Re-balancing the G-20 from efficiency to legitimacy: the 3G coalition and the practice of global governance.

Cooper, Andrew F. ; Momani, Bessma

This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance--shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy. Keywords: 3G, G-20, global governance, informal groups, small states.

Informal Global Governance

As new centers of power mobilize and old institutions fall behind the curve of change, the trend in world politics has been for countries to substitute, bypass, or marginalize established institutions of global governance in favor of engagement with new forms of cooperative institutional arrangements--in short, toward informality in global governance. International relations theory has traditionally been uneasy with forms of informal global governance. (1) Realists have dismissed them as irrelevant given that powerful members can "go it alone," and neoliberal institutionalists are uncertain of what to make of these forums where formal institutional structures or binding agreements are not apparent. (2) Students of rational design see the advance of centralized rather than disaggregated models of international organizations. (3) Yet this trend toward informality is not only important for extending the debate about the manner by which cooperation can be secured in the global political economy "after hegemony," (4) but the manner by which small states attempt to influence bigger ones. Marked by less hierarchy and greater flexibility, informal global governance of small states is an admittedly fuzzy concept, and explaining its theoretical relevance has therefore been a challenge for dominant international relations paradigms. Moreover, the relationship between conceptualization and issue-specific international practice beyond the domain of the UN Security Council in select crisis situations has not been extensively explored. Notwithstanding Jochen Prantl's call in his 2005 International Organization article for extended studies of the "dynamics between internal arrangements and formal international organizations," there has been scant research that explores the use by smaller states of informal groups to increase their leverage in the global political economy and so increase our "understanding of power, legitimacy and change." (5)

Thus, in functional terms, there is some considerable space for specialized and more nuanced studies. Although greater attention is devoted to "multilateralism light," the focus has been to some considerable extent on the mechanisms used by bigger and stronger countries, not as tools by coalitions of the weak. (6) A major strand of literature that traces forms of informal governance does so in a mode of analysis that privileges clubs of power where informality allows for easier backroom negotiations over contested issue areas as well as the implementation of tough regulations that are monitored in the privacy of informal groups, whether on a permanent or temporary ad hoc basis. (7) Well-known groupings such as the Group of 8 (G8), the World Trade Organization Green Rooms, and the Middle East Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reflections of these informal groups, which indeed can be effective at achieving their narrow objective of furthering global cooperation.

Yet although we have become accustomed to the idea that these contracting parties should have the requisite resources to back up their influence at the table, this approach should not limit our inclination or ability to perceive of alternative arrangements. Small countries also have engaged in informal groupings, either as countermobilizations via multilateral trade negotiations (the Cotton-4, or the Small Vulnerable Economies) or as part of mixed coalitions in either trade (the Cairns Group) or a variety of other issue areas through Friends (Kosovo 1999, e.g., including individual countries such as Finland and members of regional forums, notably the European Union [EU] and the Organization of the Islamic Conference) and High-Level Groups (including Sustainable Energy for All) of the UN Secretary-General as well as a number of Contact Groups (such as the Friends of Libya, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Malta, and Qatar) and Ad Hoc Advisory groups.

If asymmetrical in academic treatment and practical form, these counter-illustrations open up another important research strand that privileges cases where small countries have responded to informal initiatives by big actors through informal organizational counterresponses of their own. A prime example of this phenomenon is provided by the synergetic emergence of the Group of 20 (G-20) and the Global Governance Group (3G). On the one hand, the concert-like power of the G-20 in a modern global economy that is characterized as highly interdependent is well understood. On the other hand, the meaning of the 3G, where material resources do not explain who sits at the table, remains underanalyzed.

Our purpose in this article is to provide insights into broader puzzles about how cooperation is built into the global economic order, particularly about the role of states that are nonmembers of the G-20. How do we explain the presence of an informal group such as the 3G that serves to bridge informal groups like the G-20 with the formal pinnacle of global governance, the United Nations? Are informal groups just a part of a new network of alliances that clouds our sight of the real forums of decisionmaking and power such as the UN Security Council, or even some smaller component of the G-20? Or is their emergence and growing presence in the arena of international politics a sign of shifts, however subtle (though no less significant), in established arrangements of global governance? We provide insight into these questions based on more than a dozen extensive and anonymous interviews with ambassadors and UN representatives from stakeholder states.

The Rise of the 3G: Bridging the Efficiency and Legitimacy Gap

In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Group of 20 emerged on the world stage as the leading forum for international economic collaboration. Originally established in 1999 as a meeting of finance ministers from some of the world's most powerful states (including the United States, China, and Germany), the G-20 was first convened in Washington, DC, by President George W. Bush as a leaders' summit during the onset of the financial crisis, and has continued to hold meetings around the globe. (8) When it became clear that existing institutions--the International Monetary Fund, the Group of 8 (G8), and, notably, the UN--could not coordinate an effective response to the crisis, (9) the G-20 was elevated to the principal forum for collective response management. (10) This retreat from universalism was reinforced by the choice of setting. The Secretary-General lobbied hard for the inaugural meeting of the G-20 to be held in New York, but was rebuffed by Bush, who preferred Washington, DC, for a number of reasons. In particular, a meeting in Washington would avoid linking the G-20 to Wall Street and the culpability of the United States, and demonstrate a clear preference for the international financial institutions (IFIs) over the UN system. It was hence in Washington that the G-20, through the cooperative efforts of its member countries, was able to reduce the volatility in financial markets, implement regulatory reform, and establish a global economic stimulus to help cushion countries against the adverse effects caused by the financial crisis. (11)

