Identity in Mercosur: regionalism and nationalism.

Santos, Sergio Caballero

Two trends have historically competed in the Latin American region: a strong nationalist vision that originates in the nineteenth century with the construction of the nation-state, and the idea of a unifying project in the face of an "external enemy." This article first provides an overview of these two notions by addressing the performance of the Southern Common Market in the past decade and highlighting the emergence of Mercosur's collective identity. Then, the role of ideas and identity is examined to analyze how it configures and constrains the decisionmaking process and how this role conditions the regional identity. Finally, a reflection on the collective identity as it relates to Mercosur is offered. Keywords: regional integration, Mercosur, collective identity, ideas.

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THE FORMATION OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY MAY BE FACILITATED OR CONSTRAINED by structures, but it is never exogenously given or immutable. (1) From a socioconstructivist view of international relations, the structures, comprised of both conceptual and material elements, may be reproduced, or partially transformed, depending on the agents and the contexts. In regional integration projects, the formation of the collective identity among the states is primarily based on a rising interdependence. This can take at least two forms. One is an increase in the "dynamic density" of interactions due to, for example, trade and capital flows. A second is the emergence of a "common other," whether personified in an external aggressor or a more abstract threat such as nuclear war or ecological collapse. (2)

In the South American case, both phenomena have occurred. On the one hand, since the Latin American independences of the nineteenth century, the South American states were built in opposition to the "North American Other," due to the threat of being dominated by the US hegemon. (3) This fear motivated, in part, the fact that the idea of unity and regional integration were understood as a defense and protection mechanism against a threatening Other. There is no doubt that Other rationales also play a part in the process of regional integration, from the creation of a security community (4) to stimulating commerce and development, among others. However, at this point I am interested in reaffirming the importance of the vision of unity in opposition to the concrete or diffuse threat emanating from that Other, whoever it may be, depending on the historical context.

And on the other hand, the second element above, the growing density of the interactions between the different South American countries, has been palpable, especially after the rise of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (5) in 1991, which generated high flows of regional economic interdependence that were reduced only due to the severe regional crisis that occurred between 1999 and 2002. The emphasis on the trade agenda throughout the 1990s, influenced by the Washington Consensus, (6) gave rise to this boom in economic interdependency. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that there is a greater degree of regionalism than of regionalization in the case of Mercosur. To differentiate the nuances between these two terms, I refer to the distinction between regionalism understood as the political project tending to stimulate integration, that is, based on the political will of the parties; and the concept of regionalization, defined as the informal process of regional interaction (economic, social, cultural, etc.) that takes place beyond the strictly national borders. Now that this difference has been clarified, I argue that the former is stronger and more determining than the latter in the case of Mercosur. (7) These conceptual clarifications are relevant in that we should know clearly what we refer to in each case. For this reason I also want to clarify that, when I speak of regional integration, I use a definition that is widely accepted by scholars, and is described as

   a historical process of growing levels of interaction among
   political units (subnational, national, and transnational), carried
   out by stakeholders that share common ideas, set objectives, and
   design methods to reach them, and therefore contribute to the
   construction of a region. There are three corollaries for this
   definition: 1) the process can encompass a great variety of
   stakeholders (public and private), a variety of levels (from below
   and from above) and a variety of agendas; 2) it can come from a
   deliberate strategy or emerge as an unexpected consequence of the
   social interaction; and 3) it can lead to institution building. (8)

Having made these conceptual distinctions, I argue that the political impulses toward integration, arising from presidential speeches in regional summits (9) and reflecting a top-down model of integration, are more potent and evident in Mercosur than the process of a true de facto regional integration among the Mercosur societies. Therefore, they are based on a bottom-up model, which has been quite limited in the course of the Mercosur process. In fact, the bottom-up dynamic (i.e., based on a demand from society to promote a regional project) has been scarce and limited to a few social groups, among them a large group of scholars. On the contrary, what has been characteristic is a top-down model emanating from the elites, which is why many presidents offer integration as a sort of political product that is desirable for society. (10)

My objective in this article is to address the tensions between the ideas that support regional integration in Mercosur and the nationalist approaches and visions that emphasize the differences between South American countries. Thus, the main question to ask ourselves is whether we can suggest the regional project as something plausible and supported by the construction of a collective identity or if, on the contrary, the unit of analysis and the container of loyalties, and the goal to be, are at the national level. In the case of the latter, the regional project is secondary, be it as a defensive mechanism against the extraregional Other or to expand the market and stimulate intraregional trade.

In some way what I propose is not strictly new. Some authors have already questioned whether it is possible to "talk about a common destiny underlying a collective identity or is Latin America [or Mercosur] merely the sum of its various national identities and communities." (11) What I intend to contribute in this work is a larger theoretical framework, taking notions from constructivism, to suggest answers that include an element as diffuse and slippery as identity.

