Workers is the bargaining agent for all unionized auto workers at
Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler, while those employers must bargain
individually with the union that controls the employees for 'all
three.
Baird (1984, chap. 3) gives a list of individual freedoms that have
been compromised by U.S. labor law. It gives unions the right to be
"exclusive representatives of all the employees" in a
bargaining unit, taking away individuals' freedom of contract;
makes it illegal for employers to refuse to bargain with unions, taking
away employers' freedom of contract; and requires employers to
bargain "in good faith," which has been interpreted to mean
arriving at an outcome that is satisfactory to the union.
The developments in 20th century U.S. labor law clearly show the
erosion of individual rights and economic freedom, especially through
the middle of the century. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act and 1959
Landrum-Griffin Act did give some control of employment conditions back
to workers, but the restrictions on freedom of contract imposed by labor
law clearly reduce economic freedom for employees whose conditions of
employment are governed by a union. There can be no doubt that the
result of 20th century labor law was to give economic power to union
leaders while reducing the economic freedom of both employers and
employees.
Labor Law in Other Countries
Other developed economies have seen even more bias in favor of
collective bargaining than the United States. Sometimes this has come in
the form of legal powers given to unions, but in other cases labor law
covers all workers in a nation, regardless of their union status. Botero
et al. (2004) note that countries with left-leaning politics tend to
have more stringent labor market regulations, and that countries with
French, Scandinavian, and socialist legal origins have higher levels of
labor regulation than common law countries.
Labor market regulation abridges freedom of contract, so national
laws erode economic freedom for employees and employers. In countries
with strong government labor regulations, union contracts have less
scope for influence. Botero et al. (2004) find that countries with more
regulated labor markets have higher unemployment and lower rates of
labor force participation, so the reduction in economic freedom is
associated with a reduction in employment. Unions influence labor law,
beyond a doubt, but unionization is less important precisely because of
the restrictive government labor laws that apply to all workers
regardless of their union status.
France is a good example of a nation with substantial restrictions
on economic freedom imposed by national labor laws. Siebert (1997) noted
that the French minimum wage was at about 60 percent of the median wage
in 1997, compared with 34 percent ha the United States. France attempted
to lower the minimum wage for workers under 25 in 1993, Saint-Paul
(1996: 297) reports. However, that attempt was extensively protested,
largely by people paid more than the minimum wage who viewed young
workers as threats to their employment, and the reform was withdrawn.
The political power of some reduced the economic freedom of others.
France also has high unemployment benefits, and labor law requires
substantial severance pay to employees who are terminated. France also
mandated a 35-hour work week for many workers in 2000. The mandate was
repealed in 2005, but in exchange for higher pay for extra hours of
work.
Faced with labor laws that made it very costly to terminate
employees, employers attempted to avoid those costs by hiring workers on
"determined duration contracts" (DDCs), which specify a
temporary term of employment. This creates a two-tier labor market where
some workers have permanent jobs with substantial protections while
others are in DDCs. However, Saint-Paul (1996) reports that France has
also limited the ability of employers to hire on DDCs, restricting them
only to work that is temporary in nature, and that more generally,
European governments have tried to restrict two-tier labor markets.
France restricted DDCs to a maximum of 12 months of employment in 1989
and limited the ability to use DCCs for newly created jobs.
Saint-Paul (1996) concludes that labor market laws in Europe are
designed to preserve the interests of those who are employed, reducing
labor market flexibility and increasing unemployment. Labor market
regulations that make it more costly to terminate employees make it more
costly to hire them in the first place. When there are high termination
costs imposed on the employer, making a hiring mistake can be very
costly, so employers are more reluctant to hire, which reduces total
employment. However, if workers can be terminated anytime at the
discretion of the employer, the employer can take a chance on hiring
someone if it might pay off.
Siebert (1997) notes stringent labor market regulations in other
European countries as well. Italy passed regulations on firing
procedures in 1966, and following strikes made firing costs prohibitive
by 1970. Regulations throughout the 1970s and 1980s did loosen firing
regulations and make it easier to hire DCCs, although restrictive labor
practices remain in place. Germany passed a host of regulations in the
1970s. Mandatory social plans were required in 1972 to close a firm,
unemployment benefits were raised, and in 1976 a codetermination law was
passed requiring that half the members of the supervisory boards of
large firms had to be labor representatives. By the 1970s most European
countries required dismissals to be approved by work councils, which
considered factors like marital status, the number of children, and the
worker's health in deciding whether the dismissal would be allowed.
