Regime complexes and national policy coherence: experiences in the biodiversity cluster.

Gomar, Jose Octavio Velazquez ; Stringer, Lindsay C. ; Paavola, Jouni 等

Regime complexes or overlapping regimes relating to a common subject matter create policy coherence challenges at the national level. Recent research has observed a positive correlation between regime complexes and policy coherence: improved regime integration enables greater policy coherence and vice versa. Policy coherence has nonetheless been approached as a problem of foreign policy and not yet as a problem of public policy. This article examines the coevolution of regime complexes and (public) policy coherence in the context of international biodiversity governance, with a focus on the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and their implementation in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. It shows that global synergies in the biodiversity cluster have advanced more rapidly than national coordination of implementation activities. Feedback loops between governance levels have not been strong enough to bridge that gap. The article concludes that more symmetrical evolutions require deliberate cross-level management. KEYWORDS: regime complexes, policy coherence, biodiversity governance, Latin America and the Caribbean, synergies.

OVERLAPPING REGIMES CREATE PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT AT INTERNATIONAL and national levels. Recent work by Jean-Frederic Morin and Amandine Orsini suggests that improved synergy in regime complexes enables enhanced governmental policy coherence and vice versa. (1) Regime complexes and policy coherence coevolve, each adapting to changes in the other. Morin and Orsini focus their analysis on national foreign policy, but not on national public policy where regime implementation occurs. Understanding whether, how, and under what conditions regime complexes and national public policies coevolve is important from a governance perspective: when the management of regime complexity at international and national level is mutually reinforcing, coherent governance is achieved.

In this article, we explore the coevolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence in the context of biodiversity governance. We focus on the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) (see Table 1) and their implementation in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). Observers have noticed that coordination in the biodiversity cluster is stronger than coordination of implementation activities at the national leve1. (2) However, the nature and extent of that gap has not been examined, and its analysis appears particularly important in light of the international community's failure to achieve the global target of significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010 (the so-called 2010 Biodiversity Target).

Table 1 The Cluster of Biodiversity-related Conventions

Convention Date of Date of
Entry Adoption into Force

Convention on Wetlands of International 2 February 21 December
Importance Especially as Waterfowl 1971 1975
Habitat (Ramsar convention)

Convention Concerning the Protection of 16 November 17 December
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 1975
(WHC)

Convention on International Trade in 3 March 1973 1 July 1975
Endangered Species (of Wild Fauna and
Flora) (CITES)

Convention on the Conservation of 23 June 1979 1 November
Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) 1983

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 22 May 1992 29 December
 1993

International Treaty on Plant Genetic 3 November 29 June 2004
Resources (for Food and Agriculture) 2001
(ITPGRFA)

The coevolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence requires horizontal and vertical interaction. Accordingly, in this study, we ask two questions: (1) How different are the horizontal linkages created in the biodiversity cluster from those emerging at the level of national implementation? and (2) How do vertical linkages enable the coevolution of the biodiversity cluster and national biodiversity policy? Synergies in the biodiversity cluster have been the subject of recent attention in the literature. (3) Conversely, synergies among biodiversity regimes at the national level have mostly been examined in the context of implementation of the Rio conventions and other MEAs. (4) In this study, we examine synergies in the implementation of conventions in the biodiversity cluster in 15 LAC countries. LAC is considered one of the most biologically diverse regions in the world,5 and nine LAC countries are members of the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries, a cooperation mechanism comprising nineteen countries rich in biological diversity and associated

traditional knowledge. We collected empirical evidence from interviews with government officials with political and/or technical responsibilities in the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and national biodiversity strategies, and explored it through thematic analysis in order to answer the research questions.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the coevolution of regime complexes and policy coherence within the empirical area of focus. Then, we examine the management of biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries in the light of the coevolution thesis. We close the article with a discussion of findings and concluding remarks.

Regime Complexity, Policy Coherence, and Coherent Governance: The Case of Biodiversity

Regime complexes or collections of overlapping institutions relating to a common subject matter (6) have emerged in several areas of international cooperation. (7) Morin and Orsini (8) observe that regime complexity presents governments with a problem of policy coherence. They claim that regime complexes and policy coherence coevolve as a result of interaction of actors and institutions across levels of governance (cross-level interplay).

Morin and Orsini (9) conceive of policy coherence as a problem of foreign policy, but not yet as a problem of public policy arising from the implementation of overlapping commitments. Coherence is an ambiguous concept and is equated with as well as differentiated from other concepts such as consistency, compatibility, and complementarity. (10) In this article, coherence is associated with complementarity of action (mutual reinforcement) and is distinct from consistency or compatibility of action (absence of contradiction). (11) From a public policy perspective, coherence can be examined as a process (focusing on upstream policymaking procedures and associated institutional arrangements), an output (exploring policy objectives and associated implementation arrangements), or an outcome (assessing behavioural changes and impacts on the target of governance). (12) In a regime complexity context, these three aspects can be related to the density of the regime complex (upstream policy processes), the coherency of national policies and implementation arrangements (policy outputs), and the cohesiveness and effectiveness of governance as a whole (outcomes and impacts).

Under a conventional policy analytical framework, policy outputs should be in line with policy processes to ensure the coherence of governance as a whole (what we call here coherent governance). In contrast, from a coevolu-tionary perspective, policy processes and outputs influence each other and should advance in complementary ways if coherent governance is to be achieved. In other words, the coevolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence determines the quality of coherent governance.

Coherent governance poses particular challenges in the field of biodiversity policy. There are at least 150 MEAs relating to biodiversity, (13) and a number of intergovernmental organizations deal with issues that have relevance to biodiversity. (14) Six major MEAs--Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar convention), Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (of Wild Fauna and Flora) (CITES), Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (for Food and Agriculture) (ITPGRFA)--are generally considered the elemental regimes of the biodiversity regime complex, (15) with the CBD at the center as the framework convention. (16) Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the complex as arising from the formal agreements between its constituent conventions.

The governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions have made regular calls for states to improve synergies in national implementation, (17) and have delegated intertreaty cooperation tasks to treaty secretariats. (18) Global coordination is assisted by various overarching organizations such as the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), both of which also support domestic efforts to enhance synergies in the national implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs. (19) The biodiversity cluster has achieved partial integration in a number of areas. Examples include the joint preparation and endorsement of technical guidance, standardization of taxonomy and nomenclature, joint field missions and projects, and joint capacity-building activities. (20) While areas of substantive overlap remain underexploited, (21) it is at the national level where coordination problems appear particularly acute. (22)

Problems of coherence inbiodiversity governance became salient in the context of efforts to achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target, adopted at the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the CBD in The Hague, 719 April 2002. The Biodiversity Target was endorsed by world leaders at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, (26) August-4 September 2002, and subsequently incorporated in the strategic plans and programs of the biodiversity-related conventions (with the exception of the ITPGRFA, which came into force in June 2004 and provided more nominal support). However, the constituencies of the non-CBD conventions failed to take ownership of the Biodiversity Target. (23) Moreover, few countries established national targets as required by the CBD CoP. (24) The CBD's Global Biodiversity Outlook concluded that the 2010 Biodiversity Target was not achieved, (25) a serious failure considering that biodiversity loss is one of three planetary boundaries that have been overstepped. (26) Understanding problems of coherent governance is of utmost importance as the international community makes renewed efforts to address the biodiversity crisis through the new Aichi Biodiversity Targets established at the tenth CBD CoP in Nagoya, Japan, 18-29 October 2010.