With that purpose, I have above clarified the terminology and spatially defined the paradox we are dealing with. Next, I rapidly place it within its historical context so that we can then look at the development of Mercosur in the past decade, highlighting both the formation of the Mercosur collective identity and the perspectives adopted from each of the member states. Then, I examine the role of ideas and identity to analyze how that role configures and constrains regional identity. Finally, I present a few tentative conclusions extracted from these reflections on the impact of collective identity on regional integration.

Regionalism and Nationalism in Latin American History

From a historical perspective, the convergence of the two aforementioned elements--the growing regional integration and the existence of a common Other--allows us to talk about a defined and particular South American collective identity, constructed with an internal orientation to the region and in opposition to the external and threatening Other. "Nevertheless, the ideal image of the 'Patria Grande' (the great homeland), whether Latin American, South American, or Central American, has always had a difficult relationship with the strong nationalism that arose during the post-independence nation-building process and is still present in the identity and political culture throughout the region." (12) Just as Jose Antonio Sanahuja states, "Latin America faces a permanent 'trilemma' that entails three contradictory goals: first, the defense of the nation-state and national sovereignty; second, its traditional ambitions for unionism and regional integration; and third, the search for greater autonomy at the international level." (13)

As I have outlined, all Latin American countries share a common history of Iberian conquest, emancipations in the nineteenth century imbued with continental and unionist ideas and rationales. Furthermore, the majority of these countries had the misfortune of suffering military regimes throughout extensive periods of the twentieth century and also participated in nascent processes of recuperation and democratic consolidation in the past three decades. Thus, despite their specific singularities, as one would expect, they do present a shared history, a certain common place in the world and in history, to the extent that their societies have faced particular events and long-term processes that share many similarities. (14)

In addition, said early-nineteenth-century independences were decidedly supported by a strong nation-building process and by a reverence for patriotic symbols (e.g., flag, hymns, and founding fathers), which accentuated the differences and peculiarities of each new state formed. Thus, national reaffirmation was promoted at the expense of projects of unionism and reciprocal trust among neighbors. These characteristics are particularly evident in border territories where societies share cultural similarities and identities. However, patriotic symbols--as a simple example, think of national soccer teams--prove how personal loyalties are closer and more faithful to the nation-state in question than to the border subregion where daily life unfolds.

More recently, different models of international involvement and national development have arisen which, in the majority of cases, were antagonistic or in opposition to those in neighboring countries. An example of these antagonistic national projects is the weapons race in the Southern Cone during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that was resolved only with the ABC Plan, signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in 1915. And as an example of exclusive economic models I could cite the protectionist policies that the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), presided by Raul Prebisch, tried to overcome through the classic regionalism of the 1950s, based on import substitution industrialization and the expansion of national markets to a regional one that would favor economies of scale. Following this same regional rationale the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was signed in 1960 in Montevideo, but lost impetus until it was resuscitated twenty years later in the form of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). (15) Along the way various other institutional projects can be found, elaborate but rarely successful, such as the Andean Pact of 1969 as well as political consultation and cooperation mechanisms such as the Rio Group, which played a leading role in the 1980s. (16)

That said, the aim is not a comprehensive review of Latin American regional projects throughout all history, but simply to establish the context for integrationism, which was particularly prolific in the second half of the twentieth century. However, in any case, and to summarize, both ideas--nationalism and regionalism--have survived throughout Latin American history and, in a certain way, both ideas belong to the Latin American social imaginary. According to Charles Taylor, by social imaginary we understand "concretely the way in which regular people 'imagine' their social environment, something that most times is not expressed in theoretical terms, but is evident in images, stories, and legends." (17) That is, even if they are not explicit, both ideas are part of the way to understand that which is Latin American. Therefore, regardless of the tensions and struggles between those who argue for one vision or the other, we can say that both are part of the map of relationships and structure (18) that constitutes Latin America and, consequently, that both influence the formation of collective identity in the region, as I discuss below.

The Mercosur Process After 2003

After several years of a process of rapprochement and confidence building between the democratic governments of Argentina and Brazil, headed by Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989) and Jose Samey (1985-1990) respectively, the Mercosur treaty was signed in Asuncion by Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil in 1991. Despite the fact that they reached high levels of interdependence--measured in terms of growing trade flows--and that an incipient security community was built up throughout the 1990s, (19) the Mercosur crisis in 1999-2002 put the entire regional integration process in jeopardy. (20) The devaluation of the Brazilian real and the subsequent Argentine economic crisis extended throughout all areas, including a political-institutional crisis (several presidents in the course of a couple of weeks), a socioeconomic crisis (disturbances, unemployment, and loss of savings), and an identity crisis (rethinking national and regional development projects, and questioning the international participation models). Thus, according to sources in ECLAC, (21) during the 1990s interregional trade grew steadily from 10 percent to 25 percent of the total trade of the member countries. However, just from 1999 to 2003 it retreated to only a little more than 10 percent. Intraregional trade has kept at a steady rate of growth in the past decade, although at inferior rates than those from the 1990s, in part because the pattern of exporting the commodities of these countries has motivated the stimulation of extraregional trade, diminishing interregional trade in relative terms, although it has grown in absolute terms.