The stated goal was to make employment more secure, but as Siebert
notes, the actual effect was to make it more costly to hire workers,
resulting in increased unemployment. Nickell (1997) finds that high
unionization, with collective bargaining for wages and no coordination
among employers leads to higher unemployment when looking at a
cross-section of developed economies, including those in Europe and
North America.
Labor market restrictions are not limited to mature economies.
Besley and Burgess (2004) present evidence from India that when labor
law gives workers more collective bargaining power relative to
employers, output, employment, and productivity tend to fall. As de Soto
(1990) notes, when regulatory restrictions make employment costly in
less-developed economies, people find employment in the underground
economy. However, this type of work places people outside many of the
protections of the legal system and the tax system, and makes long-term
contracts difficult to undertake, resulting in a negative effect on
productivity.
The literature shows that, as Gwartney and Lawson (2005) note,
labor market restrictions not only reduce the economic freedom of
employers and employees but also result in higher unemployment and
slower economic growth. Labor market restrictions are not synonymous
with union activity, however, and government-imposed labor law has even
more potential than union contracts to restrict economic freedom.
To help illustrate the tenuous relationship between labor market
restrictions and union activity, Table 1 shows the level of private
sector union density in a number of developed economies for 2005. Union
density, a common measure of the strength of unions, is defined as the
proportion of the labor force that is unionized, including union
coverage of workers not belonging to a union. Union density thus
includes workers who are in a collective bargaining unit but who are not
union members. Comparing across countries, the United States has a
relatively low private sector union density, but some countries with
very restrictive labor laws 'also have low union density.
The 12 percent union density in the United States is at the low end
of the range. France, at 8 percent, is the lowest, despite very
restrictive labor laws. Korea's union density is about 10 percent,
but most countries have union densities much greater than the United
States. Sweden tops out Table 1 with a union density of 76.5 percent,
and Finland's union density exceeds 72 percent. One can see that
comparing union density across countries, union penetration in the U.S.
private sector is relatively low by international standards.
Many more workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements
than just unionized workers. In some countries--France again provides an
example--wages for all workers in many professions are set by law
nationwide, so even nonunionized workers employed in nonunionized firms
are subject to the wage and other labor agreements determined by
collective bargaining. The impact of collective bargaining then extends
much further than the unionized workforce. Table 2 shows the union
density figures from Table 1 for selected countries along with the share
of the labor force that is subject to collective bargaining. Countries
are listed in order from lowest to highest union density, and one can
see that there is little correlation between union density and the
percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.
France, with the lowest union density, has the highest share of workers
covered by collective bargaining. Table 2 illustrates the difference
between unionization and the extent to which labor law influences wages
and working conditions. Ultimately, a country's labor law will have
more influence than the extent of unionization.
In addition to the impact of collective bargaining and labor law on
wages, labor law also influences the cost of hiring and firing workers,
which in turn 'affects their employment prospects. Mandated
benefits for employees obviously make hiring more costly, but the cost
of firing employees can 'also be substantial, which also makes
hiring more costly. If termination costs are low, employers will find it
more worthwhile to take a chance on an employee, because if the employee
does not work out, he or she can be let go. If there are substantial
severance costs, hiring employees is more risky and employers will be
more reluctant to hire. The hiring and firing costs mandated by
governments are aspects of labor law that introduce frictions into the
labor market, increasing inefficiencies, reducing job mobility, and
increasing unemployment.
Table 3 shows the cost of hiring and firing workers as a percentage
of worker pay for the same countries listed in Table 2. The figures show
that these costs vary substantially. The United States is at the low end
for both hiring and firing costs, with hiring costs being 8.5 percent of
wages and firing costs at zero. At the other end of the scale France has
the highest hiring costs, which are 47.4 percent of wages, while Germany
has the highest dismissal cost at 66.7 percent.
The countries in Table 3 are divided into three groups: those with
relatively low hiring and firing costs, those in the middle, and those
with high costs. The column HC+DC adds together the hiring and dismissal
costs, which gives an indicator of the costs of taking on an employee
over and above wages paid. This indicator is approximate, because hiring
and firing costs may have different effects. The hiring costs apply to
'all hires, whereas the dismissal costs apply only in the event the
employer wants to dismiss an employee, so different firms in different
circumstances may weight these differently. So, while HC+DC is clearly a
back-of-the-envelope calculation, it is useful in that it measures real
costs of employing workers in addition to the wages they are paid.