From a public policy angle, problems of coherence in areas of regime overlap emerge from a deficient coevolution of regime complexes and national implementation arrangements. Coevolution implies that improved coordination at one level stimulates similar progress at the other. It thus requires the creation of horizontal associations and the vertical transfer of influence. The degree to which regime complexes and policy coherence coe-volve can be established by: (I) comparing horizontal management processes (horizontal linkages); and (2) exploring how influence travels from one level to another (vertical linkages). We discuss these two elements next in relation to the empirical area of focus.

Horizontal Linkages

To establish whether, and to what extent, regime complexes and national policy coherency display similar evolution patterns, criteria for comparison need to be defined. Achieving integration in a regime complex and coherence in the implementation of its elemental regimes requires interplay management. Interplay management involves deliberate efforts to improve regime interplay and its effects. (27) The literature has examined interplay management along different dimensions, including the goals and modes of management. (28) These categories can be used to examine the management of biodiversity-related conventions at global and national levels. Available information from the literature is nonetheless insufficient for a critical comparison: while there is a general understanding of cooperation activities in the biodiversity cluster, synergies at the level of national implementation are not well known. (To the best of our knowledge, studies examining coordination in MEA implementation have not examined specific developments within the ambit of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster, and, in many cases, are outdated.) The ensuing discussion thus focuses on horizontal linkages in the biodiversity cluster, making some empirical observations on regime interlinkages at the national level. We compare synergies at global and national levels later by building on the analysis of national experiences in LAC countries.

Policy goals and objectives. The management of regime interplay may be geared toward goals such as avoiding conflict, enhancing synergy, achieving efficiency, and promoting justice and equity. (29) Those goals may be proactively pursued or arise in response to specific cases of interaction. (30) Improving synergistic interplay is the main goal of interplay management in the biodiversity cluster. The Liaison Group of Biodiversity-Related Conventions (BLG) was established in 2004 for enhancing coherence and cooperation in the implementation of the conventions (CBD Decision VII/26, paragraph 2). A proactive approach to improving synergy can be established from strategic documents, resolutions and decisions promoting cooperation in the biodiversity cluster; (31) even though in practice synergies have been created in an ad hoc fashion and few synergistic solutions to common challenges have been implemented. (32)

Interlinkages in national implementation often lack strategic direction. Lack of coordination is a recurrent theme in studies looking at synergies in the national implementation of MEAs. Coordination sometimes exists at the project level, but not at the political and institutional levels. (33) Institutional and implementation arrangements. Modes of interplay management range from hierarchical control to coordination through markets and networks. (34) Interplay management in the biodiversity cluster involves decentralized political coordination. While various overarching organizations support synergy processes in the cluster, (35) none of them has powers to centrally manage regime interplay. Until the recent adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 at the tenth CBD CoP, there were no common frameworks underpinning cooperation in the biodiversity cluster.

Coordination unfolds within two different networks: a core network comprising the six conventions of the cluster and a number of peripheral networks supporting interaction between the biodiversity-related conventions and other agreements and organizations. Policy coordination occurs through bilateral and multilateral channels. (36) Bilateral coordination is based on a range of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) and Memorandums of Cooperation (MoCs) and joint work programs (see Figure 1). Multilateral coordination unfolds in the context of mechanisms such as the BLG and the chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies of Biodiversity-Related Conventions (CSAB) group. Collaboration beyond the biodiversity cluster involves generic (e.g., the UN Environment Management Group) and thematic (e.g., the Inter-Agency Liaison Group on Invasive Alien Species) mechanisms for interinstitutional cooperation.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

At the national level, overarching management of MEAs seems uncommon. Pamela S. Chasek found that there was no central coordination of MEAs in the Pacific islands. (37) In many countries, ministries of foreign affairs are responsible for negotiating MEAs and are thus in a position to coordinate implementation processes (usually under the purview of different agencies). Problems of interagency coordination, however, sometimes prevent this. Carlene Van Toen observes that ministries of foreign affairs in countries of the Asia Pacific region often failed to involve the technical agencies over plans to be implemented at the national leve1. (38)

Synergies in national implementation develop more informally. In many countries there are no mechanisms promoting joint actions among MEA officials. (39) However, some African countries (e.g., Guinea Bissau and Kenya) have established reference groups for some conventions, which are intended to support the work of MEA officials and lead agencies. (40) Overlap of experts involved in these reference groups allows the emergence of informal networks of MEA officials where opportunities for synergy arise. (41)

Vertical Linkages

Vertical linkages between governance levels should flow in both a top-down and bottom-up direction. (42) Top-down approaches may appear illegitimate and irrelevant to everyday lives, whereas bottom-up management may prioritize short-term national goals at the expense of long-term global concerns. (43) Studies examining synergies in the biodiversity cluster have thrown light on the different pathways through which global governance seeks to influence national implementation. Nevertheless, both the ways in which these pathways affect domestic behaviors and the avenues through which national actors seek to affect governance in the biodiversity cluster are difficult to assess from the available information. In what follows, we discuss two scholarly works that provide a basis for exploring how global and national governance influence each other. We apply these frameworks, where possible, to the biodiversity case. We return to these frameworks when we examine domestic synergy processes in LAC countries.

Top-down pathways of influence. Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore identify four different pathways through which global governance arrangements can influence national policy: (44)

1. International rules, including the binding obligations contained in treaty texts and the policy prescriptions of powerful international organizations;

2. International norms and discourse setting general standards of behavior of a nonbinding character;

3. Markets, which can be created or intervened to alter incentive structures;

4. Direct access to domestic policymaking processes in the form of education, training, assistance, capacity building, and cogovernance via partnerships.

International rules have marginal relevance as a means of promoting synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions. The texts of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster do not create obligations to achieve synergy in their implementation. (45) In contrast, several resolutions and decisions (soft law norms) have encouraged countries to coordinate activities pursuant to different biodiversity-related agreements. Markets have been used marginally, if at all, to foster synergies on the ground due to the fragmentation of existing financial mechanisms. However, UNEP and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) are implementing agencies of biodiversity-related projects financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and they can influence the way in which external resources are used to achieve global biodiversity goals. (46) Direct support to domestic synergies has come through capacity-building activities, including joint field missions and projects. (47)

Bottom-up pathways of influence. In a recent study, Edward J. Goodwin examined what he calls the "internal modalities" of national delegations attending international meetings. (48) Internal modalities comprise the set of norms and routines governing how national delegations prepare for meetings and how they will participate in the actual working sessions. (49) Because the evolution of international regimes depends, in principle, on decisions adopted in intergovernmental fora, preparation and participation in those meetings is crucial in shaping global governance.

