Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: Five Steps to a Better Health Care System.
Cannon, Michael F.
Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: Five Steps to a Better Health Care
System John F. Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel P. Kessler
Washington: AEI Press/Hoover Institution, 2005, 150 pp.
Two stumbling blocks typically thwart good health policy. The first
is the pervasive belief that the focus of health policy should be
ensuring that all individuals have health coverage. The second is the
tendency of many who understand the importance of markets to argue that
for markets to work, government must grow.
Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise is a new book by the distinguished
economists John Cogan, Glenn Hubbard, and Daniel Kessler. Cogan and
Kessler are professors at Stanford University. Hubbard is dean of the
Graduate School of Business at Columbia University and a former head of
the president's Council of Economic Advisers. Their book deftly
clears the first stumbling block, but is regrettably tripped up by the
second.
The desire to "expand coverage" is deeply ingrained in
the psyche of most health policy wonks, and for good reason. Though the
United States is supposedly a bastion of free-market health care, we pay
a larger share of our medical bills (86 percent) through third parties
(governments, employers, and insurers) than 17 other OECD nations. That
includes Canada, where the government is supposed to pay for everything.
When most health expenditures are financed by someone other than
the patient, it seems logical and compassionate to extend
"coverage" to those who do not have it. And there are plenty
who don't. Depending on the meaning of "uninsured," there
are 21 million, 45 million, or even more uninsured Americans.
However, expanding coverage does not reduce the cost of health
care. For that you need markets, which reduce costs at the same time
they improve quality. Health coverage shifts costs from the patient to
workers or to taxpayers. If patients are too heavily insured, the
market's ability to reduce costs can actually be defeated, making
health care less affordable.
In a world of so much quackery, Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler examine
the health care sector and deliver a precise diagnosis. "The
problem," they write, "is not that market forces cannot work
in health care. Rather, public policies have prevented health care
markets from functioning properly" (p. 25). The chief culprits are
the tax code's distortion of health care prices, overregulation of
health insurance, a lack of information on health care quality, a lack
of competition among hospitals, and malpractice liability rules that
encourage waste and error. (In a bow to the zeitgeist, the authors
estimate that their proposals would reduce the number of uninsured by as
many as 20 million. That is not the object of their recommendations, but
rather a side benefit that might accrue from sound public policies.)
To address those root causes, the authors propose five incremental
reforms designed "to make markets work." Here the book
stumbles. Rather than try to rein in a federal government that has sown
so much mischief, the authors offer four reforms that would increase
federal power over health care markets and a fifth whose effect on
federal power would be mixed.
The latter is a proposal to reduce the price distortions created by
the federal tax code. Those distortions tend to encourage paying for
health care through employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) rather than
directly or through individually purchased insurance. Among other
things, this makes patients less price-sensitive, and weakens the
market's most important check on excessive costs and poor quality:
the cost-conscious consumer.
Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler advocate reducing these harmful
distortions by (1) providing income-tax deductibility to out-of-pocket
expenditures (contingent on the purchase of health insurance) and all
health insurance premiums, (2) capping contributions to tax-free health
savings accounts (HSAs) and allowing HSAs to be combined with any type
of insurance, and (3) creating federal cash payments (deemed
"refundable tax credits") to help low-income families afford
health insurance.
Out-of-pocket expenditures and individually purchased health
premiums currently must be purchased with after-tax dollars. That makes
those items relatively expensive compared with ESI, which may be
purchased with pretax dollars. Extending income-tax deductibility to
those items would somewhat reduce this artificial price distortion.
It is unclear, though, whether that change would have much impact
other than to increase utilization. Lowering the price of health care
relative to the price of hot dogs will increase consumption of health
care relative to hot dogs. However, the authors argue that reducing the
price of paying for health care out-of-pocket relative to paying for it
through ESI would constrain health care consumption overall by
encouraging less comprehensive health coverage. They project that this
effect would overwhelm the health care vs. hot dogs effect, resulting in
a net reduction in health expenditures.
That is plausible when consumers control all the dollars involved.
Unfortunately, employers control most of the dollars spent on health
insurance, which complicates workers' ability to adjust to the new
incentives. Only about one-quarter of workers have the kind of health
benefits (cafeteria plans) that allow them to reap the savings from
choosing a less expensive plan. And one-third of workers are only
offered one plan to begin with.
Whether deductibility reduces utilization, then, will depend on
whether employers respond to incentives directed at workers. Will
employers pare back health benefits and cash-out employees? Over the
long term, perhaps. But in the short term, the utilization-increasing
effect likely would dominate, with troubling implications for the price
and quality of care.
