Jacobitism and the historian: some neglected sources on the Jacobite insurrections of 1715 and 1745.

Schweizer, Karl

From the Revolution of 1688 to the defeat of the Jacobite army at Culloden, Jacobitism was a divisive issue in British politics--the notion of an alternative monarch across the channel viewed as legitimate by at least part of the political nation. Spatially, pro-Stuart activism also represented an attempt to challenge developed and strengthening patterns of control of Ireland by England, of Scotland by England, of Northern Scotland by the Presbyterians of the Central Lowlands, of Northern England by the South and, indeed, of the whole of Britain by its most populous, wealthy and advanced region: southeastern England. (2) As such, the phenomenon was no mere "dynastic squabble" but was viewed by contemporaries as a critical military, political and religious threat to the Hanoverian Establishment. (3)

Elusively complex, ever aiming at a diversity of ends, Jacobitism has, not surprisingly, engendered a concomitantly tangled historiography--one that by extension highlights and illuminates the often contentious phenomenon known as "Britishness." (4) In the process it has also provided a deeper sense of why historians of the Stuart and Hanoverian period, both collectively and individually, perceive the past in distinctive ways and how the themes of key debates have progressed and changed over time: (5) a potent reminder of the myriad connectives, perennially operative, between historical writing and socio-political currents.

Nostalgic zealots aside, contemporary observers, English as well as Scottish, tended to adopt viewpoints ranging from qualified endorsement of Jacobite aims to pronounced skepticism about the scope of secessionist sentiment nationwide, resulting in a "watch and wait attitude." (6) This explains why even latent sympathy for the Pretender's cause did not necessarily translate into ready commitment, military or financial.

During the nineteenth century, mainstream scholars--embedded in the teleological, progressivist mores of their time--had little but contempt for Jacobitism (including its Irish nationalist dimensions), a movement so obviously at variance with the seemingly inexorable destiny of the British state: continuous progress, imperial hegemony, constitutional governance, and Anglican orthodoxy. (7)

Despite the intermittent appearance of countervailing views, (8) this dismissive trend persisted (if in more moderate form) until the 1980s (9) where the participants of the '45 were typically dismissed as "Highland rabble." Reflected here is partly a waning historical interest in Jacobitism after 1945 (10) and partly, as J.C.D. Clark put it, the fact that "... it fails to fit within the prevailing academic orthodoxy" of the "long 18th century." (11)

Revived interest in the Jacobite movement can be traced to the 1970s, when it was launched, ironically, by a Namierite enterprise. Romney Sedgwick's volume on The House of Commons, 1715-1754, in the History of Parliament contained an introduction by Evelyn Cruickshanks arguing for the demonstrable survival of the Tory party following Queen Anne's death, its vibrant role as a crucible of Jacobite militancy, (12) and an active resolve to restore the Stuarts through rebellion with assistance from European states. Comprising what might be called the "Maximalist case," Cruickshanks' position was (and in certain aspects remains) controversial, though she did spearhead a resurgence of Jacobite research on cultural, social, religious, literary, as well as domestic political themes, in Political Untouchables (1975) and four subsequently edited or co-edited volumes. (13) The persistence of a Tory party after 1714 has not been effectively disputed; though in a highly influential work, In Defiance of Oligarchy (1982), Dr. Linda Colley has seriously questioned any close link between Tories and diehard Jacobite insurgency. (14) On the other hand, Daniel Szechi has acknowledged the presence of Jacobite elements within Tory ranks, but remained less optimistic than Cruickshanks (and others) (15) about their chances of success. (16)

Collectively comprising a "revisionist" reaction to traditional "Whig" historiography, these writings--under the impact of new perspectives in political thought, culture and society (17)--have widened the matrix of influences: the complex web of factors that interactively shaped contemporary responses, positive, wavering, or negative, to a Stuart restoration. As such, Jacobitism has become a symbolic component of (if not surrogate for) the so-called "revisionist recovery of British history": (18) a reintegration into the orbit of serious scholarship of those topics and historical figures perceived as previously marginalized, ignored altogether, or misrepresented. Also it became the culminating stage in a reassessment of national history, "which reveals 1688 as the first act in a dramatic schism only to be healed in the 1750s rather than the definitive achievement and embodiment of henceforth unassailable Whig constitutional values." (19) The centrality of these values to Britain's past was henceforth in doubt, leaving scholars "liberated," (20) free to explore all manner of orthodoxies and dissent, including Jacobitism in all its manifestations.

One such focus relates to contemporary Scottish ideological and cultural norms, deeply imbedded in time and place that provided Jacobites with the motivational force, hence momentum, for their sustained challenge to the existing political order. Without a vital, animating ideology, it has been argued, "... there might have been riots and individual acts of public defiance by Jacobites but there could have been no rebellion capable of truly threatening the authority of the state and its controllers." (21) Only a sense of interconnected, mutually supporting values and convictions could provide commitment to conspiracy over the long term and numerous recent studies have cast new light on this dynamic. (22) Inevitably, part of this ideology and that of its respondents has infiltrated and coloured both Scottish and English models of historical writings on the Jacobite experience. (23)

Since the early 1980s, Jacobitism has also become paradigmatic of a broader Celtic nationalist resurgence (with Welsh/Irish orientations as company) resulting in notable studies wherein the national cause is given priority over the dynastic one as a predominant concentration of research. (24) Here embryonic nationalism and ideology, as described above, once expanded beyond local parameters, has converged to become a compelling form of collective ethnic identification conducive to the crystallization of national "identity," as contended by Hume, Smith, and especially Adam Ferguson. (25) The problem was that the concept of "nationalism" as embodied by the powerful, resource-rich British empire was ultimately far more attractive to the elites among ethnic satellites than seemingly romantic, appeals to a bygone era, the key feature of Jacobite propaganda, even in its halcyon days. (26) Still, the rebellion of 1715 occurred within the context of the 1707 Act of Union and hence took on all the trappings of a national crusade to restore Scotland's independence, since James Edward Stuart promised to sever the Union were he to become ruler of Great Britain.