Little is known of the internal modalities of national delegations attending meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions. Goodwin makes an initial contribution by examining, based on discussions with one long-serving representative of the UK at various environmental CoPs, how the United Kingdom prepares for, and participates in, Ramsar CoP meetings. (50) But to the best of our knowledge, no studies have yet explored whether and how countries create linkages between biodiversity regimes when they undertake these activities (preparation and participation). Empirical observations suggest that some countries have been more proactive than others in promoting synergies between biodiversity-related conventions. The EU, for instance, was the main proponent of a global partnership on biodiversity in support of the 2010 Biodiversity Target. (51) Coordination of national positions across biodiversity-related venues has been regarded an important aspect of improved intertreaty cooperation. (52) Research on bottom-up influence on governance arrangements in the biodiversity cluster is nonetheless sparse.

The Biodiversity-related Conventions and Their Implementation in LAC Countries

In this section, we examine interlinkages in the implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries with a view toward exploring whether, and to what extent, the biodiversity cluster and national biodiversity policies in the region have coevolved. Following a description of the research methods, we discuss the horizontal and vertical aspects of national management processes as informed by the theoretical framework that we presented in the previous section.

The Case Study

We selected LAC as the focal region in which to explore synergies among biodiversity-related conventions because it is considered one of the most biologically diverse regions in the world, (53) and LAC countries are important players in international biodiversity policy: nine out of nineteen state members of the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries (as of June 2011) are from LAC.

We examined national experiences in fifteen LAC countries on the basis of a multistage selection process. Countries that are parties to at least four biodiversity-related conventions (as of April 2011) were first identified. These (twenty-five) states were then ranked according to their wealth of biological diversity (as measured by the GEF Benefits Index for Biodiversity) (see Table 2). The primary national focal points (contact persons) of the CBD in the first fifteen countries of the sample were contacted to arrange interviews. This was possible in all countries except Venezuela. To stay within the fifteen-country target, contact was successfully made with CBD authorities in Jamaica (the sixteenth country of the sample).

Table 2 LAC Countries That Are Contracting Parties
to Four or More Biodiversity-related Conventions
(as of April 2011)

Country GEF Benefits Number of Conventions Not Yet
 Index (GBI) for Conventions Adopted
 Biodiversity Adopted

Brazil 663.7 5 CMS

Mexico 503.1 4 CMS and ITPGRFA

Columbia 380.0 4 CMS and FTPGRFA

Peru 241.0 6 --

Ecuador 199.4 6 --

Venezuela 178.2 5 CMS

Argentina 122.9 6 --

Chile 107.3 6 --

Bolivia 91.9 5 ITPGRFA

Cuba 89.8 6 --

Panama 78.0 6 --

Costa Rica 73.6 6 --

Guatemala 58.9 5 CMS

Honduras 52.7 6 -

Dominican 45.0 4 CMS and ITPGRFA
Republic

Jamaica 32.8 5 CMS

Nicaragua 23.7 5 CMS

Paraguay 22.2 6

Suriname 20.2 4 CMS and ITPGRFA

Trinidad and 16.0 5 CMS
Tobago

Belize 12.4 4 CMS and ITPGRFA

Uruguay 9.5 6 --

Santa Lucia 6,5 5 CMS

El Salvador 5.5 5 CMS

Antigua and 3.0 S ITPGRFA
Barbuda

Note: CMS, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals; ITP-GRFA, International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources (for Food and Agriculture).

A total of eighteen interviews with CBD officials (most of them technical focal points) were conducted between December 2011 and April 2012. Of these, fifteen were audio interviews and three were written responses to the questions. Audio interviews were recorded and transcribed.

We used matrix analysis to examine interview transcripts. Matrix analysis is a distinct type of thematic analysis where units of analysis (e.g., individuals and groups) are tabulated against concepts or issues relevant to the research questions. (54) The framework for the analysis of regime complexes and national policy coherence (presented in the section on regime complexity, policy coherence, and coherent governance), which incorporates two main elements (horizontal and vertical linkages) associated with the two research questions, was the basis for creating an analytical matrix. Interview transcripts were tabulated against it.

In addition to the interviews, we consulted national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs). NBSAPs are the principal instruments for implementing the CBD and considered a key mechanism for improving synergy in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions.55 First-generation NBSAPs (most of them in effect throughout the 2000-2010 decade) in fourteen countries of the sample were examined to determine whether they incorporated commitments from biodiversity-related conventions other than the CBD or synergies among biodiversity-related agreements (a copy of the Dominican NBSAP could not be obtained).

Limitations of the methodological approach need to be acknowledged. The analysis of national experiences relies heavily on subjective accounts and is not based on a systematic review of management processes. As a result, comparisons between countries are difficult to make. Indeed, our analysis focused on identifying general trends and challenges rather than on delving into specific national circumstances. In some countries, the coevolution of international and national biodiversity policies displays characteristics that deviate from the regional trends, but we did not assess this here.

For purposes of confidentiality, the names and positions of interviewed CBD authorities are kept anonymous and linked only to the country they represent. In cases where two participants were from the same country, they are distinguished by the letters A and B.

Horizontal Linkages

Implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries has advanced through separate processes rather than in an integrated manner. Implementation of any treaty requires adjustments in existing institutional frameworks. "It is a process which develops in incremental steps; progress is swift in some cases, but not in others" (Argentinian interviewee). Countries employ distinct procedures and instruments to implement biodiversity-related conventions. In Chile, for instance, implementation of the CBD relies on technical guidance available from the CBD secretariat; CITES activities have been assisted by capacity-building workshops; and CMS-related operations are based on regional cooperation (Chilean interviewee A). Different implementation arrangements often imply different human, scientific, technological, and institutional capacity requirements (Honduran interviewee).

Duplication of efforts in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions is uncommon. However, in most cases, opportunities for streamlining implementation activities remain underexploited. Participants recognized potential for enhancing synergy (Chilean, Colombian, Dominican, Jamaican, and Panamanian interviewees), improving complementarity (Costa Rican and Ecuadorian interviewees), strengthening joint work (Argentinian interviewee), and achieving greater coordination and alignment (Mexican interviewee A).

Next, we examine ongoing coordination processes along the interplay management dimensions discussed in the second section. We make comparisons with global interlinkages established in the biodiversity cluster.

Policy goals and objectives. The strategic plans and programs of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster contain provisions on cooperation with other biodiversity-related conventions. In LAC countries, however, synergies are not generally conceived of from a strategic perspective. Requirements for coherent implementation of biodiversity-related conventions are missing from policy planning. An Ecuadorian participant observed that "we do not have a working programme that encourages national focal points to create synergies ... and allows a systematic monitoring of co-ordinated work." A CBD official in Panama commented that integrated implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs has only recently been considered in the context of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020. Honduras is exploring approaches for a more integrated implementation of MEAs. Participants from other countries did not bring up similar initiatives.

Strategic frameworks for coherent implementation of biodiversity-related agreements are not only absent, but the inclusion of synergies in NBSAPs is also marginal. Of the fourteen NBSAPs that we examined, the Brazilian strategy was the only one that explicitly incorporated objectives related to MEA interlinkages. The Argentinian, Bolivian, and Cuban strategies did not address synergies between MEAs directly, but considered implementation requirements under other biodiversity-related conventions. International commitments were neglected in the rest of the NBSAPs (see Table 3).

