Pre-existing condition: taking media coverage into account when preparing for H1N1.
Quigley, Kevin ; Macdonald, Colin ; Quigley, John 等
"We find no villains in the federal government's
officials and advisers then and think that anyone (ourselves included)
might have done as they did--but we hope not twice. "
--R. Neustadt and H. Fineberg (1983) (1)
Introduction
On October 26, 2009, Evan Frustaglio, a seemingly healthy
13-year-old boy, died in Ottawa, Canada from H1N1, just as Canadian
health services were starting their vaccination programs. His death
featured prominently in the news media. Within hours, parents rushed to
get their children vaccinated (The Globe and Mail 2009). Despite having
encouraged people for months to receive the vaccine, governments and
health services appeared unprepared for a surge in demand; long line-ups
formed in front of clinics across the country (Canadian Medical
Association, the College of Family Physicians of Canada and National
Specialty Society of Community Care 2010). The limited supply of vaccine
meant that most provinces chose to administer vaccines to priority
groups only, which further aggravated the situation. In the aftermath
there were different views on who was to blame--if anyone--for long
line-ups and anxious parents.
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) foregrounds that in
October 2009, 78% of Canadians believed "the media hyped and
exaggerated the threat of H1N1" (2010: 55). This fact exposes a
paradox: if people were confident the media exaggerated the threat, why
was there such a surge in demand for the vaccine? Despite considerable
attention, many questions about H1N1 and social responses to it remain
unresolved (Grube 2013; Waterer, Hui and Jenkins 2010; Liang 2011;
Fineberg 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to examine claims that media
exaggerated the threat of HINT We explore four main questions. First,
how do people experience and respond to risk? Second, was media coverage
of H1N1 unusual? Third, and as a corollary to the previous question, how
were governments depicted by the media? In other words, what did the
media criticize the Canadian governments about? Finally, what lessons
does this episode provide for health care officials about media and
managing responses to uncertain risks? Before addressing our four
questions, we will provide a brief overview of H1N1 in Canada in 2009.
H1N1 in Canada
Timely information is important when responding to communicable
diseases. Because people are increasingly mobile, disease surveillance
must span large geographic areas, yet remain timely, accurate and
comprehensive. Outbreak detection is complex; data must flow up and down
organizational hierarchies. In Canada, this challenge is complicated by
the fact that provincial and federal governments share responsibility
for health, and it is not always clear where the line is drawn between
the two orders of government (Deber 2014: 10). Even within provincial
jurisdiction, there are a variety of institutional arrangements over
public health and pandemic response (Deber 2014: 13-4). Many provinces
have subdivided health responsibilities into regional authorities, which
may not correspond to municipal boundaries. The responsibilities of
these authorities vary across the country. These complex arrangements
generate challenges, including externalities, unfunded mandates, and
data ownership and coordination issues (Macdougall et al. 2014). In
addition, circumstances change; pandemics can spread or contract. This
depends partly on people's willingness to follow professional
advice (e.g., getting vaccinated). Therefore plans, professional advice
and predictions change as events unfold.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The Canadian governments have had a regularly updated pandemic plan
since 1988. The SARS response in 2003 was roundly criticized by three
separate commissions as inadequately prepared and coordinated (National
Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health and Naylor 2003; Expert
Panel on SARS and Infectious Disease Control (Ont.) and Walker 2003;
Campbell 2004; Macdougall et al. 2014). Naylor noted that coordination
problems during SARS were part of a long history of inadequate public
health infrastructure to support coordinated responses to national
health emergencies. The commissions variously noted a lack of
integration of emergency-related data, information-sharing
infrastructure, data quality and reporting standards, emergency response
coordination, and agreement on a common list of notifiable or reportable
diseases across jurisdictions (Macdougall et al. 2014).
H1N1 first occurred in Canada when four students from Nova Scotia
and two men from British Columbia returned to Canada from Mexico
(Manitoba Health 2010). In total, 8,507 people were hospitalized for
influenza (both H1N1 and seasonal), compared to 2,614 in typical flu
seasons (Picard 2010). In all, 428 people died of H1N1. In contrast,
approximately 8,000 died in 2007-08 due to seasonal flu and pneumonia
(Public Health Agency of Canada 2010). H1N1 affected young people at an
unusually high rate; in the early stages of H1N1's spread, the
median age of patients was 18 (Alphonso and Galloway 2009). This low
median age indicates a very serious influenza.
