The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 1940-1943: Was There A Plan?

Doerr, Paul

The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 1940-1943: Was There A Plan? by Brian P. Farrell. Lewiston, New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1998. Two volumes, vi, 871 pp. $109.95 U.S.

The short answer to the question posed in the sub-title of this book is "yes," although why it should have taken eight hundred and seventy-one pages over two volumes in a well-trod field is not explained by the author. Despite its Saharan dimensions this study has much to recommend it. Farrell is an assiduous researcher and has a thorough, if not overwhelming command of the primary sources and secondary material. What he has chosen to do with this vast array of research is more problematic.

Farrell never says so explicitly, but his book has all the hallmarks of a doctoral thesis turned directly over to a publisher without much editorial intervention, which in this case was badly needed. All the symptoms are present: the vast amounts of information included simply for the sake of inclusion; the long, and sentences, and the turgid discussions of very microscopic issues. One comes away from reading some of these chapters (there are sixteen of them, averaging forty pages each, plus introduction and conclusion) longing for a red pen and the proofs.

Farrell argues that his book is necessary because of the lack of overall studies of British grand strategy during the Second World War. He points out that "the topic has been smothered in partial treatments offered in studies of services, campaigns, diplomacy, particular controversies, and especially in biographies and memoirs" (p. 3). The thesis elaborated in the book is persuasive, if not particularly ground breaking. Farrell's methodology consists primarily of a running commentary on the official War Cabinet sources. The fact that he is operating in such a crowded field, and the need to demonstrate originality, leads the author into a number of distracting, hair-splitting arguments, often with fairly marginal historians.

Farrell employs the term "wear down" (given invariably in quotation marks) to describe British strategy from 1939 to 1943. During the period from the outbreak of war until June 1940 the Cabinet assumed that the superior economic strength of Britain and France guaranteed victory in the long run. A defensive posture on the Western front, combined with an economic blockade and aerial bombardment, would reduce German strength and eventually result in conditions conducive to a successful Allied offensive. The fall of France obviously provoked some major re-thinking. Now Britain had to confront a much superior enemy, and "wear down" took on a new form, even if the essentials stayed consistent. A sustained air offensive assumed greater importance. Propaganda efforts designed to encourage the formation of resistance movements in occupied Europe were viewed as crucial. Pinprick amphibious assaults would culminate in "igniter" attacks that would set Europe ablaze. The over-riding consideration was for the British army to avoid direct combat with the German army until victory was certain. Throughout, Farrell remains in awe of the decision-making "machinery" of the British government; the Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff, and the numerous subcommittees that functioned smoothly enough to ensure a coherent British war effort. The Chiefs of Staff countered some of Churchill' s more outlandish ideas, while Churchill's assumption of the Defense portfolio was a stroke of genius. Farrell also praises the "rolling seminar," an informal group of government officials around Churchill who constantly debated and analyzed the course of British strategy in "conversation, over the phone and telegraph wires, on paper, in conference, at dinner, long after dinner, at weekend retreats, in formal and informal settings ..." (p. 48).

The arrival of the Americans obviously changed everything, as did the growing effectiveness of the Red Army. By the time of the Casablanca conference "wear down" was pretty much worn out (not to mention the reader). The longer the war continued, the less the British had to say about its conduct. Farrell credits "wear down" with enabling Britain to survive the threat from Nazi Germany. The war significantly weakened Britain, but "at the same time it left the U.K.'s enemies even weaker" (p. 785).

It should also be mentioned that the end matter to the book contains much useful information. Farrell thoughtfully includes no fewer than fifteen handy maps for reference purposes, along with a list of the major players, their positions and dates of appointment. The bibliography is first-rate, although the index leaves much to be desired. Best of all is file appendix titled "The British Strategic Position At Important Junctures," which details British (and some American) military deployments from 1940 to 1944. Such strengths suggest, however, that this study will find a niche as a rather expensive reference source.

Paul Doerr Acadia University