Beyond one image fits all: Bono and the complexity of celebrity diplomacy.

Cooper, Andrew F.

The previous article, by Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, raises a number of issues about the role of celebrities in global governance. Although the performance of this self-selected cast of performers remains highly contentious, it must be accepted that this activity is one more signal that the traditional script of international relations is changing. This shift is exciting but also bewildering. Views on what to make of this phenomenon are sharply divided.

For sympathizers, this form of public engagement by celebrities represents an inexorable force tied in with the onward rush of globalization with all its attendant elements of mass technology in global communications. It also reflects the wider crisis of credibility and efficiency that currently effects international organizations, whether international financial institutions (IFIs), the World Trade Organization (WTO), or the G8. For the resisters, the challenge is cast as part of a spillover from the wider gauge of celebrity culture, with the global sphere providing an inviting stage for opportunistic self-indulgence.

To more fully understand the nature and impact of this phenomenon, with respect to both its positive and its negative connotations, the level of analysis must be extended beyond these parameters. In other words, at play here is a different set of "simplicity traps," which need to be avoided. Attempts to trivialize celebrity engagement, reducing it to feel-good activity, may paradoxically feed an image that discounts a bigger set of difficulties with the enterprise of global governance. Attempts to caricature this type of agency, lumping stars together without differentiating their distinctive attributes and projects, can have similar effect. Dieter and Kumar's analysis of Jeffrey Sachs and Bono is a significant example of this dilemma. In many ways, the article itself is a testament to the authentic importance of celebrity agency--a step in the right direction--since the phenomenon is being accorded a fairly serious treatment. However, the analysis fails to truly escape those simplicity traps. Instead of a one-image-fits-all perspective, a more nuanced perspective is needed. Otherwise, the complexity of this phenomenon is missed.

If it is clear then that my view concerning the engagement of celebrities in international relations is more positive than that of Dieter and Kumar, I should note that I do not see these actors as a deus ex machina. Indeed, I fault the article not only for misrepresenting the nature of celebrity activism--or what I prefer to call celebrity diplomacy (1)--but also for distorting the weight of celebrities as agenda setters, especially in the context of Africa. While individual agency outside the usual orthodox sources matters in a manner that would have been unanticipated at the end of the Cold War, the hold of structural forces as determinants of policy outcomes cannot be neglected. This is true of the weight of colonialism as well, reinforced by the inequalities imposed on African states by the international trade system. That being said, it is misleading to imply that Africa is just one big continent-wide zone of failure. Instead of embracing a one-image-fits-all perspective, opportunities (as well as constraints) need to be factored into any analysis.

Rather than getting into an overextended debate--in an already crowded field (2)--about Africa and development, I prefer to concentrate on the deficiencies of conflating very different types of celebrities into one single image. It is indicative of this problem that Dieter and Kumar chose to contrast the role of celebrities on opposite ends of the definitional spectrum: Jeffrey Sachs and Bono.

Jeffrey Sachs has built his fame (or, as the authors would have it, his notoriety) through his achieved status. (3) As a high-profile professor of economics at Harvard and Columbia, and a robust public intellectual cum policy entrepreneur, Sachs is not treated as a product of the media the way that celebrity diplomats from the entertainment world are. Whether a positive or negative judgment is made about his achievements in Russia or Bolivia, or about his Millennium Promise initiatives, there is no question that his professional talents have been recognized by official decisionmakers. This evaluation of his expertise has been made on a national basis by recipient states or through a host of international bodies, most notably the World Bank and the United Nations.

However, even with a well-known achievement-oriented celebrity like Sachs, the constraints must also be factored in. A key attribute of celebrities is the mode of communication they utilize. On the merit of their own activities, players like Sachs receive media access from a limited span of serious outlets. Without a relationship to a very different type of personality, Sachs would remain largely anonymous in the outlets that largely define celebrity status--the so-called soft media outlets on both sides of the Atlantic.

The fascinating aspect of Sachs's public behavior, therefore, is his development of connections with a number of individuals who possess what he lacks: the power of ascribed celebrity. This is the fame that comes from being in the constant spotlight of the massive array of soft media outlets: MTV, magazines such as Hello! and People, and TV shows such as Entertainment Tonight and Oprah, for example. (4)

Dieter and Kumar's characterization of the Sachs-Bono relationship is underdeveloped. Bono may refer to Sachs as his mentor ("my professor"), but the relationship is far more multifaceted. Sachs gives Bono added gravitas and, by the same associations, room is opened up for Sachs's initiatives. The ascribed celebrity is accorded weight while the achievement-oriented celebrity is accorded a better recognized, but also demystified, face.