Among military/diplomatic historians, too, Jacobitism--despite abiding controversies --has been taken more seriously, as evidenced by the writings of F. McLynn, J. Black, W.A. Speck, J.L. Roberts, S. Reid, and T. Pollard. (27) The latter, for instance, has confirmed that many of the Jacobite historians' claims about the Highland rebel forces can be substantiated by archeological evidence including data on weaponry, training, and organization. Similarly, fresh examinations of the military capacity of Irish and particularly Scottish Jacobites, resting on new primary sources, both English and Jacobite, have led to a consensus of high figures for those involved in the risings in terms of enthusiasm and commitment. (28) Pittock's work has also demonstrated that artillery and heavy guns were more prevalent than broadswords among the Jacobite regiments and that troops fighting for the Jacobites were drawn from a cross-section of British society. (29) At the same time, somewhat perplexingly, study of recruitment patterns suggest that sympathy for the Jacobite cause did not instantly translate into the building of a larger army, as was the case in Perthshire between 1715 and 1745, (30) and there were "at least as many Scottish soldiers in Cumberland's ranks at Culloden as there were in the Prince's." (31) Already during the Austrian Succession War, the Highland 42nd of Foot, better known as the Black Watch, served with distinction in the British Army; as in the Seven Years' War and subsequent imperial conflicts, (32) especially the French Revolutionary War. Nearly 12,000 men in the Highland regiments were involved during the 1756-63 struggle for empire, "almost the same size as the Highland army of the biggest Jacobite uprising in 1715 and more than twice the level of the force of Prince Charles Edward Stuart in the '45." (33) Obviously the martial value of Highland soldiers was recognized some time before (and after) the Pretender's ill-fated landing: indeed just prior to the '45, prominent Whig politicians in the Highlands had suggested raising regiments among the Jacobite clans in the belief that providing military opportunities as officers in the British army would moderate disaffection. (34) Necessarily it would also preclude Highland troops lingering too long in Scotland: following initial training, they would be dispatched overseas with all speed. Lengthy tours of duty, even enlistment for life, according to Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, would prevent them from being a menace at home. (35) Since it has been shown that the clan ethos was atrophying already by the 1750s, a process soon to be accelerated in the later eighteenth century via the commercialization of estates and Highland clearances, (36) clan allegiances were, ironically, reinforced by the Crown's recruitment practices. (37)

Perhaps the growing forbearance reflected in government attitudes towards "the Highlanders" (increasing after 1745) was prompted at least in part by the recognition that Jacobitism was, after all, not the serious menace to the Protestant succession it seemed to be earlier, though psychologically "all of the ingrained fear of disaffection took time to dissipate." (38) Once this was achieved, interpretations of later Anglo-Scottish themes--such as the role of Scots regiments at the Battle of Waterloo--led to a retrospective reappraisal of the Gael "as hero warrior representing the ancient martial tradition of the Scottish nation" (39) and a corresponding transformation of Scots from benighted rebels to eulogized men of valour. (40)

Any realistic chance of a Jacobite rising, as generally acknowledged, at the time (41) and since, depended heavily on significant foreign support from the major maritime powers, France and Spain--England's foremost colonial rivals--and intermittently Russia, the center of influential Jacobite exiles during the early Hanoverian period. (42) But such assistance, even if offered, was at best erratic and in response to agendas, timetables and logistical constraints not under Jacobite control but subject to the ever shifting, unpredictable patterns of continental politics. (43) Still,

   ... concern about the Bourbon-Jacobite threat--specifically the
   possibility of a foreign invasion coinciding with domestic
   insurrection--became a central element in the shaping of English
   military and foreign policy throughout this period. This was
   particularly the case when Britain was at or close to war, as it
   enabled the Jacobites to merge their cause with concurrent larger
   conflicts. (44)

This explains Britain's containment policy after 1715, which was a diplomatic strategy designed to defuse interstate tensions that Jacobite leaders might exploit, for example in Russia during and after the Northern War. It was also a major dynamic influence behind the critical Anglo-French-Austrian alliance of 1718 (which also curbed Spain) (45) and a factor in Britain's neutrality during the War of the Polish Succession (1739). All of these moves were highly detrimental to Jacobite hopes. Accordingly, Jacobitism's international dimension--its potential to foster combinations and distractions that would counter the weight of British naval superiority--depended substantially on the vicissitudes of power politics abroad and, by association, on Britain's own relations with potential Jacobite sources of external support. But even when it was given, such support was invariably half-hearted. France's attempt to invade Scotland in 1708 proved a fiasco. (46) From 1715-41 Britain and France were at peace, and the planned French expedition of 1745 miscarried largely due to French indecisiveness, not to mention the incompetence of Jacobite military planners in both France and England. (47)

As for the domestic parameters of Jacobitism, perhaps the fairest assessment would be that at no point was failure certain or inevitable: it was merely likely, given the inherently divergent motivations of Jacobite insurrectionary activities, the resource mobilization difficulties facing the rebel communities from the outset, (48) the effectiveness of government intelligence gathering and surveillance mechanisms, (49) the uneven quality of Jacobite military leadership, the chronic shortage of needed funds, and so ad infinitum.