Table 3 NBSAPs and Synergies Between Biodiversity-related
Conventions in LAC Countries

Synergies explicitly addressed

Country NBSAP and Dale of Comments
 Adoption

Brazi1 Polilica National da The strategy features three
 Biodiversidade objectives in the area of
 (2002) international cooperation, one
 of which is to create synergies
 in the implementation of
 international environ-mental
 agreements adopted by the
 country.

Explicit references to implementation of
hiodiversity-related MEAs other than the BD

Country NBSAPand dale of Comments
 adoption

Argentina Estrategia Nacional In Section XVI of the strategy,
 sobre Diversidad Argentina commits to
 Bioldgica (2003) implementing international
 environmental agreements and
 enhancing the country's
 capacity to participate in
 international environmental
 fora.

Bolivia Estrategia National One of the priorities of the
 de Biodiversidad strategy is to improve
 (2001) implementation of international
 environmental agreements; in
 particular, the CBD, Climate
 Change Convention, Indigenous
 and Tribal Peoples Conven-tion,
 CITES, and Ramsar Convention.

Cuba Estrategia Nacional One of the goals of the
 para la Diversidad strategy is to strengthen
 Biol6gica y Plan de international cooperation,
 Accion en la including through an active
 Repiiblica de involvement in the
 Cuba(1999) implementation of the CBD and
 other related instruments.

Svnergies or tnplementatzon of non-CBD conventions
are nor explicitly considered

Chile: Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2003)

Colombia: Politica Nacional de Biodiversidad (1995)

Costa Rica: Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2000)

Ecuador: Polftica y Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad
del Ecuador 2001-2010 (concluded in 2000 and officially
endorsed in 2007)

Guatemala: Estrategia Nacional para la Conservacion y
Uso Sostenible de la Biodiversidad y Plan de Accion (1999)

Honduras: Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad y
Plan de Accion (2001)

Jamaica: National Strategy and Action Plan on
Biological Diversity (2003)

Mexico: Estrategia Nacional sobre Biodiversidad
de Mexico (2000)

Panama: Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2000)

Peru: Estrategia Nacional sobre Diversidad
Biologica (2001)

Note: NBSAPs, national biodiversity strategies and
action plans; LAC, Latin America and the Caribbean;
CBD, Convention on Biological Diversity; CITES,
Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (of Wild Fauna and Flora).

In the biodiversity cluster, a number of thematic mechanisms (e.g., Inter-Agency Liaison Group on Invasive Alien Species) and joint initiatives in areas of regime overlap (e.g., sustainable use, environmental impact assessment, and site-based conservation) enable coordinated work.56 Thematic cooperation is also common at the level of national implementation. For example, synergies have been established around international events and in the pursuit of external resources. In most LAC countries, MEA officials take part in internal consultation meetings in preparation for high-level meetings of biodiversity-related agreements (see the subsection on bottom-up pathways of influence within this section). Participants from Panama and Honduras reported coordinated action to elaborate national reports. CBD officials in Peru have attended CMS meetings. Both Panamanian and Bolivian interviewees indicated that MEA officials cooperate in the context of project proposals submitted to the GEF. In Jamaica, national CBD and Ramsar authorities collaborated on the organization of the fifth Pan-American Regional Meeting of the Convention on Wetlands in Jamaica in December 2011 (Jamaican interviewee A).

Interlinkages between biodiversity-related MEAs have also been developed in the formulation and implementation of national policies and programs on biological diversity. In Panama and Honduras, national MEA authorities participate in the review of policy and normative frameworks for biodiversity. A CBD official from Panama highlighted the recent involvement of MEA officials in the development of a mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). MEA officials are also collaborating on the updating of the NBSAP and the national policy on wetlands (Panamanian interviewee). In Chile, CBD and Ramsar officials have been involved in drafting a strategy for the conservation of Andean highlands (Chilean interviewee). On the implementation side, CBD authorities in Panama have supported their WHC counterparts in holding capacity-building workshops for protected area managers. In Honduras, there has been collaboration on awareness-raising workshops.

Institutional and implementation arrangements. Synergies in the biodiversity cluster result from decentralized coordination. Overarching organizations, most notably UNEP, support intertreaty cooperation, but have no legal mandate to pursue centralized management. Decentralized coordination is also prevalent at the national level. In countries where various conventions fall under the same agency (e.g., the Costa Rican National System of Conservation Areas was reported to oversee eight biodiversity-related MEAs at the time when we conducted the interviews), some centralized planning can be expected. Nevertheless, the conventions of the biodiversity cluster are usually administered by different ministries or agencies. Officials with technical responsibilities in the implementation of the CBD, the Ramsar convention, CITES, and the CMS are generally based in environmental ministries or agencies whereas WHC and ITPGRFA authorities are housed by nonenviron-mental ministries. Synergies arise in the context of mechanisms for sectoral and interministerial coordination, but not through centralized planning.

Cooperation in the biodiversity cluster unfolds within a core governance network comprising the six conventions and other overarching organizations, and within a number of peripheral networks where interaction with regimes in other policy areas takes place. The core network has its most visible expression in the BLG and CSAB, but is also based on formal mechanisms for cooperation such as MoUs and MoCs and joint work programs. At the national level, the core governance network becomes blurred. This is because many LAC countries have a loose conception of biodiversity-related agreements that extends beyond the boundaries of the biodiversity cluster; for example, encompassing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). An Ecuadorian interviewee even considered that "when we talk about synergies, we talk about co-ordination among MEAs in general.

"It is mainly within peripheral networks that national-level synergies among biodiversity-related conventions emerge. In some countries, interinstitutional committees have been established to oversee the implementation of specific conventions and to address specific issues under a coordinated approach. These committees resemble the global task forces and working groups promoting cooperation between biodiversity-related conventions and other MEAs and organizations (e.g., the Heads of Agency Task Force on the 2010 Biodiversity Target and the CBD's Liaison Group on Non-timber Forest Resources).

In Chile, there are national committees responsible for following up the implementation of the Ramsar convention, CITES, and the CMS. Officials overseeing implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs are represented in these committees. This facilitates the creation of synergies between the conventions (Chilean interviewee B). Similar committees have been set up in Jamaica (Jamaican interviewee A). Cuba has a national commission that coordinates the implementation of the WHC. In Costa Rica, the National Commission on Plant Genetic Resources promotes synergistic implementation of conventions such as the CBD and ITPGRFA related to plant genetic resources. A committee was recently established in Mexico to identify priority areas for the implementation of the Rio conventions with a view toward developing GEF project proposals (Mexican interviewee A). Honduras has set up a working group that seeks to coordinate civil society activities contributing to the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions and other MEAs.

Synergies in domestic settings tend to follow a less formalized approach than synergies in the biodiversity cluster. In most cases, synergies arise through regular dialogue and communication between MEA officials. Good levels of collaboration sometimes obviate the need for a deliberate integration of synergies in policy planning. A Panamanian interviewee observed, for example, that "synergies sometimes do not have to be explicitly mentioned" when projects are designed. In a similar vein, another interviewee noticed that, "if local institutions display high levels of integration and collaboration, synergies arise on the ground" (Mexican interviewee B).

Vertical Linkages

Global governance has influenced the management of biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries, in contrast, national governance has not actively shaped regime interplay in the biodiversity cluster. We discuss top-down and bottom-up pathways of influence below.

