Bridging the gaps in global energy governance.
Florini, Ann ; Sovacool, Benjamin K.
Energy constitutes a rich, but underexplored, arena for global
governance scholars and policymakers. The world is currently on an
unsustainable and conflict-prone track of volatile and unreliable supply
of energy fuels, vulnerable infrastructure, massive environmental
degradation, and failure to deliver energy services to an enormous
proportion of the global population. Changing to a different path will
be a monumental global governance endeavor that will require bridging
multiple issue areas, regimes, and policy silos. Meeting that challenge
will require a greatly expanded research agenda aimed at understanding
the institutions, interests, and concerns that do and could shape global
energy governance. In this article, we lay out key energy-related global
issues and explore some of the connections among them to suggest an
initial research agenda for global governance scholars. KEYWORDS: global
governance, energy policy, global energy governance, energy security.
ISSUES CONNECTED TO THE PROVISION OF ENERGY SERVICES AND THE
DEPLOYMENT of energy technologies form a common thread across many of
the most pressing global problems, cutting across geopolitical,
environmental, and economic dimensions. Yet although the international
relations, governance, and global policy literatures address energy
concerns to some degree, they still reflect policy structures and remain
divided into silos, handicapping efforts to adequately understand how
energy policy and technology concerns cross domains. As energy concerns
come to feature ever more prominently, such divides pose a serious
impediment to the prospects for effective global governance on a variety
of issues.
Even a cursory assessment makes clear that contemporary global
energy governance arrangements are falling far short of meeting pressing
needs to foster efficient markets, deal with externalities (notably, but
not only, climate change), extend access to energy services to the
billions of people not adequately served by markets, and address the
many trade-offs involved with improving energy security. Indeed, as
numerous studies have documented in recent years, the world is currently
on an unsustainable and conflict-prone energy track of volatile and
unreliable supply, brittle and vulnerable energy infrastructure, massive
environmental degradation, and failure to deliver energy services. As
former head of the International Energy Agency Claude Mandil notes, a
continuation of existing trends in energy production and use is
"not compatible with reality." (1) Changing to a different
track is, however, a monumental governance endeavor. Few if any
countries have effective energy governance arrangements and policies,
and the global rules that shape and constrain national policy choices
are an incoherent and inadequate mishmash.
Improved global energy governance will need to address numerous
interrelated areas, covering issues normally dealt with in distinct
scholarly and policy silos:
* Geopolitics and security questions, including competition for
energy re sources, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and terrorism
and other cross-border threats to vulnerable energy infrastructure;
* The global environmental politics of energy, including climate
change and other negative externalities that transcend national borders;
* The international political economy of energy, including the
investment agreements, trade rules, and intellectual property rights
regimes that influence energy choices and capital flows;
* Economic development policies and foreign assistance programs
that shape energy policies and investments;
* Emerging issues in global governance and resource management that
have major energy implications, such as water and agriculture.
Each of these areas is the subject of a considerable literature,
but for the most part existing analyses do not explicitly connect them
to broader questions of global energy governance. That is starting to
change, with new works that indicate a startling lack of effective
global rule making even within, much less across, policy silos. (2) Such
key institutions as the International Energy Agency and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are hobbled by inadequate
resources and mandates even by the often dismal standards of
intergovernmental organizations, despite technically competent staffs.
Dries Lesage, Thijs Van de Graaf, and Kirsten Westphal's work on
the G8 concluded that it has "failed to exert global political
leadership" where most needed. (3) Although the G8 has contributed
to expanding the scope of the International Energy Agency and
establishing a global organization to promote energy efficiency, overall
it has proven incapable of producing effective global energy governance
because of competing interests within the institution, a dearth of
effective monitoring and mechanisms to ensure compliance, and an
inability to accommodate nonmember countries. Given the absence of
alternative overarching global energy governors, this failure leaves a
void not easily filled, and it points to the urgent need for a rich
investigation of global energy issues and institutions, with careful
attention to the connections among them.
Geopolitics and Security
Energy issues lie at the heart of major geopolitical flash points
and security concerns. The renewed great game of major power rivalries
in Central Asia, the degree of Russian willingness to play constructive
roles in world affairs, the conundrums of the Middle East, the
likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, and terrorist threats are all
lightly intertwined with energy policy decisions. Below, we highlight a
few of the leading issues.
Resource Competition
Modern economies and modern militaries depend heavily on oil,
natural gas, coal, and uranium, which are often imported. The resulting
pattern of extensive international trade in energy sources--particularly
oil--triggers major security concerns whenever supplies are concentrated
or production capacities constrained. Such tensions figure heavily in
many of the twentieth century's major wars, including World Wars I
and II, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War, and underlie key current
conflicts. (4) The International Energy Agency's emergency oil
stockpile system, born of the first oil crisis in 1973-1974, has for
decades helped mitigate fears of deliberate cutoffs. But that system is
showing its age--it is limited to members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), excluding such major new
oil consumers as China and India. Although demand for oil eased with the
global financial crisis, recovery will quickly restore the tight
conditions of recent years. Moreover, China's strategy of investing
overseas to secure access to oil raises concerns that it is pursuing a
mercantilist rather than market-based approach to energy security. Now
resurging are fears that interstate competition over energy resources
could turn contentious, even violent.