Traditionally, the debate has ranged from optimistic estimates of Jacobite potential to unqualified dismissals, with myriad intermediate positions depending upon differing agendas, ethnic/political loyalties and other operative criteria. Today, there is growing recognition that, far from being monolithic, Jacobitism was highly composite and constantly in flux: fraught with innumerable ambiguities, paradoxes, and clashing aspirations. Specific political events resonated differently and distinctly within each of the Jacobite groups, whether constitutional, nationalistic, economic, or confessional: hence each component tended to respond idiosyncratically. So, all interpretative slants within Jacobite historiography that have appeared representing significant parts of the phenomenon, are precisely that--parts rather than a unitary whole.

Possibly a more nuanced, finely grained approach is needed; one that will refresh the field and realign controversy with an awareness of the periodic need to explore manuscript material thus far still unallocated and unexamined, or only cursorily so, by historians. If good narrative history rests on analysis, reconstruction, and placing events in context, such context must be based on archival research for otherwise we get mere static accretions and trite narratives, sustained by replicated traditions and suspect assertions, unsupported by fresh documentary evidence. Here, archival data acts as a control, giving historians a clear perspective on the internal developments of scholarship in any particular area while also compelling them to traverse once more the evidential paths along which key interpretations have evolved.

Among such collections in the English language are the papers of John Calcraft (1726-72) held at the Dorset History Center. (50) Deputy Paymaster (1745-57), Calcraft was well known in high political circles and his correspondence is a rich yet largely untapped resource for contemporary events, both domestic and foreign. A reason for their neglect may be that historians too often assume the keys to policy decisions are to be found among public records, in Calcraft's case, the War Office files in the National Archives. But, as I have shown elsewhere (51) private papers for various reasons are equally vital for a fuller understanding of official enactments. Of special interest to those engaged in Jacobite studies is Calcraft's out-letter book (January 1745 to November 1746) (52) containing letters and notes from General Thomas Wentworth (co-commander of the government forces mobilized against the Highland army) as well as detailed references to Jacobite military movements and preparations. These illustrate that, once aroused from their initial inertia, manifested in a reluctance to take the uprising seriously, supporters of the Whig regime rallied to its defense, providing Cumberland and Marshal Wade with sufficient military strength to deter a Highland advance from Derby to London. This event caused the French, who were considering an invasion, to have serious misgivings and was possibly a factor in the venture being called off. Other important correspondents are Thomas Winnington, Paymaster-General (1743-46), Major Muir, Captain Chadwick and Anthony Sawyer, all of whom make informed references to the '45 campaign. One point of interest deserves particular mention: far from welcoming the potential invaders, Londoners improvised a variety of schemes for their own defense, which together with similar preparations in the shires, suggests that loyalist sentiment was more widespread than the Jacobites expected or pro-Jacobite historians would have us believe.

Another key component of the Calcrafit manuscripts is the out-letter book of Henry Fox, Secretary at War, 1746-54, which contains much material on various aspects of the '45 and its aftermath. Such material, not in the official War Office depository (53) confirms, like the items noted above, that nostalgia, and the "what if' optimism distinctive of Jacobitism and many historians of that period are no substitute for inescapable realities, however unpleasant.

In sum, these documents suggest (and suggest strongly) that, contrary to some revisionist claims, Jacobite insurgency, both in its military and political aspects, was woefully ill-prepared, that the hostility and potential counterweight of many non-Jacobite Scots have been marginalized, and that government counter measures--military, judicial, and conciliatory--were much more effective than pro-Stuart scholars have admitted. (54)

A further important and largely unexplored resource is the collection of the papers of Edward Weston (Under-Secretary of State for the North, 1729-46; 1761-64), which are located still in private hands, in the British Library, (55) and deposited in the Lewis Walpole Library at Farmington, Connecticut. (56) A seasoned, trusted professional with wide-ranging high-level connections, (57) Weston devoted much of his correspondence to diplomatic/military matters and this material has great value: precisely because of its confidential, informal, and sometimes sensitive nature; because he had access to vital information; and because the collection contains letters and dispatches unobtainable elsewhere. Indeed, his papers are an instructive example of how private, political manuscripts can supplement and enhance our knowledge of events that Weston and his contemporaries regarded as being of critical importance.

Concerning Jacobite affairs, the documents he did not put in public deposit, contain one bundle of diplomatic intelligence reports, (1738-64) and a Diplomatic Notebook, (1735-36) in Weston's own hand, providing incisive reflections on European developments including Stuart activity at the French court. (58) The much larger Farmington collection contains a wealth of relevant material, the most significant of which comprises the following:

Volume I:

Papers on the rebellion of 1745: two letters from General Ligonier to Weston concerning the Young Pretender's plan of campaign.

