文章基本信息

标题：The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development.
作者：Wisor, Scott
期刊名称：Global Governance
印刷版ISSN：1075-2846
出版年度：2014
期号：October
语种：English
出版社：Lynne Rienner Publishers
摘要：Matt Andrews joins a chorus of recent authors arguing that efforts to reform and improve public institutions in developing countries often fail to achieve their desired aims. This is due to a context-insensitive approach in which the formal rules of the game are changed to match best practices, but little meaningful change is actually achieved in increasing the responsiveness, integrity, or administrative capability of state institutions. Andrews argues for "problem driven iterative adaptation," whereby external actors such as the World Bank or US Agency for International Development adopt a model of "purposive muddling." On this approach, reforms are to be context sensitive, focused on specific problems, and driven by a willingness to adapt to new developments while taking small iterative steps to produce meaningful changes. The book is important for systematically addressing the question of institutional reform and the precise recommendations for development agencies should be taken seriously, but the analysis leaves important questions outstanding. Much of the governance reform in the 1990s did not fail to produce intended reform. Rather, significant reforms were enacted, especially economic reforms including the loosening of capital controls, the tightening of fiscal and monetary policy, the privatization of state assets, and the removal of trade barriers. Resulting economic crises in a number of developing countries may not point to the limits of institutional reform, but rather to the dominance of misguided macroeconomic policies that were promoted by international institutions in the 1990s. Furthermore, failures of reform are attributed to the misguided approaches of external actors. But political elites have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. An important empirical task is to determine whether purposive muddling is better than best practice when elites have reasons to impede progress for their populations. It would also be useful to know how external reforms focused on external actors (such as transparency requirements in the extractives industry emanating from the United States and the European Union) might help promote institutional development. Despite these remaining questions, the book deserves wide readership among those concerned with the improvement of public institutions in developing countries.
关键词：Books

The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development.

Wisor, Scott

The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development. By Matt Andrews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Matt Andrews joins a chorus of recent authors arguing that efforts to reform and improve public institutions in developing countries often fail to achieve their desired aims. This is due to a context-insensitive approach in which the formal rules of the game are changed to match best practices, but little meaningful change is actually achieved in increasing the responsiveness, integrity, or administrative capability of state institutions. Andrews argues for "problem driven iterative adaptation," whereby external actors such as the World Bank or US Agency for International Development adopt a model of "purposive muddling." On this approach, reforms are to be context sensitive, focused on specific problems, and driven by a willingness to adapt to new developments while taking small iterative steps to produce meaningful changes. The book is important for systematically addressing the question of institutional reform and the precise recommendations for development agencies should be taken seriously, but the analysis leaves important questions outstanding. Much of the governance reform in the 1990s did not fail to produce intended reform. Rather, significant reforms were enacted, especially economic reforms including the loosening of capital controls, the tightening of fiscal and monetary policy, the privatization of state assets, and the removal of trade barriers. Resulting economic crises in a number of developing countries may not point to the limits of institutional reform, but rather to the dominance of misguided macroeconomic policies that were promoted by international institutions in the 1990s. Furthermore, failures of reform are attributed to the misguided approaches of external actors. But political elites have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. An important empirical task is to determine whether purposive muddling is better than best practice when elites have reasons to impede progress for their populations. It would also be useful to know how external reforms focused on external actors (such as transparency requirements in the extractives industry emanating from the United States and the European Union) might help promote institutional development. Despite these remaining questions, the book deserves wide readership among those concerned with the improvement of public institutions in developing countries.

Reviewed by Scott Wisor