However, this combination of an exclusive form of executive multilateralism without participation or oversight from the wider international community elicited a strong counterresponse from the states left out of the G-20. Despite the inclusion of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) as members, the impression that the G-20 was a group of powerful countries that formulated and imposed rules on all others persisted largely as a result of the overrepresentation of European countries as members, an underrepresentation of African countries, and the absence of appropriate mechanisms for nonmembers to engage in a constructive dialogue with the G-20 process. (12)

Substantive questions were also raised about where the powers of the G-20 should be demarcated, (13) particularly given signs in 2008-2009 that the G-20 was venturing into issues considered the domain of sovereign states--including exchange rates, debt levels, monetary policy, (14) and noneconomic realms involving the environment and global security. (15) Procedurally, critics expressed concern about the implications of the G-20 in terms of its impact on the already weakened UN--the intergovernmental organization that had become the hub of modern global governance in the post-World War II era (16)--and on how future decisions on global issues are to be made. (17) The ability of the G-20 to act outside of the parameters of the UN instilled fear in nonmembers not only symbolically, but also instrumentally by having their interests undermined by it. The 3G countries noted that there was a "problem with the G-20 because it was making decisions that impacted the broader UN membership ... [and that] was unfair to those outside as these countries had no impact [on G-20 decisions]." (18)

In terms of resistance, the highest profile group coalesced around the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA plus) countries (led by Venezuela and Nicaragua), which pushed for an alternative summit on the financial crisis at the UN General Assembly in June 2009. Yet although the Secretary-General's backing for the Stiglitz Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress provided intellectual and policy support for this event, the UN Conference on the World Finance and Economic Crisis ultimately reinforced the traditonal small state image of voice as an expression of collective solidarirty with little leverage. While containing some considerable ideational and normative appeal, as indeed earlier initiatives direted toward a New Interational Economic Order had done, it was overshadowed as a policymaker by the G-20.

A second but overlapping cluster of states that critiqued the G-20 came from those that saw themselves as potential candidates for entry. Norway serves as a prime illustration of this response. Norwegian foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store was a harsh critic of the G-20's legitimacy, stating in the lead-up to the 2010 G-20 Toronto summits that "the self-appointment of the G-20 represents, from the point of view of international law and multilateral principles, a major step backwards in the way international cooperation has occurred since World War II." (19) Yet despite these misgivings about its mandate and functions as a forum for setting the global agenda, Norway's major policy recommendation was not the abandonment, but an expansion of the G-20 with an additional seat at the table for the Nordic Council. (20)

Other states in this same potential candidate category included Egypt, Pakistan, and Colombia. Akin to the ALBA plus group, this cluster tapped into feelings of resentment via the Group of 77 (G-77). Although unable to reshape the G-20, these states were strong enough to deny the summit some degree of legitimacy by blocking references to the G-20 in the UN context, especially via the Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee). (21) This exposes the danger in terms of the G-20's informal, but exclusive nature--in a similar fashion to the Security Council in crisis situations--by which "the processes of diplomatic problem solving and its collective legitimation ... become increasingly decoupled." (22)

Yet despite the apprehensions that spumed much of the negative criticism of the G-20 from the so-called G-172 (UN countries that are not G-20 members), their approach to reform has taken the form of calls for inclusion in the G-20 process rather than resistance. (23) Notwithstanding its structural shortcomings, many nonmembers still view the G-20 as capable of making positive contributions to the international community, as in its "effective" (24) and "commendable" (25) handling of the international financial crisis in which it "emerged out of the crisis ... [as] a mechanism to get people together." (26) Minister Store's push toward a more inclusive G-20 was echoed and, significantly, expanded on by Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon, permanent representative of Singapore to the UN. At the City University of New York in late March 2010, Ambassador Menon spoke of the international reactions to the G-20. (27) He stated that Singapore had found a different way, one that--rather than simply accepting, rejecting, or ignoring the G-20 process (28)--sought to build a more equitable relationship between the G-20 and non-G-20 countries. (29)

As early as April 2009, during the G-20 London summit, it was Menon who arranged meetings with non-G-20 countries in order to develop the idea of the Global Governance Group. (30) However, it was not political maneuvering alone that allowed Singapore to secure its leadership position within the 3G. Qatar, for example, hosted an international summit in May 2010 to discuss ways that the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) might be advanced. Yet given that it was already involved in a number of large initiatives, it eventually relinquished its G-20 responsibilities to Singapore and Switzerland (see below). (31) Including these two countries, there are twenty-eight members in the 3G: six from Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific (Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Vietnam); three from the Middle East (Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates); three from Africa (Rwanda, Senegal, and Botswana); eight from Europe (Sweden, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino); two from South America (Uruguay and Chile); and six from Latin America and the Caribbean (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Bahamas).

In approach, the 3G was not a complete break with the older tradition of solidarity among the marginalized from the bottom up. As with earlier expressions of this type, there was an explicit oppositional component in this coalition--with an emphasis on voice opportunity--given that key members of the 3G had been targeted by the G-20 directly and indirectly via the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as offshore financial centers (see below). This targeting was especially intense at the 2009 London summit with the publication of the G-20 communique in tandem with the OECD list.

