A leadership of Twenty (L20) within the UNFCCC: establishing a legitimate and effective regime to improve our climate system.

Huang, Jing

The North-South Gap on the Response to Climate Change

Climate change has imposed an unprecedented threat to human security. The Bali Road Map (which includes the Bali Action Plan), adopted at the UN Climate Change Conference in December 2007, points out that the evidence of "warming of the climate system is unequivocal." Therefore, the Road Map urges immediate global actions to reverse the current trend in climate change because any delay in doing so "significantly ... increases the risk of more severe climate change impacts." (1)

Despite growing global convergence on the urgency for actions on the climate change issue, there is substantial divergence, especially between the developed (North) and developing (South) countries, on how concrete actions--from emission standards to allocation targets, from financial arrangements to technology transfer, from industrial models to market development, and from adaptation plans to preservation of ecological systems--need to be taken to deal with this exacerbating problem. Beneath these differences are not only varied perceptions and explanations of the causes, and hence responsibility for climate change, but also substantial conflicts of interest caused by the gap between the North and South in socioeconomic development.

Developing countries, including fast-developing China and India, believe the Northern countries (particularly, the United States) must shoulder the major responsibility in reversing climate change not only because of their lion's share in energy consumption, but because the postindustrialized, developed countries are responsible for the majority of carbon dioxide emissions since the dawn of industrialization. The South insists that the developed countries, given their predominance in technology, finance, and capacity for research and development, should provide assistance instead of shifting responsibility to the developing countries in the effort to improve the climate system. Although the dramatic increase in carbon emissions in the developing countries is hardly defensible, the Southern countries' demand that the North take major responsibility in addressing the climate change issue (e.g., adopting a higher emission standard, equitable allocation of carbon emissions, providing more financial and technical assistance, and changing lifestyles) is morally and economically justified in terms of poverty eradication and human development.

The North holds the viewpoint that the developed countries (especially, the European Union and Japan) have endeavored to contain climate change, resulting in remarkable improvement not only in energy efficiency (their energy consumption per capita is over three times above the average in developing countries), but also in the ecological systems in their economies. Moreover, policy initiatives and increasing commitment by the North have helped generate global momentum to reverse (or, at least, contain) climate change. As the emerging economic powers, especially China, are becoming the leading carbon emitters, there is a growing concern and anxiety that rapid development in these countries will further exacerbate the already endangered climate system. The North is urging the South (particularly, China and India) to be "responsible stakeholders" in the global effort to improve the climate system.

The difference between North and South on the climate change issue reflects a fundamental dilemma in the South's effort to achieve economic modernization, which is an inalienable goal, if not right, for human development. Because industrialization has been the only way for a human society to achieve this goal effectively, virtually all developing countries have embarked on the same "Northern" path in their efforts to modernize their societies and economies. While the developed countries are trying to upgrade their industries to become high tech, high value added, and consume less energy, the irony is that high energy-consumption but (usually) low value-added manufacturing and processing industries have been outsourced to developing countries and are a dominant force in their economic development. The consequence is an explosive increase in consumption of coal and fossil fuels in developing countries and rampant urbanization, which in turn has aggravated climate change.

This situation has created an impasse between the North and South, wherein both see the other side as the "irresponsible" party. The North urges the South to be responsible for the future in its development; and the South blames the North for its past behavior and present "luxury" lifestyle. (2)

But it is not to be. The difference between the North and South on climate change is not one in kind, but in degree. The dispute is not rooted in ideological or even conceptual confrontations--both sides have keenly realized that human industrial activities, especially irresponsible energy consumption, are the major cause of climate change, and that only through international cooperation can we effectively prevent climate change from evolving into an irrevocable catastrophe. The issue between the North and South, given their different levels of socioeconomic development, is essentially about the distribution of costs and benefits in the effort to improve the climate system. Both the North and South would be losers if they enter a zero-sum game on this critical issue, but the international community can, and should, reach an agreement and make a joint effort to reverse the current trend of climate change. The task entails an international regime, which can provide not just a forum for multilateral negotiations and compromise making but, more importantly, strong leadership in our effort to improve the climate system.

Establishing a Legitimate and Effective International Regime: A Top Priority

The international regime for climate change, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has played an indispensable role in achieving a global consensus on climate change. After fourteen meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and numerous informal negotiations over the climate change issue, it is expected that the parties attending the culminating Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, 7-18 December 2009, will agree on "an ambitious and effective international response to climate change." (3)

However, the seventeen-year history of the UNFCCC also indicates the necessity for a legitimate and effective international regime that will possess sufficient power to enforce the implementation of the adopted agreement. The key in our effort to address the climate change issue is not just to reach an agreement on what to do, but to translate this agreement into effective actions. Without such an international regime, a sovereign state, especially a large power, can default on any international agreements on climate change--the withdrawal of the George W. Bush administration from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol serves as a painful, yet realistic, reminder in this regard.

Theoretically, a legitimate and effective international regime must meet the following requirements:

* It is universally recognized and supported by the world community.

* Its mission and operation are consistent with those of the existing international institutions and regimes.

* It has the mandate and capability to enforce implementation of the adopted agreements on climate change.

* Its authority is based not just on its legitimacy, but is institutionalized with abiding rules, compliance procedures, operational standards, and adequate financial resources.

* Its decisionmaking and operation are transparent and in accordance with the established international norms, principles, and laws.

* Its administration is subject to term limits and held accountable for the consequences of its actions.