In April 2009 (following the start of the first wave of H1N1 in
Canada), the federal government launched a public awareness campaign.
Health officials anticipated that the second wave--in the fall of
2009--would be much more serious. The campaign focused on
"infection prevention behaviours, personal preparedness and a call
to action for Canadians to get vaccinated" (Public Health Agency of
Canada 2010: 54). The federal government published 50 guidance documents
and distributed 10 million brochures, 1.7 million guides and 4 million
alert notices to travelers (p. 54); held almost 50 press conferences
between April 24 and December 15 (p. 55); received 6.4 million visits to
its website and had over 200,000 downloads (p. 55). The federal Minister
of Health and Chief Public Health Officer played prominent roles (The
Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 2010).
Generally, all orders of government worked to coordinate communications
(The Standing Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 2010).
The plan for vaccine administration changed over time. In early
fall 2009, H1N1 was not as wide a threat as health officials had
anticipated; as a result, health officials decided to delay vaccination
to give more time for trials and vaccine production. From September to
mid-October 2009, vaccine demand was low; polls suggested apathy
(Mittelstaedt 2009). In late October, there was a surge in demand just
as there was a problem with supply (Nova Scotia Department of Health and
Wellness 2010). The surge in demand occurred immediately after the death
of Evan Frustaglio, which received considerable media attention.
Production problems caused a shortage, which created a "rush"
for the vaccine; health officials in most provinces resorted to
administering it only to priority groups (Public Health Agency of Canada
2010: 73), for example, children and pregnant women. In early December
the supply increased and the vaccine was once again available to the
general public. There were vaccination queues, but apathy returned and
governments were again trying to convince people to get the vaccine.
Ultimately about 45% of the population received the vaccine, one of the
highest vaccination rates in the world (Public Health Agency of Canada
2010: 70). Figure 1 depicts the two waves.
There is no specific reference to the death of Evan Frustaglio in
the PHAC report. Rather, there are two indirect references. Under
background, the report notes:
Media coverage of H1N1 was extensive and, at times, overwhelming.
In October 2009, a survey found over three-quarters of Canadians (78
percent) believed the media hyped and exaggerated the threat of H1N1,
representing a 10-point increase from perceptions in July.
Correspondingly, just over half of Canadians (53 percent) surveyed in
the same month (October 2009) felt the general public's level of
concern was exaggerated while close to four in ten (37 percent) felt the
level of concern was consistent with the risks (Public Health Agency of
Canada 2010: 55).
In the conclusion, the report notes:
there is a need to plan for different scales of pandemic response,
dependent on the severity of the virus but recognizing that, even when
there is a lower risk of morbidity and mortality with certain strains of
a pandemic influenza, there will always be tragic cases that may move
public opinion and therefore must be accounted for in a low-risk
pandemic situation (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010: 92).
The report concludes that all health-related government agencies in
all orders of government must improve their science communication to
various audiences, including the media and general public, though it
gives no indication of how to do this or which audiences in particular.
Preventative health care
Despite evidence that preventative health care can be an effective
use of resources in many instances (Wyden, Harkin and Whitehouse 2014),
it is difficult to secure commitment to it. Fineberg (2013) notes many
challenges that work against broad-based acceptance and action of
preventative health care: it is difficult to prove conclusively that it
is successful; when it is successful, one might describe it as a
"quiet" success, that occurs over time; in other words, it
lacks the drama that generates media coverage and public attention;
moreover, rewards of preventative health care are delayed, and are not
accrued necessarily to the payer; professional advice can be
inconsistent; and permanent, long-term (and unpopular) behavior change
maybe required.
When it comes to their health, people do not necessarily make
rational decisions. Our biases impact our ability to perceive risk
accurately. Risk perception can be influenced by a sense of dread
(Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1982), personal control (Langer
1975), familiarity (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), exit options (Starr
1969), equitable sharing of both benefits and risks (Finucane et al.