One letter from General Cholmondely to Weston, January 1746--giving detailed description of the Battle of Falkirk.

A lengthy, exceptionally valuable letter from the Duke of Cumberland describing the Battle of Culloden, dated: Inverness, April 1746 (not in Royal Archives).

Assorted correspondence relating to the rebellion with lists of killed, wounded and prisoners.

Volume II:

94 items, including letters from Henry Pelham, 1744-9; General John Ligonier, 1745; General John Campbell, 1746; Andrew Stone, 1745.

Robert Wightmann commenting on rebel movements; divisions within the Jacobite high command, France's position and the battles of Falkirk and Culloden. Extremely useful.

Volume IX:

Intercepted Jacobite correspondence including papers of the Duke of Ormonde, October 1736-February 1738 concerning his activities on behalf of the Pretender. 112 letters, all original, with a key to the names and places mentioned in the correspondence.

Again, the clarifying context provided by these documents, as with that of the previous ones, tends to discredit further the still-surviving notion that Jacobitism was ever a truly realistic option: contemporary self-interested, hyperbole to the contrary notwithstanding (though that was present in reverse on the government side). Reflected throughout this material are the deep-rooted internal dissensions within Jacobite circles existing long before the decisive '45, as well as the chronic uncertainty haunting the exile movement of attracting vital foreign support, whether French, Spanish, Swedish, or Russian. Ever a remote prospect, such support rested at all times on the vicissitudes of European power politics and dynastic interests, which were factors responsive more to England's diplomatic-military stance--and naval power--than to Jacobite intrigues. (59) Indeed, it was the daunting spectre of overwhelming Hanoverian naval strength especially in Home waters (virtually ignored in all pro-Jacobite literature) that perennially discouraged the responsiveness of potential continental supporters of the Stuart restoration; though admittedly the Royal Navy could not be everywhere, nor was it ultimately invincible. Some of the letters also substantiate W.A. Speck's contention that the Whig government, once it took the rising seriously, was able to capitalize on its varied sources of strength.

Another collection that appears to have been overlooked in recent works on Jacobitism (perhaps because it is less accessible to European scholars) comprises the papers of the Campbell family, Earls of Loudoun, on deposit at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California. (60) Featuring prominent correspondents including the Countess of Loudoun; the second Earl of Stair, Lord Glenorchy; and Colin Lindsay, third Earl of Balcarres, these letters provide perceptive and informed observations on domestic and foreign current affairs, during the turbulent period of 1715-17. Specifically, the manuscripts illuminate the military aspects of the rebellion and its suppression. They indicate that the second Duke of Argyll, commander of the government army mustered at Stirling--though initially outnumbered by Jacobite troops--felt generally confident of dealing with the rebel threat from the north, despite moments of indecision and hesitation. (61) But he declined to advance northwards partly because his cavalry, larger and more effective than that of the rebels, (62) would be hampered in the Highlands (63) and partly because he feared the prospect of being attacked by forces mobilizing in pro-Stuart strongholds to the south. What ultimately proved decisive were chronic tensions within the Jacobite high command--well-chronicled in the Loudoun Papers--producing fatal delays in initiative and haphazard planning throughout, not to mention the superior military leadership and coordination that the government forces enjoyed, and the timely arrival of over six thousand veteran Dutch and Swiss infantry to bolster the strength of Argyll's regular troops. The letters also show that the rising of 1715, although inextricably linked to ruthless private ambitions--the Earl of Mar's in particular (64)--was given impetus and sustained by widespread (if somewhat tepid) discontent at a variety of social levels concerning the perceived submission of Scotland to Anglo-Welsh domination through the controversial Union of 1707. Furthermore, the letters indicate that what helped stabilize the situation in post-rebellion Scotland were not draconian measures by English authorities, but their reliance on the aristocracy (both in the north and south) to extend clemency and thereby make possible the emergence of a gradually consolidated "Greater Britain." (65)

It also seems clear from the documents that, what ultimately helped doom the Jacobite agenda by foreclosing the possibility of substantial military intervention by France, was the death in August 1715 of Louis XIV and consequent regency of the appreciably less pro-Stuart Philippe, due d'Orleans. Although Bolingbroke himself felt that this event "rendered vain and fruitless all we had done," (66) not many other prominent Jacobites in France, England, and Scotland appear to have agreed with him. An ideological fixation approaching zealotry, fuelled partly by bitter dissatisfaction with socio/economic and political developments since 1688, (67) impelled them--and their followers--toward desperate measures, undeterred by realities. Dire yet unmistakable, these realities should have induced skepticism and caution. By 1739, even Bolingbroke insisted "that the Jacobite party in Britain is an unorganized lump of inert matter, without a principle of life or action in it." Yet for those convinced that the hour had arrived, rhetorical flights of fancy "went hand-in-hand with self-delusion." (68) Passions running high distorted reason, encouraged the slippage between vision and reality, and arguably marked the Jacobite shadow-state from its outset.

Appendix:

Letters to Hugh, Third Earl of Loudoun, Concerning The Rebellion of 1715.

I. Correspondent: Campbell, Margaret (Dalrymple), Countess of Loudoun (47 letters)

LO 7370-7379 (September-October 1715): Lord Rothes dispatched to secure Perth. The Pretender sailed from Saint Malo. General Preston is to command Edinburgh Castle: scattered references to the rebellion and reflections on leading participants. Reports deep discontent in many sections of Scottish society with the Act of Union.

