After Iraq: the EU and global governance.
Cameron, Fraser
One of the central motivations for the Convention on the Future of
Europe was to devise a way for the European Union (EU) to play a
stronger and more effective role on the world stage. In spite of the
Union's leadership on Kyoto, the Doha Development Round, and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), a widespread feeling existed that
the EU was still not pulling its weight. As the convention entered the
home stretch in the spring of 2003, the Iraq crisis exposed deep
divisions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This
prompted some critics to ask if the EU should continue with its global
pretensions.
In this article, I suggest that the draft constitutional treaty
produced by the convention provides only a shaky basis for a more
coherent external policy. However, the Iraq crisis, as with previous
crises, is likely to galvanize the EU toward a more prominent and
effective role on the world stage, especially in strengthening the
multilateral institutions of global governance. This was clear as EU
member states welcomed the security doctrine presented by Javier Solana,
the EU's high representative for CFSP, in June 2003. (1) A central
theme was the need "for effective multilateral institutions."
Solana did not define "global governance" but emphasized the
importance of "a rules-based international system." (2) Long
before Iraq, the EU was on an opposite track from the United States in
this arena. Washington had a dismal record with regard to UN financing,
the rejection of the Kyoto protocol, efforts to destroy the ICC, and the
refusal to ratify a host of arms control treaties, notably the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The present Bush
administration's "a la carte multilateralism" at least
has the advantage of truth in packaging.
Partly because of its own history and constant intergovernmental
negotiations. Brussels has been more willing than Washington and many
other countries to work through multilateral institutions. The EU itself
is an example of multilateralism at work. The United States has never
learned to share sovereignty as Europeans have and is often suspicious
of such arrangements. The importance of multilateralism was emphasized
in the many contributions during the convention debates. The draft
treaty contains a number of proposals aimed at strengthening the
EU's external representation. These include the new post of foreign
minister, a stronger role in international organizations, a diplomatic
service, and a potential single voice for the European Monetary Union
(EMU, or eurozone). With the failure of the Brussels European Council in
December 2003 to agree to the new treaty, there will be some delay
before the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is concluded.
The EU faces the twin challenges of speaking with one voice
whenever possible and nudging the United States back into the
multilateral fold. As the former is a necessary precondition for
European effectiveness in addressing the latter, this essay addresses
the obstacles Europe confronts in its effort to build a coherent foreign
and security policy. It discusses the EU's multiple and overlapping
lines of authority and then examines how the EU's complex mandates
and decisionmaking structures play out within several key international
institutions and functional areas.
Underlying many of these other problems are continuing differences
between member states on major issues before multilateral institutions
and disagreements about the extent to which the states constituting the
EU should transfer or retain their sovereign prerogatives.
Who Speaks for Europe?
The EU's external representation varies depending on the
policy area--CFSP, trade, financial, economic, environmental, and
development affairs. (3) Every six months the U.S. secretary of state
has a new European interlocutor. It is little wonder, therefore, that
Colin Powell knows Solana's telephone number better than that of
whoever among the fifteen (soon twenty-five) foreign ministers is
currently holding the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council.
Moreover, when it comes to military action, the first long-distance
calls made from Washington are to London, Paris, and Berlin.
In spite of Powell's relationship with Solana, Washington may
need to call one of several commissioners dealing with the various
aspects of external relations. Washington may also wish to speak to one
of the EU's special representatives dealing with the Middle East,
the African great lakes, or Kosovo. Thus, depending on the
circumstances, the EU may be represented by Solana or the presidency
alone, the presidency and the European Commission, or by all three. If
the United States, with its lengthy history of close cooperation with
the EU, finds the situation baffling, other partners are even more
perplexed. The EU and its member states together have by far the largest
diplomatic network in the world. More than 40,000 officials work in the
foreign ministries of the member states in some 1,500 diplomatic
missions. Each member state maintains between 40 and 160 diplomatic
missions, while the Commission has a network of over 120 delegations.
These numbers will increase significantly as a result of enlargement in
2004. However, there is real uncertainty as to the effectiveness of
these resources in the pursuit of European objectives. In comparison,
the United States has about one-third of the human resources and
one-fifth of the diplomatic missions, but the United States is not less
effective than the EU in pursuing its policy objectives.
