Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics.

Dutton, Yvonne M.

Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics. By David Bosco. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

In Rough Justice, David Bosco uses a narrative and historical approach to examine the relationship between powerful states and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Why does he focus on powerful states? Because according to traditional accounts, international organizations are created to reflect and reward major power interests (p. 5). Yet the ICC was formed over the objection of some major powers, and the court was designed in a way that permits it to operate largely independently from political control-according no privileged status to the world's powers. Although more than 120 states have joined the ICC, major powers like the United States have decided to remain outside the court, thereby limiting those states' ability to influence it. Bosco concludes, however, that the evidence from the first decade of the court's operation shows that the court is responding to powerful state interests.

Based on a thorough review of evidence gathered from a variety of sources including numerous interviews, Bosco argues that the ICC and powerful states have engaged in "an interactive process of mutual accommodation" (p. 11) so that international justice and power can coexist. A chronological account of events helps to support his argument. For example, immediately after the ICC's creation, the United States went on a campaign to marginalize the ICC and sought to persuade states to refuse to join or cooperate with the court. In recent years, though, it has supported the court: it has abstained or voted for UN Security Council referrals of situations to the ICC, and it has provided resources to help locate suspects. What explains this change in behavior? Bosco suggests that because the ICC relies heavily on support from states, it has constrained itself in an attempt to avoid alienating powerful states. Indeed, Bosco argues that the ICC prosecutor has taken a "strategic approach" (p. 187) in selecting cases: initially relying on noncontroversial state referrals and later declining to proceed with any cases based on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan despite pressure from some quarters to do so. The end result, Bosco suggests, is an "independent, but constrained court" (p. 187) and one that in practice, if not on paper, reflects at least some of the interests of the major powers.

Bosco's fascinating, timely, and important book has much to offer scholars of international organizations and the ICC.