LO 7380-7382 Reports on disturbances at Alnwick, occasional references to the insurrection. Failure of rebels to take Newcastle. Deep division within Jacobite ranks.

LO 7383-7416 (October, November, December 1715): Family affairs and social matters. Frequent commentaries on the rebellion, as well as the Earl of Mar; account of operations at Preston; Earl of Mar and Loudoun in the Battle of Sheriffmuir; Mar's army seriously depleted in recruits, arms and munitions. Government forces reinforced by Dutch contingents. Preparations for flight of the Pretender to France.

II. Correspondent: Second Earl of Stair (24 letters)

LO 7670-7673 (20 March 1716-26 May 1716): Activities of the Pretender at Versailles and his relations with the duke of Orleans; France not likely to contravene Treaty of Utrecht--detrimental to Jacobite plans. The end of Mar's residence in Paris; measures to pacify the Highlands; attempts at a further insurrection generally a failure.

III. Correspondent: Charles Cathcart (64 letters)

LO 7935 (3 January 1716): Rebels are in a state of despair; low on supplies; little trust in their leaders.

LO 7905 (24 March 1716): On measures to complete the pacification of Scotland. Cadogan has entrusted the north coast (Peterhead to Dundee) to Cathcart with 2,000 men.

IV. Correspondent: General Sir Janies Campbell (70 letters)

LO 8092 Stirling (21 January 1716): Artillery being hurried forward, 26 cannons and 7 mortars. Supply ship has arrived but further artillery expected from London is despaired of for now. Intelligence from Perth that rebels do not number more than 5,000 to 7,000 at most. Army is suffering.from the cold. The Pretender is at Scone and is reputed to be ill.

LO 8149 (10 January 1716): The Pretender has entered Dundee in company with the Earl of Mar. Evidently had a good reception and will proceed to Perth. Information on strength of royal ordinance: royal troops have 18 cannons, some 12and 8-pounders--altogether 23 pieces of artillery without the train due from London.

LO 8214 (31 January 1716): Rebels have left Perth for Dundee and Cadogan has marched to occupy Perth with a detachment of Dragoons. Rebels reported to have left 200 men in Perth with orders to burn the town, which must be prevented.

LO 8099 (22 March 1716): General Cadogan plans to advance to Inverlochy if the Clans do not bring in their arms. Lord Balcarres has surrendered to Sir James Campbell; the latter has allowed him to retire to Balcarres because of ill health, but under guard. He will die if put in prison.

LO 8190 (17 August 1725): General Wade reports that Inverness is pacified and the Highlanders have agreed to deliver their arms. The town has also submitted to the malt tax.

V. Correspondent: Second baronet Sir James Campbell (38 letters)

LO 8188 (26 January 1716): On the rebels at Perth.

LO 8200 (30 January 1716): The rebels have burned houses from Ochterander to Perth.

VI. Correspondent: John Campbell, Lord Glenorchy (3 letters)

LO 8275 (29 March 1716): Edinburgh Castle: Conveys surprise about summons to Edinburgh, when his loyalty to the king's government was so well established; unable to come because rebels would have seized him on the way (notice served on him was too late to permit action within the set time limit of 15 days). He has done all he could to encourage his followers to support the government. He did come the moment the ground was clear and he prevented possible uprising in Caithness and was not responsible for his father's actions.

LO 8274 (12 April 1716): Complains that he received a citation to appear in 15 days after this time limit had expired; could not come because the Highlands were in rebellion and he would have risked capture. Sent a bond of presentation and bail to Edinburgh, but it came too late to be received. He did all he could to keep the peace as Sheriff and Justiciar of Caithness; the earl of Sutherland has a prejudice against him. Hence he has petitioned the king and appealed to the duke of Argyll for protection. He is not responsible for the rift between his father and Argyll and he wants Loudoun to help him.

LO 8273 (12 April 1716): Complains that he is shut up in Edinburgh Castle despite his innocence. Has used his influence to stop his father's tenants from joining the rebels at Perth; requests that Loudoun convince the government of his loyalty and sincerity, rather than appealing on his own behalf. He begs Loudoun to prevent his aged father, who is over 80, from being taken to London by sea for trial.

VII. Correspondent: Lord Berwick, Lord Advocate, 1713-18 (8 letters)

Important information on rebel troop movements, military strength and strategy; and on Jacobite intrigues in Sweden and Russia.

VIII. Correspondent: Colin Lindsay, third earl of Balcarres (42 letters)

IX. Correspondent: John Campbell, provost of Skipness (2 letters)

LO 7778 (31 July 1715): Edinburgh: The royal army is now marching toward Perth. The duke (of Argyll) was at Dunblane Sunday night; expected the previous day at Ardeth and this evening at Tullibardine or Gask. They will probably have to leave their artillery at Stirling. The rebels have summoned all their men from Fife and Dundee; still, they give out that they will venture a battle. They have already burned Auchterarder and Blackford; rumours of similar events elsewhere remain unconfirmed. He thinks that they will burn Perth and then march northward until supplied with more forces from abroad; the previous week a ship with about 50 officers landed at Aberdeen.