Nor is this interface unique. Why only highlight the relationship developed between Sachs and Bono when Sachs forged a similar link with another notable ascribed celebrity, Angelina Jolie? As with Bono, Jolie received mentorship from Sachs. But in turn, Sachs saw his audience expand considerably when she traveled with him to visit several Millennium Villages as part of his Millennium Promise initiatives.

Who were people tuning in to when they chose to watch the Diary of Angelina Jolie and Dr. Jeffrey Sachs in Africa, an MTV documentary that detailed a humanitarian trip to Kenya? A good hint of the answer comes from another relationship of this kind--the connection between Angelina Jolie and Gene Sperling. Sperling remains the classic Washington, DC, insider. Yet, when he launched an initiative with Jolie via the Clinton Global Initiative, it was clear who had the media pull. In one account, "Ms Jolie and Mr Sperling were accompanied by about 200 people involved in the initiative but there was no question who most interested the photographers. 'Boy this happens to me everywhere I go,' quipped Mr. Sperling as he was lit up by a battery of flashes aimed at Ms Jolie." (5)

All of this would be tangential to the main thrust of the discussion except for the fact that the critique makes an explicit distinction between the legitimacy of a celebrity such as Sachs, with his achievement-oriented status, and what is held out in the shape of Bono as a classic example of an entertainer with ascribed celebrity status. Sachs's record is savaged, but these attacks are premised on a particular interpretation of his policy record. Sachs's personality--or distinctions between his public and private lives--remains off-limits in the analysis. What is questioned is the degree to which his "earned" status holds merit.

A very different tone is adopted in the discussion of Bono. Rather than being accorded any credibility as a moral entrepreneur or instrumental agenda setter, Bono is dismissed outright as an amateur intruder with "no mandate" or legitimacy beyond his role as lead singer for U2. He is judged exclusively by his personal credibility, or lack of it (as Bono does not meet the authors' standards because of his "ruthless" practices as an investor/corporate citizen and his lack of personal philanthropy). Consequently, Bono's performance as an actor on the global public policy stage is discounted.

I think this line of reasoning overlooks Bono's hybrid role as a celebrity diplomat. Yes, like others in this category, he comes from the world of entertainment and juggles what other critics have referred to as his "day" job and his "night" job. (6) What is significant about Bono, though, is that he has blurred the lines of these activities. His day job has, to a considerable extent, not been that of a member of U2 but as a champion of a reformist agenda on global public policy. In doing so, he has completely distanced himself from the traditional image of an ascribed celebrity diplomat, of a "feel good" humanitarian. If his achievement-oriented status is of a different order than that of Sachs and other academics, Bono's understanding of the world is not that of an uninformed poseur. An indication of the extent of his awareness comes out in interviews like the one he gave to critic Michka Assayas:

 Two hundred years ago, it appears that very little difference existed
 in living standards between the Northern Hemisphere and the Southern
 Hemisphere. Today, a very wide income gap exists: the North is many
 times richer than the South. What brought about this gap? The answer
 seems to lie in colonialism, trade and debt. ... The reason ... is
 largely to do with us, and our exploitation of unfair trading
 agreements, or old debts. You can't fix every problem. But the
 ones we can, you must. (7)

Bono has therefore moved far from the standard image of celebrity as amateur enthusiast. A long list of this category can be produced, stretching from Michael Douglas to Ginger Spice. The hallmark of this role is the routing of activity through established institutions and forums, most notably UN specialized agencies. To be sure, modifications have occurred in this strand. Angelina Jolie has upgraded the format by her involvement with the Council on Foreign Relations or the Clinton Global Initiative. On funda-mentals, nonetheless, Jolie's style remains grounded in the style developed by Audrey Hepburn in the late 1980s. Empathy for those on the front lines of disaster or conflict areas is pronounced. A huge amount of personal time and money is allocated to try to alleviate suffering.

Bono transcends this style in almost every way. His approach has as many traits commonly associated with Henry Kissinger as it does with Audrey Hepburn. Although he is quick to display charm and emotion (and in doing so, contrast himself with the more technical bias of an academic such as Sachs (8)), he does not conform to an older model of behavior in which it is better to be seen and not heard. Also, as displayed in his business dealings, Bono can be calculative and even manipulative. His efforts straddle and play off different political divides, whether it be US evangelical Republicans versus liberal Democrats, or Blair versus Brown in UK politics. He has become a master of bilateral and shuttle diplomacy, in which he targets individual politicians and their advisers.

