In Jeopardy: The Royal Navy and British Far Eastern Defence Policy, 1945-1951.

Neilson, Keith

Inside this short book (approximately 115 pages of text), is an interesting and informative article attempting to get out. Malcolm Murfett, Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at the National University of Singapore and a well-known naval scholar, has written an epilogue to discussions of the "Singapore strategy," the latter arguably the dominant issue in British imperial defence in the period from 1922 to 1939. Unfortunately, as Murfett's own book shows, after 1945 changed circumstances reduced imperial defence in the Far East, and Singapore's part in it, to a minor role in British defence policy. The result is that Murfett spends the bulk of his time, as did Admiralty planners, trying to build bricks without straw. Being unable to make a book out of a discussion of British naval policy in the Far East, he discusses the general course of defence planning and then shows what this meant for the Far East.

After the end of the war, a new Labour government, committed to expensive social changes, was unlikely to countenance continued high expenditure on defence. This was particularly true for the Far East, as European security had first call on limited resources and certain elements (although not all, as Murfett shows) of Labour had little sympathy with re-establishing empire. The Admiralty's initial extensive plans for establishing a network of main support, operational and advanced naval bases in the Far East were quick to vanish when faced by the government call for large defence cuts by 1946. The result was that the admiralty was forced to make plans based on the assumption of no war for the next two to three years. The collapse of sterling in 1947 made even this planning obsolete. A.V. Alexander, the minister of defence, presented the combined services with a budget cap of 600 [pounds sterling] million, as opposed to the Chiefs of Staffs (C.O.S.) desire for approximately 900 [pounds sterling] million. After determined bargaining, in which the cabinet assured the C.O.S. that there would be no war for five years, a compromise figure, much closer to the government's number than to the C.O.S.'s, was agreed upon. The competition for scarce resources was on.

The following year made the admiralty's position, especially in the Far East, even worse. Finances did not improve and the deteriorating situation in Europe focused all eyes there, with the 1948 White Paper on defence lamely insisting that imperial defence could be achieved via co-operation with the commonwealth and atomic weapons, while the Americans ensured the defence of Europe. By the end of 1948, the C.O.S. were reduced to pointing out to the government that even these limited commitments were beyond what could be achieved with the money that Labour wished to spend.

Only events could save the Royal Navy's (R.N.) position in the Far East from the Draconian cuts that curtailed spending on defence mandated. For, as the Harwood Working Party, set up by the C.O.S. in November 1948 to establish a means of dealing with the financial strictures imposed by the government, pointed out, there would have to be a virtual abandonment of the Royal Navy's role east of Suez. All three services wriggled vainly early in 1949 to escape the government's cuts. Fortunately, for the R.N., the advances of the Chinese Communist party and the insurgency in Malaya forced the government to loosen purse strings. Within two months of the outbreak of the Korean War, the 80.82 [pounds sterling] million per year that the government had agreed to only reluctantly as the maximum for defence spending, was quickly ratcheted up to 3,400 million for the next three years, and, by the beginning of 1951, further raised to 4,700 [pounds sterling] million for the same period. Singapore and Hong Kong, far from being virtually abandoned, became staging centres for the R.N.'s naval effort in the Far East.

This is an interesting account, well-grounded in primary materials. However, the choice of topic does not deserve the extended treatment that a book provides. The bulk of this book is concerned with showing how the British naval commitment in the Far East was barely able to survive the new realities of the post-war era. This, in itself, is thin broth. If Murfett had used a broader canvas, he could have painted a picture of post-war planning for the R.N. in its entirety. In that way, larger issues, such as the R.N.,s commitments in the Atlantic, its dealings with new technology and innovation, its relationship with the United States Navy, and its role in NATO, could have been discussed. Murfett's decision to focus on the Far East -- possibly affected by the circumstances of his employment? -- means that these larger issues have been mentioned (if at all) only tangentially. The result is an article masquerading as a monograph. For the price, the reader is entitled to more.