But such conflict is not inevitable. Recent scholarship has argued
that major changes in oil markets since the 1970s have rendered
international conflict over oil far less likely. Andreas Goldthau and
Jan Martin Witte comprehensively document the transformation from
long-term fixed contracts between specific suppliers and consumers--the
pattern that prevailed at the time of the first oil crisis--to a more
open free global market in oil at present. (5) That change, they argue,
has altered the trade of energy from a mercantilist, zero-sum game fraught with the potential for interstate conflict to a positive-sum
market that merely needs better institutionalization to overcome the
fundamental problem of energy security. They suggest that the
"rules of the game" structuring these markets underpin an
effective form of "global governance" that promotes financing
for energy investments, hedges risk, and facilitates international
agreements. While they identify areas for improvement, Goldthau and
Witte assert that a number of existing institutions--such as the
Agreement on an International Energy Program, the International Energy
Forum, and the Energy Charter Treaty--suffice to correct market failures
and set rules and standards for market exchange, if governments use them
correctly.
Goldthau and Witte have made an important, and needed, contribution
to understanding one part of the energy governance puzzle. At present,
however, the peaceful and economically rational approach that they
present remains a distant prospect. On the demand side, the opacity of
Chinese energy policy raises fears that the oil China is contracting to
buy from many sources could at some point be directed solely to China,
rather than traded on global markets. On the supply side, the
world's known oil reserves are concentrated in a handful of largely
volatile and uncomfortably unpredictable countries; notably, in the oil
rich countries of Russia, the Middle East, Nigeria, and Venezuela. As
long as oil continues to be the single largest source of primary energy
supply and virtually the sole source of transportation fuel for most of
the world, investigating the interplay of geopolitics and resource
markets will be a crucial component of the global energy governance
research agenda.
Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation
An extensive literature already exists assessing this most
developed of international regimes dealing with energy issues. (6) That
regime, centered on an intergovernmental organization (the IAEA) and a
fairly comprehensive treaty (the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]), is clearly under severe stress, just when nuclear energy is
proving popular as a response both to soaring energy demand and to the
need to develop less carbon-intensive energy sources. In 2008, more than
440 nuclear power plants operated in thirty-one countries and supplied
about 15 percent of the world's electricity, and over sixty
additional countries, including Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey, have
formally expressed interest in introducing nuclear power to their energy
systems.
Such a large-scale shift to nuclear power will demand much-improved
governance structures to manage the proliferation risks associated with
the vastly increased quantities of nuclear fuel and the spread of
nuclear technology and expertise. The twin pillars of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime--the NPT and the IAEA--are nowhere near
sufficiently robust to stand up to such a vast increase in reliance on
nuclear energy. The IAEA is already badly overstretched and needs to be
considerably strengthened to address the need for monitoring and
safeguarding what is likely to be an explosion in the number and size of
nuclear energy programs, particularly in Asia. (7) The agency's
2,000 or so full-time staff have been struggling under a zero-growth
budget and spread thin across very different mandates. The IAEA, for
example, must not only devise technical safeguards relating to nuclear
power plant safety and perfect tools for assessing the economics and
planning for new nuclear reactors, but also oversee the use of nuclear
isotopes for medical diagnostics and treatment, manage research programs
on new waste management systems, and undertake basic science in
experimental nuclear physics. Yet at a time when the IAEA urgently needs
additional resources to carry out its mandates, consensus on the basic
bargain that underlies the nonproliferation regime and legitimizes the
IAEA--that nuclear weapons states will pursue disarmament and help other
states with peaceful nuclear technology on a nondiscriminatory basis and
with defense against threats of nuclear attack--is breaking down. (8)
Indeed, four decades into the life of the NPT, there are serious
questions whether the international nonproliferation regime is in danger
of collapse. The five authorized nuclear weapons states are not yet
close to the goal of disarmament. States that are not among the five
authorized under the NPT to possess nuclear weapons have not paid a
significant price for their pursuit of weapons capabilities. States that
were never party to the NPT--Israel, India, and Pakistan--have at
various stages after 1968 attained nuclear power status. The US-India
nuclear agreement, which essentially rewarded India's contempt for
the NPT, has constituted another nail in the regime's coffin, as
have Iran's and North Korea's defiance of their treaty
obligations to the IAEA.
Terrorism and Disruption of Energy Infrastructure
Most existing energy infrastructure is designed in ways that are
inherently vulnerable to interruptions, deliberate or accidental. The
prevailing tightly coupled, centralized, capital-intensive forms of
energy supply can be easily disrupted by changing weather, small
animals, balloons, rocks, bombs, and bullets. Operators have provided
little storage to buffer successive stages of energy conversion and
distribution, meaning that failures tend to be abrupt and unexpected
rather than gradual and predictable. Companies and firms have also
located sources of supply remotely from users, so that supply-chain
links have to be long and the overall system lacks qualities of user
controllability and comprehensibility. (9)
Even when no one is trying to do damage, the resulting
infrastructure is highly accident prone, accounting for a large
percentage of industrial accidents. (10) But these design features make
energy infrastructure an attractive, and frequent, target for deliberate
disruptions of many types. Suicide bombers have attacked oil
infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Yemen. In
Pakistan, gunmen have frequently stormed Pakistan Petroleum Limited
facilities, fired rockets at pipelines, and kidnapped employees of the
Water and Power Development Authority. (11) In Colombia, the 480-mile
Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline has had so many holes blown in it that the
locals refer to it as "the flute." (12) In Sudan, Arakis
Energy Corporation and the Greater Nile Petroleum Company sometimes have
had to repel daily attacks on their oil pipelines. (13) London police
foiled a plot by the Irish Republican Army in 1996 to bomb oil and gas
infrastructure across the city with thirty-six explosive devices. (14)
That vulnerability is set to worsen, ironically due to the expected
ravages of climate change, which itself is largely caused by that same
energy sector. Hydroelectric and nuclear facilities are already being
affected by unpredictable rain patterns and unusual heal waves, and more
dramatic impacts are expected as the effects of climate change increase.