X. Correspondent: Major James Cathcart (9 letters)

LO 7859 (28 December 1715): Colonel Campbell of Ffinale has taken two considerable posts, the Castles of Ffinlarig and Callichome, which threaten Perth and deprive the rebels of resources and strategic centers. Mar has left Perth to go and meet the Pretender. The duke of Argyll is the best of commanders.

LO 7858 (January 1716): The state of affairs better at Stirling than when Loudoun left for London. The rebels are drawing together but not in such numbers as expected from the landing of their king. They have clothing for 3,000 and arms in proportion. The fleet has not prevented one ship from going to them. The earl of Sutherland has obliged Seaforth to disperse his men and to undertake in writing not to act against the government pending decision at court as to his pardon. Sutherland can prevent the marquis of Huntlie from joining the rebels as he is superior in numbers. The duke of Argyll will not make any mistakes at this critical juncture.

LO 7860 (28 January 1716), Stirling: Even the common soldiers are pleased with the prospects despite the intense cold. The dragoons from Glasgow and the foot from Linlithgow will join Cathcart. The rebels should be settled within a week--they have burned all bams within 10 miles of Perth and the town of Achterairdoch. The duke of Argyll leaves today and all forces will march from Dunblain on Monday morning. It is reported that the Pretender has gone from Troone to Glamis. The rebel force cannot exceed 5,000 men; have marked out a field of battle upon the Upper Moor within two miles of Perth.

XI. Correspondent: William, first earl of Cowper (1 letter)

LO 8059 (12 January 1716): House of Lords: Summons to attend as soon as possible the proceedings now pending against several lords who stand impeached of high treason.

XII. Correspondent: Adam Cunningham (1 letter)

LO 8259 (January 1718): On the return of arms used in the rebellion.

XIII. Correspondent: William Boyd of Kilmarnock (12 letters)

LO 7852 (1715-17): On military developments in the Highlands.

(1) I wish to thank the three anonymous reviewers of the first version of this paper for their helpfully constructive comments.

(2) K.W. Schweizer and J. Black, "Jacobitism and British Foreign Policy," The European Legacy, 2 (1997), p. 850; M.G.H. Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain: Cultural Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1685-1789 (New York, 1997), chs. I, II.

(3) See inter alia, Bruce Lenman, The Jacobite Risings in Britain 1689-1746 (London, 1980); E. Gregg, The Jacobite Court in Exile 1688-1807 (London, 1984); Paul Monod, Jacobitism and the English People (Cambridge, 1994); Daniel Szechi, The Jacobites (Manchester, 1994); idem., 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (London, 2006); J. Black, Culloden and the '45 (London, 1990); Jonathan Oates, "The Responses in North East England to the Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 and 1745" (Reading, Ph.D. dissertation, 2001).

(4) cf my review of Pittock's Inventing and Resisting Britain (cited above) in: Albion, 31 (1999), pp. 303-4. The still largely definitive work on this subject is: Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992); see also: B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1986).

(5) cf Ronald Hutton, Debates in Stuart History (London, 2005); Laird Okie, Augustan Historical Writing: Histories of England in the Enlightenment (Lanham, Maryland, 1991).

(6) See especially, Andrew Henderson, The Life of William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland Edited by Roderick MacPherson (London, 2010) for a succinctly tepid, contemporary response to the chances of a Stuart restoration cf York Courant, 11 Feb. 1746; Newcastle Journal, 5 Oct. 1745, 12 Oct. 1745.

(7) D. Szechi, The Jacobites: Britain and Europe (Manchester, 1994), pp. 1-10; M.G.H. Pittock, Jacobitism (London, 1998), pp. 3-4; J.L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars (Edinburgh, 2002), pp. xi-xii.

(8) Examples include W.B. Blaikie, The Origins of the '45 (Edinburgh, 1916); Sir Charles Petrie, The Jacobite Movement (London, 1948); A. Lang, Prince Charles, Edward Stuart (London, 1903); A. Cunningham, The Loyal Clans (London, 1932); A. and H. Taylor, Jacobites of Aberdeenshire and Banffshire in the Forty-Five (London, 1928); idem., 1715: The Story of the Rising (Edinburgh, 1936); G.P. Insh, The Scottish Jacobite Movement (London, 1952).

(9) Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783 (Oxford, 1989); M.G.H. Pittock, Jacobitism, p. 4.

(10) Particularly instrumental was the prevailing influence of the Namierite school, whose writings "deemphasized ideology to the point where it might become hard to comprehend why anyone might risk their lives for such a thing as a dynasty, never mind the whole wish list of Jacobite activism," M.G.H. Pittock, Jacobitism, p. 6.

(11) J.C.D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Cambridge, 1986) pp. 115-16; idem., "On Moving the Middle Ground: the Significance of Jacobitism in Hisorical Studies," in: E. Cruickshanks and J. Black (eds.), The Jacobite Challenge, (Edinburgh, 1988), pp. 177-85.

(12) E. Cruickshanks, article in: R. Sedgwick (ed.), The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1715-1754, 2 volumes, (London, 1970), I, pp. 62-78.

(13) E. Cruickshanks, Political Untouchables: The Tories and the '45 (London, 1979); idem, (ed.), By Force or by Default (Edinburgh, 1989); idem, (ed.), Ideology and Conspiracy (Edinburgh, 1982); E. Cruickshanks and J. Black (eds.), The Jacobite Challenge, (Edinburgh, 1988); E. Cruickshanks and E. Corps (eds.), The Stuart Court in Exile and the Jacobites (London, 1995).