The remaining tax-based proposals are also a mixed bag. The authors
would allow HSAs to be paired with any type of health insurance, which
is the strongest proposal in the book. The existing requirement that HSA
holders purchase only catastrophic coverage is a major reason why HSAs
are unattractive to many consumers. However, the authors would also cap
tax-free HSA contributions, increasing taxes on HSA holders who fully
fund their accounts today.
Finally, the authors propose a subsidy to help low-income families
purchase health insurance. Though labeled a "tax credit," it
is not so much a creature of the tax system as a new spending program.
Low-income families (individuals) would receive vouchers equal to 25
percent of their health care expenses, up to $1,000 ($500). The subsidy
would phase out as income increases, creating disincentives to work and
save. Medicaid already provides assistance to low-income Americans, and
such a proposal could be crafted in that context. The authors do not
explain why a new program is necessary.
In contrast, the remaining proposals are straightforward increases
in federal power over the health care sector.
First, the authors propose to have the federal government regulate
even more of the health insurance market than it does today. They argue
that overregulation by states has dampened competition and that federal
regulation, which presently is lighter, would enhance competition. The
authors dismiss concerns that federal regulation would likely become as
onerous as state regulation--and much tougher to dislodge--despite
Congress's manifest willingness to overregulate in this area.
The authors also give short shrift to a reform endorsed by
President Bush that would put permanent downward pressure on unwanted
regulatory costs by allowing individuals and employers the freedom to
purchase insurance from out-of-state carriers, regulated by the
carrier's home state. A similar regulatory model already exists in
corporate chartering, and could be applied to health insurance either
wholesale by Congress or by each state on its own. The authors note that
this reform would be difficult to achieve. The right thing usually is.
Second, the authors advocate imposing federal malpractice liability
rules on states. Their preferred rules would reduce wasteful
"defensive medicine" (via caps on noneconomic damages) and
reduce medical errors (by limiting the discoverability of data on
medical errors collected for quality improvement purposes). These
reforms may have merit, but the authors do not discuss why they should
be enacted at the federal level rather than by the states.
Any such discussion would first have to overcome a constitutional
obstacle: the U.S. Constitution does not grant Congress the power to
impose substantive tort rules on state courts. Moreover, federal rules
are unnecessary. States have shown an increasing willingness to
experiment with tort reform. The authors even acknowledge as much.
One-size-fits-all rules imposed by Washington would prevent states from
learning from each other's experiments and competing to offer
efficient malpractice rules.
Third, the authors seek to increase competition in the hospital
sector (undoubtedly a positive, as Kessler's previous research has
shown) by beefing up federal antitrust regulation of hospital mergers.
Antitrust enforcement can sometimes block welfare-reducing
consolidation. But the authors do not discuss the counterargument: that
antitrust can also block efficiency-enhancing consolidation (often at
the behest of inefficient competitors). As economist Barbara Ryan has
demonstrated, most hospital regulation decreases competition. That
suggests pro-competition reformers might look to deregulation as a way
to promote competition. Unfortunately, the authors do not discuss why
more regulation would be preferable.
Finally, the authors propose additional federal funding for report
cards that measure the quality of health care providers. By all
accounts, consumers have insufficient information about the quality (and
cost) of medical care. However, that is most likely a result of the fact
that consumers have little incentive to demand cost-effective care.
Information on health care quality is unlikely to appear without a
demand for it. That argues for making consumers more price-sensitive.
Indeed, the private sector has begun furnishing price and quality
information at the same time HSAs and similar innovations have made
patients more price-sensitive. Instructively, Forrester's Research
rated a number of private-sector report cards as more user-friendly than
existing government report cards. While there may be public goods
aspects to this information problem, it would make sense first to see
what the private sector can do by itself once we get the market
incentives right.
The authors note that their proposals are meant to be incremental
and politically feasible steps to improve the functioning of health care
markets--not wholesale changes, nor even their first choices for reform.
For example, they flatly admit that revoking the tax exclusion for ESI
would be preferable to the tax changes they propose. However, their
proposals would generally increase federal power over the health care
sector, and it seems odd to think that health care markets have been
functioning so poorly because the federal government has not been
involved deeply enough.
Cogan, Hubbard, and Kessler are not primarily health economists.
Nonetheless, if forced to choose a triumvirate to wield all-encompassing
power over health care, the trio would make my short list. I am fairly
confident that given their druthers, they would deliver--more precisely,
they would enable markets to deliver--astounding improvements in quality
and affordability, probably by day three. By the weekend, they would be
fielding calls from foreign heads of state.
But without the benefit of all-encompassing power, they (along with
the rest of us) have to confront political feasibility. And they
certainly have forwarded a politically feasible package of reforms.
The trouble with focusing solely on what is politically
feasible--rather than trying to expand what is politically feasible--is
that most of the available options involve expanding government power.
There's always a constituency for that.
Michael F. Cannon
Cato Institute