Top-down pathways of influence. Global influence on national implementation has come less from normative means (international norms and discourse) than from utilitarian and cognitive instruments (markets and direct access to domestic policymaking). international norms and discourse are one mechanism for influencing domestic regime interplay. Normative avenues through which global governance has sought to affect national implementation include; (1) resolutions and decisions of governing bodies promoting coordination of MEAs' implementation activities; (2) state-level actions envisaged in MoUs and MoCs and joint programs of work; and (3) high-level political commitments (e.g., global biodiversity targets).

The 2010 Biodiversity Target provides a good benchmark to explore the effects of normative pathways of influence. As mentioned earlier, the 2010 Biodiversity Target was established by the sixth CBD CoP and supported by the other biodiversity-related conventions. At its second meeting (16 August 2004), the BLG made the 2010 Biodiversity Target one of its two policy priorities. The Biodiversity Target prompted increased intertreaty cooperation. Nevertheless, as explained below, it hardly encouraged substantive action in national arenas.

NBSAPs were considered a primary mechanism for implementing the CBD's Strategic Plan 2002-2010 and achieving the 2010 Biodiversity Target (CBD Decisions VI/26 and V11/30). The parties to the CBD were encouraged to develop or review their NBSAPs in light of the CBD's strategic goals and to set national targets taking into account the framework of goals and subtar-gets to facilitate the assessment of progress toward achieving the 2010 Biodiversity Target (adopted at the seventh CBD CoP through Decision VII/30). The eighth CBD CoP in Curitiba, Brazil, 20-31 March 2006, endorsed voluntary guidelines to parties for the review of NBSAPs, which were intended to serve as a practical tool to assess NBSAPs' implementation (CBD Decision VIII/8). The guidelines asked parties to consider whether biodiversity concerns were being integrated into non-CBD processes, including into activities undertaken in the framework of other biodiversity-related conventions (CBD Decision VIII/8, Annex).

Few LAC countries reviewed their NBSAPs or set national targets as required by the 2010 Biodiversity Target process. In four of the fifteen LAC countries that we examined in this research (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Jamaica), NBSAPs were developed following the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target. Only the Brazilian and Chilean NBSAPs included national targets. In the rest of the countries, NBSAPs predated the 2010 Biodiversity Target and did not feature outcome-oriented targets. However, in 2009 Costa Rica adopted national conservation targets linked to the 2010 Biodiversity Target. Interviews suggest that, in most LAC countries, NBSAPs were reviewed as part of the preparation of their fourth national reports to the CBD (due on 30 March 2009), rather than as part of ongoing monitoring of NBSAP implementation. More importantly for assessing normative influence on domestic synergy processes, of all the NBSAPs prepared or reviewed after the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target, the Brazilian strategy was the only one where MEA interlinkages were purposefully addressed (see Table 3).

Influence along the markets pathway relates primarily to the financial incentives created by the GEF. The GEF is the largest public funder of projects to protect the global environment. (57) It funds the additional costs "associated with transforming a project with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits," (58) with biodiversity being one of its main focal areas. This funding approach makes project proposals addressing synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs more appealing than issue-specific proposals. Indeed, financial incentives created by the GEF have triggered efforts to synergize implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs, most notably the Rio conventions. For example, projects that Ecuador has submitted to the GEF secretariat have considered factual linkages between MEA issue areas in an integrated way (Ecuadorian interviewee A). Also, at the time when we conducted the interviews, officials involved in the implementation of the Rio conventions in Bolivia and Panama were collaborating on the preparation of joint project proposals for GEF's approval. In Mexico, a special committee was set up to identify needs and priorities in the implementation of the Rio conventions and to streamline project planning with a view toward accessing GEF funds (Mexican interviewee A).

Overarching organizations and treaty secretariats have supported LAC countries in their efforts to improve synergy in the implementation of biodiversity regimes. Support has come mainly from the GEF, UNDP, UNEP, and the secretariats of the biodiversity cluster. The GEF has assisted national management of MEAs through the National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA) program. The initiative was launched in January 2000, with UNDP and UNEP as implementing agencies. It aimed to assist countries in evaluating their capacities to achieve the objectives of the Rio conventions and other MEAs. Participating countries were expected to identify priority issues, capacity constraints, and opportunities for capacity building, particularly in the areas of biological diversity, climate change, and land degradation. (59) A total of 152 countries were involved in the program between 2002 and 2006. (60) NCSA projects were completed in twelve countries of our sample (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru). (61)

Interviewees from Jamaica, Peru, and Panama referred to the NCSA as an initiative that helped national efforts to manage MEA implementation processes. At the time when the interviews took place, the Costa Rican government was working on a project to synergize implementation of MEAs, in particular the Rio conventions, along the lines of the Costa Rican NCSA project (Costa Rican interviewee A). The NCSA program has had less visible effects in Ecuador where the recommended policies and actions have not been operationalized (Ecuadorian interviewee A).

UNEP has provided training and capacity building to support MEA implementation in domestic arenas. Two initiatives have been especially relevant to the LAC countries: (1) a joint UNEP--European Commission program that seeks to build and enhance the capacity of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries to implement and enforce MEA obligations; and (2) a joint UNEP-IUCN initiative to promote a coherent implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions through web-based reference tools that structure biodiversity-related commitments in a logical framework (the so-called TEMATEA project). TEMATEA national workshops were held in Cuba and Peru in 2008 to test the applicability of TEMATEA issue-based modules. (62)

Treaty secretariats in the biodiversity cluster have made efforts to bridge the gap between global and domestic synergy processes through workshops, field missions, joint projects, and other capacity-building activities. The effects of these actions sparked mixed views among interviewees. Participants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru believed that convention bodies and treaty secretariats have not provided substantive assistance. CBD officials from Cuba and Panama acknowledged that the CBD secretariat has supported national implementation through capacity-building workshops. They observed, however, that synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs are hardly ever discussed in those workshops. This is because the issue is not a major concern to funding institutions (Cuban interviewee). A Panamanian participant considered that CBD workshops could be a platform for creating synergies between biodiversity-related conventions, provided that representatives of other conventions were able to attend. This often is not possible due to lack of funding.

Other participants were more positive about the assistance from treaty secretariats. In Honduras, technical, institutional, and logistical capacities to implement MEAs have been strengthened through capacity building. Projects sponsored by treaty secretariats have enabled improved interagency coordination (Honduran interviewee). In Chile, secretariats have supported projects where different MEA processes converge (Chilean interviewee A). CBD officials from Bolivia and Colombia reported that treaty secretariats have helped in the design of GEF project proposals addressing MEA interlinkages. Both Bolivian and Chilean officials believed, however, that the support received has been only modest.

CBD officials from Brazil and Mexico affirmed that treaty secretariats have assisted national management of MEAs to the best of their ability. Conversely, participants from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Argentina felt that treaty secretariats could offer better assistance to countries. A CBD official from Costa Rica considered that the burden of creating synergies between MEAs at the national level has been placed on state parties: "I understand that this is an issue of national sovereignty, but the secretariats could, at the request of countries, offer improved support for the development of synergies at the national level."