If capable of blocking influence, nonetheless, 3G countries faced other constraints in dealing with the G-20, due to the G-20's expanded membership. In addition to Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), the G-20 contained a number of middle powers--notably, South Korea, Australia, Mexico, and Turkey--that possessed both the skill and space for entrepreneurial activity. Such an extension of the head table made the condition of nonmembership more acute, in the context of an explict demonstration of global reordering. Whereas the voice of small states had been tradtionally amplified by the declaratory signs of solidaity with big countries from the Global South, the creation of the G-20 recalibrated North-South relations. Moving the general insights offered by Jan Nederveen Pieterse (32) in terms of the move toward a new axis of relations into diplomatic practices on the ground, a different polarization evolved between the old establishment (the Group of 7 [G7] and G8), the BRIC countries, and rising middle powers, and a larger cohort of smaller states on a global basis. Especially sensitive was the fact that big countries with membership in a wide range of organizations from the EU (the UK, France, Germany, and Italy, plus Spain as a permanent guest), the African Union and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (South Africa), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesia), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia) were brought into the G-20 while smaller members in the same organizations or regions were left out. (33)

The G-20, nonetheless, could not marginalize the 3G. Indeed, to a certain and significant extent, the G-20 needed the 3G insofar as those states that comprise the G-172 proved unlikely to buy into G-20 decisions, initiatives, or projects that did not represent their interests. (34) The 3G emerged "in response to very broad changes in the global strategic levels, [including] changes in China, India, [and the] emergence of the BRICS ... [3G countries] are part of a shift where the regular channels are not able to respond to the changes taking place." (35) To this end, the 3G acts as a forum that allows the G-20 to respond to the concerns of nonmembers without, notably, requiring significant changes to current institutional arrangements. (36) For example, the inclusion of small states at the G-20 high table via the 3G provision of variable geometry--a pragmatic approach whereby countries participate in initiatives based on their capacity to address them (37)--can foster informal alliances between large and small states on a variety of issues (38) and inspire creative strategies for addressing pressing global concerns: "We started the 3G with the idea of variable geometry. If the G-20 discusses volatility we [Chile] want to be there. If you are discussing agriculture, you need Uruguay. They [3G members] are trying to see who is relevant and willing in terms of how to deal with many problems." (39) As Prantl points out, such "redelegation of tasks to informal groups of states may well be seen as a stabilizing element for international institutions in transition ... [that] reshapes the [global] balance between power and legitimacy, [and] which may temper the pressure toward formal change." (40)

Indeed, in that space that is being created by transformation of global order, (41) the actors moving in to fill it may not be big states such as the BRIC countries, but may in fact be small states (42) given their capacity (and need) to craft fluid, innovative, and pragmatic responses to global issues when they perceive that they are being shut out from the decisionmaking processes of global governance. (43) As one official explains, "we want to make it clear that we have the UN and you cannot do whatever you want. We need to be tough sometimes ... if you are a small country, you can speak loud. But it is not easy. We can do good work, and influence things a little bit." (44) As new centers of power mobilize and established organizations fall behind the curve of change, the 3G, in short, is capable of shaping the global agenda in a way that is both more inclusive and streamlined through existing institutions.

The 3G Position and Substance

Arguing that "power itself confers legitimacy" (45) and that the UN is unique in that it is the only global organization with undisputed legitimacy and universal participation, (46) the 3G has proposed several measures to enhance engagement between the G-20 and UN members. As developed most fully in a document entitled "The United Nations in 2025: How Can the UN Remain Relevant in Addressing Tomorrow's Global Challenges?" (2011), it outlined various actions that are necessary for the UN to assume the dominant role in resolving world challenges and governance issues. (47) In specific terms the 3G proposed that, before future summits, the G-20 should hold consultations with non-G-20 members through regular and predictable channels. The G-20 should also provide updates about preparations and outcomes to the UN both before and after G-20 meetings. Moreover, although the Secretary-General and his staff have been regular participants at the G-20 summits and preparatory meetings, their participation should be formalized. In addition, given that there is sufficient flexibility in the G-20 process to engage all relevant parties on issues of global concern, the process should arrange for the participation of non-G-20 members in discussions on these specialized issues. Finally, the participation of established regional organizations (e.g., Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN, African Union Commission, EU, and NEPAD) should be regularized. (48)

If the proposed approach is undertaken, the 3G is convinced that the G20 process can become more transparent and inclusive, which would in turn garnish greater support for and strengthen the actions of the G-20.49 By maintaining that the UN "is the only global body with universal participation and unquestioned legitimacy," (50) the 3G's strategy is not only to bring the G-20 within the framework of the UN, but also to act as a UN pressure group for G-20 reform. (51) The goal here is to forge a G-20-UN relationship that is complementary rather than competing or contradictory. (52) As the Singaporean foreign minister George Yeo put it in March 2010:

   We participate in this "3G" process in order to help the G-20
   assume greater legitimacy in the global community of nations. It is
   to improve the G-20's interaction with the general membership in
   the UN, which in turn would build wider support for G-20 actions.
   It is important that the decisions of the G-20 take into account
   the interest of other countries and are supported by them. The G-20
   process should strengthen the UN and other international
   organizations, not weaken them. (53)

Yeo's remarks reflect those of the ambassadors and UN representatives interviewed for this article who state, for example, that "we need to reform the UN to make it work for us. But we need to be careful not to overstep boundaries in doing so," (54) and that the 3G strategy toward the G-20 and the UN "reinforces the point that norm setting really needs to take place at the UN. While the G-20 decision[s] need to be reached on a consensus ... there is a need to bring this agreement back to the UN body." (55)