(15) Other large-scale investments in energy infrastructure, however,
remain committed to producing fossil fuels (and result in climate
change). As just a small sample of projects, Saudi Aramco, the largest
oil producer in the world, invested $70 billion to complete its
five-year plan to expand oil production capacity to 12.5 million barrels
per day in 2009. Petrobras, a majority state-owned oil company in
Brazil, plans to increase investment in oil and gas production by $174
billion from 2009 to 2014. (16) Iraq is signing large contracts in the
hope that an end to the violence there will enable massive increases in
oil production, the Mexican government is rapidly broadening investment
of Pemex, and the Nigerian government plans to significantly increase
investments once it quells attacks against oil infrastructure.
Transboundary Externalities
The environmental externalities imposed by current energy systems
now rival security issues in importance on the global agenda. This is
due largely to the powerful and increasingly alarming evidence on the
scale and pace of climate change, which threatens the entire planet with
altered temperatures and weather patterns, rises in sea level, loss of
species, and destruction of habitats. But energy systems are also at the
heart of many other problems of the commons such as: (1) catastrophic
risks such as nuclear meltdowns, oil spills, coal mine collapses,
natural gas wellhead explosions, and dam breaches that cross national
borders; (2) movement of toxic pollutants such as mercury and acid rain,
which do not respect national borders and cause chronic disease,
morbidity, and mortality among humans, destroy crops, and damage
ecosystems; and (3) continual maintenance of caches of spent nuclear
fuel, a common heritage issue because of the long-lived radioactive
nature of high-level nuclear waste. (17)
Yet climate change deserves its star billing on the global
governance agenda. It is arguably the most challenging collective action
problem ever to hit the international stage, and energy and
transportation are at the core, accounting for some two-thirds of
greenhouse gas emissions. Avoiding potentially catastrophic warming may
require a 50 percent cut in planetary [CO.sub.2] emissions by 2050.
Determining whose emissions should go down and by how much, and when, to
achieve that planetary average is an excruciatingly difficult global
governance challenge.
As the large and rapidly growing literature on climate governance
indicates, the institutional development and political will needed to
address the temptation to free ride is still lacking. Moreover,
agreement on a post-Kyoto Protocol pact to mitigate climate change is,
relatively speaking, the easy part. Implementation of an accord that is
sufficiently ambitious to address the problem may be much harder.
Experiments with novel transborder governance approaches such as
cap-and-trade systems and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development
Mechanism have shown limited efficacy to date. (18) Industrialized
countries that signed up to the Kyoto Protocol agreed to collectively
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2008
to 2012, but prior to the recession their collective emissions had
increased 8.4 percent over 1990 levels. (19) Given that Kyoto imposed
only minor reductions on just the handful of countries most able and
willing to afford such reductions, this track record does not bode well
for the implementation of more ambitious agreements.
Yet even if climate change were not an issue, current fossil fuel
dependence would still impose costly, often cross-border, environmental
externalities. One megastudy of the peer-reviewed literature found that
negative externalities from only the electricity sector in the United
States amounted to $420 billion in damages in 2006, some $143 billion
more than that sector's entire revenue for the year. (20) For some
fuels such as coal or oil, the negative externalities associated with
their use are even greater than the existing market price for the
electricity that they produce.
The Political Economy of Energy
Meeting the growing global demand for energy will require massive
investment of tens of trillions of dollars, with significant challenges
relating to anachronistic regulations, trade constraints, and
intellectual property rights. Moreover, national subsidies currently
encourage the channeling of energy investments heavily in the direction
of fossil fuels and nuclear energy, exacerbating the security and
environmental governance challenges described above. Yet both
scholarship and policymaking in these areas is compartmentalized in ways
that have prevented energy from being understood as a single political
economy realm.
Decisions about cross-border energy investment are influenced by
multiple sets of actors, both private and public. Investments in
cross-border energy infrastructure (and, indeed, many other forms of
infrastructure) are regulated primarily by a large, interlocking web of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), whose terms can actively
discourage governments from making the regulatory changes needed to
encourage the development of cleaner systems that pollute less. The
treaties aim to protect foreign investors from any financial loss
arising as a result of state action. Those state actions include not
only direct expropriation, but also the enactment of new laws or
regulatory policies that force investors to make changes that result in
a loss. Thus, regulatory changes aimed at encouraging the development of
clean energy could lead to expensive expropriation claims. Under most
BITs, such claims are settled by international arbitration panels that
generally have favored investor interests.
Trade rules, although not necessarily hostile to socially or
environmentally motivated energy policy, generally fit awkwardly. Global
trade in energy fuels and services amounts to more than $1 trillion a
year. Many energy exporters, including members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Central Asian countries, and
Russia, are negotiating the terms of accession for their entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, the WTO is taking on increasing
importance as a focal point for energy-relevant trade rules. Trade rules
cover most of the policy instruments that governments have available to
them to improve energy efficiency and govern their energy sectors from
taxation to subsidies to standards and labeling requirements. Yet WTO
rules may inhibit good energy policy. It is not clear, for example,
whether the rules would allow lax policies to discriminate between
methods of energy production such as favoring electricity from
renewables over other sources of electricity. Similarly, direct support
to renewable energy industries may fall afoul of WTO prohibitions on
subsidizing specific industries within a sector.