Bottom-up pathways of influence. Synergies are an elemental, but not always visible, aspect of the internal modalities of preparation and participation of national delegations attending meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions. In many LAC countries, internal working meetings are held in preparation for international biodiversity meetings. In Bolivia, national positions presented in biodiversity-related fora are negotiated and agreed at workshops attended by officials from environmental and nonenvironmental agencies and civil society representatives. Jamaican national positions result from internal discussions among governmental and nongovernmental agencies (Jamaican interviewee A). Chilean positions in biodiversity-related venues are discussed in the interinstitutional committees overseeing implementation of specific conventions (see the subsection on institutional and implementation arrangements within this section). CBD officials from Colombia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador noticed that representatives of other IVIEAs attend domestic meetings organized in advance of CBD negotiations. Similarly, a Peruvian interviewee noticed the recent participation of government officials supporting implementation of the UNFCCC and the UNCCD in internal CBD meetings. In Guatemala, domestic consultation processes ahead of CBD deliberations occurred only recently in the context of the tenth CBD CoP.

Efforts to ensure that national positions presented in one forum are upheld in another were explicitly mentioned by some interviewees. In Mexico, the National Commission for Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity ensures that national positions at CBD and CITES meetings are coherent. Cuba has managed to defend congruent positions across biodiversity policy venues because the government has historically held principle-based positions. In Argentina, attempts have been made to achieve coherence in the national positions defended at CBD and UNFCCC venues. Coordination of national positions may not be occurring in other countries. A CBD official in Peru, for instance, did not know whether national positions at CBD meetings were reinforced at meetings of other biodiversity-related conventions.

Some participants noticed that synergies between biodiversity-related agreements have been promoted at MEA meetings. The Chilean government has supported national positions calling for greater synergy between conventions, although the country itself has not advanced concrete proposals for enhancing MEA integration. Cuba has encouraged issue-based cooperation among MEAs provided that funding for other implementation activities is not compromised. Other countries have been more proactive. Colombia has promoted MoUs and MoCs as instruments for synergizing MEA implementation processes. Colombian delegations at CBD meetings have been vigilant in ensuring that issues addressed by other conventions are transferred to the relevant venues, or else are discussed within CBD arenas taking into account the input provided by actors from the conventions involved (Colombian interviewee). This counteracts cross-institutional political strategies and prevents mandate creep. The Mexican government has advocated for increased synergy between the CBD and CITES in line with national interests (Mexican interviewee A). Recently, on the occasion of the twentieth meeting of the CITES Plants Committee in Dublin, 22-30 March 2012, Mexico submitted a draft resolution promoting cooperation between the CBD and CITES in the implementation of the CBD's Global Strategy for Plant Conservation.

Discussion of the Coevolution of the Biodiversity Cluster and National Biodiversity Policy

Morin and Orsini observe that the degree of integration in a regime complex is positively correlated with the degree of coherency of foreign policies. (63) But they fall short of examining whether that connection extends to the ambit of public policy. Such a focus is important because it is at the level of national implementation where the perceived advantages of regime complexes over comprehensive regimes need to be evaluated. (64) Scholars have noticed the effects of regime complexity on national implementation, (65) but the management of regime complexity at the national level has not yet been the subject of analysis. Regime interplay studies have been concerned with examining global-level interactions and have paid scant attention to national-level interplay. (66) Moreover, empirical research has focused on a limited number of areas of environmental governance; namely, global climate, oceans, and subject areas falling in the intersection of trade and environmental regimes. (67)

This study contributes to addressing the research gaps above. We examined the coevolution of regime complexes and national implementation arrangements through experiences in the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and the implementation of its constituent regimes in LAC countries.

The first question guiding our research was whether global and national arrangements for the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions display similar evolution patterns. Observers have noticed a gap between global and national coordination, (68) but have fallen short of exploring the nature and extent of the gap. In this study, we made an empirical comparison of horizontal management processes revealing that intertreaty cooperation does display a more advanced development in both terms of the goals pursued and the means for their achievement.

Synergies at both levels of governance usually arise in connection with specific issues and themes. However, while cooperation in the biodiversity cluster is often a proactive exercise intended to synergize implementation activities, coordination among MEA officials appears to emerge in response to particular needs. The strategic plans and programs of the biodiversity-related conventions acknowledge the importance of synergies in the biodiversity cluster. (69) While cooperation might have evolved haphazardly, (70) there have been attempts at joint implementation through the adoption of common technical guidance, the standardization of nomenclature, and joint capacity building. This has not occurred at the national level where synergies in policy frameworks are absent or left implicit at best. As is the case in the Pacific islands, (71) MEA officials cooperate in relation to specific projects, but not at more programmatic and strategic levels.

Network governance forms are a preferred avenue to coordinate implementation activities. Only at the international level, however, has a core network of biodiversity-related agreements emerged. This network is based on bilateral (e.g., MoUs and MoCs and joint work programs and plans) and multilateral (e.g., the BLG and CSAB) mechanisms promoting cooperation among the elemental conventions of the biodiversity cluster. (72) A core network of biodiversity-related MEAs is less visible in domestic arenas, where mechanisms deliberately intending to synergize implementation of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster are lacking, and cooperation between MEA officials involves more informal exchanges. This often occurs in the context of national committees supporting implementation of specific conventions or interministerial working groups addressing cross-cutting issues. Similar mechanisms operate in some countries of African and the (73) Asia Pacific region. (74)

The second research question asked whether vertical linkages have enabled the coevolution of global and national governance. Morin and Orsini's coevolution thesis suggests that increased regime density should facilitate improved national policy coherence. (75) Indeed, our study found evidence of global influence on domestic policy. Based on Bernstein and Cashore's framework (see the section on regime complexity, policy coherence, and coherent governance), we identified two main pathways of influence: markets and direct access to domestic policymaking. However, both appear underexploited. The GEF's influence on national coordination is not the result of an active policy to promote synergies among biodiversity-related agreements via markets (the CBD is the only convention of the biodiversity cluster that can access GEF funds), but is rather a side effect of resource allocation frameworks supporting projects conducive to the achievement of global environmental goals. Overarching organi7ations and treaty secretariats have made deliberate efforts to strengthen national capacities for the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions, but in the view of some interviewees (e.g., from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic), the assistance provided has been insufficient.

Recent policy discussions and research looking at ways in which global cooperation can encourage greater coordination of implementation activities at the national level have devoted much attention to capacity building. (76) The strategic manipulation of markets, however, could also bring about positive change. A number of LAC countries have considered synergies in GEF project proposals in the expectation of attracting external resources. The inter-linkages created usually unfold in the context of implementation of the Rio conventions, mainly because other biodiversity-related MEAs operate under different financial arrangements. Improved coordination of financial mechanisms in the biodiversity cluster (or their consolidation under the GEF's umbrella) can result in positive incentives for improving domestic synergies. Experiences in forest governance indicate that market mechanisms, when carefully designed, can be effective instruments to align international and national agendas. (77)

The modest influence of global governance on domestic policy suggests that synergies in LAC countries have been driven mostly by national processes. Such an inward-looking approach is reflected in a low-profile involvement in international biodiversity governance. The empirical evidence suggests that most LAC countries do not take an active stance in promoting greater integration in the biodiversity cluster as they prepare and participate in meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions. This might be because countries have derived little benefit from intertreaty cooperation, but also because they might be wary about raising the profile of biodiversity conservation in the international agenda at the expense of, for example, economic development (Sikina Jinnah points out that developing country parties to the CBD do not usually consider biodiversity conservation a priority (78)). Greater engagement with synergy processes in the biodiversity cluster is nonetheless important to reorient intertreaty cooperation toward providing increased support to national implementation in line with countries' interests.