Hence, the three founding philosophies of the 3G are: (1) to confer greater legitimacy to the G-20 process; (2) to act as a bridge linking G-20 and UN membership; and (3) to ensure that the G-20 hears the voices of nonmembers. (56) As one official puts it, "we are small countries, but we need to improve global governance and the only thing that we must make clear to them is that we are very pro UN. We don't want the UN destroyed." (57)

In regard to implementing these reforms, it is important to note that the 3G has experienced some small successes. In 2010, for example, the South Korean government extended an invitation to Singapore--as chair of the 3G--to participate in the G-20 Seoul summit. (58) The following year, during the G-20 Cannes summit, French officials made it a priority to arrange consultations between G-20 and non-G-20 members and, following the recommendations of the 3G, invited the Secretary-General to participate in the summit. (59)

These successes are contextualized by 3G strategy relative to offensive action by the G-20 toward 3G member activities. On its inception, it appeared as though many members in the new 3G grouping also happened (and not by much coincidence) to be key financial centers that opposed G-20 efforts to clamp down on gray zones in financial transactions. This common interest, however, did not mean outright resistance by the 3G along the lines of a single issue. Rather, in terms of substance, the issues promoted by 3G countries represented the divergence of categories and interests prioritized among the targeted offshore financial countries. Several other members of the G-20 were put into the same gray category as Singapore and Switzerland, including Lichtenstein and Chile, while other 3G members, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, were placed on the blacklist of noncooperative tax havens.

These divergent priorities were further complicated by the image or branding effects of G-20-OCED targeting of offshore financial centers that played up the image problems of affected countries and downplayed their respective image enhancers. The core countries of the 3G, for example, had played constructive roles in various aspects of international relations. Some of this leadership was provided in discrete areas such as Singapore's niche diplomacy on law of the sea, or Chile on the International Labour Organization or the International Criminal Court. In other cases, it was far more diffuse, as in Costa Rica's reputation for being a Samaritan state or Switzerland's hosting of UN organizations. In other words, although the commonality remained "that most members didn't think that they were treated fairly by the lists created by OCED countries in general terms, there are only smaller groups of countries represented in the 3G group. These countries feel a stronger need to have some democratic legitimacy on policies that relate to everyone. This was the political underpinning of the [3G] movement." (60)

Consequently, under these circumstances of (1) divergent interests among the targeted offshore financial countries and (2) issues of image, there was a prime logic within the 3G to engage diplomatically and settle the offshore financial issue via efficiency at the multilateral level. As a result, although proposals were made that meetings be held between senior officials or even finance ministers, this approach was rejected. Through the coordinated efforts of the 3G, the focus instead shifted to a bilateral response to the G-20-OECD targeting with concentrated, if uneven, emphasis on implementing agreed Exchanges of Tax Information (EOI) standards in more of a behind-the-scenes and low-key fashion.

What gave the 3G its originality was not its common defensive stance against stigmatization in instrumental terms, but rather its ability to shift the objectives toward a rebalancing of the relationship between nonmembers and members of the G-20. The 3G does not, therefore, "try to respond to all the issues of the G-20. [Instead] what we have chosen to do is to focus on issues that are the most important to the group. In terms of global governance, it's a process of reforming the global governance framework." (61)

Akin to the other strands of solidarity by nonmembers of the G-20, this offensive approach combined the intensity of voice opportunities with the scope of mobilization. The difference was its adaptive quality, with some degree of accommodation to the existence of the G-20 so long as the summit process shape-shifted in accordance to the tenets of inclusionary global governance. The key to this strategy with respect to goals was to limit the capacity of the G-20 to dictate the rules of the game in global governance not by outright resistance or denying the existence (or legitimacy) of the G-20, but by integrating the activities of the 3G with the G-20 both directly (by an insertion of the 3G into the G-20 process) and indirectly (by a rapprochement between the UN and the G-20). In doing so, the narrative about the G-20 was transformed from the efficiency dimension to the legitimacy dimension. As one official notes,

   There is a trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy. We take a
   sort of pragmatic approach to this.... Mostly, we are favourable to
   the G-20 because at the height of the international financial
   crisis, they were effective. Now ... we do support not only
   coordination, but we would [also] like to see more accountability
   to the UN and the bodies to which the Bretton Woods institutions
   are based on. We would like to see more of this and seeing an
   opportunity to get more engaged. (62)

With respect to means, the 3G built up its own standing through the power of numbers and a diversity of membership that was difficult to ignore. Structurally, there were some limits imposed on these coalition-building efforts. Some EU member states, notably Luxembourg, have profiles similar to the core 3G membership, but did not join. The 3G also did not include a wide number of African countries, and even those that joined kept a low profile. Notwithstanding these constraints, however, the 3G was able to build up an impressive degree of geographic diversity with twenty-nine or thirty members from Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, Asia, and Africa. At the same time, although a number of the 3G members can be placed in the category of developmental states, the 3G "is made up of both rich and developing countries" (63) and none could be depicted as fragile or failed states. On the contrary, in terms of the list of countries by gross domestic product (nominal) per capita, a number of the 3G members were at the top of the hierarchy: Luxembourg (no. 1), Qatar (no. 2), Switzerland no. 4), and Singapore (no. 10). (64) All of these countries had sophisiticated economies and professional foreign services, thus cutting into the advantages of big powers in terms of information and access.