In addition, the current global structure of intellectual property
rights creates impediments to the diffusion of new energy technologies
across countries. A debate has been raging in many industries over the
role of intellectual property in innovation, with some arguing that
strong intellectual property protections spur innovation while others
posit that strong patents deter innovation and raise prices. In the case
of energy technologies, intellectual property rights have been used to
block entry into the wind turbine, solar panel, and hybrid electric
vehicle markets in Japan and the United States and prevent the
acquisition of clean coal technology by Chinese firms. (21) Many
countries in the developing world, moreover, do not own the intellectual
property rights for the newest or most efficient energy systems, meaning
that they have to license Western technology to avoid reliance on fossil
fuels, particularly in markets such as China and India. One assessment
of the barriers facing energy systems that reduce greenhouse gases (such
as clean coal and carbon capture and sequestration, nuclear power,
energy efficiency, and renewable power plants) found that many firms
were reluctant to distribute new energy technologies to developing
markets for fear that their intellectual property rights would not be
respected and enforced by the WTO and other relevant authorities. (22)
Yet at the same time, perverse but long-established
subsidies--which benefit fossil fuel and nuclear energy sources at the
expense of emerging alternatives--abound. Indeed, among the most
pernicious entrenched factors militating against a rapid trans format
ion to a secure and sustainable global energy future is the widespread
use of energy subsidies supporting exactly the opposite. The global
energy industry receives at least $328 billion in subsidies per year.
These subsidies distort the price signals that consumers receive for
energy fuels and services, and artificially create demand for both
energy and its associated infrastructure. Moreover, existing energy
subsidies have heavily favored those technologies that are the least
efficient (from a thermodynamic standpoint) and most destructive to the
environment, with the bulk of research subsidies going toward nuclear
and fossil fuel systems.
In many industrialized countries, especially the United States,
coal producers still receive a percentage depletion allowance for mining
operations, deductions for mining exploration and development costs,
special capital gains treatment for coal and iron ore, special
deductions for mine reclamation and closing, research subsidies, and
black lung benefits paid for by national governments. Oil and gas
producers still receive a similar depletion allowance, bonuses for
enhanced oil recovery, tax reductions for drilling and development
costs, fuel production credits, and research subsidies. Nuclear energy
operators and manufacturers benefit from massive loan guarantees,
research funds, public insurance and compensation against construction
delays, tax breaks for decommissioning, tax credits for operation, and
government-funded off-site security and nuclear waste storage. From 1974
to 2002, nuclear power received almost 50 percent of all government
subsidies related to energy and fossil fuels, about 25 percent of all
subsidies; cleaner sources of energy such as wind farms, solar panels,
and biofuels received about 12 percent, energy efficiency just 1
percent. (23) And such distortions are not limited to rich countries.
The world's poorer countries (non-OECD members) subsidize oil
exploration and production at more than $90 billion a year.
Energy subsidies have global governance ramifications in two
senses. First, many take the form of trade barriers and protectionist
tariffs. Brazilian exporters, for example, face tariffs that add at
least 25 percent to the price of ethanol imported to the United States
and more than 50 percent to the European Union. (24) On top of these
tariffs, many of the same governments, especially at smaller scales such
as counties and cities, have exempted local production of biofuels from
fuel excise and sales taxes, a possible violation of free-trade rules
since they do not give foreign imports the same exemption.
Second, national subsidies for energy tend to be self-replicating
and distortionary on a global scale. Once one country subsidizes a
particular technology or energy sector, others are at a competitive
disadvantage unless they follow suit. Such subsidies, once enacted,
create powerful constituencies linked with their disbursement that
interfere not only directly with global energy markets, but also with
closely connected sectors such as transportation, manufacturing, and
agriculture. In the case of the latter, subsidies for biofuels have
resulted in higher prices for crops such as wheat, rice, soy, maize, and
oilseeds that have, in turn, caused the price of staple foods and
consumer products to sharply rise. One study estimated that domestic
energy subsidies for palm oil contributed to global price increases of
maize by 60 percent. (25)
In short, there is an enormous agenda for international political
economy research of vital importance to improving global energy
governance. Scholarship on international investment, trade, subsidies,
and protection of intellectual property rights is essential both to
understanding current patterns of energy decisionmaking and to
developing policy options that can help to bring about vitally needed
changes in energy systems.
Development and Energy
Improved access to energy services is arguably the key defining
characteristic of economic development. Worldwide, nearly 2.4 billion
people use traditional biomass fuels for cooking and heating,
constituting more than half the population in China, India, and much of
Southeast Asia. More than 1.5 billion people (greater than 10 percent of
the global population) do not have access to electricity. Even
accounting for significant increases in development assistance and rural
electrification programs in emerging economies, by 2030 about 1.4
billion will remain at risk of having to live without modern energy
services. (26) Such energy poverty contributes to hunger, with women and
children spending long hours gathering fuel rather than earning income.
