The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture of Government.
Roy, Jeffrey
The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture of
Government
By ALASDAIR ROBERTS. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Pp. 207, bibliographical references, index.
Alasdair Roberts provides both an insightful and timely examination
of the global political economy and its increasingly unstable
institutional architecture. The book is insightful in its dissection of
what he views as the institutional malaise that has now been only
all-too-well exposed by recent and ongoing crises. It is thus timely in
terms of its applicability to such crises and the potential consequences
and choices that fie ahead for policy makers and citizenries.
Roberts begins by sketching out the basis for what he terms
"the logic of discipline," which is essentially an overriding
political philosophy, highly technocratic in nature, and deeply
sceptical of the capacity of democratic processes and politics to
provide stable conditions for both economic growth and fiscal and
monetary rigour. At the heart of the matter is a shared belief among
what may be regarded as an elite class in the necessity to constrain
action via formalized legal means, on the one hand, and to limit it, on
the other hand, via a complementary set of autonomous actors who are
more or less free from direct political intervention and control.
The conceptual roots for such thinking are twofold. First, Roberts
invokes a more classic political science orientation and the
"Crisis of Democracy," presented in 1975 by Samuel Huntington,
Michel Crozier, and Joji Watanuki as an excess of political faith and
participation (leading to excessive demands and unavoidable
disappointment in results). Second, from a more economic orientation,
compounding and complementing such scepticism of active and open
politics, is the theory of public choice, casting politicians and
bureaucrats as self-serving and thus in need of competitive and
market-oriented constraints. He then traces the evolution of this
paradigm over a thirty-year time span, 1978-2008, which was abruptly
(though possibly temporarily) shattered by the onset of the global
financial crisis and the ensuing contagion that now embroils much of
Europe.
Following his presentation of the theoretical underpinnings of the
underlying discipline at play--underpinnings framed as a set of tensions
playing out globally between democratization and discipline--a number of
chapter-based case studies illustrate the logic at work. Picking up on
the invocation of this central topic in the introduction, the author
continues in the first chapter with an examination of central banks and
their shift away from political control toward operational autonomy (a
move designed to facilitate a narrow and unrelenting pursuit of price
stability, a form of discipline viewed as necessary in the aftermath of
the economic and inflationary turmoil of the 1970s). The status and role
of central banks have, of course, become topical almost everywhere and
nowhere more so than in Europe where the European Central Bank is at the
heart of debates surrounding the savaging or salvaging (depending on
one's perspective) of the Euro. Alas, more on Europe later.
Other case studies in the chapters that follow continue through the
realms of treasury, taxation, transportation, regulatory and judicial
review, and new infrastructure development, and provide further
credence, according to Roberts, of an over-riding agenda to remove the
politics from public authorities in the name of economic and fiscal
discipline and the efficiency gains that result both for the public
sector authorities and societies as a whole. Importantly, however, the
rising power and stature of the Treasury, or Finance Department (the
Canadian example of Paul Martin is invoked), reflect the imposition of
this discipline within the state, thereby reversing Wildavsky's
alternative logic of the invariable trumping of spenders over guardians
that is said to occur typically through openly contested democratic
venues.
Thus, Roberts' logic of discipline must be viewed in the
context of changes both within and outside formal state confines. In one
sense, this illustrates a limitation of the book: namely, its partial
exploration of governance dynamics within government without much
acknowledgement or examination of the parallel pursuit of new public
management as an internal application of the logic he applies primarily
to a wider and more global institutional order. Despite this latter
focus, the case studies are largely of national bodies and their
governing apparatuses. Given Roberts' own background, it is
unfortunate that more attention is not devoted to the inner workings of
government in response to the widening acceptance of a political
economic order that, while stressing market liberalization and state
limitations, also espouses public sector reforms to, in essence, run
government more like private industry.