One route in projecting capacity was through an overlapping initiative with the World Economic Forum, which networked Singapore and Switzerland with Qatar--a formidable small state diplomatic actor and one, notably, without an offshore financial issue association. Singapore's foreign minister Yeo traveled to Davos to link up with state officials of small European states as well as a larger group of opinion leaders. It was during this stage of the initiative that the name "3G" was formalized--an idea that came from Lichtenstein. Another source of strength was the willingness of the core states in the 3G--in particular, Singapore, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein--to use the diplomatic capacity of their UN offices in New York to build leverage for the group. Such a buy-in demonstrated that the 3G directed its voice toward opportunity not only from the outside, but also from inside the global system.

In implementing this strategy the 3G made its own mechanisms valuable, even indispensable, to both the G-20 and the UN. "It's not just that the UN pushes for more transparency," as one ambassador notes, "it's [also] often the case the G-20 wants to see their work reflected in the UN texts, so it makes sense that two sides with common interests meet." (65) The problem for the G-20 as it moved beyond its catalytic stage was that of entrenching its legitimacy. Although most important for the BRIC countries, that did not want to be seen as explicity breaking away from the tenets of universalism and solidarity, legitimacy was also a concern for the Barack Obama administration, which wanted to mend some fences with the UN and the wider international community in the post-George W. Bush era. A measure of this US concern with legitimacy can be gauged by the fact that President Obama's sherpa for the G-20 had begun to include the UN in his shuttle diplomacy, a huge contrast with the culture of neglect for the G-20 under the Bush administration.

The 3G's ability to deliver on the legitimacy dimension of global governance is perhaps best exemplified by the UN's unwillingness to acknowledge the G-20's existence formally in its proceedings and documentation. In facilitating this breakthrough--through the text of Resolution 65/94--the 3G had to overcome resentment to the G-20 not so much of resister countries directly, but of the core countries within the overall structure of the G-77. Here sheer numbers played a crucial part in allowing Resolution 65/94 to be adopted by consensus in December 2010, as open conflict with the 3G meant that resisters would have to break with a large group of the UN membership. The success of Resolution 65/94 led to a more sophisticated (albeit continuing) debate about the comparative advantages between the G-20 and the UN. Joseph Deiss, the Swiss president of the General Assembly in 2010, conceded, for example, that the G-20 had "effectively delivered" rapid and coordinated response at least in the context of the "immediate aftermath" of the 2008 financial crisis. (66) He also conceded that in this process the UN had been marginalized to a considerable extent--it was talking through the General Assembly without the G-20 listening. That being said, however, the G-20, as with other ad hoc groups, had "questionable legitimacy" and the need then was for "the best possible articulation of expertise, leadership and legitimacy, and to do so in a setting of coherence." (67)

A second means by which the 3G was able to bridge its leverage and the extension of legitimacy was through the rapprochement of the Secretary-General's role in the G-20. As noted, the George W. Bush administration had chosen the IFIs over the UN in an explicitly exclusionary fashion. What the 3G was instrumental in doing was to reinsert the Secretary-General into the G-20 process, if not as a primary actor then at least in a connected or supportive manner. This reinsertion was done above all through persistent lobbying in the run-up to the 2010 Toronto summit, due to concerns that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon would be excluded from the summit. A third achievement in instrumental results, due to 3G pressure and in combination with other forces (including the push by South Korea as host), was the acceptance by the G-20 of a formula for nonmember participation, enabling the summit host to invite up to five guests. Although mainly directed at the settlement of regional representation, the 3G was the main beneficiary of the decision of this G-20 just before the November 2010 summit to introduce a "G-20 plus five" approach, along with the Korean preparatory committee explicitly stating that this decision had been made because "we finally agreed that we needed to have a better geographical balance." (68)

Yet given even its capacity to provide innovative solutions to the decisionmaking processes of global governance, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the 3G's impact on the G-20's effectiveness vis-a-vis its agenda. The 3G did promote a form of variable geometry that sought to establish and justify a dialogue between the G-20 and the 3G on issues of instrumental importance to the 3G, as illustrated in its concerns on the labeling of its members in the offshore financial-related issues. But as the 3G moved into bilateral means of dispute resolution and the pressure from the G-20 on these issues relaxed, this concept of bilateralism spilled over into other issue areas, in particular food security in which countries such as Chile and Uruguay had important interests as agricultural exporters. At the same time, this downplaying of its overall instrumental effectiveness should not overlook the 3G's influence on the legitimacy side. Unlike the resisters or the aspirants to the G-20 process, the 3G reconciled self-selective executive multilateralism with the principles of global governance. While grounded in national interests, this reconciliation could have been achieved only via the "3G['s] innovative method of modern diplomacy" (69)--its subordination of issue-specific instrumental concerns to a wider 3G narrative that was grounded on the need for transparency, greater scope for participation, and some joint agreement between formal and informal mechanisms of multilateralism.

As with other components of small state diplomacy, there was a strong element of symbolism attached to the 3G's achievements. Certainly, there was little in the way of immediate material benefits that came out of the coalitional exercise, and the instrumental benefits from the 3G were gained largely at the national level. Leveraging the voice opportunity amplified by numbers, Singapore was able to move toward an inside status in the G-20. And the general consensus among the ambassadors and UN representatives interviewed for this article, in the words of one official, is "that Singapore was the [3G] developer. They are a strong economy. They are completely globalized, they depend on the dynamics of the global economy as much or more than any other country. They decided that they cannot just look at what is going on with the G-20. They established coalitions of likeminded countries, with similar interests and developed that.... [T]hey have been the engine to this." (70)

Invited by South Korea to attend the Seoul summit, Singapore was invited back by France to the G-20 Cannes summit in November 2011. These benefits reflected a demand for an in-between approach from a nonmember that was not tilted toward blocking, but rather toward entrepreneurial and technical leadership on an issue-specific basis. The status of Singapore in this regard can be judged by its repeat attendance, in a context where the natural representative of the 3G would be a country such as Switzerland. To the credit of Singapore, it was able to supply this form of leadership over a mixed coalition with representatives of both rich countries from the North and well-to-do and poor countries from the Global South. The recipe for keeping the coalition was a mix of industriousness and an interesting mix of public relations and risk averseness. Using resources not available to most small states, Singapore has "over time... paid the bill," (71) and kept the momentum up by holding monthly meetings and preparing documents. Its ambassador to the UN used an effective form of public diplomacy to complement the inside game of lobbying with an outside game that showcased the narrative of fairness and equity in terms of global governance.