And the health consequences are dire: reliance on traditional fuels and
indoor combustion are monumental. Indoor air pollution kills on the
order of 2.8 million people every year, almost even with the number
dying annually from HIV/AIDS. (27) Environmentally, energy poverty
forces its victims to harvest more polluting and less energy dense fuels
such as woody biomass or charcoal, often causing land degradation,
deforestation, and contamination of soil and water resources. Such
depletion instigates conflicts over land, decreases food supply,
diminishes sources of traditional medicine, and accelerates
malnutrition. (28)
These are global concerns. Many if not most developing countries
lack the capacity and technology to shift to more sustainable and
affordable supplies of energy without external assistance. One survey of
the twenty-four Least Developed Countries in the world found that
twenty-two of them each had less than 1 percent of their region's
total energy resources. (29) With scarce energy resources of their own,
these countries must rely either on the global trading system or
development assistance. Although most financing for energy development
goes through private sector hands, various agencies of the UK system and
the multilateral development banks (in particular, the World Bank) play
a key role in setting the terms of the debate and in providing funding.
By far, the lion's share of World Bank funding on energy continues
to support traditional centralized fossil fuel plants. There is no
coherent discussion on energy among the donor community, or between
donors and developing nations. Those countries that do have significant
energy sources still often must rely on outsiders to help develop those
resources. That is frequently a troubled process, often accompanied by
accusations of corruption, rent seeking, major human rights violations,
and extreme environmental despoliation. (30)
Nonetheless, many countries that have successfully eradicated
energy poverty have relied on international support such as borrowing
and development assistance instead of national measures alone. Brazil
was able to increase use of liquefied petroleum gas for cooking fuel
from 16 percent in 1960 to 100 percent in 2004, and China. Morocco, and
Tunisia were able to expand electrification efforts so that more than 70
percent of their respective populations in 2001 had reliable access to
energy services. Yet each of these programs was dependent on assistance
from international donors. (31)
When done right, external investment and development assistance
aimed at the promotion of appropriate energy technologies can promote
key development goals and alleviate human rights abuses, issues that are
of paramount importance to the global community. Ending poverty,
reducing hunger, avoiding major disease and health effects, and reducing
environmental degradation are all connected to cleaner forms of energy
supply. Modern energy services have multiplier effects on health,
education, transportation, telecommunications, safe water, sanitation,
and economic growth. Exploring the conditions under which external
assistance and private investment produce these varied effects offers a
rich agenda for scholarship.
Emerging Issues in Global Governance and Energy Policy
As if the above issues were not enough, many new governance
challenges are arising as public and private actors try to improve their
energy security and respond to climate change. Among the particularly
salient issues, just beginning to be understood, are water governance
and agriculture. Even though energy, food, and water are addressed by
almost entirely separate communities of scholars and policymakers, they
are in fact deeply intertwined. Energy fuels and production cannot be
managed without attention to water and land, with every single energy
source (including energy efficiency practices and renewable resources)
using at least some water and taking up space. And many components of
the water sector (conveyance, treatment, purification, desalination,
pumping, and distribution) are reliant on electricity and energy.
Most obviously, the more than fifty countries that rely primarily
on hydroelectric dams to generate power in their electricity sectors
depend on predictable water supplies. Beyond this, ambitious expansion
of conventional power plants and transportation fuels would require vast
amounts of water. Thermoelectric power plants running on coal, natural
gas, oil, and uranium are water cooled, withdrawing trillions of gallons
of water from rivers and streams, consuming billions of gallons of water
from local aquifers and lakes, and contaminating water supplies at
various parts of their fuel cycle. Oil and gas production facilities,
refineries, ethanol distilleries, and manufacturing firms also rely on
prodigious amounts of water to transform raw commodities into usable
energy fuels, services, and technologies.
But the water that these energy facilities need may not be
available. Nearly 1 billion people already lack adequate access to
water, a figure that may rise to more than 3 billion by 2015. Water
tables for major grain-producing areas in northern China are dropping at
a rate of 5 feet per year, and per capita water availability in India is
expected to drop 50-75 percent over the next decade. (32) About
two-thirds of groundwater withdrawals in India, responsible for
one-quarter of the country's harvest, are from rapidly depleting
aquifers that could soon run out. Groundwater consumption in Yemen
exceeds the natural recharge rate by more than 70 percent, and other
crisis levels could soon exist in urban areas across Asia, parts of
Mexico, the Oglalla aquifer in the midwestern United States, and Saudi
Arabia. (33) Some of the driest and poorest countries that are
completely reliant on water for agriculture also lack it. Ninety percent
of water use in Egypt. Libya, and Sudan is in support of irrigation and
agricultural systems, meaning droughts and shortages can cause
widespread shortages of food. (34) By 2025, demographers, geologists,
and water managers anticipate that more than 60 percent of the global
population will live in countries with significant imbalances between
water supply and demand. (35)
The global governance implications of this water use are twofold.
First, the nexus between energy production and water consumption and
withdrawals intersects with many of the other key challenges that we
have presented in this article. The availability and quality of water,
for example, is intimately connected to climate change and the issue of
transboundary externalities discussed above. One study relying on
satellite data and monitoring from aircraft noted that power plant
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and other pollutants from
one country can completely shut off precipitation from clouds that then
affect other countries. (36) Greenhouse gas emissions also contribute
directly to climate change, which negatively affects water resources by
increasing temperatures, altering precipitation patterns, changing the
availability of snowpack, and magnifying the risk of flooding and
drought.