To what extent will changes proposed in the draft constitutional
treaty address these issues? The IGC discussions on the draft treaty
began in October 2003. On the external front, the proposed innovations
include a new foreign minister (merging the positions of Solana and
Chris Patten, the commissioner for external relations), the creation of
an armament agency, a voluntary humanitarian youth corps, the
establishment of an EU diplomatic service, a mutual solidarity clause,
and provisions to enable some countries to act in the name of the EU on
defense. These measures should lead to a more coherent EU voice on the
world stage, building on the trend of the past decade for member states
to agree first on common policies on functional issues. For example,
recent steps include Solana's representing the EU at the Quartet
meeting in the Middle East, common positions on countries and crises
(for example, Russia, Ukraine, Southeast Asia, the ICC, and Kyoto), and
peacekeeping missions (Bosnia, Macedonia, and Congo).
The EU and Multilateralism
As Europe's global identity evolves, interaction with other
multilateral institutions becomes increasingly important. The UN poses a
special problem, because Britain and France are permanent members of the
Security Council and are supposed to inform and take into account the
views of the EU on matters before the council. (4) Although coordination
between EU member states at the UN has improved in recent years, London
and Paris are still criticized for pursuing national, as opposed to EU,
interests. In January 2003, Spain and Germany began two-year terms as
nonpermanent members, but even with four major European states
represented there was no unified European voice on the Iraq crisis. The
UK and Spain backed the U.S. position while France and Germany opposed
it. Although both London and Paris are on record as favoring reform of
the Security Council, any restructuring would more likely add more
members rather than a single EU seat.
With regard to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), the EU president speaks for the Union when there is an
agreed political position. On economic issues, the Commission takes the
floor. But member states nearly always exercise their right to speak at
OSCE meetings, which dilutes any message. The position of the Union in
the Council of Europe is equally weak.
The confused external representation of the CFSP is replicated in
many other policy areas, with one notable exception--trade policy--for
which the commissioner for trade (currently Pascal Lamy) represents the
EU. The advantages of this approach for all member states have been
proved from the Kennedy to the Uruguay Round and most recently in the
launching of the Doha Development Agenda. The approach is simple. The
Council of Ministers agrees on a mandate, which the Commission then uses
as the basis for its negotiations with third parties. After agreement is
reached, the commission presents the results to the Council for
approval. Such an approach could be employed as well for foreign and
international economic policies.
In the international financial arena, the shift of monetary policy
sovereignty from the national level to the European Central Bank (ECB)
in eurozone countries has increased significantly the EU's
governance. However, despite the introduction of the euro, the EU is
weaker than it should be in international financial forums. This
weakness reflects the complicated nature of financial decisionmaking,
the incomplete overlap in membership between the Union and eurozone, and
the rules of major multilateral financial institutions.
In 1998, the European Council agreed to rather complicated
guidelines regarding the EU's external representation in financial
forums. For meetings of the Group of 7 (G7) finance ministers, "the
president of the ECOFIN Council (5) or if the president is from a
non-euro area member state, the president of the Euro 11, assisted by
the Commission" participates. Union views on issues of particular
relevance to the EMU would be presented at the board of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) by "the member of the executive
director's office of the member state holding the euro presidency,
assisted by a representative of the Commission." For matters
bearing on economic and monetary union, the European Council's
conclusions encouraged the Commission, Council, and member states to
prepare common positions for presentation in international forums, but
it was recognized that this might be hindered because such bodies were
not fully associated with the preparatory processes of international
meetings. (6)
The situation of the EU in the G8 is also weak. Although European
representation is top-heavy with the UK, France, Germany, and Italy
along with the European Commission and the presidency (when it is not
held by one of the Big Four), these very numbers are a demonstration of
the EU's inability to speak with one voice.
So far, ad hoc solutions to external representation have prevailed
for the IMF, G7 or G8 meetings, the Financial Stability Forum, the G-20,
and other such groupings where topics pertinent to the EMU are
discussed. However, member states have begun to realize that if Europe
is to have an effective international voice, these solutions are
inadequate. There is also increasing pressure from emerging markets and
non-European G7 countries for streamlining EU representation in bodies
such as the IMF. (7)
Institutionally, however, less progress has been made. In the IMF
and World Bank, the EU's position is complicated by the incomplete
membership of the eurozone. The influence of the EU is hampered by
institutional membership criteria: The 1945 IMF Articles of Agreement
confer on states the right to membership. Furthermore, the IMF
decisionmaking process, with countries grouped in mixed EU/non-EU
constituencies, can sometimes be at odds with the Union's need to
respect its treaty requirements on position taking and representation.
Under the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank, a country must
first join the IMF before it may become a member of the Bank. This
limits the EU's capacity, as an organization of states, to act
collectively. In addition, as with the IMF, World Bank voting
constituencies are organized along lines that sometimes mix EU and
non-EU groups.