Overall, vertical linkages between global and national governance in areas where the mandates of the biodiversity-related conventions overlap appear underdeveloped. This prevents governance systems from interacting in complementary ways and sustains the gap between global and national implementation.

Concluding Remarks

When global and national governance systems coevolve in a mutually supportive manner, coherent governance is achieved. Empirical observations in our research suggest that the coevolution of the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and MEA management systems at the national level is weak, confirming previous observations of a gap between global integration and national coordination. Bridging the gap is in the interest not only of those countries lagging behind (a more integrated implementation would reduce costs of administration and compliance), but of those that are leading the way toward improved integration of biodiversity-related agreements. Indeed, the case for biodiversity conservation cannot be made stronger without the active involvement of countries that have been wary about or have opposed diverting resources away from national implementation to intertreaty cooperation.

The coevolution thesis anticipates greater alignment of global and national governance systems through iterative processes of interaction. However, because coevolution is founded on weak vertical linkages, more deliberate cross-level management is needed to bridge the implementation gap. Until recently, synergies among biodiversity-related conventions at the global level and within LAC countries have developed in the absence of strategic frameworks for coordination. As a result, potential complementarities in areas of substantive overlap have been overlooked or appear underexploited. Recent events reveal positive attempts to improve the situation. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 is intended to provide common focus in the biodiversity cluster. Implementation of the plan at the national level is expected to occur through revised NBSAPs that should take into consideration synergies among biodiversity-related agreements. Both the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the NBSAPs provide flexible frameworks for horizontal and vertical coordination in areas where substantive coherence is particularly needed. It remains unclear, however, whether the momentum created at the tenth CBD CoP in response to the failure to achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target will be maintained throughout the decade such that it can advance more coherent biodiversity governance.

Notes

Jose Octavio Velazquez Gomar is a PhD candidate in the School of Earth and Environment at the University of Leeds. He continues this study of the coevolution of regime complexes and national policy coherence in his doctoral thesis (forthcoming 2014). Lindsay C. Stringer is professor in environment and development and director of the Sustainability Research Institute in the School of Earth and Environment at the University of Leeds. Jouni Paavola is professor of environmental social science and deputy director of the ESRC-funded Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy in the School of Earth and Environment at the University of Leeds. The first author wishes to acknowledge Mexico's National Council of Science and Technology for its fmancial support.

(1.) Jean-Frederic Morin and Amandine Orsini, "Regime Complexity and Policy Coherency: Introducing a Co-adjustments Model," Global Governance 19, no. 1 (2013): 41-51; Jean-Frederic Morin and Amandine Orsini, "Policy Coherency and Regime Complexes: The Case of Genetic Resources," Review of International Studies (forthcoming), http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?iid=7660848 (accessed 17 July 2013).

(2.) See Mireille Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance: The Contribution of the Main Biodiversity-related Conventions," in Raphael Bine, et al., Global Governance of Biodiversity: New Perspectives on a Shared Challenge (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 2010), pp. 6-44; AlSalheiour Joharmsdottir, Ian Cresswell, and Peter Bridgewater, "The Current Framework for International Governance of Biodiversity: Is It Doing More Harm than Good?" Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 19, no. 2 (2010): 139-149.

(3.) UNEP-WCMC (UN Environment Program World Conservation Monitoring Centre), Promoting Synergies Within the Cluster of Biodiversity-related Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Cambridge, UK: UNEP-WCMC, 2012); Karin Baakman, Testing Times: The Effectiveness of Five International Biodiversity-related Conventions (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal, 2011); Richard Caddell, "The Integration of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Lessons from the Biodiversity-Related Conventions," Yearbook of International Environmental Law 22, no. 1 (2011): 37-75; Nils Simon, "Fragmentation in Global Governance Architectures: The Cases of the Chemicals and Biodiversity Cluster," paper presented at the third Global International Studies Conference, Porto, August 2011; Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance"; Johannsdot-tir, Cresswell, and Bridgewater, "International Governance of Biodiversity"; Steinar Andresen and Kristin Rosendal, "The Role of the United Nations Environment Programme in the Coordination of Multilateral Environmental Agreements," in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhiiner, and Anna Schreyogg, eds., International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 133-150; Niko Urho, Possibilities of Enhancing Cooperation and Co-Ordination Among MEAs in the Biodiversity Cluster (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2009). Note that Nils Simon's study is the only one that has attempted to examine synergies in the biodiversity cluster under the lens of regime interplay approaches.

(7.) Kal Raustiala, "Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal Order," in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack, eds., Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 293-320.

(8.) Morin and Orsini, "Regime Complexity and Policy Coherency."

(9.) Ibid.

(10.) See, for example, Martin Hopner, "What Connects Industrial Relations and Corporate Governance? Explaining Institutional Complementarity," Socio-Economic Review 3, no. 2 (2005): 331-358; Pascal Gauttier, "Horizontal

Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union," European Law Journal 10, no. 1 (2004): 23-41; Wolfgang Streeck, "Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Complementarity as a Moving Target," in Peter Mooslechner and Ernest Gnan, eds., The Transformation of the European Financial System: Where Do We Go? Where Should We Go? Proceedings of an Oesterreichische Nationalbank Workshop Held on June 20, 2003 (Vienna: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2004), pp. 101-115.

(11.) See also Tom Jones, "Policy Coherence, Global Environmental Governance, and Poverty Reduction," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2, no. 4 (2002): 389-401.

(12.) Mans Nilsson, Tony Zamparutti, Jan Erik Petersen, Bjorn Nykvist, Peter Rud-berg, and Jennifer McGuinn, "Understanding Policy Coherence: Analytical Framework and Examples of Sector--Environment Policy Interactions in the EU," Environmental Policy and Governance 22, no. 6 (2012): 395-4.42.

(4.) Pamela S. Chasek, Confronting Environmental Treaty Implementation Challenges in the Pacific Islands (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2010); Hillary M. Masundire, "Opportunities for Synergies in Planning and Implementing Projects for Biological Diversity and Combating Desertification in Africa," in Caroline King, Harriet Bigas, and Zafar Adeel, eds., Desertification and the International Policy Imperative: Proceedings of a Joint International Conference, 17-19 December, Algiers, Algeria (Hamilton, ON: United Nations University Press, 2006), pp. 307-318; Carlene Van Toen, "Delegates Perceptions on Synergies and the Implementation of MEAs: Views from the ESCAP Region," paper presented at the Informal Regional Consultation on Inter-Linkages: Synergies and Coordination Among Multilateral Environmental Agreements, Kuala Lumpur, February 2001.

(5.) Andrew Bovarnick, Francisco Alpizar, and Charles Schnell, eds., The Importance of Biodiversity and Ecosystems in Economic Growth and Equity in Latin America and the Caribbean: An Economic Valuation of Ecosystem (New York: UN Development Programme, 2010).