Increasing levels of water needed to provide and use energy
resources could also exacerbate geopolitical conflicts and tensions. An
expose in the New York Times noted that one potential flash point could
be the Euphrates River Valley, where Turkey has expended $30 billion to
build dams and irrigate fields, already forcing Syria to reduce its
withdrawals and Iraq to cut back on its consumption. (37) Two of the
largest freshwater sources in Asia, the Haihe River Basin in China and
the Ganges River Basin in India, have also been slowly depleted by
upstream users with less water available for wheat and maize producers
and major metropolitan areas, making supply of water a key national
security concern. (38) The potential for conflict and international
dispute over water, especially with rates of energy consumption (and,
thus, water use) expected to rise dramatically, highlights the urgency
of finding cross-border solutions for distributing water resources
between upstream and downstream states in ways that parallel the
security concerns related to energy. (39)
Second, existing mechanisms for resolving transnational water
disputes are failing to address the causes behind water scarcity. The
classic approaches to global water problems, enshrined in international
agreements, have focused on interbasin water transfers, capacity
building, water exports, and intergovernmental bargaining and
cooperation over shared river basins. Each, however, faces significant
constraints. Interbasin water transfers, where canals and pipes
transport water between countries, are capital intensive, are
potentially harmful to the environment, make downstream communities
dependent on upstream communities, and tend to accelerate water
consumption, as inhabitants of villages and cities along the canals and
pipes often demand equivalent access to the water, adding to total
demand from the source. (40) Capacity building is time consuming and
expensive as well as reliant on the goodwill of developed countries that
have the technology and expertise, many of which are not willing to give
it away. Water exports are a technically simple way of addressing
scarcity, but actual exports have been extremely controversial.
Intergovernmental bargaining, multilateral agreements, and efforts to
cooperate over transnational river basins do not fare much better. These
efforts have largely faltered because knowledge of watersheds tends to
end at national borders even when water problems are international, when
private sector actors gradually erode the authority of the state to
control and manage water resources, and when the agreements that have
been reached are seldom enforced. (41)
Different types of institution building are needed such as formal
international regimes organized not around national territories but
instead around river basins, international networks of water experts and
professionals that can share knowledge, and strong civil society groups
to oppose destructive projects such as some large dams and canals. Some
of these new approaches are starting to emerge, but they are being
implemented selectively and slowly. The fundamental driver of water
governance problems is almost identical to that of climate change: the
most immediate causes and effects of water problems are localized,
meaning that benefits accrue to local communities, but the consequences
are often global and distributed beyond national borders, implying that
both local and global governance are required.
Conclusion
The world is offtrack on energy. The stakes are enormous, with
geopolitical stability, environmental sustainability, and economic
prosperity all heavily dependent on successful management of finding and
using sustainable and affordable energy fuels and services.
Yet the obstacles are equally large. Many governments and large
firms continue to make long-lived investments in fossil fuel
infrastructure, even though those investments contribute to
destabilizing climate change that could damage that very infrastructure.
Multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank are continuing to invest billions every year in fossil
fuel undertakings. (42)
These complex energy issues provide an extraordinarily rich field
for international relations scholars. Research questions abound. Some
fit within existing scholarly paradigms and provide ample opportunities
for theory testing. How will the nuclear nonproliferation regime cope
with the challenges of rising global reliance on nuclear power at a time
when the NPT faces fundamental challenges to its legitimacy? What are
the implications of the growing web of bilateral investment treaties for
energy policy choices? Under what conditions do states alter entrenched
patterns of subsidies to energy industries? What insights does the
emerging literature around water governance offer for investigations of
global energy governance? What types of different governance challenges
do electric vehicles and wind turbines, as well as nuclear reactors and
carbon capture and storage sites, entail? But the real utility of an
energy focus in global governance scholarship may be much broader.
Energy offers an empirical core around which to explore new research
directions. Signs of discontent with existing theoretical paradigms are
already emerging. Regime theory, for example, has been enriched by a
broader idea of regime complexes that would seem to have great utility
in exploring the cross-cutting energy issues that we describe in this
article. (43) Core paradigms that focus almost exclusively on interstate
relations are giving way to approaches that attempt to incorporate the
much wider range of "global governors" from intergovernmental
organizations to for-profit corporations to civil society groups. (44)
Contestation over the nature of world order and competing visions of
future architectures are rife in international relations scholarly
circles and policy communities alike. (45) Because energy is such a
fundamental issue crossing so many disciplinary boundaries, it is
ideally suited to framing discourses around new approaches.
Moreover, energy may offer great potential for bridging the theory
/policy divide. As described above, complex and interconnected energy
issues are failing to be addressed by governments, intergovernmental
organizations, and markets. Provision of sustainable and secure energy
services to all requires a broad assessment of existing and likely
future needs for those services. Good policy would examine the full
range of benefits and costs (including the environmental and social
costs not currently included in price signals) of various energy
sources. Such assessments cannot be carried out on a purely national
basis, given most countries' inability to meet their own energy
needs and the various spillover effects of energy production and
consumption.
As energy problems take center stage on the world's agenda of
pressing issues, the inadequacies of scattershot policymaking and
incoherent governance loom ever larger. The existing institutions of
global energy governance are demonstrably ill equipped to handle
humanity's daunting energy challenges, which require simultaneous
attention to issues related to geopolitical stability, the security of
energy infrastructure, trans-boundary environmental externalities, the
proliferation of nuclear technology, investment and trade rules,
economic development, and water and agricultural policy. Together, these
challenges constitute a compelling rationale for a sustained research
agenda in global energy governance.