Bono is extremely conscious of the hierarchy of power. His tactics differ when targeting contrasting states, even within the G8 constellation. When Canadian or Italian leaders fail to deliver what he wants, they become the target of harsh attacks. By contrast, George W. Bush's failure to deliver on his own promises was met with frustration, but there were no public outbursts or broken relationships.

Bono does not cross the boundary from diplomacy into antidiplomacy. In this regard, he is a far cry from Jane Fonda, Brigitte Bardot, Sean Penn, or even Bob Geldof (to whom he is misleadingly compared). What differentiates Bono more dramatically than anything else is his concern with autonomous institutional development. If he avoids an antidiplomatic style, he also eschews the UN. It is hard to mesh the idea of Bono as an amateur when he has built up Debt, AIDS, Trade Africa (DATA) as such a powerful organizational tool. Not only has he surrounded himself with former congressional staffers in the US office, but he has teamed with experienced nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers, such as Jamie Drummond. This is a highly professional organization.

Instead of nuance, Dieter and Kumar urge dismissal in a manner reminiscent of other attempts to discipline or "gatekeep" unwanted intruders in the debate about who and what should be considered serious actors and objects of concern on the international policy stage. It is significant, in this respect, that it is a feminist scholar, Christine Sylvester, who has most forcefully noted the tensions between "where the true international relations is supposed to be, how it is supposed to look, and where it is not supposed to be and, in fact cannot be." (9) As she goes on to note, "International relations where it's not supposed to be is not some understudy to international relations where it's supposed to be. ... It has its own missions, parties, techniques, destinations and drivers." (10)

In form, Bono has moved far beyond any stereotyped notion of the role performed by a celebrity diplomat with ascribed status. Although he started out as the "famous face" of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, (11) Bono has become the hub of a sophisticated network that bridges the worlds of entertainment and business. If mentored by Sachs, Bono mentors other entertainers through both DATA and the ONE campaign. He has also forged strong ties to individuals--above all, Bill and Melinda Gates, George Soros, and Warren Buffett--who represent the business face of celebrity diplomacy.

To an even greater degree than Bono, figures such as Bill Gates and George Soros may be taken to be ruthless. But they also reinforce the notion that it is wrong to take a one-image-fits-all approach to celebrity diplomacy. Unlike Bono, Gates and Soros spend huge amounts of their own monies on issues central to global governance. Moreover, their relationship with Bono is a complex one. At one level, akin to the connection between Sachs and Bono, there is a crossover effect. Bono provides buzz while Gates and Soros supply material bite. At another level, neither Gates nor Soros appears to have much time for amateur enthusiasts. The fact that Bono is held in such high regard suggests that he and his organization provide not just emotion but deliverables.

In intensity, the Bono style is a mix between the insider and outsider. Brought into the 2005 and 2007 G8 summits by helicopter, Bono has achieved a diplomatic status on these big occasions that matches all but the most powerful officials. Few leaders over the years have received the amount of face time with Bush or Blair that Bono has. But equally, Bono continues to exert the power of voice in more unconventional settings, as exhibited by his appearances at the Hyde Park and Rostock rock concerts staged in parallel with the G8 summits at Gleneagles and Heiligendamm.

In scope, Bono's agenda has been stretched well beyond development per se. Consistent with the original aim of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, debt eradication remains a priority. However, akin to Sachs, much of the focus of Bono's effort, more recently, has been on health issues. Sachs's involvement with this agenda dates back to his position as chair of the 2000-2001 Commission on Microeconomics and Health, established by the World Health Organization. Bono, through DATA and the ONE campaign, has focused increased attention on HIV/AIDS.

In the case of Bono, any judgment about actual deliverables cannot be conclusive. Still, a few things are obvious to all but the most resolute critic. Unlike other celebrity diplomats--and, of course, the official diplomats themselves--Bono is free not only of the taint of doing harm but also of embarrassment. Despite charges by Bianca Jagger and others that Bono (with his bad cop partner Bob Geldof) is sleeping with the enemy, (12) he has not been overtly co-opted by the diplomatic process. Unlike Geldof, Bono did not accord Gleneagles a stellar grade. And although it is true that Bono and DATA, like many NGOs, spent much of their time trying to hang on to the $50 billion in development assistance that they were promised at Gleneagles, this was not a single-minded focus. What the critics should appreciate is how much energy Bono spent at the Heiligendamm summit. He was not content with accepting simple platitudes. Bono accused the summit outcomes document of using "labyrinthine language" to muddy the G8's responsibilities: "We are looking for accountable language and accountable numbers," he said. "We didn't get them today." (13)

An appreciation of what Bono has to offer should not be equated to hero worship. Certainly, as suggested, the Bono model is not without flaws. But these are very different from those put forward by most critics. The ultimate problem with this model may be not its simplicity but other bigger issues. One of these has to do with its lack of transparency and its exclusivity. Unlike the efforts of some other celebrities, Bono's activities cannot be dismissed casually as facile. What weaknesses he has relate on the one hand to concerns about the generalized rise of private authority in global governance and, on the other hand, to a sense that this is still a project dominated by Northern actors. To his credit, Bono has dispelled some of the latter concerns by his links to celebrities from the South, such as Wyclef Jean and Youssou N'Dour. But the board of DATA and the stars of ONE are still embedded in a narrow domain.