2000,) and the potential to blame an institution or person (Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982). It can also be associated with how a person feels about
something, such as a particular technology or a disease (Alhakami and
Slovic 1994). People also show confirmation bias (Wason 1960) and can be
vulnerable to "probability neglect" (Slovic et al. 2005). When
probability neglect is at work, "people's attention is focused
on the bad outcome itself, and they are inattentive to the fact that it
is unlikely to occur" (Sunstein 2003: 122). Indeed, psychologists
have noted that the reporting of one death can have a greater emotional
impact than reporting multiple deaths if the single victim is depicted
on his or her own; the photo of the individual on his own can have the
effect of suppressing our ability to use probabilities to place the
event in broader perspective (Slovic 2011; Kearney 2013).
Risk experience and response
For our analysis, we categorize H1N1 as an "uncertain
risk" (Renn 2008). According to Renn (2008), uncertain risks are
risks where the influencing factors are largely known, but the
likelihood of any adverse effects cannot be precisely described (for
example, terrorism, rare natural disasters, pandemics). He stresses that
uncertain risks require reflective discourse by experts and key
stakeholders about balancing the possibilities of over-and
under-protection. Despite Renn's focus on risk communication, he
offers little on the media's role in framing uncertain risks for a
lay audience. This is surprising since most people base their
perceptions of risk on information from the media (Fischhoff 1985, 1995;
Kitzinger and Reilly 1997).
The government depends on the media in risk events. As we saw with
H1N1, this can be a challenge when the media and the public are moved by
a singular, tragic event. At the same time, simply declaring that the
media "hyped and exaggerated the threat of H1N1" is arguably
blame-shifting and naive. Government plays an important role in setting
public expectations; if it fails to meet those expectations, it
jeopardizes its own credibility and the credibility of its pandemic
plan. Government must therefore anticipate amplified media coverage of
uncertain risks and cope better with it. Otherwise, important
vulnerabilities remain.
Media reactions to the events in late October 2009 expose the scope
of the challenge when addressing uncertain risks. While the novelty of
one death may initially attract attention, the death of one person does
not change the probability that one is going to develop a disease. This
rationale for risk, however, depends on a rational actor paradigm in
which probability and consequence are objective and (reasonably)
obtainable measures (Jaeger et al. 2001), which is not the case with
uncertain risks. While the PHAC report refers to the challenge of
communicating low morbidity pandemics to lay audiences, governments at
the time of the pandemic gave mixed messages. The PHAC report
highlights, for instance, that as late as August 2009, the federal
Minister of Health declared, "What may come this fall is something
that could test all of us, possibly to a limit we have never
experienced" (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010: 47).
A psychometric approach to risk provides more insight into the
effect of media than a rational one. The media tends to report the
dramatic over the common but more dangerous (Soumerai, Ross-Degnan and
Kahn 1992). They tend not only to sensationalize (Johnson and Cavello
1987), but to sensationalize the most negative aspects of events
(Wahlberg and Sjoberg 2000). Media connects with people at an emotional
level.
A particularly powerful moment in the H1N1 episode in Canada was
the death of Frustaglio just as the vaccine was released. Sociologists
have focused on how the media stage and amplify death and grief and the
social context in which it is interpreted. The moral panics literature
(Cohen 1972; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1999) examines episodes that include
broad social concern, disproportionate response and volatile public
opinion. Moral panics also encompass an element of the
"taboo"--such as the death of a child. According to Walter,
Littlewood and Pickering (1995), media plays a crucial role in
interpreting and staging death scenes for public consumption. According
to Weaver and Jackson (2012), child deaths are frequently interpreted
through the lens of maternal grief, exploiting its emotional and
symbolic significance. There is also a "utopian bias" that
underpins most coverage--no child should ever die prematurely. Mitchell
et al. (2012) note that the death of a child is one of the most
disruptive and profound types of loss; it produces deep, intense and
prolonged grief, particularly in affluent societies. In the West, the
death of a child is "an unspeakable contravention of the
'natural' order of things, particularly in 'modern'
society" (p. 14).
The rational ordering of public bureaucracies is ill-equipped to
deal with these circumstances. Their interest in fairness, regulation
and process cannot easily accommodate problems of profound human grief.
Many of these emotionally charged events in which media and social
commentators rush to impose meaning lead to a selective search for
accountability and an eagerness to lay blame. The Columbia Journalism
Review (1979) notes that issues involving children are often
"ambiguous, complicated and touchy," and that stories about
kids can be "nasty, intrusive and potentially sensational" (p.