The extension of Singapore's diplomatic attributes into the 3G--and through these into a more privileged position in the G-20--also reinforced its own skills and capabilities. Although stimulated into action on the G-20 due to its nonmember role, Singapore (along with Switzerland) enjoys insider status in other parts of the G-20 extended network. This role is most evident in the membership of these key 3G countries in the Financial Stability Board. In terms of the shaping and monitoring of an array of regulatory issues, therefore, Singapore (along with Switzerland) was a rule maker, not a rule taker. The finance minister of Singapore was also appointed head of the International Monetary and Financial Committee. And Singapore was willing to pass on leadership when the context of the G-20 evolved, thus defusing emerging rivalry issues. "Singapore is a good convener," remarked one offical, "but this does not mean that Singapore will be the only one to go to the G-20 in the future." (72) To be sure, as witnessed by the dynamics of the Los Cabos meeting in June 2012, Singapore's visibility in the 3G could be reduced on a summit-by-summit basis, with Chile taking on the task of supplying much of the group's entrepreneurial and technical capabilities. (73) Such a transition reinforced the impression of success with respect to the impact of "informal-based multilateral light" (74) in that this handing off of leadership enhanced the 3G's credibility in terms of the practice of global governance while consolidating institutional access to the G-20 in the context of an easing of intensity over the question of financial centers.

Conclusion

In this nascent world order in which the operational rules do not follow predictable patterns, small countries have an accentuated ability to draw attention to global governance issues. In such a context, they can influence important policy decisions of dominant institutions. (75)

This space for influencing the international system is at odds with the assumptions about a movement toward multipolarity in which power coalesces around a small number of dominant poles. To be sure, it is increasingly important for small states to remain attuned to the desires and interests of emerging economies and new world powers. (76) Indeed, the ascendancy of the G-20 in global governance fits this template. If not a classic concert of powers along the lines of the model associated with the 1814-1815, 1919, and 1945 eras, the G-20 represents a condominium of big states from both the G8 and the Global South. Galvanized by the 2008 financial crisis, the G-20 came into being as a self-selected group of countries designed to be systemically important.

Certainly, at the outset, the 3G countries were excluded from even a traditional form of pyramidal structure featured in traditional trade negotiations. (77) Many of the 3G's key members were branded as problem countries due to the Offshore Financial Centre tax haven issue and, as such, as targets for stigmatization in key components for their national economic development. Although different from the meaning of "exiting" in other manifestations of informal governance--that is to say, in relation to the movement away from the UN framework--the first success of the 3G was to defuse this targeting by moving the issue from the political and diplomatic to the technical domain.

By then taking the high road--that is, by emphasizing the need for equality at the core of a reconfigured form of robust multilateralism--the 3G became an agent for solutions, especially with respect to legitimacy of the G20 process. In conceptual terms, this push for balance fits the conclusions of some important recent literature that signals the limits of big power influence through informal mechanism. As Randall Stone puts it, "[there is an upwards bound] that powerful states can display, and it requires that informal prerogatives of the powerful are compensated with a degree of formal control by the weak. In this sense, the legitimacy of the organization is a binding constraint that influences institutional design." (78)

The 3G in practice effectively bridged the efficiency of the G-20 with the legitimacy of the UN members, or "the other G-172." Consequently, it was able to carve out a key intermediary role for itself within the existing network of regional and extraregional interests of global governance. This quiet Singaporean initiative thus gathered kudos for its innovative and pragmatic middle way approach, and for the careful manner in which officials exercised their diplomatic skills to advance its mandate. (79) Unlike the resisters, whose agenda was to use the crisis to push for more fundamental and wide-ranging change, the 3G allowed the G-20 to receive some imprint of credibility from the UN. In terms of realizing the power of small states, "the creation of the 3G was a step in the right direction.... When you have issues that go directly to the heart of others, it is important... to have channels to have input on these issues." (80)

In tactical terms, such an approach bridged as well the divide between risk orientation and risk aversion. Singapore was willing to distinguish itself--and the 3G coalition--both from the G-20 membership and the resisters. Yet at the same time, the institutionalized adjustment was pursued via a change in the G-20 (with the inclusion of nonmembers), not the UN.

While not wanting to overstate the instrumental achievements of the 3G, in terms of agency, the role of this coalitional is extremely important in shifting the framework of the G-20 specifically and global governance more generally from a tight club to a loose network of states. Instead of the centralization that appeared to be the mode of operation at the outset, one of the major impacts of the 3G was in recalibrating the image of the summit process to a far more decentralized model in a multifunctioning environment. Such leverage challenges the assumption of multipolarity in favor of an image of nonpolarity; "a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power." (81)

Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the 3G, the looseness of its organizational structure allowed it to hang together. Areas of potential conflict between members of the group were minimized, with care by individual states not to overplay their hand or try to push the group toward positions that were problematic from either an international or domestic position. The preparation and research underpinning the 3G's efforts were crucial to its performance, without the leader centrism of the G-20. Instrumental here, as we have noted throughout the article, has been the role of Singapore as intellectual leader, provider of technical support, and convener of the group.