Returning to the regional crisis of the turn of the century, during those years a few of the leading stakeholders stated their opposition to the regional project, in an effort to reduce Mercosur to a mere free-trade region, as had been proposed by Domingo Cavallo, Argentina's minister of finance at the time and former chancellor. However, and perhaps paradoxically, this regional crisis opened a window of opportunity to intensify some aspects of regional integration that had been secondary during the period of growing economic interdependence in the 1990s. Thus, in the years following the crisis, presidents who shared a particular regional vision and were supported by civil society groups, such as scholars and epistemic communities, were elected to power: (22) Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (hereafter, Lula) in Brazil and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina in January and May 2003, respectively; Tabare Vazquez and his Frente Amplio coalition in Uruguay in 2004; and Fernando Lugo in Paraguay in 2008. First of all, these presidents stressed that domestic weaknesses were so strong that it was more feasible to overcome them from the regional level. A visible example is the Argentine government of Eduardo Duhalde (2002-2003), who had not shown any preference for the regional project prior to his election, but was persuaded toward a greater integration with the rest of the Mercosur countries by the circumstances of domestic weakness and international isolation. (23)

It is also important to add that the relative understanding that these presidents shared regarding the regional process and the suitability of redefining Mercosur bolstered and led to a greater collective identity and to the idea of a common region as a first step toward acting on the international stage. Thus, whether motivated by political need or by a sincere reflection, the presidents of the member states of Mercosur in these years (Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, 2003-2007 and 2007, respectively; Lula, 2003-2010; Vazquez, 2005-2010; and Lugo, 2008-2012) adopted measures that not only did not push regionalism into a crisis, but rather revitalized it with broader and more ambitious agendas, introducing sociopolitical elements in addition to the eminently economic trade ones.

The bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil was exemplified in the Consensus of Buenos Aires in 2003, which sets a new priority agenda that includes political (bringing democracy closer to the citizens and reversing the democratic deficit of Mercosur), economic (promotion of equitable development), and social aspects (emphasis on education). (24) From this consensus between Nestor Kirchner and Lula springs the idea of expanding the Mercosur agenda and configuring a true redefinition of Mercosur. Furthermore, it is worth highlighting the identity rationale that unites its members and makes them share values and traditions; that is, that envisions them as belonging to a single society of states, and allows them to see themselves as partners in a shared future instead of as rivals or enemies.

Beyond that, the minor partners, both Uruguay and Paraguay, focused on the regional agenda, promoting mechanisms for the reduction of imbalances such as the Structural Convergence Fund of Mercosur (FOCEM) and sociopolitical programs to empower citizens as an active part of this process such as the Somos Mercosur (We Are Mercosur) program. By virtue of FOCEM, Argentina and Brazil transferred a small sum of money (25) to Uruguay and Paraguay, making it a type of redistributive mechanism, in spite of the deficiencies and pockets of poverty already present in the two major partners. (26) This fund is primarily targeted toward the improvement of the regional infrastructure, stimulating economic complementation programs and reducing regional asymmetries. Therefore, even though its final impact may be limited given the small contribution provided by the member states, the underlying rationale behind this integration mechanism is none other than regional solidarity based on the perception of a collective identity. Also, the Somos Mercosur program, launched by Vazquez's Uruguayan government in 2005, aimed to give civil society a larger role in the process of integration. This program was intended to bring the citizens and the decisionmakers closer, and to generate a sense of ownership over a regional project; in other words, it sought to develop a particular Mercosur sense of identity among the citizens of the member states.

However, what probably best portrays the commitment of the process of regional integration with the sociocultural identity is the emergence of a Mercosur Parliament in 2005. Once the democratic deficit of the regional project was recognized, the presidents of the then four member states decided to create a regional parliament. Opting for direct election of its respective delegations for this body, they hoped to achieve a double objective: (1) to make citizens the participants of debates in the regional realm and (2) to create a forum to deliberate on the regional agenda and the citizens' demands. However, the initial goals must be weighed and compared against what was actually achieved. In this sense, even though it was an important step toward promoting a more definite collective identity, the Mercosur Parliament still is not comprised of representatives elected directly by the citizens, except in the case of Paraguay's parliamentarians. What is more, this parliament does not have any executive or decisional jurisdiction, merely a deliberative one with the power to issue political recommendations. (27)