3, as cited in Hennink-Kaminski and Dougall 2009). More generally, in
reference to crises and disasters, Pidgeon argues that "despite the
inherent complexity and ambiguity of the environments within which
large-scale hazards arise and the systemic nature of breakdowns in
safety, cultural myths of control over affairs ensure that a culprit
must be found after a disaster or crisis has unfolded" (1997: 9).
In other words, while the death of Frustaglio generated the initial
coverage, an aggressive and selective hunt for a culprit was likely to
follow.
Method for media analysis
The volume of H1N1 media coverage was from 3 to 10 times greater
than the volume of media coverage of other low probability/high
consequence events (see, for example, Quigley and Quigley 2013; Quigley
and Mills 2014). For this paper, we focus exclusively on how H1N1 media
coverage in Canada compared to H1N1 coverage in other countries. We
selected Australia and the UK for comparison because they are
Westminster systems with universal, publicly funded health care,
delivered at the regional level (although the federal/central
governments also have important responsibilities, particularly with
respect to obtaining vaccines). (1) All three countries had operations
in place to respond to H1N1 (Hine 2010; Public Health Agency of Canada
2010; Department of Health and Ageing 2011). Table 1 shows statistics on
H1N1 hospitalizations and deaths for all three countries. While H1N1 was
more serious in Canada, there are three reasons why the comparison is
valid. First, the differences are within an order of magnitude. H1N1
caused a large number of deaths and hospitalizations in each country and
generated considerable media coverage. Second, the respective health
sectors (1) and government prepared their responses not knowing what the
eventual death and hospitalization rates would be. Finally, while we
recognize there are differences between these countries (for example,
proximity to Mexico where the pandemic started), H1N1 was largely the
same problem at the same time. These similarities allow us to control
many extraneous variables in our comparison, which is generally
difficult to do with low probability/high consequence events in
different countries.
In January 2011 we retrieved 819 articles about H1N1. We used
Factiva to search a leading national newspaper in each country. Our
intention was to examine volatility and variation among these
newspapers. We acknowledge that 1) media sources have their own
political and ideological biases, and market orientation, which may
affect their coverage and limit comparative methods, 2) we have only
selected one newspaper from each country, which limits our capacity to
generalize (it would be useful, for example, to examine how the
G&M's coverage compared with coverage in the National Post, the
Toronto Star and La Presse (1)), and 3) examining the role of social
media in communicating about the spread of pandemics could generate
useful results. However, social media did not play an influential role
in communicating risk to the public during the 2009 outbreak (Lui and
Kim 2011). Moreover, while it may be declining in audience size,
traditional media continues to be the most trusted news source among
Canadians (see Table 2).
For our analysis, we selected the most widely distributed national
broadsheet in each country. Our sample comprises all articles in the
year following April 25, 2009, that included the term(s) most commonly
used to refer to the event. We eliminated any articles that were not
principally about H1N1. Content analysis of the articles was carried out
in two stages. First, we reviewed articles to determine whether key
actors were assessed positively, negatively or neutrally (N/A was also
an option). We assigned a value of +1, -1, or 0 to each article
depending on whether it was on balance a positive, negative, or neutral
assessment for each key sector. We then calculated the net sum. Each
order of government (5) was assessed separately (if one article had a
negative assessment of both the federal and provincial government, then
it was assessed -2).
We reduced bias in our assessments using several strategies. We
assessed all the H1N1 articles during a short period of time: January
and February 2011. We also applied a standard template to all articles.
One researcher classified articles for each newspaper. To ensure
consistency, the research group met to review a sample of articles
together before and during the assessment process. To test the
inter-rater reliability of our coding, 10% of articles were double
coded; using Cohen's kappa coefficient we found an inter-rater
reliability agreement of k=.66 for performance assessment. This
corresponds to a substantial level of agreement.
Following this initial assessment, we created a three-by-three
matrix to assess what the governments were criticized for. First, we
used a cybernetic definition of control (information-gathering,
standard-setting, and behavior modification; see Hood, Rothstein, and
Baldwin 2001). For the second dimension of the matrix, we adopted the
three justifications of Hood and Jackson's (1991) administrative
argument (sigma [efficiency] justifications, theta [fairness and
accountability] justifications, and lambda [stability and learning]
justifications). Circumstance guides which administrative argument we
employ to criticize government performance (for example, an issue of
efficiency, if identified previously in a similar risk event, could also
be categorized as a failure of stability and learning). In all cases,
reviewers were instructed to choose the best fit.