In overall terms, therefore, the 3G recalibrated the narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance. Building on the notion of resilience, the 3G was able to use a mix of diplomatic skill and concentrated focus to adapt under stressful conditions. Rather than acting as unorthodox agents, however, this informal grouping acted ultimately as a stabilizer of the international system, alleviating a wider sense of resentment about the G-20, and as an enabler for the embeddedness of global governance in the practice of international politics via the economic agenda of the G-20.

Notes

(1.) Fen O. Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, "The 'New' Multilateralism of the Twenty-first Century," Global Governance 17 (2011): 299; Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, "Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving International Relations?" Global Governance 20 (2013); Eduardo Galvez, "Multilateralism, the United Nations and Global Governance," speech at the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 8-9 August 2011, www.un.org/esa/ffd/economicgovemance/ECLACseminar_EGalvez.pdf, accessed 28 February 2010.

(2.) Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Thomas Konzelmann, "Informal Governance in International Relations," in Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold, eds., International Handbook on Informal Governance (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012).

(3.) Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 1 (1998): 3-32.

(4.) Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?" Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 44-55.

(5.) Jochen Prantl, "Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council," International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): 589.

(6.) Risto Penttila, "Multilateralism Light: The Rise of Informal International Governance," Centre for European Reform, EU2020 Essay (Westminster, London: Centre for European Reform, 2009).

(7.) Konzelmann, "Informal Governance in International Relations."

(8.) Andrew F. Cooper and Ramesh Thakur, The Group of Twenty (New York: Routledge, 2012).

(9.) Barry Carin et al., "Making the G20 Summit Process Work: Some Proposals for Improving Effectiveness and Legitimacy," CIGI G20 Papers 2 (2010): 3; John Langmore and Shaun Fitzgerald, "Global Economic Governance," in Ralph Pettman, ed., A Handbook of International Political Economy (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2012), p. 1.

(10.) Andrew F. Cooper and Eric Helleiner, "The G-20: A Global Government in the Making?" in Christoph Pohlmann, Stephan Reichert, and Hubert Rene Shillinger, eds., The G20: A Global Government in the Making? International Policy Analysis (Berlin, Germany: Friedrich, Ebert, Stiftung, 2010), p. 11.

(11.) Hampson and Heinbecker, "The "New" Multilateralism of the Twenty-first Century," p. 304.

(12.) Carin et al., "Making the G20 Summit Process Work," pp. 3, 10; Anthony Payne, "How Many Gs Are There in 'Global Governance' After the Crisis? The Perspective of the 'Marginal Majority' of the World's States," International Affairs 86, no. 3 (2010): 730-731; Vanu Gopala Menon, "Strengthening the Role of the UN in Global Economic Governance," statement at the UN Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group, 2 June 2010, www.un.org/esa/ffd/events/2010GAWGFC/7/Stmt_Singapore.pdf, accessed 28 June 2011.

(13.) Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership: Can Small be Significant?" Working Paper No. 108 (Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore: Institute for South Asian Studies, 2010), p. 5.

(14.) Hampson and Heinbecker, "The "New" Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century," p. 304.

(15.) Asfia Tareen, "The UN and the G20: Efficiency vs. Legitimacy?" Centre for International Governance Innovation, 14 June 2010, www.cigionline.org/blogs/2010/6/un-and-g20-efficiency-vs-legitimacy, accessed 31 July 2011.

(16.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 3.

(17.) Thalif Deen, "G20 Big Powers Under Scrutiny by Smaller Nations," Global Policy Forum, 23 March 2010, www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/globalization-of-politics/ general-analysis-on-globalization-of-politics/48892-g20-big-powers-under-scrutiny-by-smaller-nations.html, accessed 31 July 2011; Tareen, "The UN and the G20"; Vanu Gopala Menon, "Global Governance: The G20 and the UN," Ipsterraviv, 29 March 2010, www.ipsterraviva.net/UN/print.aspx?idnews=N7370, accessed 2 January 2012.

(18.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 10 February 2012.

(19.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 6.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Josette Altmann, "ALBA Institutions and Mechanisms," Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Secretaria General, 2009, www.flacso.org/file admin/usuarios/documentos/Integracion/ ALBA_Institutions_and_Mechanisms.pdf, accessed 25 February 2011.

(22.) Prantl, "Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council," p. 589.

(23.) Andrew F. Cooper, "Small State Responses to the G20: Regional Voices of Criticism to Collective Engagement via the 3G," European Consortium for Political Research conference, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, 24--28 August 2011, p. 5.

(24.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(25.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 14 February 2012.

(26.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(27.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 8.

(28.) Ibid., p. 2.

(29.) Ibid., pp. 8-9.

(30.) Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SHA), "SIIA Welcomes New 3G Initiative for Small States," SIIA, 12 February 2010, www.siiaonline.org/?q=programmes /insights/siia-welcomes-new-3g-initiative-small-states, accessed 31 July 2011; Ravi Velloor, "3G Group to Give Small States a Voice: Singapore Working Hard to Shape Global Group of 28 Nations Not Part of G-20," Straits Times, 1 February 2010, http://siiaonline.org/files/2010-02-01-ST-GeorgeYeo-3G-GiveSmallStatesAVoice.pdf, accessed 31 January 2011.