Beyond the aforementioned events that are inclined toward reinforcing a growing Mercosur identity, it is worth mentioning other events that blocked regional advances or that eroded any hope of self-perception as belonging to the same collective. The main obstacle faced in recent years was the conflict between Argentina and Uruguay over the cellulose plants installed along the Uruguay River. Between 2005 and 2010, this dispute caused strong diplomatic struggles and heightened the tensions between nationalist interests and hypothetical regional aspirations. After unfruitful negotiations between Presidents Nestor Kirchner and Vasquez, the situation was successfully addressed only during the new presidencies of Cristina Fernandez and Jose Mujica. Even though the conflict seems to have been finally resolved, the consequences for the regional process in terms of reciprocal distrust and animosity are particularly strong, as is seen whenever this topic reemerges as a dispute on both sides of the river. Another critical element was added to the rising nationalist feelings in both countries: the lack of Brazilian activity to resolve the dispute when there was an expectation for Brazil to fulfill its role as regional leader and paymaster of the regional integration process. But Brazil is not comfortable with the idea of being presented as regional hegemon, and rejects any responsibility or attempt to be considered a regional leader or a paymaster. What is yet to be seen is the degree to which Brazil will act as a regional leader in relation to projecting itself onto the international stage, or how it will play the role of stabilizer in intraregional conflicts through the Union of South American Nations (Unasur). But in spite of all this, Itamaraty (28) continues to reject any label that might smack of hegemony, subregional imperialism, or paymaster of the costs of regional integration.

Finally, the other relevant event from recent years that is worth mentioning--in this case, an event that has revealed the aligning of the majority of presidents, acting as a sort of friends' club and emphasizing the political dimension above the legal--is the suspension of Paraguay from Mercosur and Unasur after Paraguayan president Lugo was removed from office in June 2012. This sui generis suspension was used at the same time to formalize the definitive accession of Venezuela to Mercosur, which had remained blocked for years by the Senate of Paraguay. After the elections in Paraguay in April 2013, full reinstatement of Asuncion to Unasur materialized in August 2013 and, following formal procedures, his return to Mercosur was certified in December 2013. However, what is relevant in this context is how these integration processes rely on the political will of the decisionmakers even above institutionalism and, in this specific case, on the perception of peers of being aligned or not (i.e., like a friends' club with whom to share common projects).

In this section, I have tried to show elements of the Mercosur integration process that exemplify the tensions between the two opposing poles I have highlighted: regionalism and nationalism. Thus, among the improvements and setbacks of this process, the ideas of common regional projects and those of national loyalties have been in direct competition, each one gaining in prevalence over the other according to the circumstances and the political will of the presidents themselves.

The Collective Identity of Mercosur

Without needing to establish an exhaustive definition of what is understood as collective regional identity, it might be useful to point out how I approach this concept. Here, identity would not be something established and fixed, but rather processual, which I would conceive the projection of what we want to be as being more important than what we already are. In fact, this volitional dimension is what shows us not only how subjects perceive themselves, but how they want to construct themselves. Therefore, the dimension of identity, understood as self-perception and loyalties toward certain ideas (whether nation, region, or any other), will not be clearly organized or stratified, as I show below, but will be intermingled and in permanent construction and definition as a function of the relationships between the subjects. When applied to my particular case study, this means that the interaction between the different regional stakeholders would model the different identities, and that the regional political projects would be susceptible to proposing what these societies would like to be (i.e., if they wish to share a regional collective identity).

Now that this conceptual point has been clarified, going back in history the emergence of a Latin American regional identity has been determined by many different factors. (29) In this particular case, that of Mercosur, it is worth highlighting that a shared history (Iberian conquest, the emancipations of the nineteenth century, strong nation-building processes, unionist projects against the hegemony of the United States, and military regimes) with common values (democracy, human rights, international participation with a regional voice, Western values, and indigenous worldviews) is manifested by stakeholders and decisionmakers throughout the region. Over the past decade or so, both the presidents of the member states and the spokespersons of civil society (illustrated by the social summits of Mercosur, held periodically since 2006) and the different epistemic communities, particularly the networks of scholars working in and on the region since the 1980s, have directed their efforts and synergies to intensifying and deepening regional integration.

In light of this, it is common to find citizens of the Mercosur territory who perceive themselves both as nationals of their respective countries and as members of a common regional project. (30) In fact, in a sense we can understand there to be a layering of identities. This idea of overlapping identities would be, in part, the equivalent of what has been called "shared sovereignty" in terms of the political-legal relationship between the national state and regionalism. To be more precise, even if a state does not delegate its national sovereignty to a supranational entity, that state can reach agreements and consensus with its neighbors in certain areas, and can decide to make joint determinations regarding certain affairs. Thus, in the same way, citizens, without rejecting or negating their sense of belonging to their national state, can at the same time actively incorporate the regional project as something common and shared with the rest of the citizens of said region.