Japan, Australia, and the United States are substantially lower in
HC+DC than the other countries, with Japan the highest of the three at
33.9 percent of worker pay. The United Kingdom mad Canada fall in the
middle, at around 40 percent. Italy, France, and Germany are all around
80 percent or more. The countries are listed in Table 3 in order of
their 2007 unemployment rates, and the countries with the low hiring and
dismissal costs all have 2007 unemployment rates lower than those in the
middle group, which in turn all have unemployment rates lower than those
in the high group. The rightmost column shows average unemployment rates
for 1999-2006, which tells 'almost the same story. Tiffs provides
some evidence of the impact that labor law has on one easily measurable
indicator of labor market efficiency: the unemployment rate.
The point of looking at international labor law is to illustrate
that there is much more to labor market restrictions than ration
activity, and to illustrate that there is not a close correlation
between unionization and labor market restrictiveness. Table 3 provides
some evidence on the effect of labor market restrictiveness on
unemployment. Labor law restricts economic freedom when it reduces the
ability of employees and employers to bargain over the terms of
employment. Labor law compromises economic freedom regardless of the
union status of an employee.
An Example of the Productivity Effects of Unions: Right-to-Work
Laws
The effects of unions on productivity can be seen by examining
right-to-work laws. In the United States, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act gave
states the right to pass right-to-work laws, which outlaw the
requirement that workers join and financially support a union as a
condition of employment. As such, right-to-work laws enhance individual
freedom. Moore (1998) reviews a substantial empirical literature showing
that right-to-work laws do affect productivity and unionization on a
number of dimensions.
Right-to-work laws support economic freedom because they ensure
that workers are not coerced into joining a union as a prerequisite for
taking a particular job. They do not 'allow a worker to bargain
independently of the ration with firms that are covered by union
contracts, however. While it may be that right-to-work laws allow those
who do not join to free-ride off the collective bargaining provided by
the union, as Sobel (1995) notes, laws that force individuals to join a
union as a condition of employment clearly compromise those
individuals' freedom of contract. The freedom-enhancing solution to
the free-rider problem would be to exempt nonunion workers from being
bound by the union contract, not forcing them to join the union.
Businesses like right-to-work laws because they make it more
difficult for unions to organize their employees, and unions dislike
right-to-work laws for the same reason. Thus, the debate tends to be
centered on pro- versus anti-union lines, not on the issue of economic
freedom. Right-to-work laws also appear to help economic development, as
Palomba and Palomba (1971) and Moore and Thomas (1974) note, which can
factor into the debate. Calzonetti and Walker (1991) present survey data
showing that firms do consider right-to-work laws in their location
decisions.
Holmes (1998) presents some interesting evidence on the effect of
right-to-work laws on manufacturing activity. He measures manufacturing
activity along the borders of states with and without right-to-work
laws, comparing manufacturing activity in border counties in
right-to-work states with counties directly adjacent in
non-right-to-work states. Holmes finds that manufacturing employment is
about one-third higher in border counties of right-to-work states than
in the adjacent counties in non-right-to-work states. A number of other
studies, such as Newman (1983) and Woodward mad Glickman (1991), support
the conclusion that states without right-to-work laws have lower
manufacturing employment and employment growth. Moore's (1998)
survey cites many studies showing the positive effect of right-to-work
laws on employment and business activity, but no studies with the
opposite results.
Right-to-work laws make a good case study on unions, economic
freedom, and growth, because right-to-work laws clearly preserve
economic freedom by preserving employees' rights of contract, and
decades of empirical research in economics shows that the absence of
right-to-work laws hinders economic development.
The Decline in Private Sector Unionization
One bit of evidence on the effect of unionization on productivity
is the decline in private sector unionization in the United States over
the past half century. By 1945, partly due to the strength of pro-union
legislation in the 1930s, 22.4 percent of the civilian labor force was
unionized. Table 4 gives figures for union density in the United States
for various years. It shows that private sector union density has
declined from more than 30 percent of the labor force in 1960 to less
than 12 percent by 2007.
