Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917-1918.

Neilson, Keith

The United States has been a reluctant and tardy participant in the two world wars of the twentieth century. In both conflicts, this fact, and the influence of differing national perspectives and goals, has resulted in co-operation between London and Washington that has not been as smooth as proponents of the "special relationship" between Britain and America might suggest. David Woodward, author of Lloyd George and the Generals (London, 1983), editor of The Military Correspondent of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson (London, 1989) and writer of a number of important articles about Anglo-American relations in the First World War, is an ideal person to consider the complicated nature of the Anglo-American relationship, 1917-18.

Although this is a book firmly grounded on primary evidence culled from archives on both sides of the Atlantic, it is also a work of synthesis. Woodward looks at the totality of the Anglo-American connection, not merely at its high politics and military and naval workings, narrowly defined. Here, Woodward goes beyond the earlier work of David Trask. Trial by Friendship integrates such things as Anglo-American finance and the domestic influence of American politics on Woodrow Wilson's policy into the larger issue of Anglo-American relations. And, Woodward's earlier study of Lloyd George ensures that the politics of British civil-military relations is not overlooked. The result is a comprehensive and balanced look at Anglo-American relations.

Woodward's approach is chronological. The first two chapters detail the improvement in Anglo-American relations before the First World War and the trials of neutrality. Several themes emerge. The first is the dichotomy between the essentially moral basis of Wilson's policy and the amoral means by which he pursued it. The president's high-minded utterances about mediation and even apportioning of the responsibility for the war contrasted sharply with his attempts to use the United States? economic power to lever the belligerents into making peace. And, his assumptions about the kind of peace - an American one, formulated on his own moral principles - that should ensue, ensured that Anglo-American relations would not be congruent. The second is the unpreparedness of the United States for war. The military plans that were drawn up by the American General Staff prior to the American entry into the war were breathtaking in their naivety and the American armed forces were both small and ill-equipped. On the eve of war, the United States was an economic giant, but a military pygmy.

These two themes are at the focus of Anglo-American relations during the period of cobelligerency. The British wanted unlimited access to American money and materiel, but (initially) had little use for direct American military assistance. On the other hand, Wilson wanted to provide American resources in a limited fashion, using them to force the beuigerents to end the war in his approved fashion. For this reason, he would not permit American manpower to be integrated into the British and French armies, lest these troops be used to achieve military ends that would have political consequences of which he did not approve. In this, Wilson was strongly supported by the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.), General John Pershing, who clung stubbornly to his insistence that the A.E.F. would constitute an independent command, regardless of his (or its) competence.

Woodward is particularly good at illustrating the paradoxes that these differing concepts of the war engendered. Because the Americans insisted on sending troops to Europe as complete units, much of the limited, valuable, and essentially British shipping, which could have been used more rationally to provide vital economic assistance to the Allied war effort, was tied up to no great end. For the A.E.F. was essentially useless as a fighting force until at least July 1918 and of limited value subsequently. This infuriated the British, who understandably felt that winning the war was more important that concluding a Wilsonian peace. There was a certain irony about this, given that Lloyd George's cabinet had definite ideas about achieving a British peace, but it ensured that Anglo-American relations would not be smooth.

However, the fact remained that both sides needed the other. Russia's leaving the war and France's deteriorating morale meant that if the war continued past 1918, American troops would be as vital to victory as was American economic assistance. Thus, the British could not utilize the fact that American troops could come to Europe only in British hulls and mere completely dependent upon British logistic support once they arrived to bend Wilson to their will. On the other hand, Wilson could not afford to ration American resources such that the Allies lost the war, for this would be fatal to his political aims. The German offensive of March 1918 drove home this codependency. Despite much recrimination, Woodward shows how the possibility of defeat imposed a limited, if somewhat competitive co-operation (to use a phrase coined to describe the Anglo-American relationship in the 1920s) upon Britain and the United States. Nonetheless, Woodward is clear that American and British long-term strategies mere divergent in 1918. The Americans wished to focus on Europe, while the British wished to ensure their post-war position by concentrating on the extra-European dimensions of the struggle. The unexpectedly early end to the war was fortunate for Britain. Wilson's dream of a peace on American terms, based on the anticipation of another year of campaigning, was dashed, since the A.E.F.'s role had been limited in achieving victory. And, the British army not only had been dominant in the final hundred days of the war in Europe, but also had been triumphant in the Middle East. Thus, Britain was in a position to achieve the bulk of her aims at the Paris Peace Conference, as Erik Goldstein's recent study has shown. Wilson's dream of a pax Americana would have to wait until 1945.

Trial by Friendship is a sane, sober, and sensible account of Anglo-American relations during the war. Woodward's primary research is solid and he has read widely in the relevant secondary literature. My only reservation about this valuable study is Woodward's ambivalent attitude about the strength of the United States. Woodward notes that the actual military contribution of the A.E.F. was slight, that Pershing was not overly competent and that the impact of American entry into the war was more psychological than real. Yet, there is an anticipation of both the Untied States' future global ascendency and Britain's eventual decline throughout the book. To my mind, this contributes a somewhat misleading tone, for Britain was the dominant force in the Anglo-American war effort during 1917 and 1918. However, this cavil should not detract from a book that is required reading for all those interested in both the First World War and Anglo-American relations generally.