Returning to my unifying thread of the collective identity, I find particularly useful and compelling the concept that Thomas Risse uses for the European case: the "marble cake." Risse affirms that "the idea is that multiple identities are nested or embedded rather than neatly layered." (31) Applying this concept to my consideration of collective identity in Mercosur, I can argue that the "marble cake" concept claims, on the one hand, that there is much more Mercosurness embedded in national, regional, or other collective identities than is usually assumed. On the other hand, the meaning of Mercosur might differ profoundly in the various national, subnational, and other contexts. (32)

Therefore, even though the degree of regional collective identity achieved could be debated (in a continuum that would extend from an embryonic regional collective identity to one fully consolidated), what does seem plausible is the existence of a greater regionness (33) than what is usually allowed. Thus, the pro-integration speeches and the regional policies not only would be populist measures to obtain political capital and win elections, but also would create the conditions that would make it possible to legitimize ideas and interests that coexist in those societies.

Nevertheless, it is true that the idea of a common region has different meanings for each stakeholder and, in a more defined way, depending on the stakeholder's nationality. Thus, simplifying and adopting a broad stroke, from Brazil, for some (34) it might seem that the region has become the springboard to obtain international recognition as a global player. By this logic, the commitment to the region would be purely instrumental, a means for a more important end: international projection as a relevant stakeholder on the global stage. Others introduce some nuances and signal Brazil's capacity during the governments of Lula to modestly please the less favored partners, preaching a leadership style based on consensual hegemony, although in practice its foreign regional and global policies appear to conflict. (35) Perhaps we can adopt an eclectic position (36) that underlines the existence of different rationales between the diplomats of Itamaraty and the will (and tension) of Brazil's decisionmakers to carry more weight both in the region and on the international stage.

In the case of Paraguay, a country with no access to the ocean, the region has become its only way to participate internationally in a globalized world. Thus, Paraguay is "condemned" to integrate with its neighbors, which explains its need to be admitted again into Mercosur (obviously, observing the formalities for its full return) after its suspension following President Lugo's removal from office in June 2012.

As for Uruguay, the fact that it is a small country that shares a multitude of sociocultural elements with its two big neighbors means that the Uruguayans need to perceive themselves as being in permanent interaction with the region, even though hypothetical economic alliances with extraregional partners (e.g., a free-trade agreement with the United States like the one proposed in 2006) might be advisable if only economic trade elements were being considered. Finally, from Argentina's viewpoint, Mercosur should be understood as a way to insert itself internationally, which ties in with its permanent search for autonomy in foreign affairs while at the same time the regional project implies a future linked to the powerful and emerging Brazilian economy. However, it also suggests the strengthening of a Buenos Aires-Brasilia axis to act as a guarantor of regional stability.

The Role of the Stakeholders and the Capacity for Agency

In discussing the collective regional identity of Mercosur, it seems necessary to discern how it is built, or at least identify some of the factors that stimulate and/or constrain it. For this, I refer to the well-known debate in international relations between agency and structure. (37) It can be put in the following broad terms: there is no easy and incontrovertible solution regarding the traditional struggle between the unitary projects and the Latin American nationalisms. Both tensions appear to be integrated in their structures and are promoted or rejected by different agents. In the same way, even though agency and structure are two different elements, from a constructivist perspective both would be interrelated and reciprocally constructed, where the dynamic and processual dimension would be fundamental for understanding this intersubjective relationship. The stakeholders have the capacity for agency as well as the will to introduce normative changes. However, these are limited by the structures and the stakeholder's true capacity to persuade the other stakeholders (e.g., the rest of society) and influence them through ideas. Also, those ideas would be deposited gradually, not in a linear or stratified way, on the ideational structures that develop along a historical process of longue duree.

As an example to clarify this reflexive interconnection between agency and structure, the case of Brazilian president Lula (2003-2011) can be presented in a synthesized way for the purpose of observing how the capacity for agency--in this case study, presidents who promote and redefine the process of regional integration--is a relevant factor in constructing a collective identity in the region. While I recognize the methodological limitation of focusing on only one stakeholder, I believe that this deliberate simplification can shed light on how the collective identity of Mercosur is designed. Thus, considering the historical aims (structure) of Brazilian diplomacy and its elites to transform Brazil into a relevant global actor, and to play a larger role on the international stage, (38) the personal commitment of President Lula (agency) with the region and his regional counterparts prompted a rapprochement with Argentina after the regional crisis of 19992002 while also establishing Mercosur as the main priority of his foreign policy. (39) Additionally, the sociopolitical redefinition of Mercosur and the subsequent emergence of Unasur (40) gave a new importance to interregional relations, which permeated the Brazilian and regional social imaginaries. (41) Thus, Lula's capacity for agency and his personal design of foreign policy (42) were extremely relevant for a better understanding and alignment of the political projects for regional integration while deepening the idea of a collective regional identity. However, at the same time, these events would also be constrained and limited by Brazilian aspirations that make up its own national development structure; that is, the idea of a Brazil that subtly exercises its regional leadership as a springboard to become a global player. (43) Furthermore, some see Brazil's national interest as one of the risks against the regional integration of Mercosur. (44)