There is a substantial variation in union density among industries,
with transportation and warehousing, utilities, and telecommunications
having union densities above 20 percent while finance, business, and
professional services have union densities below 3 percent. Table 5
gives some figures on union densities across industries. With the
problems facing the auto industry, the effects of unionization in
manufacturing have been highlighted, but manufacturing overall has a
union density of about 12 percent, close to the U.S. average for the
private sector workforce. Table 5 shows that even in the most unionized
industries, under a quarter of the labor force is covered by union
contracts, with the exception of utilities. Utilities are a special case
in at least one respect, however, because they tend to be regulated
monopolies and therefore sheltered to a degree from the effects of
competition that firms in other industries face. Taken together, Tables
4 and 5 show that union labor is a small and declining part of the
private sector U.S. labor force.
Meanwhile, union density among public sector employees is about 40
percent, and has been relatively stable for several decades. Table 6
shows that union density among government workers rises for lower levels
of government. Union density is 33 percent at the federal level, 35
percent at the state level, and 46 percent at the local level. While
private sector unionization in the United States is relatively small and
declining, public sector unionization remains much stronger. Like the
utilities industry mentioned in the previous paragraph, governments are
shielded from competition. High union density remains in areas where
competition is limited, and it appears that market competition erodes
the penetration of union labor. As the global economy has become more
competitive, unionization of the U.S. workforce has fallen.
When considering the decline in private sector unionization in the
United States, one must recognize that the higher labor costs created by
union rules and contracts price union workers out of markets. When
industries cannot escape union labor, high costs eventually eliminate
those industries. The U.S. railroad industry has seen significant
decline over the past half-century. Passenger rail has been taken over
by the federal government with the creation of Amtrak and freight
shipments have shifted toward trucks. Reynolds (1987: 111) states that
without union work rules in the railroad industry the number of rail
workers could be cut approximately in half. Work rules have been
modified since Reynolds wrote, but by then private passenger service had
already disappeared and freight traffic was already in substantial
decline. Reynolds (1987: 118) notes that from 1959 to 1985 railroad
employment fell from 900,000 to 301,000, showing that the union was not
effective at saving railworkers' jobs. Nobel Laureate Paul A.
Samuelson (quoted in Reynolds 1987: 147) has said, "The whole
history of unionism has been ... in determining how industries in
decline are accelerated toward their extinction."
The auto industry provides a good ease study to illustrate
Samuelson's point. One would be hard-pressed to blame the 2009
bankruptcies of Chrysler and GM solely on the UAW. Nevertheless, high
labor costs mad reduced labor flexibility imposed by the UAW on the auto
companies dearly raised their costs and limited their ability to
innovate to keep up with a changing market.
The UAW's hold on the auto industry began with what Asher et
al. (2001:161) called the union's greatest victory: the
unionization of the GM workforce in 1937. Pushed by the UAW, GM began
paying some employee health insurance benefits in 1950, and by 1973 was
paying all costs for employee health insurance, pensions, and all health
insurance for retirees and their survivors. GM also agreed to a "30
and out" retirement program that provided full pensions to
employees after 30 years of employment, regardless of the
employee's age. When these benefit packages were agreed to they
were much less costly, but as costs (especially health care costs) have
risen, the UAW has stood firm in insisting that those benefits remain.
Other costly programs included the Jobs Bank Program, which paid
laid-off workers 95 percent of their previous wage once they had
exhausted unemployment benefits, regardless of whether they worked, and
job classification rules that prevented workers in one classification
from doing work outside that classification, even when workers were
idle.
As long as America's "big three" controlled the auto
industry as an oligopoly, the UAW contracts that hampered 'all
three companies did not put one at a competitive disadvantage over
another. The "big three's" hold on the industry began to
crumble in the 1970s when higher gasoline prices tilted the market
toward more fuel-efficient imports. In addition, the impression of poor
quality control at the "big three" contrasted with an
increasing reputation for quality in Japanese autos, further eroding the
"big three's" hold on the market. UAW membership exceeded
1.5 million in 1979, but had fallen to 465,000 in 2007. Now, a number of
foreign automobile manufacturers produce cars in the United States,
including BMW, Honda, Mercedes Benz, Nissan, Toyota, and Volkswagen.
They have located mostly in Southern states where labor costs are lower,
and perhaps as significant, in right-to-work states where auto workers
are not unionized.