Indeed, these tensions are at the forefront of Roberts'
chapter on infrastructure and public-private partnerships--a tool of
choice for proponents of the logic of discipline. While Roberts is quite
correct to lament the excessive secrecy of such dealings (i.e., attempts
to mitigate if not block political oversight and democratic
accountability via contractual means), much has changed in recent years
since the creation of such vehicles (known as private finance
initiatives) in the UK thirty years ago. Certainly, any objective review
of this burgeoning literature from which Roberts draws quite
selectively--leads to some recognition that public-private collaboration
and models of shared and open governance have at least come to rival the
methodology espoused initially by those seeking to constrain and
circumvent democracy.
Much as it was politicians who chose to render central banks
independent, elected officials have been responsible for the advent of
public-private partnerships and, as Roberts acknowledges, their pursuit
has long since transcended partisan boundaries. While my point is that
they have become more nuanced (and thus perhaps more balanced and
effective--witness the relative success of such models in underpinning
the Vancouver-Whistler 2010 Olympics, albeit not without controversy and
contestation), Roberts' main interest remains at a higher order.
His view, by contrast, is that the expansion of the use of such vehicles
reflects a widespread adaptation of his logic of discipline.
De-politicization is thus one of Roberts' "three
ill-chosen words," along with autonomy and discipline (leading to
the shortcomings of the logic presented and its resulting institutional
order). As the aforementioned discussion illustrates, the nexus between
de-politicization and autonomy is well examined by Roberts, even if the
dynamics and relative power of the state may be underplayed somewhat (a
charge admittedly much easier to make today than even a few short years
ago when this book was written, as Roberts acknowledges in his
Afterword).
Yet this third and perhaps most central
word--discipline--highlights the crux of the matter for Roberts in terms
of institutional arrangements and policy prescriptions. Here, too, I
wished the author had pushed further his own conclusions and
consequences for reform. Roberts rightly distinguishes between
discipline and legitimacy, pointing out that building the latter is
"slow and complex." For example, in Russia, Putin may have
succeeded, at least partially, in imposing discipline (distinct from but
not unrelated to Roberts' worldview), whereas his legitimacy is
altogether a different matter.
A bit further west, the turmoil in Europe's financial system
is the most powerful laboratory of Roberts' analysis. The author
underscores Germany's inflationary scars from the 1920s as a factor
that cannot be ignored in understanding the country's stance at
present. Indeed a thoughtful November 2011 profile of German Chancellor
Angela Merkel in Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine supports this view: it
explains her resistance to expanding the policy repertoire of the
European Central Bank to provide greater stimulus and debt relief as a
German variant of Roberts' logic of discipline rooted deeply within
German political culture. The proposed response--to create an even
tighter fiscal union backed by formalized treaties lends further
credence to Roberts' assertions regarding his logic of discipline,
as does Italy's 2011 government of technocrats, who completely
displaced elected officials, at least temporarily, as well as parallel
proposals to create a European Department of Finance (to whom national
budgetary authorities would cede at least some power).
While some Euro-enthusiasts would counter that such proposals for
more European governance are precisely meant to counteract the logic of
which Roberts speaks, time will tell. The French presidential and
parliamentary elections in the spring of 2012 will be an important test
case of both political leaders and citizenries in terms of proposals for
reform and the limits (or not) of Roberts' logic of discipline.
Whether the European project supports or refutes Roberts'
hypothesized political-economic order is an open question, bur the broad
and most central lesson of European integration since the Second World
War seems intact: closer economic ties require political architectures
to guide them forward (perhaps only a temporary though immensely
consequential flaw of the single currency project that encapsulates much
of Roberts' critique).
Roberts' Afterword to the book, written in the midst of
unfolding European drama, proceeds with caution. He acknowledges not
only that the taste for order and discipline has been destabilized
(which may or may not be a bad thing, since European integration is now
hotly and openly debated), but also that any world dictated by economic
liberalization and financial integration is bound to pursue the logic of
discipline with vigour. And herein lies the centrality of the European
experiment for Roberts' broader claims and the implications for the
wider world as this century unfolds: can democracy find ways to exist
transnationally and co-exist with market liberalization, an increasingly
technological project that has sought to impose the order so well
described and dissected by Roberts in his book? Stay tuned ...
Jeffrey Roy is Professor, School of Public Administration,
Dalhousie University.