Once we had created the categories, one reviewer analyzed the 339
relevant H1N1 articles in the G&M. The review occurred from December
2013 --January 2014. Once again, we used Cohen's kappa coefficient
to determine whether there was significant bias in the reviewer's
analysis; we found a high level of agreement (see Table 3).
Media coverage of H1N1
While the volume and distribution of coverage in the news sources
were similar prior to Frustaglio's death, there was some variation.
After an initial peak in coverage through July, the Australian coverage
slowed. The Australian flu season occurs between May and October; there
may have been a sense of urgency in April/May, but by August it became
clear that the pandemic would not pose a serious threat in Australia.
There is also variation in how child mortality is reported. The
Australian rarely reported the death of children, and did not focus on
the specifics of one child (with one exception where the death of one
child prompted two articles in the Australian). There is a somewhat
stronger parallel between the G&M and the DT in how child death is
reported. The DT's coverage spiked between mid-June and -August.
There are four articles about the death of a seemingly healthy
six-year-old--Chloe Buckley --which, like the case of Evan Frustaglio,
contributed to a surge in media coverage. While the number of articles
about Buckley's death is lower than the G&M's coverage of
Frustaglio, the DT stories focus largely on vulnerable youth.
Figure 2 shows just how dramatically the G&M coverage increased
following the death of Frustaglio and the release of the vaccine. In
this sense, the G&M coverage was unusual. Between October 27 and
November 26, 86 articles were published. This number represents 25% of
the articles published, all within a month.
Notwithstanding the spike in coverage after of Frustaglio's
death, only 16 articles refer to the death of a youth in the G&M,
and only 12 of those refer to Frustaglio. (6) Frustaglio's death
seems to have heightened awareness of the risks associated with H1N1
just as the vaccine became available. The vast majority of media
coverage, however, focused on the performance of governments in response
to the surge in demand.
While the domestic health sector tended to receive neutral
assessments and a relatively small mix of positive and negative
assessments, which netted to zero, assessments of governments varied
more dramatically. The G&M included several negative assessments of
government (-82); the DT and Australian had moderately negative
assessments (-23 and -27, respectively). Figure 3 shows performance
assessments of governments in each of the three newspapers. In the
G&M, 63% of the negative assessments can be attributed to the
federal government and 37% to the provinces. In comparative perspective,
media coverage in the G&M was unusual. Whether this was due to an
overzealous G&M, an overanxious population or a poorly prepared
government response is unclear.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
G&M criticisms of Canadian government
Of the 339 articles in the G&M, 48% (161) included negative
performance assessments of governments. There are 201 negative
performance assessments in total. We categorized criticisms according to
cybernetic control and the administrative argument that journalists used
to frame their criticisms (see Table 4). The most common criticism
concerned the intersection between behaviour modification and stability
and learning, constituting 32% (64) of the total. Efficiency and
behaviour modification (28) and each of the three argument types
concerning standard setting (32, 32 and 27) ranged from 16 to 13% of the
total negative performance assessments. These criticisms might be
grouped as the second most common. Few criticisms concerned
information-gathering, which is particularly ironic given its importance
to public health initiatives.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
To detect variations in negative performance assessments over time,
we divided the G&M's coverage into four periods: before the
first wave (April 25 to May 3); the first wave (May 4 to July 31); the
interim period (August 1 to September 30); and the second wave (October
1 to April 25). Standard setting and behaviour modification are very
similar throughout the entire episode, although behaviour modification
passes standard setting during the second wave. As noted,
information-gathering gets little attention. When we consider which
administrative argument is used to frame criticism (Figure 4) we see
that the majority are framed as criticisms of stability and learning.