(14) Linda Colley, In Defiance of Oligarchy: The Tory Party 1714-1760 (Cambridge, 1982); cf Ian Christie, "The Tory Party, Jacobitism and the 'Forty Five'.... A Note," Historical Journal, 30 (1987), pp. 921-31.

(15) cf F. McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England, 1745: The Final Campaign (Glasgow, 1988), see my review in : Scottish Tradition, 26 (2000), pp. 111-18; A. Maclnnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788 (East Linton, 1996).

(16) D. Szechi, Jacobitism and Tory Politics, 1710-1714, (Edinburgh, 1982).

(17) For more recent reflections see: G. Plank, Rebellion and Savagely: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (London, 2006); and the discussions in: E. Cruikshanks, Ideology and Conspiracy: Aspects of Jacobitism, 1689-1759 (Edinburgh, 1982); H. Smith, Georgian Monarchy: Politics and Culture, 1714-1760 (Cambridge, 2006); C. Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830, Beyond Jacobitism: Towards Industrialization (Manchester, 2000); D. Cannadine, "British History, Past, Present--Future?" Past and Present, cxvi (1987), pp. 169-91.

(18) J.C.D. Clark, "On Moving the Middle Ground," p. 179.

(19) Ibid., p. 177.

(20) A term used by Dr. Clark, ibid., p. 178.

(21) D. Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven, 2006), p. 5, chs. 3, 4.

(22) See, inter alia, Szechi, passim; M. Pittock, Scottish Nationality (London, 2001); Leo Gooch, The Desperate Faction? The Jacobites of North-East England 1688-1745 (Hull, 1995); Christopher Whatley, Scottish Society 1707-1830 (Manchester, 2001); P. Monod, M. Pittock, and D. Szechi, Loyalty and Identity: Jacobites at Home and Abroad, (New York, 2010).

(23) M. Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans: The Scottish Army in 1745 (Edinburgh, 2009, second. edn).

(24) cf Allan Mac Innes, Union and Empire: The Making of the United Kingdom in 1707 (Cambridge, 2007); T.M. Devine, Scotland's Empire, 1600-1815 (London, 2003); M. Pittock, Celtic Identity and the British Image (Manchester, 1999); J.M. MacKenzie and T.M. Devine (eds.), Scotland and the British Empire (Oxford, 2011) esp. intro, and chs. 2 and 4; Eamonn, O. Ciardha, Ireland and the Jacobite Cause, 1685-1766: A Fatal Attachment (Dublin, 2002); K. Jeffery (ed.), An Irish Empire: Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester, 1996); M. Pittock, Scottish and Irish Romanticism (Oxford, 2008); D. Carey and C.J. Finlay (eds.), The Empire of Credit: The Financial Revolution in Britain, Ireland and America, 1688-1815 (Dublin, 2011).

(25) See: Evan Gottlieb, Feeling British: Sympathy and National Identity in Scottish/English Writing, 1707-1732 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, 2007).

(26) D. Szechi, "Elite Culture and the Decline of Scottish Jacobitism 1716-1745," Past and Present, 173 (Nov. 2001), pp. 90-128; John MacKenzie, "Empire and National Identities: The Case of Scotland," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 8 (1998), pp. 215-31; Colin Kidd, Union and Unionism: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500-2000 (Cambridge, 2008); idem., Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians and the Creation of an Anglo British Identity 1689-1830 (London, 1993); RR. Rossner, Scottish Trade in the Wake of the Union (1700-1760) The Rise of a Warehouse Economy (Stuttgart, 2008).

(27) F. McLynn, passim,; W.A. Speck, The Butcher: The Duke of Cumberland and the Suppression of the '45 (Caenarfon, 1995); J.L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (Edinburgh, 2002); S. Reid, 1745: A Military History (Staplehurst, 1996); R. Wills, The Jacobites and Russia, 1715-1750 (East Linton, 2002); D. Szechi, "Scottish Jacobitism in International Context," Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History (Oxford, 2012), pp. 355-69.

(28) Szechi, 1715, chs 3-6; Pittock, The Myth of the Jacobite Clans, pp. 14-86, 93-154; T. Pollard, Culloden: The History and Archeology of the Last Clan Battle (Barnsley, 2012).

(29) Pittock, passim.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Speck, op.cit., p. x.

(32) J.M. MacKenzie and T.M. Devine, op.cit., ch. iv esp. 177-183; cf S.E.M. Carpenter, "Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British Army, 1756 to 1815," (M.Litt thesis, University of St. Andrews, 1977).

(33) J.M. MacKenzie and T.M. Devine, op.cit., p. 179; cf A. Mackillop, "More Fruitful than the Soil Army, Empire and the Scottish Highlands, 1715-1815 (Edinburgh, 2000).

(34) J.M. MacKenzie and T.M. Devine, op.cit., p. 181.

(35) Barrington to Newcastle, Nov. 27, 1761, Dec. 3, 1761, Barrington MSS/East Suffolk Record Office H.A. 174/1026/114, 122.

(36) B. Lenman, The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650-1784 (London, 1984), pp. 189-213.

(37) Ibid., pp. 190-91, 213-18; Mackillop, op.cit., pp. 68-78, pp. 102-14.