(31.) Cooper, "Small State Responses to the G20," p. 14.

(32.) Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Global Rebalancing: Crisis and the East-South Turn," Development and Change 42 (January 2011): 22-48.

(33.) Two recent special issues of Third World Quarterly give substantive analysis of these trends, "Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World," edited by Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Fiemes, 34, no. 6 (2013): 943-1143; and "Rising Powers and the Future of Global Governance," edited by Kevin Gray and Craig N. Murphy, 34, no. 2 (2013): 183-355.

(34.) Hampson and Heinbecker, "The 'New' Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century," p. 306; Menon, "Global Governance."

(35.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 10 February 2012.

(36.) Langmore and Fitzgerald, "Global Economic Governance," p. 11.

(37.) Barry Carin et al., "Making the G20 Summit Process Work," p. 3.

(38.) Flampson and Heinbecker, "The 'New' Multilateralism of the Twenty-First Century," p. 307; Andrew F. Cooper, "Small State Responses to the G20," p. 18.

(39.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(40.) Prantl, "Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council," p. 588.

(41.) Robert Kappel, "The Decline of Europe and the US: Shifts in the World Economy and in Global Politics," vol. 1 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2011), p. 1; Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," pp. 12-13; Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: Norton, 2011).

(42.) Kappel, "The Decline of Europe and the US," p. 1; Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," pp. 12-13.

(43.) Jim McLay, "Making a Difference: The Role of a Small State at the United Nations," New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 27 April 2011, www.nzembassy.com/united-nations/news/address-by-ambassador-jim-mclay-to-juniata-college-pennsylvania, accessed 28 June 2011.

(44.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(45.) Yeo, quoted in Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 6.

(46.) Menon, "Strengthening the Role of the UN in Global Economic Governance," p. 2.

(47.) "The United Nations in 2025: How Can the UN Remain Relevant in Addressing Tomorrow's Global Challenges?" on behalf of the Global Governance Group (3G) during the thematic debate on United Nations in Global Governance, 28 June 2011.

(48.) Ibid., p. 3.

(49.) Ibid., pp. 2-3.

(50.) Ibid., p. 1.

(51.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," pp. 2, 8; and Hugo Dobson, "The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism?" Working paper No. 179 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2011), p. 19, www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/52410/l/671536176.pdf, accessed 28 January 2012.

(52.) See Kim-Ji-hyun (2010), cited in Andrew F. Cooper, "Small State Responses to the G20," p. 2.

(53.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 7.

(54.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 14 February 2012.

(55.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 10 February 2012.

(56.) Ibid., p. 7.

(57.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(58.) Pradumna B. Rana, "Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We Have a New Bretton Woods?" Working Paper No. 215 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2010), pp. 7-8, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/workingpapers/wp215.pdf, accessed 31 July 2011.

(59.) Wayne Chan, "G20 Must Address Risks to Global Economy: 3G," Channel newsasia.com, 31 October 2011, www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporebusiness news/view/1162746/l/.html, accessed 30 November 2012.

(60.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 9 February 2012.

(61.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 10 February 2012.

(62.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(63.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 10 February 2012.

(64.) World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

(65.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 9 February 2012.

(66.) Joseph Deiss, "The UN General Assembly Is the Pre-Eminent Forum for Global Debate," 65th session of the UN General Assembly, 14 September 2010, www.currentconcems.ch/index.php?id=1126, accessed 28 October 2011.

(67.) "The United Nations in Global Governance: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective," paper presented at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile regional seminar, Santiago, August 2011.

(68.) Cho Jin-seo, "Five non-G20 Nations Invited to Seoul Summit," Korean Times, 24 September 2010, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2010/09/301_73469.html, accessed 28 October 2010.

(69.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(70.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(71.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 13 February 2012.

(72.) Ibid.

(73.) "Chile Invited to Participate in G-20 June Summit In Mexico--FinMin," Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120119-713509.html, accessed 7 June 2013.

(74.) Penttila, "Multilateralism Light."

(75.) Kappel, "The Decline of Europe and the US," p. 5; Payne, "How Many Gs Are There in 'Global Governance' After the Crisis?" pp. 738-739; Galvez, "Multilateralism, the United Nations and Global Governance," pp. 8-9; McLay, "Making a Difference."

(76.) Alan Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper, Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges for Global Governance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

(77.) Gilbert R. Winham, "Getting to the Table: Process of International Prenegotiation," International Journal 44, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 280-303.

(78.) Randall W. Stone, "Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue," Review of International Organizations 8 (2013): 126.

(79.) Chowdhury, "The Global Governance Group ('3G') and Singaporean Leadership," p. 2; Cooper, "Small State Responses to the G20," p. 14; Deen, "G20 Big Powers Under Scrutiny by Smaller Nations"; Langmore and Fitzgerald, "Global Economic Governance," p. 11.

(80.) UN ambassador of a 3G country, interviewed by the authors, New York, 14 February 2012.

(81.) Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," p. 44.

Andrew F. Cooper is a professor at the University of Waterloo and Balsillie School of International Affairs. He is author or coauthor of eight books and editor or coeditor of twenty-one collections, including the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Diplomacy. His publications have appeared in a wide number of journals including International Organization, World Development, International Affairs, Journal of Democracy, International Studies Review, and Global Governance.

Bessma Momani is associate professor at the University of Waterloo and Bailsillie School of International Affairs and senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation. She has authored and coedited over seven books and over fifty-five scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters on the Middle East and global economic governance issues