In practice, there must be a balance between the legitimacy and effectiveness of the regime. For example, few would question the legitimacy of the UNFCCC because of its affiliation with the United Nations and, more important, the participation of virtually all the UN members. Although the regime has convened fourteen meetings of the COP, with numerous intersessional negotiations, and achieved many important agreements since its establishment in 1992, its mammoth size and lack of strong leadership has substantially constrained its effectiveness, making it virtually toothless in terms of implementation as well as decisionmaking. Despite the marathon programs, most of the meetings of the COP--usually lasting for ten days or more--appeared more symbolic than substantial, and the agreements achieved through exhausting negotiations are hardly abiding. One of the regime's benchmark agreements on the targets of carbon allocation still involves controversies in both standard (per capita versus industrial output) and implementation.

In order to ensure the regime's effectiveness, strong leadership must be established through a "deal" among the major powers, not necessarily because they are more influential, but because their participation (or withdrawal) would have a substantial impact on a global response to climate change. In other words, an effective international regime for climate change must be based on an abiding agreement among the major economies in both the North and South; its mission must focus on not just achieving agreements, but also their implementation; its authority must be supported by well-established rules and compliance procedures; its operation must be secured by adequate financial resources; and participation must involve commitment from the top leadership of each country ensuring that implementation of the agreement is at the top of the agenda in domestic politics.

A Leadership of Twenty (L20) Embedded in the UNFCCC

There are no existing international regimes on climate change that can meet the above-discussed requirements for legitimacy and effectiveness. Climate change has become a top priority in some newly emerged, powerful regimes such as the Group of 8 (G8) or G8 plus 5 (the G8 plus China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa). But it is unlikely that these summits would be transformed into an international regime for climate change. The fact that developed countries are predominant in the G8 or G8 plus 5 undercuts their legitimacy in the international community on climate change, making it unrealistic to achieve any global agreement, let alone actions. This was demonstrated at the recent G8 plus 5 summit in L'Aquila, 8-10 July 2009. Despite the top priority given to climate change at the summit, the discussion on this important issue, chaired by US president Barack Obama, bore little fruit.

Neither is it likely that the recently established G-20, where the North and South enjoy fairly equal representations, would evolve into a regime for climate change. Like the G8 and G8 plus 5, the G-20 is also designed for government networking and consensus building in handling the pressing issues with global implications. As such, they function as ad hoc meetings for current affairs or crises, rather than as an institutionalized regime to address persistent problems such as climate change. It is significant that these summits have improved coordination and collaboration among the world powers, and hence affected substantial impacts on world affairs, especially during times of crisis. But they have yet to come up with any long-term plans or strategies for major global issues such as climate change, poverty eradication, water crisis, energy security, and food supply--all these issues will have serious and even disastrous impacts on human security unless addressed promptly and effectively.

What is required is not to mimic another G-20, but to develop an international regime for climate change, with abiding rules, compliant procedures, operational standards, and adequate financial resources. This involves a process of institution building for long-term global actions to improve the climate system, rather than another summit gathering for the leaders to build up mutual confidence and consensus. In this endeavor, a formidable (albeit more often than not overlooked) challenge is how to integrate this new regime into the existing international system. The establishment of a new regime that overlaps, or is even in conflict with, the existing international institutions is not just wasteful, but can further muddle the already complicated situation.

An ideal and realistic solution is to establish a Leadership of Twenty (L20) major powers within the UNFCCC, with fairly equal representation from the developing and developed countries. As such, the embedded L20 can build on the UNFCCC's institutional framework developed in the past seventeen years, taking full advantage of the organization's undisputable legitimacy in the world community. More significant, with the L20's strong commitment to the climate change issue, the UNFCCC can transcend its functional mission into a new global regime that will provide strong and effective leadership in global actions to reverse climate change. This new global regime would be part of the existing international system by birth. The organizational structure of the L20 must be built to not only maximize the participation of the world community in order to obtain legitimacy, but also optimize the regime's authority and effectiveness in achieving an agreement on climate change and enforcing its implementation (see Figure 1). Specifically:

1. The L20 functions as the leading council of the UNFCCC.

2. Its members are elected by the UNFCCC member countries. The L20 membership can be revoked by at least two thirds of votes of the UNFCCC member countries.

3. The L20 council convenes the COP and sets conference agenda on behalf of the UNFCCC.

4. The L20 council supervises and provides guiding instructions to negotiations under UNFCCC.

5. The L20 council executes the adopted agreements and policies.

6. The L20 council makes the decisions on actions necessary for enforcing the adopted agreements and policies.

7. The L20 council is cochaired by two individual leaders representing the developing and developed countries, respectively. They are elected by the L20 and serve maximally two terms.

8. The L20 council is supported by four major subordinate offices (or departments) of Administration, Finance (budget and accounting), Policy Planning (including research and development), and Liaison (communication with UNFCCC member countries).

9. The L20 council holds meetings, attended by the leaders of the member countries.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

It is the time to establish the L20 within the UNFCCC, ideally at the upcoming Copenhagen conference in December 2009.

Notes

Jing Huang is visiting professor at the Lee Kwan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is a senior overseas economic analyst for China's Xinhua News Agency. He serves as the overseas adviser to the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies. His book, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (2000), won the prestigious Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2002. Previously, he was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

(1.) The full text of the Bali Action Plan is available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.

(2.) In his best seller Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution--And How It Can Renew America, Thomas Friedman has provided a compelling analysis of the seeming impasse between North and South amidst the global environmental crisis. The solution he proposed is a "green revolution," led by the United States, not just to save Mother Earth, but also to sustain overall US supremacy.

(3.) Quoted from UNFCCC, "Negotiations in 2009 Leading to Copenhagen," available at http://unfccc.int/2860.php