Despite many factors working against the "big three," in
response to increasing competition for U.S. auto sales and jobs, the UAW
held firm in fighting for conditions of employment, and continued to
strike when the terms of employment were not met. From 1996 to 1998 the
UAW had seven local strikes against GM, and its most recent strike in
2007 pulled workers off the job in 82 facilities across the nation. Even
as the industry was collapsing, the UAW was unwilling to offer
concessions to the auto companies. Only when the companies declared
bankruptcy in 2009 did the UAW offer concessions, which it would have
had to have made anyway in a bankruptcy proceeding. The UAW provides an
excellent case study illustrating Samuelson's observation that
unions accelerate declining industries toward their extinction.
However, this is only part of the story. Research indicates that
unions push up wages and reduce the profits of unionized firms (Hirsch
2004). But this is a two-edged sword. While the unionized workers will
enjoy higher wages in the short run, the higher costs and lower profits
will make it more difficult for the unionized firms to compete
effectively. Capital can be exploited in the short run, but dais will
not be the case in the long run. Therefore, to the extent that the
profits of unionized firms are lower, investment expenditures on fixed
structures, research, and development will flow into the nonunion sector
and away from unionized firms. As a result, the growth of both
productivity and employment will tend to lag in the unionized sector.
Thus, unions will not only hasten the demise of declining industries as
Samuelson states, they will also hasten the shift of unionized firms mad
industries from expansion toward decline.
The primary impact of private sector unionism in the United States
has been to shift output and employment away from heavily unionized
firms and industries toward the nonunion and less heavily unionized
sectors. These shifts have been gradual, but they have reduced both the
size and impact of unions on the private sector of the U.S. economy.
However, unionization remains strong in the public sector, which is
sheltered from competition because it is financed by compulsory
taxation.
The Effect of Unions on U.S. Productivity and Growth
Vedder and Gallaway (1993: 141) estimate that in 1939 the
unemployment rate was more than 6 percent higher than it would have been
in the absence of the growth of unionized labor in the 1930s. They are
looking at a period in which labor law greatly expanded the power of
unions, and before mitigating legislation was passed in the 1940s and
1950s. Reynolds (1987: 61) reviews the evidence and concludes that there
is "no obvious association between the degree of unionism and
aggregate productivity growth in the historical data," and
reviewing the literature finds that a consensus is that unionization may
be responsible for a 0.33 percent reduction in aggregate income. He
notes that these estimates do not take account of the effects of
unionization on investment and entrepreneurship, where unions may have a
larger effect. The estimates show a small impact of unionization, and
private sector union density has fallen substantially since he drew
those conclusions.
In the United States, where private sector union density is below
12 percent and falling, the direct effects of unions on productivity and
growth fall into two primary areas: the impact of unions in retarding
productivity in heavily unionized industries, pushing those industries
into decline; and in the public sector, where union density remains
higher and stable, where there are few alternatives to those public
sector services, and where they can be paid for by compulsory taxation.
The auto and railroad industries provide two examples where union
contracts substantially raised the costs of unionized firms, resulting
in their declines and shifting employment toward nonunionized
industries. In the private sector, market forces are reducing the impact
of unions on productivity, hut public sector unionization is more
problematic.
One of the looming issues regarding public sector union contracts
is retirement benefits, which threaten to overwhelm governments,
especially at the state and local level. The two problems are the
ability of public sector employees to retire young coupled with very
generous retirement benefits. A key factor is that because public sector
employees are funded by compulsory tax payments, governments do not face
the same market discipline as private sector firms, and the tax burden
that will be applied to finance generous pension benefits will impose a
cost on private sector productivity. Chrysler and GM were able to
renegotiate generous benefits to union retirees in bankruptcy. That
burden will be more difficult for governments to overcome. Looking
ahead, the biggest impact unions will have on prosperity will come from
public sector unions, not those in the private sector.
Conclusion
While the right of workers to unionize and bargain collectively is
completely consistent with freedom of contract and individual rights,
20th century labor law has created an environment in which unions have
the power to compromise the freedom of contract by compelling workers to
bargain collectively, in some eases to compel them to join a union and
pay union dues, and to compel employers to negotiate with unions for
labor contracts even when individuals may prefer to bargain themselves,
independent of other workers. The concept of collective bargaining is
consistent with economic freedom, but the developments of 20th century
labor law have compromised economic freedom, and the powers given to
unions have limited the rights of workers and employers.