Equally, critics must acknowledge Bono's strengths. The script that Bono offers would not get the acceptance it does at either the elite or mass level if there was not the perception that the project he is advocating--with its bias toward issues central to global governance--is being accorded ample attention from conventional actors. We can debate the impact, but there is no question that Bono's role is amplified by the impression that he is filling gaps of neglect. This is true on policy, but it is also true of process, with an estrangement by the general population from traditional diplomatic methods. Far from a simplistic formula, Bono's project can be interpreted as one that builds momentum on a multidimensional basis. As Nancy Birdsall argues, Bono's push on development aid, rather than being a "feel good" activity, becomes a wedge activity, which has the potential of spilling over into a multitude of issues central to global governance. In her words,

 [Bono's] efforts to mobilize more aid money have vastly increased
 the number of people in the rich world that understand the potential
 to improve lives in the poor world--and that understanding is the
 first step in mobilizing support for other ways to help: agricultural
 and health research geared to poor country needs; ending U.S. and
 European agricultural subsidies that constitute unfair competition;
 better enforcement of anti-corruption to reduce bribery of western
 corporations in developing countries; and allowing more immigration
 from the poorest countries. (14)

Bono's tenacity, however, cuts both ways. If commendable, it is also exhausting. The quote from Bono that the "only thing worse than a rock star--is a rock star who cares" is not a confession about his personal shortcomings, but a sign of his concern that his public activity could become wearisome, with Bono fatigue setting in both for himself and for his targeted audience.

Still, just like the constraints of intellectual gatekeeping, any fatigue factor should not be taken to detract from Bono's impact. If, as John Rug-gie suggests, a different form of competition is in train, in which

various actors "vie with each other for attention and imagination," (15) Bono--or as it can be recast, Bonoization--remains extremely well suited to vie successfully with those images that have traditionally occupied the elevated spaces on the global stage. The future of global governance will not remain the typecast preserve of those who look, speak, and act in orthodox ways.

Notes

Andrew F. Cooper is associate director and distinguished fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation, and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo, Canada. He is author of Celebrity Diplomacy (2007).

(1.) Andrew F. Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy (Boulder: Paradigm, 2008).

(2.) See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and William Easterly, The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin, 2006).

(3.) Chris Rojek, Celebrity (London: Reaktion, 2001).

(4.) Daniel W. Drezner, "Foreign Policy Goes Glam," National Interest (November-December 2007): 24.

(5.) John Gapper, "Clinton Brings Shades of Davos to Manhattan," Financial Times, 28 September 2007.

(6.) Michael Fullilove, "Celebrities Should Concentrate on Their Day Jobs," Financial Times. 1 February 2006. See also Gideon Rachman, "The Aid Crusade and Bono's Brigade," Financial Times, 29 October 2007.

(7.) Michka Assayas, Bono: In Conversation with Michka Assayas (London: Riverhead Penguin, 2005).

(8.) James Taub, "The Statesman," New York Times, 18 September 2005.

(9.) Christine Sylvester, "Woe or Woah! International Relations Where It Is Not Supposed to Be," Brown Journal of World Affairs 10 (Winter-Spring 2004), p. 57.

(10.) Ibid., p. 58.

(11.) Ann Florini, The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2005), p. 166.

(12.) Bianca Jagger, "Real People Power, or Pernicious Platitudes?" New States-man, 11 July 2005.

(13.) Bono, "More Leaders Slipping Up Than Stepping Up for Africa at This Year's G8," DATA, 8 June 2007. Available at www.data.org/news/press_2007 0608.html.

(14.) Nancy Birdsall, "A Farewell to Alms: If Only Things Were That Simple," Global Development: Views from the Center, 23 August 2007. Available at: http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2007/08/a_farewell_to_alms_if_only_thi_1.php.

(15.) John G. Ruggie, "Reconstituting the Global Public Domain: Issues, Actors, and Practices," European Journal of International Relations 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 519.