Notes
Ann Florini is professor and director of the Centre on Asia and
Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the
National University of Singapore. She is also senior fellow in the
Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in
Washington, DC. She is internationally recognized as an authority on new
approaches to global governance, focusing on the roles of civil society
and the private sector in addressing global issues. Currently, she is
codirector of the S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, which brings
Asian, European, and North American scholars together to conduct
rigorous research on global energy governance and global health
governance. Her publications include The Right to Know: Transparency for
an Open World (2007), The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New
World (2003), and The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil
Society (2000), along with numerous scholarly and policy articles.
Benjamin K. Sovacool is currently an assistant professor at the Lee Kuan
Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He
is also a research fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre
on Asia and Globalisation. His research interests include the barriers
to alternative sources of energy supply, such as renewable electricity
generators and distributed generation, the politics of large-scale
energy infrastructure, designing public policy to improve energy
security, and building adaptive capacity and resilience to climate
change in least developed Asian countries. He is the author or editor of
six books and more than one hundred peer-reviewed academic articles on
various aspects of energy and climate change, and he has presented
research at more than fifty international conferences and symposia. He
is a frequent contributor to Energy Policy, Electricity Journal, Energy,
and Energy for Sustainable Development.
(1.) Claude Mandil, speech delivered at the Singapore Energy
Conference, Singapore, November 2006.
(2.) See, for example, Thijs Van De Graaf and Dries Lesage,
"The International Energy Agency After 35 Years: Reform Needs and
Institutional Adaptability." Review of International Organizations
4, no. 3 (2009): 293-317; Andreas Goldlhau and Jan Martin Witte, Global
Energy Governance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010);
Ann Florini and Benjamin K. Sovacool, "Who Governs Energy? The
Challenges Facing Global Energy Governance," Energy Policy 37, no.
12 (2009): 5239-5248.
(3.) Dries Lesage, Thijs Van de Graaf, and Kirsten Westphal,
"The G8's Role in Global Energy Governance Since the 2005
Gleneagles Summit." Global Governance 15 (2009): 259-277.
(4.) See, for example, Yuichi Arima. "The Way to Pearl Harbor:
U.S. vs. Japan," ICE Case Studies 118 (2003),
www1.american.edu/ted/ice/japan-oil.htm; Cleveland Cutler and Robert
Kaufmann, "Fundamental Principles of Energy," in Tom Lawrence,
ed., Encyclopedia of Earth (Washington. DC: Environmental Information
Coalition, 2008), pp, 430-445; Lester W. Grau, "Hydrocarbons and a
New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia," Military
Review 81, no. 3 (2001): 17-26; John R. Stewart, "Japan's
Manchurian Base," Ear Eastern Survey 11, no. 17 (1942): 180-186.
(5.) Andreas Goldlhau and Jan Martin Witte, "Back to the
Future or Forward to the Past? Strengthening Markets and Rules for
Effective Global Energy Governance," International Affairs 85, no.
2 (2009): 373-390.
(6.) See Allison Graham, "Nuclear Disorder," Foreign
Affairs 89, no. 1 (2010): 74-85; R. Nicholas Burns, "America's
Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-India Partnership,"
Foreign. Affairs 86, no. 6 (2007): 131; Scott Sagan, "How to Keep
the Bomb from Iran," Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006): 45; Lee
Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent,"
Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 136; William Odom. "The Problem:
The Nuclear Option," Foreign Policy 160 (2007): 51-52; Steven
Weber, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, "How
Globalization Went Bad," Foreign Policy 158 (2007): 48-54; George
Perkovich, "Memorandum: Urgent: How to Be a Nuclear Watchdog,"
Foreign Policy 146 (2005): 60-64; Stewart Patrick, "Prix Fixe and a
la Carte: Avoiding False Multilateral Choices," Washington
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 77-95; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd,
"The Iranian Nuclear Challenge," International Affairs 80, no.
2 (2004): 257-276; Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba,
"Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime." International Security 29, no. 2 (2004):
5-49: Nina Tannenwald, "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the
Nuclear Taboo." International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 5-49.
(7.) International Atomic Energy Agency, Reinforcing the Global
Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity: The Role of the IAEA to 2020 and
Beyond (Vienna: IAEA, 2008).
(8.) George Perkovich, "The End of the Nonproliferation
Regime?" Current History 105, no. 694 (2006): 355-362.
(9.) Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Dirty Energy Dilemma: What's
Blocking Clean Power in the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008).
(10.) See Stefan Hirschberg, Peter Burgherr, Gerard Spiekerman, and
Roberto Dones, "Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector: Comparative
Perspective," Journal of Hazardous Materials 111, no. 1-3 (2004):
57-65; and Benjamin K. Sovacool, "The Costs of Failure: A
Preliminary Assessment of Major Energy Accidents, 1907 to 2007,"
Energy Policy 36, no. 5 (2008): 1802-1820.
(11.) Gal Luft, "Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline: The Baloch
Wildcard." Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Policy
Brief (Washington, DC: IAGS, 2005), www.iags.org/n0115042.htm.
(12.) Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Terrorism Goes to Sea,"
Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (2004): 64-65.
(13.) Amnesty International, Sudan: The Human Price of Oil, 3 May
2000, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr540042000?opendocument&of=countries%5csudan.
(14.) Paul W. Parfomak, Pipeline Security: An Overview of Federal
Activities and Current Policy Issues, CRS Report for Congress No.
RL31990, Washington, DC, 5 February 2004, pp. 1-6.