In the end, the understanding and the alignment between the different world visions of the region's decisionmakers determine, in a way, how the societies perceive themselves. This most certainly conditions the way in which the collective regional identity is shaped. And in addition to these agents who have the capacity to shape the identities in their societies, there are also nation-building structures that limit and hinder the possibilities for change. In other words, the stakeholders do not act on an empty or yet-to-be-constructed reality, as if it were a clean sheet of paper, but rather within contexts based on preexisting (and often barely mutable) relationships. These structures, which we conceive in terms of longue duree, change slowly. As a matter of fact, the ideational dimension of the structures also plays an important role in shaping the collective identity.

Conclusion

In this article, I have presented an approach to the formation of the collective identity in the case of a process of regional integration such as that of Mercosur from a perspective close to the constructivist approaches of international relations. Based on the presented arguments, I can propose some preliminary conclusions. First, the most obvious conclusion is the confirmation of the existence of two competing rationales that have survived in the Latin American social imaginary for two centuries and that continue shaping the ideas of the region's decisionmakers. In a similar way, I can also state that there is more Mercosurness than is typically admitted. This means that, in addition to the tensions between both narratives--the one of national projects and the one of regional projects--there really is a collective Mercosur identity based on certain achievements, such as the FOCEM and the regional parliament. In spite of the frequently cited gap between discourse and reality and also over institutional failings and deficits, the region's sociopolitical progress and improvements have been palpable and the emergence of a regional identity that coexists with a national one in each of the member states has become a fait accompli.

And finally, another element we can extract from the discussion is the complexity inherent in all of us as subjects at the time of dissecting our different identities and loyalties. In fact, betting on the marble cake concept is consistent with this idea, as it allows us to explain how different--and sometimes even opposite--identities function in an intermingled and simultaneous manner. And therefore, it allows us to banish simplifications that arise from the clear stratification of said identities as if the agents could decide at each moment under which notion they would prefer to act. The agents definitely introduce ideas in which they have been previously socialized into the social contexts (structures) with the intention of producing change and wrap their actions in regulations (e.g., to stimulate regional integration), but their success will depend on the very relationships between the different agents. Thus, this scenario leaves the playing field open for different national and regional visions to compete among the Latin American political projects.

Notes

Sergio Caballero Santos is researcher at Universidad Autonoma de Madrid. He has written on international relations and regionalism.

A Spanish version of this article has been published in Foro Internacional, the journal of the Center for International Studies at El Colegio de Mexico, vol. 54, no. 4 (October-December 2014). It has been translated into English by James McMillan under an agreement between Global Governance and Foro to simultaneously publish two articles. The editors of both journals feel that sharing our work will spark greater collaboration between our readers.

(1.) Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-396.

(2.) Ibid., p. 390. This and the following translations are mine.

(3.) Andres Rivarola Puntigliano, '"Geopolitics of Integration' and the Imagination of South America," Geopolitics 16, no. 4 (2011): 846-864.

(4.) In the realm of the security communities, Karl Deutsch's vision is a compulsory reference; he states that "in the first stages of the integrative process, frequently a psychological, non-belligerent community arises. War between partners, in hindsight, is considered illegitimate; serious preparations for war no longer enjoy popular support." Karl Deutsch, Analisis de las relaciones internacionales (Buenos Aires: Polity Press, 1974), p. 232.

(5.) A regional integration project formally launched with the Asuncion Treaty of 1991, which originally integrated Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. For legal-institutional information, see www.mercosur.int.

(6.) The liberalizing postulates characteristic of 1990s neoliberalism, marked by deregulations and privatizations, are grouped under the Washington Consensus label. However, for more details, see John Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform" (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990), www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=486.

(7.) For contrast, in the case of NAFTA-TLCAN, the political will for integration (regionalism) has been weak while the interaction and the informal integration across the borders (regionalization) has been evident, including economic and migratory flows and even tourism and drug trafficking.

(8.) Olivier Dabene, The Politics of Regional Integration in Latin America: Theoretical and Comparative Explorations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 34.

(9.) The gap between the integrationist rhetoric of presidential speeches and the implementation in practice of truly integrating measures is a common critique against Latin American regionalism. See Sergio Caballero Santos, "El proceso de integracion regional del Mercosur: ?que papel juegan los factores ideacionales?" Editorial Academica Espanola, April 2012. Given that there is no room here to delve into whether said gap is as wide or not, I will accept as given the existence of such pro-integration presidential speeches and will reference a few below.