This situation is clearly confusing and should change. Ultimately,
there should be a single EU seat in the Bretton Woods institutions. Some
argue for a gradual approach, placing the emphasis on improved
coordination in Washington. Others suggest that, as issues concerning EU
competence increasingly dominate the IMF agenda, Brussels should play a
more prominent role through the ECOFIN and discuss IMF issues at its
regular meetings, thereby adopting common positions. A further
complicating issue is Britain's absence from the eurozone. However,
the draft constitutional treaty put forward by the convention does
provide for the possibility of EMU members agreeing on their own
external representation. A step toward this goal might be a joint
Franco-German seat, initially at the IMF and elsewhere, as these two
countries have traditionally been pioneers in European integration.
Environmental policy is an area of mixed competence between the EU
and the member states that exposes the limitations of the rotating
presidency. International environment negotiations usually last several
years but the presidency only six months. Moreover, as with the CFSP,
there are substantial differences among member states in their capacity
to conduct negotiations on environmental issues. There are also
substantial differences of opinion among member states on the role of
the Commission in this arena. Some members favor giving the Commission a
negotiating mandate, as in trade policy, but others are opposed.
The result, again, is distinctly ad hoc. In the negotiations on
climate change and in the implementation of the Kyoto protocol, the
presidency negotiates on behalf of the EU, although the Commission plays
an important role on particular issues that need to be harmonized. A
number of informal arrangements have been put in place to maximize the
EU's impact in international environmental negotiations, to
facilitate preparations, and to ensure continuity. In the Commission on
Sustainable Development (CSD), the EU has adopted a "lead-country
approach." In the biosafety negotiations, the "EU-team"
approach has been embraced. These examples are catching on in other
fields and are likely to become the norm in an enlarged Union. For
example, the Netherlands and Sweden presided over negotiations in the
CSD for longer than one presidential term.
Conclusion
The external representation of the EU is a complicated process that
is likely to undergo change as a result of the proposals tabled by the
convention. The EU is gradually increasing its profile in the world, and
more and more countries are looking to Brussels for leadership. Yet
there are clear challenges to more effective participation in
international bodies. The first challenge is to develop an effective and
coherent representation within bodies that were set up for a membership
comprising only states. Second, there are challenges for reaching common
EU positions on the economic and financial as well as political front.
For example, the EU has been largely invisible in international efforts
to deal with recurrent financial and banking crises caused by the sharp
swings in capital flows in emerging markets. In this area, no distinct
EU position has been developed and defended, even in cases where
Europe's strategic interests are clear (for example, Turkey). In
contrast, the United States usually has well-defined positions and is
highly effective at influencing multilateral bodies such as the IMF.
Another challenge is enlargement. If twenty-five member states can
speak with one voice, then clearly the Union's influence on the
world stage will increase. But the Iraq crisis revealed deep
differences, and not just between "old" and "new"
Europe. The new member states will undoubtedly align themselves, as they
have done in the past few years, with mainstream EU policies. They will
recognize the value of the EU presenting a unified position. Already,
apart from Romania, they have withstood U.S. pressure to sign bilateral
agreements on the ICC.
In the end, a Union with 450 million citizens--the largest trading
bloc in the world, with a single currency, and the largest provider of
development aid and humanitarian assistance--cannot be denied a greater
role in world affairs. It will be some time, however, before it speaks
with a single voice. Meanwhile, the more it speaks with one voice, the
greater the likelihood of leading the United States back to the path of
multilateralism.
Notes
Fraser Cameron is director of studies at the European Policy Centre
in Brussels.
1. Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," 20
June 2003, available online at
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf (accessed 5 January
2004).
2. For a more comprehensive approach, see Commission of the
European Communities, "European Governance: A White Paper," 25
July 2001, available online at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf
(accessed 5 January 2004).
3. See Fraser Cameron, Foreign and Security Policy of the European
Union (London: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), and the respective web
pages of the Commission and Council, available online at
http://www.europa.eu.int (accessed 5 January 2004).
4. Treaty on European Union, "Title V: Provisions on a Common
Foreign and Security Policy," available online at
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title5.html (accessed 5 January 2004).
5. ECOFIN is the meeting of economic and finance ministers of the
EU.
6. Vienna European Council, "Presidency Conclusions," 11
December 1998, available online at
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=56427&from=&LANG=1 (accessed 5 January 2004).
7. Private conversation with Commissioner Pedro Solbes.