(15.) Cleo Paskal, The Vulnerability of Energy Infrastructure to
Climate Change, Chatham House and Global Energy and Environment
Strategic Ecosystem,
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/13901_bp0409energy.pdf.
(16.) "The Outlook for the Oil Price: Bust and Boom," The
Economist, 23 May 2009, pp. 65-66.
(17.) Scholarship in this area has achieved the status of a
distinct subfield, with its own journals and a number of well-recognized
scholars such as Oran Young, Paul Wapner, and Karen Litfin. However, the
major international relations theory journals rarely publish articles
addressing environmental issues. A casual survey of such top journals as
International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, American
Political Science Review, and World Politics found a total of fewer than
a dozen from 2005 to 2009.
(18.) Michael Wara, "Is the Global Carbon Market
Working?" Nature, 8 February 2007, pp. 595-596; Michael Wara and
David G. Victor, "A Realistic Policy on International Carbon
Offsets," Stanford University Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development Working Paper No. 74 (Stanford, CA: Program on Energy and
Sustainable Development, Stanford University, 2008).
(19.) Cameron Hepburn, "Carbon Trading: A Review of the Kyoto
Mechanisms," Annual Review of Environment and Resources 32 (2007):
375-393; Saleemul Huq and Mozaharul Alam, Climate Change Adaptation in
Post-2012 Architecture (London: Progressive Governance, 2008).
(20.) Sovacool, The Dirty Energy Dilemma.
(21.) Benjamin K. Sovacool, "Placing a Glove on the Invisible
Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy
Research and Development (R&D)," Albany Law Journal of Science
and Technology 18, no. 2 (2008): 381-440.
(22.) Marilyn A. Brown, Jess Chandler, Melissa V. Lapsa, and
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Carbon Lock-in: Barriers to the Deployment of
Climate Change Mitigation Technologies, Report No. ORNL/TM-2007/124 (Oak
Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, November 2007).
(23.) International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008
(Paris: OECD/IEA, 2008).
(24.) Ronald Steenblik, Biofuels At What Cost? Government Support
for Ethanol and Biodiesel in Selected OECD Countries (Geneva:
International Institute for Sustainable Development, September 2007).
(25.) Ibid.
(26.) Vijay Modi, Susan McDade, Dorminique Lallement, and Jamal
Saghir, Energy Services for the Millennium Development Goals (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
World Bank, and UN Development Programme, 2005).
(27.) John P. Holdren and Kirk R. Smith, "Energy, the
Environment, and Health," in Tord Kjellstrom, David Streets, and
Xiadong Wang, eds., World Energy Assessment: Energy and the Challenge of
Sustainability (New York: UN Development Programme, 2000), pp. 61-110.
(28.) UN Development Programme, "Energy and Major Global
Issues," in Energy After Rio: Prospects and Challenges (New York:
UN, 1997).
(29.) UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,
Energy Security and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific,
Report No. ST/ESCAP/2494 (Geneva: UNESCAP, April 2008), p. 185.
(30.) See John Ruggie's analyses of the human rights issues
involved with the extractive industries, more generally, in John Ruggie,
"Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises," UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/97 (21 February 2006).
(31.) Modi, McDade, Lallement, and Saghir, Energy Services, pp.
13-14.
(32.) Carl Pope, "The State of Nature: Our Roof Is Caving
In," Foreign Policy 67, no. 149 (2005): 66-68.
(33.) Jill Boberg, Liquid Assets: How Demographic Changes and Water
Management Policies Affect Freshwater Resources (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2005), p. 20.
(34.) Peter H. Gleick, "Water Use," Annual Review of
Environment and Resources 28 (2003): 275-314.
(35.) Thomas J. Feeley et al., "Water: A Critical Resource in
the Thermoelectric Power Industry," Energy 33, no. 1 (2008): 1-11.
(36.) Daniel Rosenfeld, "Suppression of Rain and Snow by Urban
and Industrial Air Pollution," Science, 10 March 2000, p. 1793.
(37.) "Water for a Thirsty World," New York Times, 29
August 2002, p. A24.
(38.) Mark W. Rosegrant, Ximing Cai, and Sarah A. Cline, Global
Water Outlook to 2025: Averting an Impending Crisis (Washington, DC:
International Food Policy Research Institute, September 2002), p. 7.
(39.) Ken Conca, "Rethinking Authority, Territory, and
Knowledge: Transnational Socio-ecological Controversies and Global
Environmental Governance," in Jacob Park, Ken Conca, and Matthias
Finger, eds., The Crisis of Global Environmental Governance: Towards a
New Political Economy of Sustainability (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.
193-207.
(40.) Jill Boberg, Liquid Assets.
(41.) Conca, "Rethinking Authority;" Ken Conca, Governing
Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution
Building (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
(42.) Christopher Swann, "World Bank Criticized for Helping
Fossil Fuel Plants," New York Times, 11 August 2008,
www.nytimes.com/2008/08/II/business/world business/IIint-energy.
1.15169918.htm.
(43.) Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor, "The Regime Complex
for Plant Genetic Resources," International Organization 8, no. 1
(2004): 26-34.
(44.) Deborah D Avant, Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, eds.,
Who Governs the Globe? (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). See
also Florini and Sovacool, "Who Governs Energy?"; and Andreas
Goldthau and Jan Martin Witte, eds., Global Energy Governance: The New
Rules of the Game (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
(45.) Sanjeev Khagram, "Future Architectures of Global
Governance: A Transnational Perspective/Prospective," Global
Governance 12, no. 1 (2006): 97-118.