(10.) Regarding an interesting vision of regional integration in terms of supply and demand, see Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

(11.) Marcelo de Almeida Medeiros and Maria Isabel Meunier Ferraz, "The Cognitive Dimension of Regional Integration in Latin America: What Does Neo-Bolivarianism Mean?" paper presented at the International Political Science Association International Congress, Sao Paulo, February 2011, p. 9.

(12.) Jose Antonio Sanahuja, "Post-liberal Regionalism in South America: The Case of Unasur," Working Paper RSCAS 2012/05 (Florence: European University Institute, February 2012), p. 1.

(13.) Ibid.

(14.) Using long duration in the sense proposed by Fernand Braudel. See Fernand Braudel, La historia y las ciencias sociales (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1968; reprint, 1982).

(15.) The Latin American Free Trade Association was created in 1960 between eleven Latin American countries in the hope of establishing a free-trade zone. However, the fact that it was more useful for the big economies (Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina) partly encouraged the emergence of the Andean Pact in 1969 in Bolivia (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, which left in 1976 while in 1973 Venezuela joined) and, finally, its reformulation in Montevideo in 1980 as the Latin American Integration Association, which acts as a legal-institutional umbrella of the set of integration agreements in the region.

(16.) The Rio Group, founded in 1986 by the merging of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) and the Apoyo Group (Argentina, Brasil, Peru, and Uruguay), had an important role in ending the belligerent conflicts of the Central American subregion in the 1980s. In a certain way, it emerged as a Latin American forum of joint political action until 2010 when it became the embryo of the current Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

(17.) Charles Taylor, Imaginarios sociales modernos (Barcelona: Paidos, 2006), p. 37.

(18.) The agency-structure debate in international relations allows us to dissect the different theoretical approaches and the disparities between them. However, in this case, I did not go into detail about these debates, but stated that I understand as structure the material and ideational dimension in which the action occurs. Such structure is built on the basis of the relationships among the stakeholders themselves (in Pierre Bourdieu's terms, it acculturates and places them in certain doxa) and represents the field in which the stakeholders interact and whose practical actions reinforce, reject, or resignify the material and ideational elements of said structure. In any case, I will explain the use of the "structure" concept as it relates to this article.

(19.) See, among others, Andrea Oelsner, "Consensus and Governance in Mercosur: The Evolution of the South American Security Agenda," Security Dialogue, no. 40 (2009): 191-212.

(20.) For more on the origins and development of Mercosur, see, among others, Gian Luca Gardini, The Origins of Mercosur: Democracy and Regionalization in South America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Olivier Dabene, The Politics of Regional Integration in Latin America: Theoretical and Comparative Explorations (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

(21.) Data CEPAL-ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook 2013, http://interwp.cepal.org /anuario_estadistico/anuario_2013/es/index.asp, accessed 13 January 2015.

(22.) We understand "epistemic communities" along the lines of Peter Haas, who defines them as professional networks of renowned prestige and experience in a certain topic, which makes them ideal for consultation by decisionmakers. Peter Haas, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), quoted in Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 149. Therefore, given their capacity to influence decisionmakers, epistemic communities become an important driver of new ideas.

(23.) In an anecdotal fashion and with the purpose of elaborating on this paradigmatic case, Duhalde himself would be forced to end up speaking on behalf of the regional project, as he held the presidency of the Commission of Permanent Representatives of Mercosur from 2003 to 2005.

(24.) At the same time, the presidents of both countries ratify in this document "our deep conviction that Mercosur is not only a trade block but that it also constitutes a catalyzing space for values, traditions, and a shared future. Thus, our governments are working to strengthen it through the refinement of its institutions in the trade and political fields and in the incorporation of new countries." Article 15 of the Buenos Aires Consensus, signed in October 2003 by President Nestor Kirchner and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, RESDAL (Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina), www.resdal.org/ultimos-documentos/consenso-bsas.html. They state that:

we understand that regional integration constitutes a strategic option to strengthen the participation of our countries in the world, increasing their negotiating capacity. Greater authority to make decisions will allow us to more efficiently face the destabilizing movements of speculative financial capital and the opposing interests of the more developed blocks, increasing our voice in the different forums and multilateral organisms. Accordingly, [the presidents] emphasize that South American integration should be promoted in the interest of all, with the objective of forming a development model in which growth, social justice, and the citizens' dignity are united. (Article 16)

(25.) Initially, a total amount of $100 million was committed, which at times was not completely disbursed due to technical difficulties. However, as time has gone by, the amounts have increased slightly and the first projects have reached their end so that their impact on society is beginning to be felt.

(26.) We cannot ignore the fact that Uruguay is the richest of the four members in per capita terms, nor that in spite of that it is a net beneficiary of the FOCEM. At the same time, Brazil is the principal contributor despite its own domestic pockets of poverty.