From the interim period onward, however, criticisms are framed less as
criticisms of stability and learning and more as efficiency concerns. In
short, there seem to be two distinct periods in the criticisms: what
Renn would call the knowledge generation stage, which is concerned
largely with learning, and the implementation stage, which is concerned
with stability, learning and efficiency. This growing concern over
efficiency can be detected before the death of Frustaglio.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Discussion and conclusion
Uncertain risks create communication challenges for health
officials. Their inability to predict the likelihood of events within a
narrow range--as well as to articulate the possible
consequences--conveys knowledge gaps from which people can draw the
wrong inferences; these inferences can lead to exaggerated concern and
heightened anxiety. Arguably, Frustaglio's death reframed the H1N1
story from a pandemic that was under control or not particularly
threatening to one which could prove fatal to healthy youth. This
reframing affects all stages in Renn's risk governance framework:
social concern increased; tolerance and acceptability decreased;
circumstances required a risk management process that was adaptive and
immediate. In essence, the problem health officials were addressing
before Frustaglio's death changed after his death. The governments
and their plan were in a highly vulnerable position: they had been
strongly encouraging people to receive the vaccine but now the
governments did not have enough. H1N1 shows both the volatility of media
coverage around uncertain risks, and the consequences of this
volatility. Media coverage cannot easily be predicted but it can have
considerable impact on demand for public services. Coverage can also be
highly negative of government performance, which can undermine
credibility in the governments' plan. For these reasons governments
must carefully consider how to prepare for high volume, volatile media
coverage. Here, we suggest lessons governments might draw from H1N1.
First, governments should recognize the role they play in
influencing how media and populations respond to messages concerning
uncertain risks. For months, governments had contributed to heightening
awareness of H1N1. There was a large public bureaucracy working on
pandemic response since SARS in 2003 (Liang 2011). As noted, H1N1
communications included press conferences, alert notices, brochures,
downloads and a website. While PHAC implies the media over-reacted to
H1N1, evidence suggests that the governments reacted strongly also, as
the PHAC report attests. Leadership also matters. Our media analysis
shows that the heath sector received much more favourable coverage than
governments. Medical practitioners are trusted more than elected
officials and civil servants (Freed et al. 2011). Crisis response led by
political figures can generate more negative coverage (Eisenman et al.
2007): the motives and competence of politicians are suspect, and
members of opposition parties may attack the position of elected
officials for political gain. This erodes trust in the process (Kramer
1999; Hardin 2006). Notwithstanding their formal constitutional duties
and barring more controversial policy decisions, governments should be
seen to support--not lead--those working on the frontline. The public is
less likely to doubt the knowledge, competence and motives of health
professionals, which is crucial to establishing trust (Peters, Covello
and McCallum 1997).
Second, governments should be sensitive to powerful stories. While
the death of Frustaglio seems poorly timed from a health services
operational perspective, it should not have been a surprise that a young
person would die of H1N1 in the fall of 2009. Moreover, there are many
things that could have alerted health services to the possibility of
media and public overreaction: healthy young people were vulnerable
(high dread); the disease was indiscriminant (uncontrolled); there was
not enough vaccine ready (few escapes/exits); the national media
published a powerful photo of a child (probability neglect); and
governments were expected to have obtained enough vaccine (ability to
blame an institution). PHAC publishes guidebooks on a variety of topics
yet ironically its report does not list any on the subject of child
death or dealing with the media (Public Health Agency of Canada 2010:
45-6).
The communications challenge is significant. Government cannot
dismiss the emotional weight of a child's death. While the death
may not tell us much about the probability of a disease spreading, it
has a strong emotional impact and will likely draw media attention.
Government must address consequence and probability separately. It
should acknowledge the profound grief associated with the death of a
child (consequence), but then be specific about what it knows about the
likelihood of contracting illnesses (probability) to demystify new and
emerging diseases. Ominous descriptions, such as the one conveyed by the
federal Minister of Health in 2009, heighten anxiety. No doubt
governments did much to reduce concerns when Frustaglio died but by then
it was too late. The governments must work closely with the media in
advance to report the spread of disease and persuade media to depict
events in the appropriate context. By the end of October, there was
considerable evidence from Canada and abroad that H1N1 should not cause
alarm (Schabas and Rau 2009). There is also considerable data on child
death and illness that could have helped to convey that risks associated
with H1N1 were much lower than risks we face every day. (7) Importantly,
health officials could have shown evidence that vaccines work, and that
a significant percentage of the population would ultimately receive the
vaccine in a timely manner. And there are other actions the population
can take to reduce the spread of a disease, such as washing hands
regularly. Finally, editorial boards make decisions about how to report
stories. The Australian and the DT were much less alarming than the
G&M. The governments had the opportunity to coach the media over
time, and not strictly following the death of Frustaglio when anxiety
levels were high, as many of the same journalists covered the story for
many months. Relatedly, governments can do more work with organizations
designed to improve scientific communication in the media, such as the
Science Media Centre of Canada and the Evidence Network of Canadian
Health Policy (The Science Media Centre of Canada 2013; The Evidence
Network n.d.).