(38) J.M. MacKenzie and T.M. Devine, op.cit., p. 182; cf D. Zimmerman, The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1749-1759 (London, 2004). This work emphasizes that Jacobitism was viewed as a potent threat to the British state until at least 1759.

(39) Ibid., p. 177.

(40) Robert Clyde, From Rebel to Hero: The Image of the Highlander, 1745-1830 (East Linton, 1995), pp. 172-96.

(41) Memorandum of James II Sept, (ns), 1720; Earl of Orrery to James, Jun. 30,1727, Royal Archives (Windsor) RA 49/25; 107/150 74/60, 152/107.

(42) R. Wills, passim.

(43) J. Black, The Politics of Britain, 1688-1800, pp. 11, 33-38.

(44) K.W. Schweizer and J. Black, "Jacobitism and British Foreign Policy," p. 851.

(45) J. Black, The Collapse of the Anglo-French Alliance (Gloucester, 1987), chs. I-1V; idem.. British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh, 1985), intro., ch. VII.

(46) J.S. Gibson, Playing the Scottish Card: The Franco-Jacobite Invasion of 1708 (Edinburgh, 1988).

(47) F. J. McLynn, France and the Jacobite Rising of 1745 (Edinburgh, 1981).

(48) Szechi, 1715, pp. 4-6.

(49) Paul Fritz, The English Ministers and Jacobitism between the Rebellions of 1715 and 1745 (Toronto, 1975).

(50) Dorset County Record Office, Bridgeport rd. Dorchester, IRP, Great Britain.

(51) K.W. Schweizer and J. Bullion, "The Private Papers of Statesmen and Policy Formulation in the 18th Century: The Bute Manuscripts as a Case Study," Archives, XXII (1995), pp. 34-44.

(52) D/RWR/XZ.

(53) National Archives (Kew) W.O.4.

(54) K.W. Schweizer, "The Jacobite Army in England: The Final Campaign" International History Review, VII (1985), pp. 171-74; idem., "The Final Campaign: A Review Article," Scottish Tradition, vol. 24 (1999), pp. 111-18.

(55) I discovered these long lost and still largely under-utilized papers during the course of my Cambridge doctoral research. They are still relatively inaccessible unless permission can be obtained from their owner, Dr. John Weston-Underwood, Mill House, Iden Green, Kent. For an index to these papers see: K.W. Schweizer, "A Handlist to the Additional Weston Papers," Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 51 (1978), pp. 99-102.

(56) K.W. Schweizer, "Edward Weston (1703-1770): The Papers of an 18th Century Undersecretary at the Lewis Walpole Library," Yale University Library Gazette, 71 (Oct. 1996), pp. 43-55; cf W.H. Smith, "The MS Collections at the Lewis Walpole Library," Yale University Library Gazette, 56, (1982), pp. 53-60. Weston Papers in the British Library can be found in: Egerton MSS (Eg MSS) 2683-94 and Add MSS 6808-9, 6823, 831, 38201-5, 57305-8, 57927-8.

(57) L. Scott, "Under-Secretaries of States 1755-1775" (MA Thesis, University of Manchester, 1950); K.W. Schweizer, "Edward Weston, 1703-1770," Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004), vol. 58, pp. 285-87.

(58) "Report on the miscellaneous personal, estate and diplomatic papers of Edward Weston, 1703-1770," Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (London, 1977), 77/42.

(59) See my review of: R. Wills, "The Jacobites and Russia, 1715-1760," in Albion, 35 (2003), pp. 491-93.

(60) The notable exceptions here are Prof. Szechi, 1715, The Great Jacobite Rebellion, A. MacInnes Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603-1788, (East Linton, 1996) and W.A. Speck, The Butcher. They consulted the Loudoun Papers but only quite selectively.

(61) See inter alia, M.G. Pittock, Jacobitism, pp. 42-45; B. Lenman, passim; Szechi, 1715: The Great Rebellion, pp. 120-21, p. 142; J.L. Roberts, op.cit., pp. 45-48.

(62) Ibid., p. 43.

(63) Argyll to Townshend, 4 Nov. 1715 (National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh) R.H. 2/4 307 318.

(64) E. Gregg, "The Jacobite Career of John Earl of Mar," in: E. Cruickshanks (ed.), Ideology and Conspiracy, pp. 179-200; Cockbum to Under-Secretary Pringle, Sept. 8, 1715, N.A.--S.P. 54/87.29.

(65) This supports the recent conclusion of M. Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 150-53; though she does not appear to have consulted the Loudoun Papers.

(66) Viscount Bolingboke, Works (London, 1844), I, p. 140.

(67) D. Szechi, 1715: The Great Rebellion, pp. 21-25, 58-60; Lord Justice Clerk Cockbum to Under Secretary Pringle, 1715 NA. SP 54/71/73

(68) Ibid., p. 75; Bolingbroke to Wyndham, 25 Jan. 1740 (NS) in: W. Coxe, Memoirs of the Life and Administration of Sir Robert Walpole (London, 1798), III, p. 555.

Karl W. Schweizer holds a PhD from Cambridge University and is Professor in the Federated Department of History, Rutgers University and the New Jersey Institute of Technology. In addition to many scholarly articles he has published, among other books, The Seven Years' War: A Transatlantic History (2010); The International Thought of Herbert Butterfield (2007) and the forthcoming Herbert Butterfield and Diplomatic History: An Enduring Legacy.