(6.) Amandine Orsini, Jean-Frederic Morin, and Oran Young, "Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?" Global Governance 19, no. 1 (2013): 27-39.

(13.) Ministry of the Environment of Finland. Report from a Nordic Symposium.

(14.) Sybille van den Hove and Lucien Chabason, "The Debate on an Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES): Exploring Gaps and Needs," idies pour le debat 1 (2009).

(15.) See Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Report from a Nordic Symposium.

(16.) See Desiree M. McGraw, "The CBD: Key Characteristics and Implications for Implementation," Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 11, no. 1: 17-28.

(17.) See UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(18.) Urho, Enhancing Cooperation and Co-ordination.

(19.) See Andresen and Rosendal, "United Nations Environment Programme"; Urho, Enhancing Cooperation and Co-ordination.

(20.) See Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance."

(21.) See Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Report from a Nordic Symposium.

(22.) Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance"; Masundire, "Opportunities for Synergies."

(23.) "Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-Related Conventions," Bonn, May 2008, www.cbd.int/big (accessed 15 December 2012).

(24.) "Implementation of the Convention and the Strategic Plan and Progress Towards the 2010 Biodiversity Target," note by the executive secretary to the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Nagoya, Japan, October 2010, www.cbd.int/cop (accessed 15 December 2012).

(25.) CBD Secretariat, Global Biodiversily Outlook 3 (Montreal, QC: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010).

(26.) See Johan Rockstriim et al., "A Safe Operating Space for Humanity," Nature 461, no. 7263 (2009): 472-475.

(27.) Sebastian Oberthiir, "Interplay Management: Enhancing Environmental Policy Integration Among International Institutions," International Environmental Agreements: Politics. Law and Economics 9, no. 4 (2009): 371-391.

(28.) See Olav Schram Stokke and Sebastian Oberthiir, "Introduction: Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Change," in Sebastian Oberthiir and Olav Schram Stokke, eds., Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 1-23.

(29.) Oberthiir, "Interplay Management."

(30.) Olav Schram Stokke, "Trade Measures and the Combat of IUU Fishing: Institutional Interplay and Effective Governance in the Northeast Atlantic," Marine Policy 33, no. 2 (2009): 339-349; Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthiir, "Comparative Empirical Analysis and Ideal Types of Institutional Interaction," in Sebastian Oberthiir and Thomas Gehring, eds., Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict Among International and EU Policies (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), pp. 307-371.

(31.) See UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(32.) Urho, Enhancing Cooperation and Co-ordination.

(33.) Chasek, Confronting Implementation Challenges: Van Toen, "Delegates Perceptions on Synergies."

(34.) Stokke and Oberthiir, "Introduction"; Oberthilr, "Interplay Management"; Keith G. Provan and Patrick Kenis, "Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18, no. 2 (2008): 229-252.

(35.) See Andresen and Rosendal, "United Nations Environment Programme."

(36.) UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(37.) Chasek, Confronting Implementation Challenges.

(38.) Van Toen, "Delegates Perceptions on Synergies."

(39.) David Mouat, Judith Lancaster, Ismail El-Bagouri, and Fernando Santibafiez, eds., Opportunities for Synergy Among the Environmental Conventions: Results of National and Local Level Workshops (Bonn: Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, 2006).

(40.) Masundire, "Opportunities for Synergies."

(41.) Ibid.

(42.) Sylvia I. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, "From Rio to Rio via Johannesburg: Integrating Institutions Across Governance Levels in Sustainable Development Deliberations," Natural Resources Forum 36, no. 1 (2012): 3-15.

(43.) Ibid.

(44.) Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore, "Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies: Four Pathways of Influence," International Affairs 88, no. 3 (2012): 585-604.

(45.) Caddell, "Integration of Multilateral Environmental Agreements."

(46.) See Andresen and Rosendal, "United Nations Environment Programme."

(47.) Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance."

(48.) Edward J. Goodwin, "Delegate Preparation and Participation in Conferences of the Parties to Environmental Treaties," International Community Law Review 15, no. 1 (2013): 45-76.

(49.) Ibid.

(50.) Ibid.

(51.) "Report of the Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Meeting on the Multi-Year Programme of Work of the Conference of the Parties up to 2010," submitted to the seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Kuala Lumpur, February 2004, www.cbd.inr/cop (accessed 15 December 2012).

(52.) UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(53.) Bovarnick, Alpizar, and Schnell, importance of Biodiversity and Ecosystems.

(54.) Nigel King and Christine Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2010).

(55.) See UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(56.) Ibid.

(57.) "What Is the GEF?" Global Environment Facility Secretariat, www.thegeforg/gef/whatisgef (accessed 8 March 2013).

(58.) "Areas of Work," Global Environment Facility Secretariat, www.thegef.org/gef/Areas_work (accessed 8 March 2013).

(59.) Jean-Joseph Bellamy and Kevin Hill. National Capacity Self-assessments: Results and Lessons Learned for Global Environmental Sustainability (New York: Global Support Programme, Bureau for Development Policy, UN Development Programme, 2010).

(60.) "National Capacity Self-Assessment (NCSA)," Global Environment Facility Secretariat, www.thegef.orgigefincsa (accessed 29 September 2013).

(61.) Ibid.

(62.) "National Experiences," TEMATEA Secretariat, www.tematea.org/?q=contact (accessed 10 November 2012).

(63.) Morin and Orsini, "Regime Complexity and Policy Coherency"; Morin and Orsini, "Policy Coherency and Regime Complexes."

(64.) See Oran R. Young, "Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times," AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment 41, no. 1 (2012): 75-84; Robert 0. Keohane and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex for Climate Change," Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 1 (2011): 7-23.

(65.) See Karen J. Alter and Sophie Meunier, "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 13-24; Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources," International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 277-309.

(66.) Robert M. Ochieng, Ingrid J. Visseren-Hamakers, and Kwabena S. Nketiah, "Interaction Between the FLEGT-VPA and REDD+ in Ghana: Recommendations for Interaction Management." Forest Policy and Economics 32 (2012): 32-39.

(67.) Sebastian Oberthilr and Thomas Gehring, "Institutional Interaction: Ten Years of Scholarly Development," in Sebastian Oberthiir and Olav Schram Stokke, eds., Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 25-58.

(68.) Jardin, "Global Biodiversity Governance"; Masundire, "Opportunities for Synergies."

(69.) UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(70.) Urho, Enhancing Cooperation and Co-ordination.

(71.) See Chasek, Confronting Implementation Challenges.

(72.) UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies.

(73.) See Masundire, "Opportunities for Synergies."

(74.) See Van Toen, "Delegates Perceptions on Synergies."

(75.) Morin and Orsini, "Regime Complexity and Policy Coherency."

(76.) See UNEP-WCMC, Promoting Synergies; Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Report from a Nordic Symposium.

(77.) See Solenn Leplay and Sophie Thoyer, "Synergy Effects of International Policy Instruments to Reduce Deforestation: A Cross-country Panel Data Analysis," Working Paper (Montpellier, France: LAMETA, University of Montpellier, 2011).

(78.) Sikina Jinnah, "Marketing Linkages: Secretariat Governance of the Climate-Biodiversity Interface," Global Environmental Politics 11, no. 3 (2011): 23-43.