Third, government should be more sensitive to the different
response stages with uncertain risk. In the early stages, criticisms
were framed as stability and learning criticisms, relating to capacity
to learn and adapt, even in adverse conditions. While these criticisms
remained high throughout, we saw a rise in efficiency criticisms from
August onward. There may be a temptation with uncertain risks to focus
on learning, with optimism that we can understand better the problem and
maintain a stable operation. As the second wave approached, however,
there was concern over operational effectiveness. Government needs to be
aware of how and when to move beyond the knowledge generation phase of
the risk governance process to the decisions and implementation of
actions phase. Measures of success in operational and learning phases
are not the same. Governments could establish more rigorous independent
oversight to comment on work-in-progress during the different stages of
an operation; there is evidence that in other jurisdictions there was
such scrutiny. (8) The G&M coverage suggests that there were
operational problems and that they pre-dated Frustaglio's death.
The best way to address increased demand for health services is
with an effective response that meets public expectations. In the
absence of data to help health officials be more specific about the
magnitude of the risk, government should employ a precautionary
approach, particularly when harm is potentially catastrophic or
irreversible (Sunstein 2009). Uncertain risks also require government to
avoid vulnerability. It is, however, unrealistic for a pandemic plan to
dictate constant availability of sufficient human resources to respond
to worst case scenarios. Adaptive capacity and a diversity of means to
accomplish mission-critical tasks are necessary. Future scenario
exercises are a good way to increase adaptive capacity. Uncertain risks,
in particular, can benefit from scenario exercises because the external
driving forces (supply and demand of vaccines) are neither predictable
nor under the complete control of health authorities (for examples of
scenario exercises, see van der Heijden 2005; van Asselt et al 2010).
Yet adaptive capacity does not come naturally to public bureaucracies.
Despite decades of public management reform aimed at improving the
delivery of public services (Aucoin 1998), the vaccination program
seemed insensitive to the manner in which people organize their lives.
People stood in line for hours to receive the vaccine. There are few
public services today with such a standard of service. It was not
difficult for the media to find stories that resonated with the public:
parents having to take the day off work to get their children vaccinated
(CBC News 2009); line-jumping by those not in risk groups (Wente 2009);
family doctors not providing vaccinations due to bureaucratic obstacles
(Alphonso, Priest and Matas 2009). Frustaglio's death may have
increased coverage of H1N1 significantly but coverage almost certainly
would have subsided more quickly had the health service provided more
efficient service. A more decentralized approach which employs the
entire health community, including more family doctors, would help.
Finally, government needs to get better at getting it wrong. The
PHAC report claims that the media hyped and exaggerated the threat of
H1N1. This claim is unsettling because the report side-steps, however
gently, the responsibility that health-related government agencies have
to anticipate media coverage and incorporate it into their plan. Because
of our limited knowledge with uncertain risks, we may misinterpret early
warning signs, over- (and under-) react and give bad advice. Governments
need an organizational culture that supports action in the face of
uncertainty and learning in uncertain situations. Political culture is
not conducive to this type of risk-taking; again, letting the health
sector lead may generate better results.
It would be disconcerting if government approached the next health
crisis with a distrust of the media. This distrust would inevitably lead
to less transparency, which would further erode trust in government
process (Kramer 1999). Civil servants would become more nervous about
engaging with the media knowing the potentially negative consequences of
a high dread message amplified by the media. Rather, government should
work to understand the incentive structures and the biases in media
coverage and public reaction to it, particularly during a highly emotive
and volatile event, and account for these features in government
pandemic planning. Ultimately, government will still need media to help
communicate its message. The rise of social media makes the need for
adaptive capacity in the health sector even greater. Next time, the
pandemic may be more severe and, like in Australia in 2009, we may have
considerably less lead time.
Notes
(1) In 1976 the US government orchestrated a large and far-reaching
vaccination program in anticipation of a swine flu outbreak. The program
was enacted quickly and absorbed considerable resources. Ultimately,
however, swine flu never materialized.