(27.) For more details regarding the redefinition process of Mercosur and a larger debate of this process, see Santos, "El proceso de integracion regional del Mercosur."

(28.) Itamaraty Palace, in Brasilia, is the home of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Brazil.

(29.) For a suggestive theoretical reflection throughout history, see Jorge Larrain, "La identidad latinoamericana: Teoria e historia," Estudios Publicos, no. 55 (Winter 1994).

(30.) Statement supported by interviews by the author in different countries of Mercosur and at various times between the years 2005 and 2012. Data suggesting the same can be found in different statistical sources and surveys. See, for example, the source related to the sentiment of the connection to Mercosur compiled by Angel Garcia Santiago and Juan Carlos Zubieta Irun (coordinators), Los estereotipos nacionales de las poblaciones de los paises del Mercosur y de Espana (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2006), pp. 293-294.

(31.) Thomas Risse, "Regionalism and Collective Identities: The European Experience," prepared for the workshop "El estado del debate contemporaneo en Relaciones Internacionales," Buenos Aires, Argentina, 27-28 July 2000, p. 5.

(32.) Ibid., p. 6.

(33.) Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum establish a classification into five levels of regionness: (1) regional space; (2) regional complex; (3) regional society; (4) regional community; and (5) institutionalized regional government. For more details, see Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, "Theorising Comparative Regionalism: Bridging Old Divides," document prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Session, "Comparative Regional Integration: Towards a Research Agenda." Nicosia, April 2006, pp. 28-29.

(34.) See Andres Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy," Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 3 (2011): 1-24.

(35.) See Elodie Brun and Bruno Muxagato, "El proyecto internacional brasileno (2003-2010): Intenciones regionales y proyeccion global via las relaciones Sur-Sur," Anuario Americanista Europeo, no. 10 (2012): 91-116.

(36.) Along these lines, I adopt the proposal of Santiago Caballero Santos, "Brasil y la region: una potencia emergente y la integracion regional sudamericana," Revista Brasilena de Politica Internacional (RBPI) 54, no. 2 (2011): 158-172.

(37.) Among the vast literature on this topic, I rely on the seminal work of authors such as Anthony Giddens and his theory of structuring; scholars of international affairs such as Alexander Wendt and Kenneth Waltz; critical neo-Gramscian reflections such as those by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton; and interpretations and rereadings of Bourdieu such as those by Didier Bigo. However, to summarize, I recognize that part of my analysis is underpinned in large part by what was said by Gaston Ain and Santiago Caballero Santos, "El debate agencia-estructura en las Relaciones Internacionales: voluntad politica y limitaciones," paper presented at the International Political Science Association International Congress, Madrid, July 2012.

(38.) To understand the broad Brazilian foreign policy lines, see Miriam Gomes Saraiva, "Brazilian Foreign Policy Towards South America During the Lula Administration: Caught Between South America and Mercosur," Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional 53, special issue "An Assesment of the Lula Era" (December 2010): 151-168.

(39.) "The biggest exterior political priority during my government will be the construction of a politically stable South America, prosperous and united and based on democratic ideas and social justice.... We will also take care of the social, cultural and scientific and technological dimensions of the integration process." Inaugural address by President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva at the National Congress, Brasilia, 1 January 2003, quoted in Itamaraty, "Repertorio de Politica Externa: Posicoes do Brasil" (Brasilia: Funag, 2007), p. 39.

(40.) First, with the Cuzco Declaration of 2004, which resulted in the South American Community of Nations, and later with the consensus arising from the Isla Margarita summit, which led to the creation of the Union of South American Nations in 2008. For more on Unasur, see Sanahuja, "Post-liberal Regionalism in South America."

(41.) "We ratify our profound conviction that Mercosur is not only a trading bloc, but, on the contrary, it constitutes a space to catalyze values, traditions, and a shared future." Buenos Aires Consensus signed by Presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Nestor Kirchner, Buenos Aires, 16 October 2003, quoted in Itamaraty, "Repertorio de Politica Externa," pp. 64-65.

(42.) For a detailed analysis of the specific foreign policy during the administrations of Lula, see the article written by his chancellor, Celso Amorim, "Brazilian Foreign Policy Under President Lula (2003-2010): An Overview," Revista Brasilena de Politica Internacional 53, special issue "An Assesment of the Lula Era" (December 2010): 214-240.

(43.) Malamud, "A Leader Without Followers?"; Brun and Muxagato, "El proyecto internacional brasileno"; Santos, "Brasil y la region."

(44.) See Steen Fryba Christensen, "The Influence of Nationalism in Mercosur and in South America: Can the Regional Integration Project Survive?" Revista Brasilena de Politica Internacional 50, no. 1 (2007): 139-158.