Unions have consistently bargained for higher wages and other
benefits for their employees, and in the short run, because labor law
has given to unions an advantage in the bargaining process, union
contracts have had the effect of increasing the wages and benefits of
union workers. In the long run, the higher cost of union labor brought
on by those union contracts has resulted in a steady decline in private
sector unionism, and has eroded U.S. manufacturing in unionized
industries--most visibly, the railroad and auto industries.
With private sector union density in the United States at about 12
percent, the overall effect of unionization on economic growth is not
substantial. In a few industries such as the railroad industry and the
auto industry, it has been devastating. Those two industries illustrate
the larger effect of unionization, which has been the shift of
employment away from unionized firms.
While private sector union density is relatively low and declining,
public sector union density is higher and stable. Local government
employees have a union density of 46 percent, and many of the same
factors that applied to the UAW's effect on the auto industry also
apply to local public sector employees. Benefits are very generous,
imposing a less visible future cost that will have to be borne by
taxpayers unless those benefits are restructured. The effect of unions
on overall economic growth in the United States has been minor, because
market forces have shifted private sector employment from unionized
toward nonunionized industries, but international comparisons show that
more restrictive labor law does place a measurable burden on the
economy.
In the future, the largest impact of unionization in the United
States will come from public sector unionization. The burden of generous
retirement benefits will crowd out other government expenditures, will
be a force for higher taxes, and will impose an increasing burden on the
private sector of the economy that pays those taxes.
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TABLE 1
PRIVATE SECTOR UNION DENSITY
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2005
Country Union Density (%)
Australia 22.1
Canada 29.9
Finland 72.4
France 8.0
Germany 21.6
Italy 33.8
Japan 18.8
Korea 9.9
Netherlands 21.0
Sweden 76.5
United Kingdom 28.8
United States 12.0
SOURCE: OECD (www.oecd.org/dataoeed/25/42/39891561.xls).
TABLE 2
UNION DENSITY AND SHARE OF EMPLOYEES WHOSE WAGES
ARE SET BY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Country Union Density Collective Bargaining
(%) (%)
France 8.0 93
United States 12.0 15
Japan 18.8 20
Germany 21.6 67
Australia 22.1 80
United Kingdom 28.8 36
Canada 29.9 32
Italy 33.8 90
SOURCES: Union Density from Table 1. Collective bargaining from
www.abs.gov.au,
http://unionstats.com, http://www.statcan.ca,
and Visser (2006). Collective bargaining figures are for years
2000-02. These data are updated infrequently, but collective
bargaining coverage changes slowly.
TABLE 3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND THE COST OF HIRING AND FIRING EMPLOYEES
Country Hiring Cost (%) Dismissal Cost (%) HC+DC (%)
Japan 12.7 21.2 33.9
Australia 21.0 4.0 25.0
United States 8.5 0.0 8.5
United Kingdom 8.7 33.5 42.2
Canada 12.0 28.0 40.0
Italy 32.6 47.0 79.6
France 47.4 31.9 79.3
Germany 21.3 66.7 88.0
Unemployment Rate (%)
Country 2007 1999-2006
Japan 3.8 4.8
Australia 4.4 5.9
United States 4.6 5.0
United Kingdom 5.3 5.1
Canada 6.0 7.2
Italy 6.2 8.7
France 7.9 9.4
Germany 9.0 8.4
SOURCES: World Bank, Doing Business in 2006: Creating Jobs,
and CIA World Factbook, 2008.
TABLE 4
PRIVATE SECTOR UNION DENSITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Year Union Density (%)
1960 30.9
1970 27.4
1980 22.3
1990 15.5
2000 12.8
2007 11.6
SOURCE: OECD (ww.oeed.org/dataoecd/25/42/39891561.xls).
TABLE 5
UNION DENSITY IN SELECTED U.S. INDUSTRIES, 2009
Industry Union Density (%)
Transportation and Warehousing 22.4
Utilities 28.3
Telecommunications 20.4
Construction 16.2
Manufacturing 12.3
Educational Services 16.0
Health Care and Social Assistance 8.9
Financial Activities 2.3
Professional and Business Services 2.7
SOURCE: www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm, Table 3.
TABLE 6
U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR UNION DENSITY, 2009
Level of Government Union Density (%)
All Public Sector 40.7
Federal 33.0
State 35.1
Local 46.1
SOURCE: www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm, Table 3.