(2) In the case of flu vaccines, public funding varies by province
and territory (Public Health Agency of Canada 2015) and supply and
distribution is determined through complex administrative processes
involving federal, provincial and territorial health authorities (Public
Health Agency of Canada 2014).
(3) For the media analysis in this paper, the "health
sector" refers to doctors, nurses and hospital staff.
(4) For instance, the G&M is a national newspaper and therefore
more likely to focus on federal--than provincial--issues. The same can
be said for the DT and the Australian. The Toronto Star and La Presse
might be more likely to cover local issues.
(5) Orders of government refer to, in Canada, federal, provincial
or municipal government, in Australia, federal, state and municipal, and
in the UK, central, devolved and city.
(6) A 6-year-old girl from Brampton, Ontario (whose name was never
released to the media) was the first child to die from H1N1 in Canada
(Boyle 2009).
(7) People do not comfortably compare risks. For instance,
accidents, cancer, congenital malformations/deformations,
assault/homicide, heart diseases, intentional self-harm, cerebrovascular
diseases, and septicemia all ranked as higher causes of mortality for
youth (ages 1-14) in Canada in 2008 than influenza/pneumonia (Statistics
Canada 2012).
(8) In the U.S., for example, the President's Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology prepared a report (PCAST 2009)
assessing pandemic preparations to facilitate the transition from the
knowledge generation phase to the decisions and implementation phase.
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Kevin Quigley is Associate Professor, School of Public
Administration, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Colin
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Caption: Figure 1. Incidents of Hospitalizations and Death due to
H1N1 (2009) in Canada
Caption: Figure 2. H1N1 Cumulative Coverage in Selected Broadsheets
Over Time
Caption: Figure 3. Government Performance Assessment
Caption: Figure 4. Breakdown of Articles by Administrative Argument
Showing an Increase In the Proportion of Efficiency Claims by the Third
and Fourth Periods and a Related Decrease in the Proportion of Stability
and Learning Claims
Table 1. Comparison of Selected H1N1 Statistics for Three Countries
Showing all Three Are Within an Order of Magnitude
Country H1N1 Related H1N1 Related Population
Hospitalizations Deaths in 2009
(000,000)
Canada 8678 428 33.7
United Kingdom 5376 474 61.8
Australia 4992 213 21.9
Country Hospitalizations Deaths
per 100k per 100k
Canada 257.51 12.70
United Kingdom 86.99 7.67
Australia 227.95 9.73
Table 2. Trust Among Canadians in News Sources
Media Source 2012 2013 2014 2015
Traditional Media 75% 74% 70% 62%
Online Search Engines 55% 54% 62% 55%
Hybrid Media 56% 48% 55% 45%
Owned Media 38% 34% 36% 35%
Social Media 32% 34% 32% 35%
Source: Edelman (2015). (a, b)
(a) Survey 200 college-educated respondents, aged 25-64, in top 25%
of household income who report significant media consumption and
engagement in business news and public policy (Edelman 2015).
(b) Traditional denotes print or broadcast media; hybrid media
denotes online versions of traditional media sources (e.g. The
Huffington Post); owned media denotes a brand or company website;
social media denotes sites with user shared/generated content
(e.g. Twitter) (Edelman n.d.).
Table 3. Cohen's Kappa Coefficient Showing High Level of Agreement
Between the Coders
Cohen's Kappa Coefficient
Agreement of Selection of Administrative 0.7366
Argument
Agreement of Control 0.7612
Mechanism
Agreement of both the Administrative 0.6842
Argument and the Control Mechanism
Table 4. Classification of Articles by Cybernetic Control Classes
and Administrative Argument Classes Showing Few in Information
Gathering and the Strongest Association Between Behavior
Modification and Stability and Learning
Information Standard
Gathering Setting
Efficiency 5 (2.5%) 32 (15.9%)
Fairness And Accountability 4 (2%) 32 (15.9%)
Stability And Learning 2 (1%) 27 (13.4%)
Totals 11 (5.5%) 91 (45.3%)
Behaviour Totals
Modification
Efficiency 28 (13.9%) 65 (32.3%)
Fairness And Accountability 7 (3.5%) 43 (21.4%)
Stability And Learning 64 (31.8%) 93 (46.3%)
Totals 99 (49.3%) 201 (100%)